


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**THE SPRINGS OF
HUMAN ACTION**

THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE SOURCES, MECHANISM,
AND PRINCIPLES OF MOTIVATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR

BY

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TO
MY TEACHERS AND PUPILS

PREFACE

The study of human behavior is most fascinating. It is becoming increasingly popular every day. But more significant still is the fact that the psychological approach to the perplexing problems of life is being earnestly employed. This situation creates an obligation on the part of psychologists for more scientific data. All sciences dealing with human behavior, we are often told, must be based on a thorough knowledge of human nature—original tendencies and acquired traits, innate and learned likes and dislikes, psychophysical capacities and resources, and the intricately complex reactions to the environment in actual everyday life. If this be true, it is difficult to see how we can afford to ignore drives and motives. And yet the field of motivation has been woefully neglected. There is an imperative need for a scientific study to account for the springs of human action in a comprehensive way. The present study is an attempt to meet this fundamental need.

The importance of motivation can scarcely be overemphasized. Every science calculated to modify human conduct will be immeasurably aided by a knowledge of why we do as we do. This knowledge is of value for every phase of human intercourse and in particular for social control. Writers and speakers are constantly reminding us that, although the race has taken tremendous strides forward in mechanical and industrial affairs, progress in moral, religious, and character traits is virtually marking time if not actually retreating. This alarming disparity is due largely to ignorance of the springs of human conduct. Social control will never become

scientific until we shall have mastered the principles of human motivation: for, after all, social control is essentially and ultimately a problem of inhibiting or modifying or sublimating the fundamental human drives.

Although the present study undertakes primarily to set forth comprehensively the sources, mechanism, and principles of motivation and does not attempt to follow through to any great extent the numerous implications for social control, it is, nevertheless, bristling with practical suggestions that may be utilized as a basis for more specialized study by one who is interested in that phase of the problem. The aims of the book may be stated more specifically as follows:

1. To make a systematic and comprehensive study of all the springs of human action;
2. To take account of the unconscious and mechanical drives as well as the conscious and purposeful motives;
3. To distinguish between the primary and secondary drives, the innate and the acquired;
4. To indicate in a general way the relative strength or importance of the various motives;
5. To provide a comprehensive study of sources, mechanisms, and principles of motivation;
6. To hint at practical applications of the principles set forth;
7. *To point out the compound motives synthetically as well as the elementary drives analytically.* The chief criticism against existing accounts of motivation is that they invariably seek for the motives analytically among the elements. They regard instinct, or emotion, or will, or habit, or idea, or the "libido," or something else as the spring of human action and often insist that one or the other of these is *the* drive of all conduct. This is a serious mistake. In the first place, it aims to reduce the extremely complex phenomena of mental life to too simple a formula which at best accounts for a very small fraction of our total acts. Second, it overlooks the sig-

nificant fact that there are compound motives which may not be further analyzed, for the moment this is done they cease to be motives at all. The situation is quite analogous to the relationship of elements and compounds in the chemical world. You cannot ascribe the drive of a complex motive like reverence, for example, to the component elements of fear, awe, self-regarding sentiments, etc., and call them the real motives any more than you can say that either hydrogen or oxygen as such, or both of them together, except in the relation of H_2O , is water. It is desirable to know the elements of a compound, but the two must not be confused. Thus, water is a liquid whereas the elements that comprise it are gases. Similarly, reverence as such is a distinct motive. The elements that make it up are also distinct motives, but when combined in a special way to form reverence, a new and distinct motive appears which must be regarded as a unitary compound motive. The main thesis of this book is that there are complex compound motives as well as elementary drives. Synthesis as well as analysis must be used to account adequately for human motives. Hence, a comprehensive treatment of the subject, which has not heretofore existed, is necessary.

The reasons for the present methods of approach to the problem and the organization of materials are discussed in the introductory chapter. It will be noted that we proceed from the simple to the complex, from the more strictly mechanical to the relatively more psychical, from the personal to the relatively more social phases of human motivation. However, there is bound to be considerable overlapping; for, as the reader will find emphasized over and over again in this volume, life is a unit. It is only for the sake of convenience in discussion that we isolate the various elements of behavior. We should never lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with a personality, an integrated selfhood, the total man.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor A. J. William Myers for his friendly counsel when the investigation was first undertaken in quite another connection; to Professor E. S. Brightman for his kindly personal interest as well as his valuable criticism of portions of the manuscript; to Harvard University for extensive use of the several libraries and other valuable equipment for research. Certain libraries deserve special mention for courtesies—the university libraries of Yale, Columbia, Wesleyan, California, Kansas, the Boston Public Library, and the library of the Boston Psychopathic Hospital. Materials from other writers are acknowledged by exact references in the footnotes which may also serve the purpose of furnishing references for additional reading on specific points. The bibliography at the end of the book lists merely the sources that are referred to in the text. In the almost total absence of materials directly on the subject of motivation the vast majority of sources consulted are omitted from the bibliography because of vagueness and irrelevancy. Many of those included are admitted primarily for purposes of comparison; *Cf.* is used frequently in the footnotes to call the reader's attention to similar or contradictory ideas expressed by others.

Perhaps it should be further stated that although I have profound appreciation for the contributions of other investigators and gladly acknowledge their value by rather frequent quotations, the present study is not an eclectic account of the subject. It is a new interpretation of the springs of action from the viewpoint of the total personality.

This book is intended primarily as a text in the new field of motivation. It may also be used as an introductory or supplementary course to any of the social sciences—social psychology, economics, philanthropy, criminology, ethics, educational psychology, jurisprudence, and the like. Regardless of the merits or demerits of the treatment of materials in these pages, the subject matter should make a special appeal not

only to students of the social sciences, but also to parents, teachers, ministers, lawyers, physicians, public speakers, salesmen—all who have a natural interest in understanding and influencing human conduct, and to the general reader who is interested in the problem of why we behave as we do.

M. K. T.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	vii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Need and Value of a Scientific Study of Motivation, 1; Problems of Motivation, 3; Existing Theories of Motivation Inadequate, 8; Is a Scientific Treatment of Motivation Possible? 14; Methods in Motivation, 16; Motivation Defined, 20.	
II. THE URGE OF PHYSICAL ACTIVITY	21
General Theory of Dynamics, 21; Cosmic Forces, 23; Organic Drives (Irritability), 23; Tropism, 25; Psychophysical Reactions, 27.	
III. AUTONOMIC ACTS AND REFLEXIVE RESPONSES	36
Autonomic Reflexes (Glandular Activity): Kinetic Drives, 36; Significance of Glands in Motivation, 40; Reflexes Proper, 41; The Conditioned Reflex, 43; Significance of Reflexes in Motivation, 45; Appetite, Craving (Vegetative Instincts): Conditioned Appetites, 48; Acquired Automatisms, 51.	
IV. HABITS AS MOTIVES	53
Mechanisms and Drives in Habit-Formation, 53; Drives of Formed Habits, 56; Drive of Character as Habits, 61; Character Motives, 63.	
V. INSTINCTS AS MOTIVES	65
Instinct Defined, 65; Characteristics of Instinctive Behavior, 68; Criteria for Determining Specific Instincts, 70; Specific Instincts, 73; Significance of Specific Instincts in Motivation, 74; Conclusions and Summary of Instincts as Motives, 81.	
VI. EMOTIONS AS MOTIVES	83
Emotion Defined, 83; Primary Emotions, 88; Significance of Primary Emotions in Motivation, 89; Secondary Emotions, 96; Compound Emotional States,	

98; Sentiment, 104; Mood, 106; Temperament, 108; Thrill, 111; Happiness, 114.

VII. FEELING AS MOTIVE 117

Pleasant-Unpleasant: Pleasure-Pain, 117; Hedonism (The Pleasure-Pain Theory of Motivation), 119; Pleasure as Motive, 121; Pursued Pleasure: Pleasure as a Primary Motive, 127; Pleasurable Acts: Pleasure as a Secondary Drive, 128; Reward-Punishment Motives, 129.

VIII. IDEAS AS MOTIVES: IDEO-MOTIVES 133

The Ideo-Motor Theory, 133; Knowledge, 144; Ideo-Motives, 146; Imagery and Symbolism, 148; Dominant, Overvalued, Fixed Ideas: Fanaticism, Obsession, 149.

IX. INTEREST AS MOTIVE 153

Attention, 153; Objective Conditions of Attention, 154; Subjective Conditions of Attention, 157; Attitude, 166; Wish: Intention, Purpose, Desire, 167.

X. WILL, CHOICE, PERSONALITY AS MOTIVES . . . 170

Will, 170; Limitations of Will, 172; Province and Scope of Will as Motive, 174; Motives in Choice: Vacillation, Abulia, 180; Personality as Motive, 184; Freedom of Will, 188.

XI. SELF-REGARDING MOTIVES 191

Self-Esteem, 191; Self-Regarding Instincts: Self-Assertion, Self-Abasement, 193; Self-Regarding Sentiments, 197; Expansion of Self-Regarding Sentiments, 199; Self-Expression, 201; Domination, 209; Exploitation, 211; Pride and Envy, 213; Rivalry and Jealousy, 220; Self-Respect, 223.

XII. PREJUDICE AS MOTIVE 229

Prejudice as a Factor in Conduct, 229; Taste, 234; Conventional Prejudices, 234; Belief: Opinion, Conviction, 239; Principles as Motives, 243; Conscience as Motive, 244.

XIII. MOTIVES AS PREPARATORY REACTIONS . . . 247

Preparatory and Consummatory Reactions: Means and Ends, 247; The Fate of Motives, 250; Motives Realized, 252; Inhibited Motives, 253; Disjuncted Mo-

CONTENTS

XV

CHAPTER

PAGE

tives, 254; "Disguised" Motives, 255; Reënforced Motives, 256; Coördinated, Substituted, Sublimated Motives, 257.

XIV. ACQUIRED AND SUBSTITUTE MOTIVES 262

New Motives, 262; Mixed and Compound Motives: Constellation Motives, 266; Master Motives, 267; Ulterior Motives, 269; Artificial (Sophisticated) Motives, 271; Persuasion and Conviction, 271; Conversion, 272.

XV. NEGATIVE MOTIVES 274

Inertia, 276; Malingering, 276; Dissuasive Motives, 278; Disillusionment, 278; Discontent, Discouragement, Despair, 279; Pessimism, 279; Boredom, 279; Fatigue, Pain, Illness, Disease, 282; Perversions as Negative Motives, 284.

XVI. MOTIVES OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS MIND 289

Psychoanalysis, 290; The Subconscious as Source of Motivation, 294; The Subconscious versus the Conscious, 299; Coöperation between the Conscious and the Subconscious, 301.

XVII. MOTIVES OF AUTOSUGGESTION 303

Couéism, 303; Hypnosis, 305; Suggestion and Suggestibility, 311; Imitation, 318; Intuition, 322; Insight, 324; Inspiration, 325; "Sour Grapes," 326.

XVIII. MOTIVES OF GROUP SUGGESTION 330

Mob Psychology, 330; Sympathy, 336; Physiological Sympathy, 336; Biological Sympathy, 338; Psychological Sympathy, 339; Rational Sympathy, 340; Sympathy as a Social Motive, 341; Telepathy, 342; Leadership, 343.

XIX. SOCIAL MOTIVES 346

Social Pressure, 346; Folkways, 350; Ritualism, 352; Fads, Fashions, 354; Mores, 354; Conventions, Customs, 355; Authority, Docility, Prestige, 357; Social Institutions, 358; Institutions as Motives, 360; Law, 362; Veracity and Justice, 363; Liberty, 365.

XX. LOVE AS MOTIVE 367

Conjugal Love, 367; Parental Love, 376; Filial Love, 378; Friendship (Platonic Love), 379; Altruism and Philanthropy, 381; Patriotism, 384; Humanitarianism, 385; Reverence, 387; Hate, 389.

CHAPTER	PAGE
XXI. VALUES AS MOTIVES	396
Ethics, 396; Hedonism, 397; Formalism, 398; Energism, 400; Morals: The Virtues as Motives, 402; Morals as a Means of Social Control, 404; Religious Motives, 405; Philosophy, 413; Science, 415.	
XXII. ECONOMIC MOTIVES	416
Work, 418; Advertising and Salesmanship, 422; The Profits Motive, 426; Rivalry and Domination, 427; Exploitation, 427; Something-for-Nothing Motive, 428; Motive of Sympathy and Social Service, 431.	
XXIII. MORALE AS MOTIVE	434
Esprit de corps, 434; Tradition, the "We-Feeling," 437; Sentiment and Sentimentality, 438; Ideals as Motives, 439; Faith and Hope, 443; Immortality, 445; Potential Immortality, 447; The Immortality of Influence, 447; Physical Immortality, 448; Personal Immortality, 449; Public Opinion, 450; Propaganda, 451.	
XXIV. ÆSTHETIC MOTIVES	454
Universality of the Æsthetic Appeal, 454; Elements of Æsthetic Motivation, 455; Motives of Appeal in Drama, 463; Amusements: Hobbies, Play and Games, 465; Comedy: Humor and Laughter, 467; Culture, 469.	
XXV. INTERACTION OF MOTIVES	471
BIBLIOGRAPHY	475
INDEX	489

THE SPRINGS OF
HUMAN ACTION

THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

NEED AND VALUE OF A SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF MOTIVATION

One man kills another and receives a medal; another man slays a fellow creature and is hanged. What makes the difference? *Motives*. The law courts are constantly seeking to understand and interpret conduct in terms of motives as well as consequences. Motivation is an important problem in every phase of social life. Parents, teachers, preachers, public speakers, clerks, salesmen, advertisers—all propagandists—appeal to motives constantly. Whenever a person aims to influence the conduct of another he must, if he is to succeed, arouse some one or a group of impulses, incentives, urges, drives, motives. Conversely, “we deliberate over a thing proposed only so long as it appeals to us to be ‘worth while’. . . . It must seem to advance our interests in some way.”¹

It would seem, then, that the first task of economics, sociology, jurisprudence, ethics, philanthropy, in fine, all the social sciences should be a thorough and systematic study of motivation, of the various simple and

¹Scott, *Influencing Men in Business*, p. 25.

2 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

complex factors that *move* human beings in their conduct and behavior as individuals and in groups. And yet, this is precisely the field most neglected. There has, so far as I know, not yet appeared a single comprehensive survey of motivation unattached to some other subject or point of view. Even the professional psychologists have been wary of this theme. Recently an economist, wishing to write on *Economic Motives*, was compelled to devote more than half his book to the problem of motivation itself because, as he says, "McDougall, in his *Social Psychology*, complained that professional psychologists had left the study of the human springs of action to ethical writers until the province was 'the most backward department in psychology.'² As we shall see in a moment, a complete theory of action, or of motives, requires a complete psychology, so that there was some excuse for the backward condition he lamented. *Nevertheless it was high time for one of the craft to gather up what was known on the subject, and especially to put it into such form as is useful to the social sciences.*"³ (Italics mine.)

On the other hand, while a systematic contribution to the problem of motivation is long overdue, practically all psychologists, however they may differ on other matters, are agreed on the fundamental importance of the springs of human conduct.⁴ But the reader

² McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 2-3.

³ Dickinson, *Economic Motives*, p. 17. Cf. Strong, *Introductory Psychology for Teachers*, Book II.

⁴ Cf. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 36; English, "Dynamic Psychology and the Problems of Motivation," *Psychological Review*, July, 1921, p. 239; Wolfe, "The Role of Sympathy and Ethical Motivation in Scientific Social Research," *Journal of Philosophy*, April 26, 1923, p. 228; Watson, *Psychology from the Viewpoint of a Behavior-*

will hardly need the testimony of experts to convince him that a systematic presentation of the springs of human action is immensely worth while. The demand is everywhere apparent. What would not a fond parent give to know the deep-lying drives as well as the surface and articulate desires and wishes of his child in order that he may discharge the duty of parenthood by a sympathetic understanding of his own offspring? We know that business houses actually spend vast sums of money to discover the motives of prospective buyers and the surest methods of appeal.⁵ What could be more helpful in molding public opinion, correcting anti-social behavior, selling goods, giving instruction in morals and religion, training for citizenship, gaining friendship, making a successful courtship—in all phases of social control—than a systematic knowledge of the facts and principles involved in the *movers* to conduct!

The advantages to be derived from a science of motivation are many and self-commending. Every one would welcome such a science. But is a science of motivation possible? Are not the difficulties insurmountable? Perhaps there are justifiable reasons why the attempt has not been made. Let us see.

PROBLEMS OF MOTIVATION

It would be folly to attempt a systematic treatment of motivation without a thorough understanding of the

ist, p. 1; Freud, *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 48; Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, p. 257; McDougall, "Purposeful Striving as a Fundamental Category in Psychology," *Scientific Monthly*, 1924, p. 309.

⁵ Cf. Hollingworth, *Advertising and Selling*, p. 1.

4 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

numerous difficulties involved. Some are not as formidable as they appear; others are so vital as to force one almost to despair of any real science of motivation. Nevertheless, a discussion of these difficulties at the outset will clarify the whole question.

1. *Motives are elusive.* They are very difficult to "get at" in any given case. We do not always know our own motives. "Of all the doubts that invade our primary assurances," says Hocking, "the last to arise, and the most disconcerting, is the doubt whether we know what we want."⁶ Not only is it difficult, if not altogether impossible, to interpret accurately the motives of another person through observation, but the individual is often deceived and is subject to many illusions in the interpretation of his own motives. Ask a person why he ran out of a burning building, or hurried to get out of the way of an express train or automobile, and he is likely to tell you that he did it in order to save his life. If questioned further as to why he wished to save his life, the chances are he will begin to philosophize on the value of his life to himself and others, to support his family, to complete some unfinished task or business, etc. These are what might be called sophisticated motives. They are logical, thought-out reasons occurring *after* the event and after attention has been called to the motive for the act. They did not present themselves at the time the choice was made. Ordinarily, one seeks to save his life impulsively through instinctive reactions for the most part. Added to this there may be a feeling of horror of a violent death associated with the emotions of disgust, repul-

⁶ Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 16.

sion, and pain through past experience of a painful situation to one's self or to others or mostly imaginary. Then, too, the sophisticated reasons given afterwards might also be present vaguely at the time, loved ones to care for, duties and obligations to fulfill, pleasures to enjoy, etc.—a whole panorama of activities, persons, possessions, achievements, hopes.

2. *As a rule motives are extremely complex.* In all probability there is no such thing as a "pure motive." All motives are highly complex.

That all human motivation is highly complicated and curiously mixed is a fundamental and generally accepted truth. The noblest deed may be, and often is, the consequence of a chain of motives some of the links of which are prosaic and commonplace, if not even sordid. Nor need one be a student of criminology to know that many a hideous crime is the result of an entanglement of motives some of which are really praiseworthy. The good and the bad acts which men do are both made out of the same stuff. They flow forth from that common fountainhead of mental life, the undifferentiated emotional, instinctive, and sensational congeries which constitutes what, for want of a better name, may be called the momentary active self.⁷

3. *The sources of motivation are numerous and varied.* Almost anything may stimulate a motive or a group of motives. The field is extremely broad; it covers the whole of psychology. "The last word will be said on motives," writes Dickinson, "when the last word is written on psychology."⁸ Woodworth believes it to be more inclusive still, for, says he, "The field of

⁷ Robinson, "The Chief Types of Motivation to Philosophical Reflection," *Journal of Philosophy*, Jan., 1923, p. 29. Cf. Hocking, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁸ Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

6 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

human motives is as broad as the world that man can deal with and understand.”⁹ Moreover, if we admit his contention that the mechanism itself may become a drive for further action,¹⁰ the situation is made still more difficult for an exact science.

4. *There seems to be no constant factor in motivation.*¹¹ The variables are many and perplexing. Motives are sometimes as fickle and fleeting as a melody; sometimes they fix and dominate a man's major acts for years without much change. What I enjoy to-day I may spurn to-morrow or vice versa. The subjective state is dependent upon many physical, psychic, and environmental factors which are themselves constantly changing.¹² There are serious individual, personal differences which place obstacles in the path of an exact science of motivation designed for general use.¹³ However, this is a difficulty that all the social sciences have to face, also all kinds of psychology.

5. *Most of our conduct is motivated by hidden urges and unconscious impulses.*¹⁴ As in the prover-

⁹ Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 104. "In short, the power of acquiring new mechanisms possessed by the human mind is at the very same time a power of acquiring new drives; for every mechanism, when at the stage of its development when it has reached a degree of effectiveness without having yet become entirely automatic, is itself a drive and capable of motivating activities that lie beyond its immediate scope."

¹¹ Barrett, *Motive-Force and Motivation Tracks*, p. 73. "Dr. Michotte and Dr. Prum well point out, the constant factor, if there be one, which characterizes motives, has not yet been discovered."

¹² Cf. James, *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 231; Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 150, 151.

¹³ Cf. Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 255; Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 27.

¹⁴ Cf. McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 241; Pierce, *Our Unconscious Mind*, p. 231; Stekel, *The Depths of the Soul*, p. 179.

bial iceberg, the hidden portion far outweighs the surface appearances. Psychoanalysts claim that the neurotics are unconscious of the motives that actuate their obsessions and that even normal persons are constantly influenced by urges that never reach consciousness. Motives that originally were deliberately suppressed may be forgotten but not obliterated. They are simply pushed below the threshold of consciousness where they continue to influence the conduct of the individual in more subtle and elusive ways. Obviously, if a science of motivation is called upon to deal with these hidden, almost mysterious forces, as well as the rest, its task is not made more simple thereby.

6. *The reason tends to disturb rather than reveal the true motives.* From the viewpoint of motivation it is sometimes unfortunate that man is endowed with intelligence and capacity to reason. This ability enables us to deceive ourselves as well as others concerning our true motives. If we want badly enough to do a thing we usually find a laudable motive for it. "Naturally," remarks Stekel, "we always have a few superficial motives at our disposal when it suits us to mask our unconscious secrets from ourselves and from the world."¹⁵ A person may not know his own motives, nor does he always stop to analyze them. He might "rationalize" his conduct, to explain it. But the "rationalized" motive may be far removed from the real motive or motives. One may not actually falsify intentionally; but often does so quite unconsciously. Speech is supposed to be a means of communicating ideas, emotions, desires and purposes; in

¹⁵ Stekel, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

8 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

reality it is often the most convenient method of concealing facts and true motives.¹⁶ What shall we say, then, in the face of formidable difficulties some of which are now before us? Is it possible to place the study of motivation on a scientific basis?¹⁷ Let us suspend judgment a while longer—until we shall have examined some of the existing theories in the field.

EXISTING THEORIES OF MOTIVATION INADEQUATE

To anticipate the main criticism in general, I hold that all of these theories have some value and contain not a little truth. They are all good so far as they go, but no one of them can adequately account for all the facts. My criticism is, therefore, directed chiefly against the limitations. The need for a synthetic theory of motivation will become more apparent as we proceed.

1. *The self-preservation theory* assumes that all conduct is motivated by the inherent desire to live, to survive the struggle for existence. This is borrowed from organic evolution and contains a certain amount of truth, but is really a general truism and not specific enough to be of much value for a science of motivation. It reduces complex conduct to a simple, vague formula which explains very little.

2. *Mechanistic theories of conduct* tacitly solve the problem by deliberately ignoring it. If we take behaviorism or behavioristic psychology so-called as the

¹⁶ Cf. Horton, "Origin and Psychological Function of Religion According to Pierre Janet," *American Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1924, p. 30.

¹⁷ For a negative answer see Znaniecki, *The Laws of Social Psychology*, pp. 30-36.

most recent and most flourishing example of the mechanistic school, we find that by its own charter, so to speak, that is, by its point of view and method of procedure, it totally excludes a study of motives in any true sense. Behaviorism is wrongly regarded as a system of psychology.¹⁸ In reality it is merely a method; and as such is most useful because it lends itself to experimentation and exact results whenever obtainable. But, like all methods, it has serious limitations. It is too narrow and restricted, it leaves out too much, it does not and can not take up the real problem of motives in the strict sense because it does not concern itself with consciousness, much less with interests, purposes, desires, motives as such.

3. *Will* as the supreme source of motivation is emphasized more by certain philosophers and moralists than by psychologists. Very few would deny that will has a place in motivation, but so much of our conduct is outside its jurisdiction that once more we are compelled to say of will as of the others listed here, that it is important and adequate so far as it goes but cannot begin to account for all the facts of motivation.¹⁹

4. *The pleasure-pain theory* is one of the most celebrated. Its classical exponents were the Epicureans and Utilitarians. But it has not lacked for supporters in all ages and countries. A certain phase of it which states that we are actually moved by pleasure or the avoidance of pain in all our conduct is known as psychological hedonism. While it is true that a great

¹⁸ Cf. Roback, *Behaviorism and Psychology*.

¹⁹ See Chapter X.

10 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

many acts are at least directed, controlled, by this urge, many others are independent of it at the inception of the act which may be undertaken for its own sake. The evidences for this statement are presented in a more elaborate discussion of this subject in Chapter VII, "Feeling as Motive." The pleasure-pain theory surely needs to be taken into account but it is fallacious to accept it as a complete, final, adequate explanation accounting for all motives. We have here a theory that is misconceived for the most part and grossly exaggerated in its application. It rests on the most unstable element of the psychic life, the emotional or affective.

5. *The self or soul as the prime mover in conduct* introduces the difficult problem of dualism, the relation of body and mind, and all the mooted questions connected with it. This is not the place to discuss metaphysical problems,¹⁰ nor even the attractive sill psychology of Miss Calkins and others. Suffice it to say that so much of our conduct is unreflectively mechanical, instinctive, habitual that at best this theory can account for only a portion of our acts and a relatively small portion of the sum total of our behavior.

6. In rationalism we have a theory that makes reason supreme, it implies that our conduct is motivated by reason, by intelligence, by conscious, deliberate, thought-out, logical arguments. On the contrary, we are all constantly and, often painfully, aware that very few of our acts are motivated by reason. Reason is important enough to set us apart from the lower animals, and yet, all but a very small percentage of our

¹⁰ Cf. Moore, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 15.

acts are motivated by urges we share in varying degrees with the horses.

7. The theory that ideas induce action is known in its practical form as the ideomotor theory. It asserts that the nature of an object or an act in the mind will lead the person to commit the act provided there are no conflicting ideas. This is treated fully in the chapter on "Idea as Motive" where its weaknesses and limitations are pointed out. Here we emphasize the lack of its adequacy as a complete explanation of conduct.

8. Theories of the unconscious, subconscience, preconscious, etc., claim that the real source of our conduct is submerged beneath the threshold of consciousness, that most, if not all, of our acts are initiated by urges and drives from this subconscious source. The Freudians and psychoanalysts are the chief promoters of this idea. There is a difference of opinion among psychologists concerning the validity of this theory. McDougall calls it "the latest and most fashionable fad in psychology."¹ This fad, however, has produced so much real evidence that we cannot ignore it. On the other hand, it has definitely overreached itself, making extravagant claims as do all theories which purport to be the only real explanation of the complex facts in the mental life. The aim here is to examine its claims sympathetically yet critically with a view of showing what is in accord with the facts of motivation.

9. The "hormic theory of action" is championed by McDougall who asserts "that the instincts are the

¹ McDougall, *Foundations of Psychology*, p. 104.

12 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

prime movers of all human activity, that instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained.”²² This position is challenged by Woodworth who says that the mechanism itself may become a drive.²³ Drever is also inclined to disagree.²⁴ But, assuming that instincts are the prime movers of all human activity, a statement of this fact amounts to little more than a truism which does not shed a great deal of light on our complex conduct. For, no instinct is “pure” nor does it ever act alone. Very early in life these instincts and instinctive acts are seriously modified by habits and social pressure.²⁵ A theory of motivation based solely on the instincts is inadequate to account for all the motives in the conduct of even a child to say nothing of the adult. Nevertheless, the supreme importance of instinct in motivation is here recognized by devoting a whole chapter to it under the title, “Instincts as Motives.”

10. *Emotions* are often regarded as *the* source of motivation. McDougall very ably defends the thesis that the primary emotions are inseparably linked up with the primary instincts; are merely another aspect of the instincts.²⁶ There is no doubt that the emotions play a big rôle in motivation as I point out more specifically in the chapter entitled “Emotions as Motives.”

²² Publishers' circular announcing and describing McDougall's *Outline of Psychology*.

²³ Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

²⁴ Drever, *Instinct in Man*, p. 253.

²⁵ Cf. Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 77; Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 604; Dewey, *op. cit.*; Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 50ff.

²⁶ McDougall, *Social Psychology*, Chap. III; Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind*, p. 138.

But it is decidedly questionable to assert that *all* action is thus motivated.²⁷ There are those who emphasize the sentiments as a source of motivation.²⁸ But this is subject to the same criticism of incompleteness and insufficiency.

There are other theories aiming to account for the springs of conduct, the Freudian "libido" or sex urge, for example. But enough has been cited to show the futility of attempting a comprehensive and systematic treatment of motivation on the basis of any one theory. Nothing short of a synthetic treatment of all the available sources of motivation may dare to approach anything like a comprehensive study of the problem. And even this will perhaps leave many important factors untouched. Nevertheless, a step will have been taken in the right direction. What is here attempted is a synthetic presentation of human dynamics from the viewpoint of the total personality. It is well-nigh hopeless to look for "the" motive or a "pure" motive. Such efforts are alluring but are bound to end in disappointment. As a matter of fact, life is too complicated; conduct too complex to allow such simple and direct analysis. The best we may hope for in this field is, first of all, to appreciate the complex nature of our motives, urges, drives, and incentives to conduct and second, to attempt merely to determine the *dominating* motive or motives in any given case, to know something of the principles of motivation in general. This may not be an impossible task and its practical value is obviously far-reaching. It concerns every situation in-

²⁷ Cf. Shand, *Foundations of Character*, p. 523.

²⁸ Cf. *ibid.*

14 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

volving human relationships, human conduct in all its phases, in fine, the whole of social life in all its varied fields of activity. The obvious motive need not be the real or dominating motive and frequently it is not. However, the question raised earlier has not yet been answered.

IS A SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT OF MOTIVATION POSSIBLE?

We may speculate and theorize on this question all we please, the fact remains that we do make practical use of motives. Every salesman, every public speaker, every teacher, every preacher, every moralist, every one who advertises or conducts any sort of propaganda, in short, every one who would influence his fellows to any purpose, makes his appeal to that in human nature which is capable of response in the desired way. This presupposes some knowledge of the springs of action, of arousable tendencies and their proper stimuli. Each successful propagandist has somehow mastered the principles of "appeals." It is therefore pertinent to inquire whether it is possible to draw valid conclusions and formulate general principles from the methods already in use and from others that might be added, and to put these in systematic, accessible form. A great deal has already been done in this connection in the field of salesmanship and advertising despite the elusive nature of motives. Hollingworth, who has carried on extensive experiments in the business applications of psychology, says:

. . . Since we are dealing with such subjective things as interest, feelings, persuasions, attention, choice, motive, action,

belief, we cannot employ any objective scale such as the yard stick, the balance, the clock work, or thermometer. But we need not despair. In the psychological laboratory we find students measuring the intensity of sensations, the degree of attention, the strength of belief, the legibility of handwriting, the agreeableness of color combinations, the excellence of literary compositions, the eminence of scientific men, the humor of comic situations, and many other things which are no less subjective than the persuasiveness of a selling talk or the pulling power of an advertisement.²⁹

Perhaps we need to distinguish between the theoretical and practical phases of the problem. There is little doubt that the various factors of motivation may be classified as in any descriptive science, but it is extremely doubtful if these principles can be applied according to any rule-of-thumb method. Each concrete case will vary somewhat from all others. Nevertheless, the general principles deduced should go a long way towards suggesting solutions in each and every particular instance. The factor of variability due to heredity, training, age, sex, physical conditions, social pressure, etc., is the most formidable obstacle in the path of attaining a science of motivation. And yet, all these exist for all the social sciences to a greater or lesser degree without invalidating or discrediting them as sciences. The science of general psychology meets the situation by assuming a certain amount of uniformity in the facts of mental life among normal persons by virtue of the fact that we are human beings. Perhaps motivation as a science may be permitted to make the same general assumption. It is the only feasible plan and the tendency seems to be in that direc-

²⁹ Hollingworth, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

16 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

tion.³⁰ Moreover, to assert dogmatically that it is impossible for motivation to acquire a scientific footing is to presuppose a greater knowledge of the subject than is now available. The least (and perhaps the most) that we can do at the present stage of progress is to make the attempt.

METHODS IN MOTIVATION

The next question is, "How shall we proceed?" Upon what basis shall we group or classify the facts? The following answers suggest themselves:

1. *Various so-called levels of behavior.* Woodworth, in his *Psychology*, virtually adopts this method of approach in attacking the problem of motivation. He recognizes three levels of control, the lowest, the middle, and the highest. "The lowest level," he says, "is typified by fatigue. The middle level, that of internal steer, is typified by the hunting dog, striving toward his prey, though not as far as we know, having any clear idea of the result at which his actions are aimed. The highest level, that of conscious purpose, is represented by any one who knows exactly what he wants and the means to get it."³¹

McDougall distinguishes four levels³² as does also Edson but from an entirely different point of view.³³ Other possibilities are: (1) conscious motives as con-

³⁰ Cf. Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 553; Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 1; Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 240; Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 197; Edman, *Human Traits*, p. xi; Kelley, *Human Nature in Business*, p. 1; Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 46; Hollingworth and Poffenberger, *Applied Psychology*, p. 18.

³¹ Woodworth, *Psychology*, pp. 71-72.

³² McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

³³ Book review of Edson's *Getting What We Want* by G. S. Hall, in *American Journal of Psychology*, April, 1922.

trasted with unconscious (subconscious, coconscious) motives; (2) individual (personal) motives as contrasted with social motives, etc. The chief objection to all of these as methods in motivation is that the various so-called levels seriously overlap. There is no sharp line of demarcation. In fact it is quite misleading to put it that way. These so-called levels do not in reality exist and if artificial levels are set up the problem of interaction between them becomes most troublesome. The figurative and arbitrary nature of such a classification is further emphasized by the fact that no two psychologists would agree on the "levels."

2. A second possibility is to *take definite phases of conduct and attempt to show the reason or the urge and motives back of them*; for example, such topics as why we laugh, cry, pray, love, hate, fight, work, play, etc.³⁴ The obvious difficulty here is that the list could be indefinitely extended; besides, there would be considerable wearisome overlapping, for some of the principles involved are common to most of such phases of conduct.

3. *The stimulus-response method or point of view* is another possibility and a great favorite with Woodworth.³⁵ He thinks that "*all mental phenomena*" may be reduced to this category. ". . . whether movements, sensations, emotions, impulses or thoughts, are a person's acts, . . . but that every act is a response to some present stimulus—the stimulus may be from

³⁴ Cf. Cabot, *What Men Live By*; Patrick, *The Psychology of Relaxation*; Wallis, "Why Do We Laugh?" *Scientific Monthly*, Oct., 1922, pp. 343-347. Cf. also Thurstone, "The Stimulus-Response Fallacy in Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. XXX, p. 269; Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

³⁵ Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 68.

18 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

within as well as from without.”³⁶ The attractive feature of this method is its promise of exact results. But as a final system it breaks down at several vital points. Morgan points out that “attempts to resolve all response into terms of stimuli must account for a variation in response with the same objective stimulus.”³⁷ Moreover, the concept of stimulus-response is itself so loosely defined by Woodworth as to make for confusion, especially in the so-called higher levels of response.

4. *Experiments in motivation.* This is indeed a good method and extremely valuable. Some efforts have already been made in this direction³⁸ and it is to be hoped that many more will be attempted in the future. However, these must of necessity be more or less fragmentary. What we need first of all is a comprehensive treatment of the problem as a whole, then we shall be in a position to benefit more by series of experiments which we shall have learned how to classify. There is no inherent objection to experimentation except that it must not be supposed to take the place of the comprehensive method; it must supplement.

5. *The case method.* This method is extremely popular at present. It would indeed be interesting to take definite cases of each type of motivation and, after an elaborate description of each phase of each case, to draw general conclusions. In so doing, however, we

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

³⁷ Morgan, “An Analysis of Effort,” *Psychological Review*, 1920, p. 110.

³⁸ Cf. Barrett, *Motive-Force and Motivation Tracks*; Moss, “A Study of Animal Drives,” *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, June, 1924; Tsai, “The Relative Strength of Sex and Hunger Motives in the Albino Rat,” *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 1925, pp. 407-415; Wheeler, *An Experimental Investigation of the Process of Choosing*.

would run into the same difficulties of hopeless overlapping as in method number two listed above, also the fragmentariness of the experimental method. This study aims to utilize the directness of the case method by numerous concrete illustrations from everyday life.

6. *Types of personality and their "behavior motives."* This method is also attractive in many ways but, unfortunately, there is no scientific classification of "types." Hence, as a chief method of studying motivation, it suffers from the same disadvantages and limitations as the so-called levels of behavior. Nevertheless, temperament and types of personality must not be overlooked as factors of motivation. They have their place with the others in this book.

7. *The comprehensive method.* After a careful survey of the field I have adopted this method because I believe it offers the best promise of a scientific approach to the problem *as a whole*. The various theories accounting for the springs of action were shown to be inadequate because of severe limitations. While each is good as far as it goes, no *one* of them can possibly account for all the facts. The object here is to study motivation comprehensively from the viewpoint of the total personality.

This comprehensive method is also of indirect value to psychology in harmonizing the many seemingly conflicting points of view among psychologists—purposive, mechanistic, personalistic, psychoanalytic, etc. If successful, this indirect contribution will justify the major attempt. At any rate, there is here undertaken a comprehensive, systematic treatment of the various phases of the mental life from a definite single point of view, the viewpoint of motivation.

20 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

The particular arrangement of the material was determined largely by the effort to avoid overlapping as much as possible, to proceed from the simple to the complex, from the mechanical to the relatively more psychical, from the individualistic to the relatively more social phases of motivation. But what is meant by motivation?

MOTIVATION DEFINED

It should be quite apparent by now that the aim here is to use motivation in its fullest, widest, most comprehensive sense. Usually motive is confined to the conscious, deliberate, purposive drives or wishes seeking to realize a definite end. But, as will be shown later, the conscious motives are confined to a very tiny arc of the circle of conduct. Very few acts are motivated by conscious choices. We need a term to cover *all* the incentives, drives, urges, motives—conscious, semiconscious, and the so-called unconscious. No one term in use seems to be adequate. Rather than coin a new term, however, it is deemed better to use the term motive and motivation in the strict etymological sense. Motive is a Latin derivative of *motus*, from the verb *movēre*, to move. Throughout this book, motive and motivation will be used to denote all the factors that move to conduct. Nevertheless, in order to avoid confusion and keep as nearly as one may to common usages, such terms as force, urge, drive, incentive, etc., will be employed wherever the meaning might be rendered more exact. Thus it is hoped to avoid controversy and confusion over mere words and to direct attention to the real problems involved.

CHAPTER II

THE URGE OF PHYSICAL ACTIVITY

GENERAL THEORY OF DYNAMICS

The trend in science is toward a dynamic interpretation of phenomena. The modern theory that electrons and ions are the ultimate indivisible units of matter would seem to explain matter in terms of energy. And if "matter, mute and inanimate" be regarded as essentially dynamic, surely living substance cannot be less so. Force, power, energy seem to be the most common and fundamental attributes of the elements which, free or in combinations, make up our physical universe. The psychic and so-called spiritual are apparently endowed with more concentrated, specialized, though less exact and less stable manifestations of the *élan vital*, so to speak. In its broader aspect the notion of dynamics has played an important rôle not only in physics and the physical sciences, but also in philosophy and the social sciences. From the "flux philosophy" of Heraclitus and the hylozoistic concept of the Greeks in general to the Leibnitzian doctrine of dynamic monads as psychic forces, Fichte's notion of self-determining activity, Spencer's comprehensive evolution, and Bergson's creative evolution, we have various expressions of the concept of dynamics as ultimate reality or the source of being. The significance of all this for the facts of the mental life will be found in the field of

22 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

dynamic psychology which is receiving an increasingly stronger emphasis among psychologists. What we need is a comprehensive view of dynamics in general. Taking our cue from the physicists who claim that so far as they have been able to ascertain the ultimate units in all the elements they are exactly alike except for the number and peculiar coördination of the electrons and ions, we might take the hypothesis that all substance is essentially one, is dynamic, different only in the coördination and configuration of this primordial dynamic world stuff.

This hypothesis need not necessarily involve a materialistic philosophy—provided our interpretation of dynamics to include psychical urges and so-called spiritual forces as well as cosmic energy and organic drives is permissible. It is not the purpose here to enter into controversy, nor even to suggest a system of philosophy from the viewpoint of dynamics broadly interpreted, although something of the sort must be assumed. The contention is merely this: that we cannot afford to overlook the essential unity of the world order implied in a general theory of dynamics; that a treatise on motivation endeavoring to be comprehensive may profitably begin by examining briefly the manifestations of force and power and energy and drive in the “environment” before concentrating on the more or less strictly psychical urges, drives, impulses, desires, wishes, motives. Hence, this chapter will be devoted to brief discussions of cosmic forces, organic drives, tropism, psychophysical reactions—the urge of random movements, restlessness, euphoria, play, rhythm, sensori-motor reactions.

COSMIC FORCES

The cosmic forces are usually given as gravitation, cohesion, adhesion, and chemical affinity. The motions relative to these forces of energy are, respectively, mechanical force, heat (light, sound), magnetism (electricity), and chemical changes. An elaborate account is obviously out of place here. It is quite sufficient for our purpose merely to point out that each and all of these profoundly influence human beings. They not only operate in our environment, affecting us indirectly, but also, because of the constitution of our psychophysical mechanism, are of more direct and immediate concern.¹ We cannot possibly escape these forces. Explicit as well as implicit statements of these influences in human motivation will be found throughout the whole of this book.

ORGANIC DRIVES (IRRITABILITY)

In the organic world of plant life the chief forces and motives recognized are the powers of growth through assimilation and reproduction. In the lowest forms of animal life, as illustrated by single-celled organisms, are found the same forces plus the power of locomotion and irritability.² As we ascend the scale of living organisms to the mammalian group, which includes the human species, we find an increasingly greater variety and complexity of structure and function, of forces of energy and motion. But very early

¹ As an illustration of how closely interdependent are the specific manifestations of all forms of energy, see Crile's *Man an Adaptive Mechanism*, p. 20.

² Cf. Verworn, *Irritability*, p. 1.

in the study of animal life (and some higher forms of plant life) we come upon situations difficult to classify as either purely physical and chemical or something resembling behavior in a truer sense. For example, is the "conduct" of the Venus fly-trap in catching and devouring flies a purely physical and chemical reaction? It looks very much like "purposive" or "hormic" or "teleological" conduct; at least almost reflexive, and hence approaching true behavior. Now, how far do organic drives enter as relatively significant determinants into the problem of human behavior? It is difficult to say. Probably no one would deny them a place, no matter how insignificant. There are those who assign the purely vegetative forces in us the prestige of regulating the more obvious movers—brain, heart, lungs, glands, and even the wish proper in its actual realization. But irritability *per se* has no self-starter; it must be cranked, so to speak; it never takes the initiative, it acts only when it is acted upon. It is the most elementary form of reaction and the lowest in the scale of motivation outside of the purely cosmic forces already mentioned. In the human organism it may be regarded as potential energy, as being in reality a constituent element of the mechanism. All living tissue, chiefly the muscle cells, contain this potential force which needs to be released by some other force but which, nevertheless, is capable of self-activity once it is set off. The quantity and quality of this energy is obviously of great importance in the actual efficiency (intensity, persistency) of the higher motives, especially if we admit, as we must, that the mechanisms are potential drives. Of all the multiple sources of motivation this is probably the most capable of exact measurement

because it is physical, chemical, electrical, and can be definitely determined and expressed in terms of grams, rate of combustibility, volts, etc., although no adequate system has yet been devised for the purpose. Such knowledge based on the physics and chemistry of the human machine could not predict very accurately what the man *will* do, but might be fairly accurate in predicting the maximum effort he *may* exert at any given time.

The remaining sections of this chapter and some of the next treat more specifically of these mechanisms as potential drives.

TROPISM

Closely connected with organic drives is the notion of tropism, the reaction of the organism as a whole to stimuli. "The tropism is a definite physiochemical mechanism within the organism which, when properly stimulated, will give rise to a specific response."³ A power, somewhat mysterious, is supposed to influence the organism in various ways. The chief sources are gravitation, light, heat—all sorts of physical and chemical stimuli. For example, the moth is attracted to the flame, the sunflower constantly turns its face toward the sun; while numerous forms of insects shun the light and retreat in the shadow or under rocks and within

³ Link, "Instinct and Value," *American Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1922, p. 4. Cf. Dickinson, *Economic Motives*, p. 102. "In the lowest creatures, many of them being single-celled, these stereotyped responses are called tropisms, from the Greek word meaning to turn. Tropisms are classified according to the stimulus which excites them to action—light (helio- or phototropism), heat, gravity, chemical action, touch and others. They are identical in principle with the reflex circuit, except that there are no separate nerve-cells involved, but only partially specialized tracts within the organism's one cell."

crevices, preferring darkness to light. The general theory of tropism advanced by Loeb is that the tropistic urges or stimuli cause an unbalancing of the organism's equilibrium and hence the peculiar behavior of the plant or animal to regain its normal status.⁴

There is no doubt that tropism plays an important part in the conduct (more strictly, the movements and reactions) of the lowest forms of life, but it is questionable physiology as well as bad psychology to say that memory images, instincts, human courtship, and even so-called free will are essentially tropisms, as does Loeb.⁵ Nothing but confusion can result from such a concept. It were better to confine the notion of tropism to the relatively simple responses of the organism, or rather to the responses of organisms minus a nervous system, although it is difficult to draw a hard and fast line. It is this difficulty which lends a sort of plausibility to Loeb's theory. However, it is quite sufficient for the present purpose to remember that something resembling tropism occurs in all forms of life, that to a greater or lesser degree the organism reacts to practically every stimulus as a unit.⁶ This fact is more noticeable in the lowest types because they are more homogeneous. Lacking differentiation of organs and functions they must of necessity react as organisms to every stimulus, e.g., the amoeba has but one organ to carry on all the functions of life that a single-celled

⁴Loeb, *Forced Movements, Tropisms, and Animal Conduct*. For a concise summary of various views on tropism and an excellent list of references see Craig, "Tropism and Instinctive Activities," *Psychological Bulletin*, May, 1919, pp. 169-178.

⁵Loeb, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

⁶*Cf.* Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 102; *cf.* Watson, *Psychology*, p. 193; James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 372; Crile, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

THE URGE OF PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 27

animal is capable of. While, for this reason, it seems advisable to confine the term tropism to the lower forms, we must never lose sight of the fact that the functioning of each and every organ, all responses ever so simple, profoundly affect all the others individually and collectively. In fact there is a special system (the autonomic) whose primary function is to unify and coördinate behavior. This fact must never be forgotten in discussing motivation. We isolate the various motives for the sake of convenience, but they would not be what they are apart from the rest. The final chapter is devoted to the "Interaction of Motives" in order to emphasize once more what we have just been saying and also to summarize succinctly the various factors of the seeming diversity in the general unity.

PSYCHOPHYSICAL REACTIONS

In keeping with what has just been said concerning unity of behavior is the psychophysical status or "health" of the individual. All the so-called higher motives are directly and indirectly influenced by the condition of the organism at any given time. The success of any motive is determined largely by the degree of set or readiness of the system to react to that particular urge. The appeal of food just after a good meal is not as strong as it was immediately before the meal was eaten. Nor is the appeal the same in sickness as in health even though one has gone the same number of hours without eating. An invitation to play golf does not ordinarily have the same appeal to a man when just returned from a fishing trip or some other form of outdoor exercise and recreation as when he

has just finished his day's work at the office. During the course of a trial a jurymen once asked to be released from duty, saying, "I have an attack of acute indigestion and feel that not only the defendant but the whole court should hang." The abnormal or unusual disturbances, affecting the psychophysical status and hence the motives, are treated in Chapter XV under "Negative Motives." The remainder of this section will be devoted to the psychophysical factors affecting motivation under more or less normal conditions.

1. *The urge of random movements.* The dynamic property of life is manifest in motion, especially animal life which is often distinguished from plant life by attributing to it powers of locomotion, generally lacking in the latter. Random movements seem to be the forerunners of learned reactions. The young baby's vocation and avocation consist chiefly of these random movements: kicking, throwing his arms about, turning his head from side to side—even his crying and cooing and gurgling are at first more or less random in nature. Whether we call this an instinct⁷ or not, the fact remains that activity is characteristic of life everywhere. Here we come upon an urge that is an end in itself although it might sometimes be means as well. Sheer activity is gratifying on its own account and needs no ulterior drive.

2. *Uneasiness, restlessness.* One form of physical activity is restlessness. The restless person is uneasy. His conduct may be purposive, but usually it is random

⁷ Gault, *Social Psychology*, p. 46. "To begin with, there is the universal instinct of activity: an undifferentiated disposition toward activity, physical or mental or both."

—no special reason why he should pace east and west instead of north and south, hum a tune, whittle a stick, smoke a cigarette, twirl his watch charm, jingle the loose change in his pocket, toy with a bunch of keys, etc. A so-called nervous person or one who is embarrassed will be more likely to make these random and sometimes grotesque gestures, yet even under perfectly normal conditions there is a certain amount of restlessness when a person has nothing in particular to occupy his attention. "Any day of comparative idleness," says Kelly, "such as Sunday, causes people to think of candy. They eat it not so much to appease their appetite as just for something to do. There is a certain restlessness that can be disposed of by munching candy or peanuts or by whittling a stick. Country storekeepers have often noticed that, among their loafers, the habitual whittlers are less disposed to help themselves to dried apples."⁸ In moments of idleness the adult shows less uneasiness than the child partly because he can control himself better, but the main reason is that he has larger resources for "occupying his mind." This is more especially true of men of affairs and of those relatively more highly cultured. The child, on the other hand, has to depend almost entirely on external stimuli, in the absence of which he is fidgety and restless. Apparently this fact was not appreciated by the dutiful mother who was heard to exclaim in a railroad train, "Now, James, you sit right up, sit straight, and don't wiggle!"

There is another form of restlessness due to balked desires of one sort or another, chiefly instinctive. Gen-

⁸ Kelly, *Human Nature in Business*, p. 34.

erally speaking it is pleasant to act when one has the impulse or desire to act and finds satisfaction in it, but when the impulse is balked the person becomes restless. This uneasiness may grow into an emotional cyclone or it may pass off without much fuss, if it is not of sufficient intensity to persist or if a suitable outlet or substitute is found. This type of restlessness, however, is only incidental to the original drives in the impulses which are treated more fully in succeeding chapters. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that this secondary drive of restlessness due to balked desires may develop a definite objective or motive of its own. The desire to overcome the opposition may replace the original urge and become an end in itself.

3. *Surplus energy, euphoria and dysphoria.* The exhausted person has not the reserve or surplus energy to do more than sheer necessity compels him to do; while the well-fed and rested person can scarcely sit still. The lower animals are subject to the same influences in this respect. Perhaps the best illustration is that of the frisky horse after being kept in the stall for several days. Other examples are the tied hunting dog or wild animals in captivity. The healthy human being is not an exception to the rule in the animal kingdom that when tissues of the body are fed more than they consume a certain amount of energy is stored up as a reserve force and is likely to manifest itself in gratuitous exercise, a release of energy beyond the immediate need. When, besides the excess physical or chemical energy, a person is at peace with the world and himself, is mentally free from care and worry and anxiety, is well adjusted to his environment and has achieved internal unity, his state may be described by

the term *euphoria*. Euphoria means for the possessor superb health, self-confidence, a keen appreciation of values, expanded selfhood. This type of "health and vigor," as Jastrow points out, "opens the motor pathways to the abandon that allies itself with the optimistic mood; there is little sense of impediment, of obstacles, and hesitation, but in their place confidence, energy, daring, ambition, a sense of importance."⁹ Obviously, a person enjoying euphoria is differently motivated from one who is experiencing dysphoria (the opposite of euphoria). Not only will the various motives of appeal strike these men differently but the state of being will of itself serve as a different motive force in each. The euphoric is fearless, he expects success, he is venturesome, he will undertake and accomplish, he is enthusiastic and will risk enterprises that ordinarily would not tempt him; while the dysphoric is exactly the opposite: he is fearful, weak, vacillating, will not take chances, expects defeat, has no ambition, attempts little and accomplishes less.

4. *Play*. Woodworth speaks of "the play instincts" as including locomotion (walking), vocalization, manipulation, exploration or curiosity, laughter, fighting, and even self-assertion.¹⁰ But why stop with these? Why not say with Mabel Jane Reaney that "all activity which tends to give free scope for the simple primitive instincts will come under the term of play"?¹¹

⁹ Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, p. 314.

¹⁰ Woodworth, *Psychology*, pp. 151ff.

¹¹ Reaney, "The Psychology of the Organized Group Game," *British Journal of Psychology* (Monograph Supplement). This monograph contains one of the best discourses of the whole problem of play. One interested in this question should not fail to read it.

Once we admit learned reactions into this group there is no legitimate stopping place inside the whole field of human activity. For, on the interpretation of play as an activity satisfying in itself, without ulterior motives, as means and end in one, almost any activity may become play. Many men who have amassed large fortunes, wealth more than sufficient to meet all their needs and desires, continue to work as usual for the sheer joy of "playing the game." To be sure many other factors enter in, but the dominating motive in many instances is play. Learning and association create new drives, the mechanism itself sometimes becomes a sufficient urge, and once activity is enjoyed for its own sake, it becomes play. There is therefore no stable factor in play. That is one reason why there seems to be such a diversity of opinion concerning the essentials of play. Beyond the general definition of play as an activity which is a satisfying end in itself there is practically no agreement on the subject among authorities.

Strictly speaking, random activity is probably all that can be taken as the original native urge to play. It is for this reason that play has been here classified under the general head of physical activity. However, in view of the controversial nature of the problem it seems advisable to refrain from dogmatic assertions concerning the exact nature and limits of play. For motivation the following significant facts need to be emphasized: (1) that the play impulse is a real drive; (2) that it is far-reaching and capricious—almost any activity may be identified or associated with the play impulse; (3) that, in our complex life of to-day with endless social taboos curtailing and suppressing the original native tendencies, play is a real godsend to

keep us out of the insane asylum. Perhaps some day the science of motivation will have advanced far enough to enable experts in applied psychology to compile a manual of the plays and games best suited for each of the various occupations, temperaments, etc., based on a knowledge of exactly what native tendencies are suppressed and the best methods of supplying legitimate outlets in play. This whole problem is so closely connected with the self-regarding impulse that further discussion from this point of view is deferred till Chapter XI, "Self-Regarding Motives."

5. *Rhythm.* Besides the drives of random activity, restlessness, euphoria, and play, there is the urge of rhythm. This is not as violent as the others, but it is surely as compelling and omnipresent in all levels of psychophysical activity as well as the purely physical and purely psychical. Rhythm directs the laws of stellar and planetary motions; the seasons of the year; the ocean tides and the heaving of the ocean's bosom in the crest and trough of the waves; the swing of the pendulum; the heart beat and respiration; activity and fatigue; impulsive drives and their satisfaction; wakefulness and sleep; music; poetry; attention; consciousness—no phase of activity escapes it entirely. Any disturbance of the psychophysical rhythms is annoying. Disregard for rhythm in music and poetry jars the finer sensibilities, work devoid of rhythm is unpleasant and fatiguing. Rhythm obviates a great deal of the wear and tear in drudgery, promotes skill and efficiency in motor reactions. Rhythm is characteristic of attention, the central thing in consciousness.¹² No one can

¹² Cf. Puffer, *The Psychology of Beauty*, p. 161.

34 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

fix his attention on an object for more than a moment at a time—it “goes and comes,” it is rhythmic. The environment itself as well as body and mind are atune to rhythmic activity. Hence, rhythm is pleasurable.¹³ Rhythm is a distinctive and fundamental urge in motivating conduct.

6. *Sensation, sensori-motor reactions.* Sensation is an awareness of what is going on as the result of a stimulus or stimuli. It differs from feeling in that sensation is localized; feeling is not. The attributes of sensation are quality, clearness, intensity, duration. The stimulus may help to determine the intensity and duration, but clearness and quality are subjective. In fact, no matter what the source or nature of the stimuli each sense organ always gives its own peculiar quality of sensation if it reacts at all. The definite quality of sensation is due to the peculiar mechanism of the senses. Sensations are elementary. They might almost be regarded as the units of the mental life, that is, without sensation there could be no percept, no concept, no memory, no imagination—in fine, no experience, no conscious life. Sensations furnish the stuff of the mental life but themselves remain distinct in localization and constant in quality. The mechanism of sensation involves the end organs of sense, the sensory nerves and the nerve centers. Usually the motor paths are also concerned, i.e., when a complete circuit of stimulus-response is involved. This complete circuit is called a reflex arc when the act is purely mechanical, a sensori-motor reaction when there is a greater or lesser degree of consciousness and perhaps deliberation. In terms of

¹³ Cf. Seashore, *Psychology in Daily Life*, p. 34.

motivation, *the sensory is the basis of appeal; the motor of response.*

The sensori-motor reactions lend themselves readily to the stimulus-response psychology. Sensation is not a prime mover. It must first be aroused by some other drive either external or internal. But once it is aroused sensation is capable of "spread," of enlisting the prime movers in its service. Moreover, most motives do involve sensation sometime during their life history.

CHAPTER III

AUTONOMIC ACTS AND REFLEXIVE RESPONSES

AUTONOMIC REFLEXES (GLANDULAR ACTIVITY):

KINETIC DRIVES

From the viewpoint of dynamics and motivation the autonomic system is most remarkable. From birth (and somewhat earlier) to death it works incessantly without direction or control from the conscious nervous centers, it needs no rest because it never tires.¹ Its function is to stimulate, coördinate, and regulate the unconscious activities of the organism. It serves as a faithful watchman besides, for it guards against threatened attacks, retards certain processes; accelerates others, according to the emergency. On occasion it rings in a general alarm, so to speak, which arouses all the officers on board and the decks are cleared for action with the captain in command. Ordinarily, however, it does not disturb the conscious self. Nevertheless it furnishes the "kinetic drive" which regulates and sustains the conduct of the conscious self. It serves to keep the self in safe contact with his environment.

The apparatus of the autonomic system consists of the glands of internal secretion; the respiratory, digestive, and circulatory systems; and the unstriped skeletal muscles.² Its function is to regulate and coördinate

¹ Pierce, *Our Unconscious Mind*, pp. 89-90.

² Cf. Kempf, *Autonomic Functions and Personality*, p. 9.

the purely mechanical activities of the organism which lie outside the direct control of the central nervous system. For this reason the autonomic system is sometimes called the peripheral or sympathetic system.

The autonomic system has survival value. To begin with, the conscious personality is saved a lot of wear and tear in not being bothered by (aware of) the numerous vital processes of the organism under normal conditions. This enables consciousness to direct attention to other things, to acquiring new experiences, learning, carrying on multiform activities which would be impossible if consciousness had to concern itself with details of respiration, circulation, digestion, sorting out the various chemical compounds to be delivered to each gland and regulating the exact amount of this gland fluid to be released in time of need, maintaining friendly and amicable relations between the glands. In the economy of physical and mental harmony it is sometimes necessary to suppress some glands and encourage others. In fact it is doubtful if the consciousness could carry on such a complex and delicately adjusted mechanism. Apparently it requires the clock-like precision of a machine to do this. Many organisms get along without consciousness, but no conscious being could long survive without the autonomic apparatus.

In the struggle for existence the autonomic system serves the organism in definite emergencies and in specific ways besides constantly regulating the vital processes. This is the task of the autonomic reflexes and glandular reactions. A great deal of time and thought and experimentation has been devoted to the study of glands in recent years. A great deal yet remains to be

38 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

done. When the facts of gland secretions and their functions are revealed, something approaching a revolution will have taken place in the medical sciences and perhaps in psychology as well.³ Enough, however, has already been accomplished to show that the emotions are directly and indirectly controlled by the glands and vice versa. Cannon, Berman, Crile, Kempf and many others have shown by convincing experimental evidence that in fear and anger the adrenal glands pour out adrenalin into the blood stream which liberates the stored up sugar in the liver and carries it to all the muscles, giving them just the food they want to sustain and energize them for the emergency. That is why the angry person is sometimes temporarily stronger than normal—he is more thoroughly alive. Cannon points out that

the increased blood sugar attendant on the major emotions and pain would be of direct benefit to the organism in the strenuous muscular efforts involved in flight or conflict or struggle to be free. . . . Every one of the visceral changes that have been noted—the cessation of processes in the alimentary canal (thus freeing the energy supply for other parts); the shifting of blood from the abdominal organs, whose activities are deferrable, to the organs immediately essential to muscular action (the lungs, the heart, the central nervous system); the increased vigor of contractions of the heart; the quick abolition of the effects of muscular fatigue; the mobilizing of energy-giving sugar in the circulation—every one of these visceral changes is *directly serviceable in making the organism more effective in the violent display of energy which fear or rage or pain may involve.*⁴

³ Cf. Bolk, "The Part Played by the Endocrine Glands in the Evolution of Man," *Lancet*, Sept. 10, 1921, pp. 588-592.

⁴ Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*, pp. 193, 195, 215.

The remarkable thing is that the same bodily conditions characteristic of anger and fear may be produced artificially, as it were,

when adrenalin is injected into the blood, it will cause pupils to dilate, hairs to stand erect, blood vessels to be constricted, the activities of the alimentary canal to be inhibited, and sugar to be liberated from the liver. These effects are not produced by action of the substance on the central nervous system, but by direct action on the organ itself. . . . Great grief and prolonged anxiety during a momentous crisis have been regarded as causes of individual instances of diabetes, and anger or fright has been followed by an increase in the sugar excreted by persons who already have the disease. Kleen cites the instance of a German officer whose diabetes and whose Iron Cross for valor both came from a stressful experience in the Franco-Prussian War.⁵

The action of the thyroid gland is even more fundamental. Berman says that

without thyroid no thought, no growth, no distinctive humanity or even animality is possible. . . . A cretin, idiotic, dwarfish, deformed, hopeless, an incessantly prodding burden of sorrow to the mother, who looks upon the masterpiece she had labored to bring forth, and beholds a terrible gargoye, becomes transformed when fed thyroid.⁶

The adrenals and thyroid are but two of the several important glands of secretion. Some of the others are the pituitary, the pineal, the thymus, the gonads, the parathyroids, and the pancreas.⁷ However, since we are here concerned more with the place of these kinetic

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁶ Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, pp. 55, 56.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94, contains a schematic summary of the important glands with their respective secretions and functions.

40 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

drives as a whole in the problem of motivation than with the individual glands as such, further discussion of them is unnecessary. Therefore attention is called to the task of estimating their significance for motivation.

SIGNIFICANCE OF GLANDS IN MOTIVATION

Those who have paid special attention to a study of the glands of internal secretion are not content with regarding them merely as reflexive mechanisms useful in regulating the purely vegetative functions of the organism. They go so far as to assert that these glands determine temperament, mental capacities, ambition, force of character, and even the subtle thing we call personality, as well as the more distinctly physical manifestations of behavior.⁸

What is the significance of all this for motivation? For one thing, in so far as it is possible to solve the extremely complex problems of motivation in terms of chemistry, we have here a method which lends itself to exact results. Doubtless Berman is overenthusiastic in his assertions that "the most precious bit of knowledge we possess to-day about man is that he is the creature of his glands of internal secretions,"⁹ that "they [the glands] control human nature and whoever controls them, controls human nature,"¹⁰ that "given the internal secretory composition, so to speak, of an individual, his endocrine formula, and so his intravisceral pressures, one may predict, within limits, his physical and psychic make-up, the general lines of his life, diseases, tastes, idiosyncrasies and habits."¹¹

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

Without accepting the whole of the contention in its extreme form until more convincing evidence is adduced, it is surely a promising field for further investigation.¹² The remarkable results attained by the artificial use of thyroid tantalizes the imagination. One is tempted to picture to himself the future chemist who will have on his shelves bottles containing chemicals mimicking gland secretions to perfection and labeled "ambition," "good nature," "will power," "aggressiveness," "modesty," etc. Or perhaps a knowledge of the exact nature and function of these glands will lead us to regulate our lives in harmony with the demands of a healthy functioning of the glands of internal secretion. Methods and principles which promise exact results and scientific control are always welcome and nowhere more than in motivation which, for the most part, is so terribly elusive. Nevertheless, even though we assume the most optimistic attitude toward the development of scientific knowledge of glands we cannot reasonably expect such a science to solve all the problems of motivation, for human life and conduct seem to be more than chemistry and autonomic reflexes.

REFLEXES PROPER

Besides the autonomic reflexes which we have just been discussing there is another group which may be called the reflexes proper because they are the ones we think of as typical. They differ from the autonomic

¹² Cf. Harrow, *Glands in Health and Disease*, p. 9. "The achievements judged by rigid scientific standards, are no more than modest, but the possibilities are limitless. It is because of these possibilities that an imagination not sufficiently tempered by self-criticism, is apt to enlarge a molehill into a mountain." This book also contains an excellent bibliography on the subject.

42 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

mainly in that they are more or less conscious although almost as free from volitional control, i.e., practically entirely. Another difference is that while the autonomic reflexes are constantly active by virtue of their physiochemical mechanism, the reflexes proper are of very short duration and need to be stimulated for each reaction by appropriate stimuli. The knee jerk, the pupillary reflex, the eyelid reflex, coughing, sneezing, swallowing, sucking, vomiting, are good examples.¹³ Like the autonomic system the function of these is also to protect the organism from injury and aid it in the struggle for survival. Every one of these is an adaptive act. They are all purposive.¹⁴

From the standpoint of genesis [says Kantor] reflex responses are unique among the permanent behavior equipment of human beings, in that they may be considered as the earliest and most intrinsic of all the types of responses. . . . Reflex behavior is essentially life-maintaining activity and therefore is intimately related to and dependent upon the biological structures of organisms. Hence, reflexes absolutely must begin to operate from the very inception of the organism's life.¹⁵

The reflex is so fundamental and elementary that often it is regarded as the unit of motor action. The simplified expression of it is the reflex arc. This arc or circuit consists of a sensory neuron, a neuron center (usually in the spinal cord), and a motor neuron

¹³ Cf. Warren, "A Classification of Reflexes, Instincts, and Emotional Phenomena," *Psychological Review*, May, 1919, p. 198, Table I.

¹⁴ Kantor, *American Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1922, p. 22, quotes from Sherrington's *Integrative Action of the Nervous System*: "The reflex reaction cannot be really intelligible to the physiologist until he knows its aim."

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

attached to an end-organ of reaction—usually a muscle. In actual experience, however, the situation is not so simple. As a rule there is considerable “spread” of the impulse in the central cells which are equipped with many branches for this purpose. Briefly stated, the essential characteristics of the type of reflexes under consideration are: (1) they are innate tendencies to reaction; (2) they require stimuli to produce responses which are purely mechanical, to themselves; (3) so long as the mechanism remains intact the impulse is definite and final; (4) they are common to all normal human beings; (5) they are free from conscious and volitional control; (6) they cannot be modified to any appreciable extent by the process of learning except in the source or nature of the stimulus. This type of modification is known as the conditioned reflex.

THE CONDITIONED REFLEX

The conditioned reflex is an interesting and significant phenomenon. It differs not a whit from the ordinary reflex except in the added or “conditioned” source of stimulation. This result is obtained experimentally by repeatedly giving a neutral stimulus together with the normal stimulus of the given reflex. After repeated trials of this sort the response will be forthcoming by the associated stimulus alone and the reflex is said to be “conditioned.” The classical example of a conditioned reflex is furnished by Pavloff. He placed a delectable substance in a dog’s mouth and at the same instant caused the ringing of a bell. Pavloff found that the same result could be obtained by not offering the food at all but merely ringing the bell. The

amount of saliva, measured after draining it off by means of a test tube especially adjusted, was the same for both stimuli. The sound of the bell had become a "substitute stimulus." Woodworth mentions a conditioned reflex experiment on a child. He says, "A young child confronted with a rabbit, showed no fear, but on the contrary reached out his hand to take the rabbit. At this instant a loud rasping noise was produced just behind the child, who quickly withdrew his hand with signs of fear. After this had been repeated a few times, the child shrank from the rabbit and was evidently afraid of it." He adds, "Probably it is in this way that many fears, likes and dislikes of children originate."¹⁶ No doubt many taboos of primitive man also originate in like manner. As a matter of fact all of us are profoundly influenced constantly by these conditioned reflexes in everyday life. "Blushing, obsessive phobias, compulsive cravings, psychoneuroses, appetites, sexual excitement, hatred, convulsions, vomiting, anesthetics, etc., are autonomic reactions that become conditioned to react to well-defined stimuli which may have a wholly indifferent effect upon other people."¹⁷ This factor complicates the problem of predicting conduct. There is no limit to the sources of conditioned reflexes.¹⁸ Almost anything may serve

¹⁶ Woodworth, *Psychology*, pp. 303-304; cf. Watson, "The Place of the Conditioned Reflex in Psychology," *Psychological Review*, March, 1916, pp. 89-116; Cason, "The Physical Basis of the Conditioned Reflex," *American Journal of Psychology*, July, 1925, pp. 371-393; Burnham, *The Normal Mind*, pp. 61-113.

¹⁷ Kempf, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

¹⁸ Dickinson, *Economic Motives*, p. 148. "Mankind has always been familiar, of course, with the 'mouthwatering' phenomenon in connection with the sight or thought of food; and a multitude of other associative responses have for ages been commented on before these

as substitute stimulus. And yet, "the psychologist cannot afford to overlook the fact that reflexes are very strictly conditioned and that upon the type of stimulus object which elicits the reaction depend the intensity and range of the behavior."¹⁹

SIGNIFICANCE OF REFLEXES IN MOTIVATION

At first thought it would seem that reflexes, being dependent upon external stimuli, have very limited scope in motivation. But a closer study reveals the fact that reflexes are not as simple, in actual life, as they seem when isolated and studied apart from the rest of the organism for the sake of convenience. The reflexes are very close to the instincts. In fact, it is not easy to give a clear-cut distinction between them. There is bound to be considerable overlapping in any definition of either group. Both are innate tendencies to reaction. Distinctions on the basis of degree of consciousness, promptness of the response, relative complexity, etc., are not altogether satisfactory. Hence, if reflexes have any significance for psychology, they have a place in motivation. Kantor's conclusion on this point is that "unless we consider reflexes as well as every other type of reaction as definite psychological facts, and not physiological acts, we cannot hope to understand them."²⁰

exact, quantitative observations were thought of. We all acquire responses to whistles, bells, pictures, colors, names, flags, scenes, simply by virtue of their having been presented in temporal contiguity with some stimulus which was at the time intrinsically interesting to us."

¹⁹ Kantor, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

Now, if this be true, and it seems almost self-evident, then Kantor's previous statement that reflexes modify conduct, directly and indirectly, is important for our problem.²¹

Quite in keeping with this line of thought is Kempf's argument to the effect that it is by a sort of modified reflex reproduction that we are best able to understand and interpret the conduct and experience of others.²² "Learning by doing," "no impression without expression" and similar golden texts of the disciples of modern methods in education pay tribute to this principle. A sympathetic audience will usually cough or clear their throats for the speaker when he becomes hoarse. One who is eager to catch the full meaning and import of another's narrative of some experience will reflect the speaker's facial expressions—in modified form to be sure—but nevertheless a kind of reflex accommodation. We may call this imitation; doubtless it is—as we shall see later (Chapter XVII)—but the *mechanism* is best explained on the basis of reflective reproduction of the thing imitated, consciously or unconsciously.

We may summarize the significance of reflex action in motivation as follows: (1) As a physical factor, predisposing the organism, determining his "set" or readiness for any given act, the reflex may control conduct by inhibiting, facilitating or summing an act through its influence on the physiopsychic mechanism. (2) To comprehend adequately and appreciate fully the motives and general conduct of others it seems necessary to reproduce the experience in ourselves by means of modified imitative reflexes. (3) There is always the

²¹ Kantor, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

²² Kempf, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

possibility of the mechanism in reflex activity becoming a drive for further action or at least in modifying an act already begun.²³ (4) The innumerable conditioned reflexes which are of wide range serve to modify motives in more or less fixed ways—mostly unconscious and mechanical, yet frequently rising to conscious appreciation of means and end. This is especially true of conduct motivated by prejudice in one form or another.²⁴ (5) In the main, however, reflex action in motivation must be regarded as secondary, in the sense that most reflexes are dependent upon external stimuli. If any valid distinction can be made between reflex and instinct it is this: that instincts are usually regarded as innate impulses, primary tendencies, needing no other urge; while reflex action, though also an innate tendency, is not a primary urge. Not only does it need to be set off by a stimulus, but once started the reaction channels are extremely limited. It is practically a mechanism pure and simple, it must respond in a given way. The source of stimulation and the actual stimuli are many—according to the theory of conditioned reflexes—but the response as a mechanism has limits which may not be exceeded to any appreciable extent.

²³ Ladd and Woodworth, *Elements of Physiological Psychology*, pp. 170ff. "Feeble irritation of two points of the spinal-dog's back evoke the scratching, though neither of the two irritations does so by itself; and the strength of the scratching movement evoked by moderate irritation at one point is increased by moderately irritating another point. . . . Mental states may exert a similar reinforcement on various reflex functions of the nervous system; and artificial stimuli applied to the cortex of the brain may facilitate the reflex effect of stimulation to the skin."

²⁴ The significance of this is here recognized by devoting a whole chapter (XII) to a fuller discussion of prejudice as a factor in motivation.

APPETITE, CRAVING (VEGETATIVE INSTINCT):
CONDITIONED APPETITES

Closely connected with the autonomic system and the reflexes in general are the appetites and vegetative cravings. These are more like the action of the glands than the reflexes proper in that they carry their own drives; while the common reflex usually needs an external stimulus. In some respects the appetites are the strongest of all motives. In a sense they supersede such powerful drives as instincts, for some of the instincts operate in the service of appetite, hunger and sex, for example. Here the stimulus is always internal, depending upon recurring physiochemical cycles. In the case of hunger and sex it is the urge in the appetite which arouses the corresponding instinct. Another way of stating the case is that the appetite is the waking, active, pulsating phase of the instinct. The external stimulus cannot arouse a vegetative appetite unless the internal conditions are "ripe." If the physiochemical status is that of satiation or fatigue or is interfered with by psychical and physical disturbances, such as fear or severe pain, the external stimulus is seriously handicapped if not wholly vitiated. In other words, the internal chemical, physical, and psychic conditions and drives must be ready or near-ready. On the other hand, while the internal set or readiness needs not the outward stimulus for the awakening of an appetite, nevertheless, external influences may greatly strengthen, intensify, the "craving" in appetite. The sight of food need not in itself arouse a desire for it. Hunger in some form or other must

always be presupposed. To be sure we often keep on eating long after the demands of hunger have been met, but in such cases another appetite, an acquired one, is operating, the craving of the "palate," taste.

The primacy of appetites as movers is widely recognized.²⁵ Some of the appetites are innate; many more are acquired. Of the innate appetites, the so-called vegetative instincts of hunger and sex already noted, are good examples. There seems to be no special advantage in making a distinction between vegetative instincts and other instincts, except to note that in the case of vegetative instincts there is a special organ or mechanism which localizes the craving and its satisfaction; while in the case of other instincts, though usually dependent to some extent on similar physical, chemical, and psychic factors, there is no localization of desire and function but rather a general uneasiness to mark its presence and the persistency of this state to be followed by quiescence, when the craving is satisfied, sometimes violent agitation and positive pain when opposed or denied, or sublimated when the craving finds satisfaction in a substitute.

The more numerous by far are the "conditioned" or, more precisely, the acquired appetites. There is every conceivable gradation of substitute and conditioned appetites. The craving for "habit-forming" drugs, such as morphine, opium, alcohol, tobacco, and even tea and coffee and many others, are not congenital but, obviously, acquired. Drever points out that:

We speak of the "smoking habit," the "drinking habit," the "drug habit," though the important factor is not the "habit"

²⁵ Cf. Drever, *Instinct in Man*, p. 246.

50 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

but the "appetite," which has been acquired. It may be maintained that habit itself can give rise to an acquired "appetite." . . . Probably in most cases organic changes are also produced which cause recurring organic conditions, determining the acquired "appetites" in the same way as the naturally recurring organic conditions determine most of the natural "appetites."²⁶

Appetite with craving as drive may vary from a mild urge to the most persistent, compelling and tumultuous of incentives. As a factor in motivation the appetite is vital and far-reaching: (1) It is a primary urge—usually vegetative or chemical in nature but dependent more or less on the general and specific status of the organism. (2) External stimuli come as reënforcements to the internal craving either to arouse or magnify or both. (3) There is likely to be considerable rivalry or fusion among the various appetites, inhibitions, facilitations, summations, according to the laws of reflex action in general. (4) New appetites are acquired on the instigation of innate drives, old appetites or instincts; but once acquired they furnish their own drives. (5) The predictability of appetitive conduct depends upon a knowledge of the individual's life history, his dominating habits, his character. The pulling or impelling force of any given appetite will vary from person to person and from time to time in the same person. Experiments on mice have determined the degree or intensity of the appetites of hunger and sex in terms of electrical measure units.²⁷ Perhaps some day we shall acquire the technique of measuring the urge or drive in human appetites in

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

²⁷ See footnote, p. 18.

exact terms. (6) Appetites not only serve as primary drives, but also control other urges by predisposing the organism to vary in its set and readiness for other motives. An agreeable act motivated by the urge of physical activity, the social impulse, curiosity, or what not, may suddenly cease to be attractive if the appetite of hunger is paramount. Even from play we must take time to eat.

ACQUIRED AUTOMATISMS

Reserving for the next chapter a discussion of habits in the generally accepted meaning of the term, we note here merely those habits which have become so mechanical that they may be classified as acquired automatisms and hence belong in the general group of automatic acts and reflexive responses. They resemble the reflexes proper and the reflex action of the autonomic system in the matter of relatively quick and stereotyped responses, the chief difference being that the former are acquired and the latter innate. And since the acquired automatisms are annexed in the life of the individual they cannot have quite the same degree of spontaneity and vital necessity that the innate reflexes have acquired in their longer life history during which time their survival value to the race has been severely tested and found essential.

The chief point of resemblance, as already noted, is that the acquired automatisms, like the innate reflexive tendencies, are more or less unconscious and almost wholly mechanical. These acquired mechanisms are employed in large numbers in the service of habits in general and skilled motor reactions in particular. Common examples may be found among the habits of

dressing. Almost every person invariably puts on the right or left shoe first each time and does it quite mechanically. The proof is that one is not aware of this fact until his attention is called to it. The same is true of putting on any garment: the right or left foot or arm, as the case may be, is thrust into the garment first every time. In shaving himself a man comes sooner or later to have a definite invariable plan of attack against his beard. He begins hostilities at a given point and concludes the engagement in precisely the same locality as on the previous encounters each time the battle is waged. Other examples are: grabbing for one's hat the moment it is lifted from the head by an adverse wind, the old veteran clicking his heels and coming to attention in the street or anywhere at the sudden and unexpected command in true military fashion. There are hundreds of these little tricks of habit peculiar to the individual in his manner of eating, walking, talking, working, playing, thinking—in fine, in almost every phase of his everyday life.

The significance of these acquired automatisms for motivation is not pronounced. Perhaps they constitute the least important group of all, surely less so than the innate reflexes some of which were seen to be primary sources of motivation. These secondary automatic reflexes serve the rôle of mechanisms. They do not initiate acts. They are time-saving and energy-saving devices in the employ of habits. Their service is a practical one, they help determine the method of procedure in actualizing a motive.

However, for reasons already set forth, the automatic acts and reflexive responses taken together constitute an important phase of motivation.

CHAPTER IV

HABITS AS MOTIVES

MECHANISMS AND DRIVES IN HABIT-FORMATION

Native automatic reactions make learning and progress possible by affording a person leisure to devote his energies to mastering new activities. But these native kinetic drives represent a bare minimum to start the organism on his career as an independent individual. They need to be supplemented by many more acts that are mechanical or semi-mechanical before a person can take his place as an effective member of society. These acquired mechanisms and drives are called habits. Given the proper incentive, repetition seems to be the chief requirement in habit-formation. At each successive repetition the act becomes more efficient, more mechanical, less fatiguing, less conscious. If repeated often enough certain acts may become wholly mechanical and, under normal conditions, not at all perceived in consciousness. The child learning to walk needs to focus his full attention and to concentrate all his energies on the task of coördinating his muscular activities in maintaining his balance and equilibrium in the process. Until these movements have become more or less mechanically adjusted the slightest disturbance will cause him to lose his balance and fall. Yet the adult will walk while his mind is preoccupied with some theme or problem. He may be discussing philosophy,

perhaps, with a companion, and pay no conscious attention to the mechanism of walking. He will avoid objects, change his pace in crowded places and do it all quite mechanically. Learning to write is a serious task for the beginner. He has to watch every movement of the pen. If you observe him closely you will see every indication of complete mobilization of effort and concentration. And yet, later on he will, with apparently no strain or effort, take notes on a scientific lecture without losing the trend of thought. This is possible because not only the writing of each letter but, for the most part, even the spelling of familiar words, has become mechanical, does not require conscious effort. The novice at the piano, the typewriter, the ball game—any new situation requiring skilled movements—makes many false moves. By persistent effort these false steps are eliminated and he becomes an expert, complete master of the situation.

What, then, are the drives, incentives, urges, inducements to habit-formation? It is obvious that during the formation period at least, habit must be motivated, must have some urge other than the activity itself, some aim or purpose or motive. We frequently "drift" into various habits without any definite or conscious aim. A good deal of this is due to our physical make-up and environmental conditions. For example, the peculiar gait and carriage of a man, the eccentricities of speech and gestures are not usually the result of thought-out, purposeful, deliberate aims though they are most certainly fixed habits. So far as the aim is concerned they are purely accidental. Moreover, the mere fact of existence presupposes activity and activity, of any sort whatsoever, predisposes to habit-for-

mation. Hence we must not assume that all habits are motivated by definite specific aims. Nevertheless, despite numerous exceptions, most habits do have an aim once they are motivated. No doubt the autonomic system, the native impulses and instincts, no matter how defined, furnish the original drives and motives. The mechanistic psychologist reduces these original primary movers to elementary reflexes;¹ while the purposive psychologist insists that instinct and instinct alone accounts for the springs of human action.² The chief difficulty seems to be over a definition of terms, the point of view, and an attempt to reduce all of psychology with its manifold complexities to fit a formula. By whatever name the impulses of original nature may be designated they are of supreme importance in directing habit-formation both as drive and as mechanism.

The reasons and urges generally ascribed to the forming of habit are usually superficial and often misleading for our purpose. It is said that we form habits in order to become more efficient—to save time and energy, gain power and prestige, attain ease and comfort in the performance of our daily tasks. All this is true enough but does not get at the root of the matter. It also overlooks the fact that we also form bad habits, habits that handicap us in the struggle of life and the attainment of the truest self-realization and self-expression. The facts are that we form habits: (1) because we have the mechanism for doing so, are so constituted that habit-formation is the inevitable result of living; (2) because our native reactions are in-

¹ Cf. Watson, *Psychology*, pp. 270, 272.

² Cf. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 218.

sufficient for carrying on anything above the purely vegetative functions; (3) because the impulses and instincts with all their native force are not specific enough in concrete instances. This is one of the main distinctions, as already noted, between human beings and the lower animals. The animal's instincts are specific, definite, fixed, and each prompting by a given instinct leads to practically identical results in identical ways: witness the nest-building instinct in the bird which prompts her to build the type of shelter characteristic of her species and to do this correctly the first time. There is no corresponding mechanical exactness among the instincts of man. Man, with his peculiar psychophysical inheritance in reacting to his environment comes to do so in more or less fixed ways largely through habit. Society dictates and directs the process. Custom and tradition pass on this social inheritance from generation to generation. The specific drives in particular instances of habit-formation are: (1) the urge of physical activity, random movements; (2) accidental and unconscious urges; (3) impulsive drives and appetites; (4) more pronounced instinct-emotion motives; (5) a combination of impulses and motives; (6) the deliberate forming of mental and motor habits as in skilled acts. These are the urges that motivate the formation of habits and are not to be confused with the drives of habits already formed. The urge and drive of habits as such will be considered next.

DRIVES OF FORMED HABITS

If we were to accept McDougall's view on the subject this paragraph would be unnecessary, for he

stoutly maintains that "the habit has no motive power, is not in itself a 'drive.' It is mere mechanism, a servant of the driving impulses which come from the instincts."³ This is in keeping with his general theory that instincts are the primary and sole movers in conduct. In support of the contention that habits never become drives he cites instances of habits in animals whose motive is supplied by some impulse, usually fear or hunger. He denies that in habitual action skilled movements ever furnish their own drives but affirms that these are always dependent upon some purpose or object or aim apart from the habit as such, i.e., display of skill, self-assertion, etc. Now, it is undoubtedly true that in most instances habits are formed and continue to function in the service of some impulse or motive. But this is quite different from saying that no habit is ever a drive as well as a mechanism. On the basis of McDougall's hypothesis how shall we account for the "craving" for alcohol or for narcotic drugs in those who have the *habit*? What native impulse or group of impulses compels the drug addict to break the law, ruin his health and reputation in the maddening endeavor to satisfy his craving for the drug? Is it the instinct of self-assertion, self-abasement, pugnacity, gregariousness, curiosity, or a combination of any of the instincts?

According to the theory that impulses may easily become attached to new objects one explanation would be that the instinct of curiosity first led the unfortunate victim to try the drug and it led to another trial until the habit was fixed. This, however, is not

³ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

always the case. There are instances in which the habit is contracted quite accidentally, e.g., morphine or some other sedative administered by a physician during a severe illness. But granting that an impulse prompted the formation of the habit it is surely not that impulse (of curiosity or any other instinct) that motivates the unfortunate victim with the fixed habit. The drive is in the habit, is the habit, and what a fearful drive in most instances! Nor is the problem solved by suggesting that perhaps in this instance we have an abnormal physical state resembling an original vegetative impulse, for McDougall clearly repudiates the claim that instincts are physiochemical merely or due to chains of reflexive activity.

It can be demonstrated, however, that this habit and many others carry their own drives though perhaps they are not always motivated that way. Some of these habits will be discussed presently. A good test of the strength of habit is apparent to any one who has tried to free himself from it. The habit of smoking, for example, may be acquired through various motives, but the urge that impels a man to keep on smoking despite his best efforts to "break" the habit is none other than the force or drive of the habit itself.⁴ Dewey is extremely pronounced in his advocacy of the dynamics of habits.

All that metaphysics has said about the *nisus* of Being to conserve its essence and all that a mythological psychology has

⁴The following is quoted by Barrett, *Strength of Will*, p. 190: "Gladstone had different desks for his different activities, so that when he worked on Homer he never sat among the habitual accompaniments of his legislative labors." Barrett adds, "It is also said that Stanley the African explorer could not make an after-dinner speech without first putting on the cap Livingstone gave him."

said about a special instinct of self-preservation is a cover for the persistent self-assertion of habit. Habit is energy organized in certain channels. When interfered with, it swells as resentment and as an avenging force.⁵

In another connection he asserts that:

All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they *are* will. They form our effective desires and they furnish us with our working capacities. They rule our thoughts, determining which shall appear and be strong and which shall pass from light into obscurity.

We may think of habits as means, waiting like tools in a box, to be used by conscious resolve. But they are something more than that. They are active means, means that project themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting.⁶

In the following strong statement Dewey not only finds a place for habits in motivation, but he makes habits paramount.

Habits once formed perpetuate themselves, by acting unremittingly upon the native stock of activities. They stimulate, inhibit, intensify, weaken, select, concentrate and organize the latter into their own likeness. They create out of the formless void of impulses a world made in their own image. Man is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct.⁷

From these and other statements that run all through the book, Dewey's position is clearly on the side of habits as supreme in conduct. He places habit before instinct in importance. This is quite contrary to McDougall's position. Dewey, furthermore, states that habits profoundly affect our very mechanisms and

⁵ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 76.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

that it is useless to talk of changing one's conduct contrary to an established habit by any pious wish no matter how strongly motivated until one has first made serious alterations in the psychophysical mechanism involved.

Woodworth also gives habit a place among the drives. He is quite explicit on this point. "A habit is a drive," he says, "as we may see from the tension and uneasiness that occur when a habitual reaction is called for but prevented from realizing itself. To perform a habitual action gives satisfaction; or, at least, to forego the performance brings dissatisfaction and uneasiness."⁸

James also emphasizes the driving force of formed habits. He puts in italics the statement that "most instincts are implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits and, that, this purpose once accomplished, the instincts themselves, as such, have no *raison d'être* in the psychical economy and consequently fade away."⁹

In summing up the case for habits as drives we may say (1) that in perhaps the majority of instances instinctive impulses originally prompt the habit and remain its chief motive force throughout—there are, in addition, cases in which habit serves but to make original impulse more specific and effective; (2) that in a few instances the habit, originally prompted by a very weak impulse or by sheer accident, carries its own drive once it is firmly established; (3) that in other instances although originally induced by a true impulse the habit

⁸ Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 162; cf. English, "Dynamic Psychology and the Problem of Motivation," *Psychological Review*, July, 1921, p. 243.

⁹ James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 402.

gathers enough momentum of its own to drive the act; (4) that in still other instances the habit, called upon by social pressure to curb or eliminate a native impulse, may employ other native impulses or may develop a self-starter.

DRIVE OF CHARACTER AS HABIT

So far in this chapter we have been discussing the drive of habits as though each habit were an isolated phenomenon. The fact is that despite the apparent inconsistency among the habits of an individual there is, nevertheless, a certain unity and consistency represented by the term character. The habits of a person are not separate entities. They are not even a "bundle." They are more or less coördinated traits shaped by the personality as a whole. Character represents a man's habitual mode of conduct. It is more or less fixed. It gives him a certain bent, a set, a readiness to react to his environment.¹⁰ In an emergency a man falls back on his character, his "characteristically" habitual mode of behavior. Character furnishes the stabilizing quality of personality. Individual habits determine specific acts; character determines conduct. "Character is the interpenetration of habits." Once personality is achieved character determines the nature of each new habit. Graham Wallas rightly observes

¹⁰ Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 62. "Both for the individual and for society habit is of supreme importance. Individual character in the adult must be regarded as due to the process of habituation. In other words, what we mean by character in the individual is very largely a matter of habit. This is especially true if we include in our terms not only the grosser external acts of the individual, which we ordinarily term behavior, but also his internal mental attitudes, ways of thinking and feeling, and, in short, the whole 'set' of his nervous system." Cf. Elliot, *Human Character*, p. 1.

that "a habit can neither be formed without risk of failure in the process, nor permanently retained, when formed, unless it is adapted, not only to the facts of the outer world, but also to the whole of our inner nature."¹¹

"To thine own self be true" is hardly a necessary injunction, for, in a very real sense, one cannot be otherwise. Hocking points out that "if a person lapses at any time, it is obvious that he was 'capable' of that lapse. Hence he who has ever stolen is a thief; and one indiscretion is enough to establish a woman's permanent status."¹² It is just as difficult for an honorable man deliberately to commit even a petty crime as it is for one of the opposite type to refrain if he thinks no one is looking. It is all a matter of character. Character not only predisposes us to positive modes of conduct, but it also "sets up universal negatives." The one is just as restraining as the other is compelling. After reaching a certain stage of maturity, character determines habits to a great extent; whereas before that period, habits were forming which determined character. So fundamental is this influence of character on conduct that even a hypnotized person cannot be made to do an act which "goes against his grain," as the saying is, despite the fact that persons are extremely suggestible when in that state.¹³ Character is so fundamental as to penetrate a man's unconscious self as well as the conscious. Baudouin's statement, based on experiments with patients under hypnosis, is enlightening.

¹¹ Wallas, *The Great Society*, p. 80.

¹² Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 101.

¹³ Cf. Woodworth, *Psychology*, pp. 547-549.

If, for instance, we propose some bad action to a good man, conveying it in the form of posthypnotic suggestion, at the appointed time the idea of performing this act will come into his mind, but he will probably have no difficulty in rejecting the prompting, just as he habitually represses other bad ideas that arise in his mind from time to time. Speaking generally, indifferent suggestions, and those which the subject knows to be useful to him, are accepted; repugnant suggestions are spontaneously rejected.¹⁴

CHARACTER MOTIVES

Character is the basis of predictable conduct. We have here another phase of motivation that lends itself to tantalizing exactness and varying degrees of uncertainty. We judge a stranger's character by his conduct; when we come to know him we judge his conduct by his character. How frequently we hear it said "that is just like him" to do thus and so, or "I do not believe it, that is so unlike him." We are constantly "sizing up" chance acquaintances. We classify our fellows according to certain *prearranged* type labels. When we find one who exhausts our stock of tags we are puzzled and distressed. "I cannot make him out. He is such a mystery," we say and then try again. It is so delightfully convenient to know exactly where to "find" our friends and acquaintances. It is so upsetting when we discover that we have "misplaced" them. In the business world, as elsewhere, character is basic. It is the cornerstone of the credit system, it is the assurance of predictability. Without it the present system could not stand. Character is a man's best asset in business or profession. That is why the law

¹⁴ Baudouin, *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, p. 241.

64 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

allows libel suits in case of defamation of character or reputation. Every employer wants first of all to know something about the character of the prospective employee.

A mere youth is not as good a risk as an older man for the reason that his character is still unformed. . . . A surety company would rather guarantee the honesty of a man who has an unblemished record covering at least ten years. The man who plods along on a safe and sane basis for ten years without any sign of skittishness is a pretty safe bet.¹⁵

The drive of character in motivation means: (1) that specific habits are formed in its service, in its likeness and superscription; (2) that character limits the possible choices and in large measure predetermines the choice in any given case; (3) that character is the steadying factor, the relatively constant, the predictable after a fashion.

Kelly, *Human Nature in Business*, p. 245.

CHAPTER V

INSTINCTS AS MOTIVES

INSTINCT DEFINED

The term instinct is often used as a synonym for motives; hence its significance for motivation is apparently fundamental. Reference has already been made to McDougall's view that instincts are the prime movers of all human activity. The following passage in which this theory is set forth is almost a classic in psychology:

In every case the motive, when truly assigned, will be found to be some instinctive impulse or some conjunction of two or more such impulses. . . . "Take away these instinctive dispositions, with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless, like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn. These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life and mind and will."¹

Woodworth, while agreeing that instincts are of primary importance, denies that they are the only source of motivation. He says, "there are native likes and

¹ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 218. In a footnote he adds: "I have modified the foregoing passage by leaving out a reference to habits as springs of action derived from the instincts, because I seem now to see clearly that, . . . motor habits are not in themselves springs of energy, or 'drive.'" See Chapter IV of this book on "Habits as Motives."

dislikes (for color, tone, number, persons, etc.) to be placed beside the instincts as primary motives."² There is no question as to the fundamental importance of instincts as movers in human conduct,³ but a mere statement of this fact is not very enlightening. It is necessary to show in just what respects instinct is important, at least to indicate the intricate avenues in which the instincts individually and collectively furnish the drives in our complex behavior. Before attempting this difficult task we need to have a definite conception of instinct itself.⁴

Popular terminology has almost ruined the use of the words "instinct" and "instinctive" for scientific purposes.⁵ They are used very loosely. McDougall illustrates this point by a choice collection of examples: "The instinct of subordination," "the instinct of ancestor-worship," "political instinct," "instinct of vengeance," "popular instinct," "the instinct of contradiction and the instinct of acquiescence."⁶

Among psychologists "instinct" has a more restricted usage. But even here there is wide diversity of opinion when it comes to precise definitions. James says that "*Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous educa-*

² Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 137.

³ Cf. Link, "Instinct and Value," *American Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1922, p. 1.

⁴ Cf. Gault, *Social Psychology*, p. 42.

⁵ Cf. Rivers, "Instinct and the Unconscious," *British Journal of Psychology*, Nov., 1919, p. 4. Dunlap, "Are There Any Instincts?" *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1919-1920, Vol. 14, pp. 307-311; Laing, "The Contemporary Theory of Instinct," *Monist*, Jan., 1925, pp. 49-69.

⁶ McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

tion in the performance.”⁷ McDougall, one of the most widely quoted authorities on instinct, defines it as essentially purposive psychophysical disposition.⁸ The threefold nature of instinct which he emphasizes over and over again is brought out explicitly in the statement that “every instance of instinctive behavior involves a knowing of some thing or object, a feeling in regard to it, and a striving towards or away from that object.”⁹

The mechanistic view of instinct is in direct contrast to the “purposive.” There are various shades of differences in the mechanistic interpretation, various modifications of the general definition of instinct as a “series of reflexes.”¹⁰ The tropistic and physiochemical nature of these complex reflexes is emphasized by Loeb,¹¹ Kempf,¹² and Berman.¹³ From a somewhat similar point of view Watson, the behaviorist, says “We should define instinct as an hereditary pattern reaction, the separate elements of which are movements principally of the striped muscles. It might otherwise be expressed as a combination of explicit congenital responses unfolding serially under appropriate stimulation.”¹⁴ Kuo gives a more explicit statement of

⁷ James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 383.

⁸ McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 30.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁰ Hollingworth, *Advertising and Selling*, p. 237: “We may look upon the *instinct* as a very complicated *reflex action*.” Dickinson, *Economic Motives*, p. 101: “An instinct, according to the best scientific usage to-day, is a specific response, or combination of reflexes.” Watson, *Psychology*, p. 106: “An instinct is a series of concatenated reflexes.”

¹¹ Loeb, *Forced Movements Tropisms and Animal Conduct*, p. 156.

¹² Kempf, *Autonomic Functions and Personality*, p. 78.

¹³ Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, p. 172.

¹⁴ Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

this position.¹⁵ Parmelee adds that "an instinct is an inherited combination of reflexes which have been integrated by the central nervous system so as to cause an external activity of the organism which usually characterizes a whole species and is usually adaptive."¹⁶

Thus purposive psychology and mechanistic psychology¹⁷ represent extreme views on instinct as well as on many other phases of mental life.¹⁸ Between these extremes there are several intervening gradations. It is of no special advantage here to heap up definitions of instinct. It will be more fruitful to summarize the points of general agreement and disagreement. This will bring out the essential characteristics of instinct.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INSTINCTIVE BEHAVIOR

To summarize the characteristics of instinctive behavior:

1. Wherever admitted as a factor in mental life, instinct is universally regarded as innate tendency to action. The act is prompted and performed without previous training. It is an unlearned, inborn tendency.

2. It is a persistent tendency toward an end-result as distinguished from reflex which is also an innate tendency but not persistent. The response in reflex follows close upon the heels of the stimulus. The mechanism is more specific and is definitely limited in its "reaction system" as compared with instinct.¹⁹

¹⁵ Cf. Kuo, "How Are Our Instincts Acquired," *Psychological Review*, Sept., 1922, p. 365.

¹⁶ Quoted by Kempf, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁷ Cf. Link, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁸ Cf. Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

¹⁹ Cf. Kantor, *American Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1922, pp. 38-39.

3. Instinct is unreflective; it does not "take thought."

4. It functions through the mechanism of the nervous system.

5. The stimulus may be internal or external. Instinctive activity may be aroused by objects perceived through the sense organs or by memory images of these and other objects or by situations or by ideas.²⁰

6. Instinct leads to action outside the self and is "explicit" as contrasted with emotion which is subjective (a "stirred up feeling") and is largely "implicit."²¹

7. Instinct is accompanied by uneasiness until the end is realized. McDougall goes so far as to assert that every instinct has an emotional accompaniment, is itself the impulse phase of a definite primary emotion.²² Woodworth,²³ Drever,²⁴ and Shand²⁵ are inclined to disagree. However, it is generally conceded that at least some instinctive reactions have emotional accompaniment and that all of them set up a sort of uneasiness to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon the intensity of the stimulus and the intensity and duration of opposition.

8. Instinct is more or less conscious. While the impulse is toward a definite end the end may or may not be consciously perceived; the means surely need

²⁰ Cf. Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 565.

²¹ Cf. Watson, "A Schematic Outline of the Emotions," *Psychological Review*, May, 1919, p. 167; Edman, *Human Traits*, p. 18; McDougall, "Instinct and the Unconscious," *British Journal of Psychology*, Nov., 1919, p. 38; Hocking, *Human Nature*, p. 417.

²² McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 35, 49.

²³ Woodworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.

²⁴ Drever, *Instinct in Man*, p. 159.

²⁵ Shand, *Foundations of Character*, pp. 188, 531.

not be. There is difference of opinion on this point among psychologists.²⁶

9. There are nascent periods for particular instincts or instinctive acts. James and others think that instincts not only have nascent periods, but also, in some cases, periods of senescence and death as well.²⁷ The general belief, however, is that although instincts are greatly modified by training and social pressure they nevertheless remain a part of the permanent native endowment.

10. Instinct is modifiable, educable to some extent.²⁸ The central thing in instinct is impulse. To be sure it has affective and cognitive elements or accompaniments, but that is doubtless due to experience and learned associations. The essential urge is the vital energy.²⁹

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING SPECIFIC INSTINCTS

There has always been a tendency to look for *the* instinct, the undifferentiated native mass urge. This

²⁶ Cf. James, *loc. cit.*; Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 131; Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, p. 186; Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious," *British Journal of Psychology*, Nov., 1919, p. 17; McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 27; Wright, *Self-Realization*, p. 138; Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 173; Drever, "Instinct and the Unconscious," *British Journal of Psychology*, Nov., 1919, p. 33.

²⁷ Cf. James, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 402; McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 42; Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

²⁸ Cf. Warren, *Elements of Human Psychology*, p. 237; Reaney, *British Journal of Psychology* (Monograph Supplement), 1916, p. 16; Hollingworth and Poffenberger, *Applied Psychology*, p. 24; Buckingham, *Personality and Psychology*, p. 126; Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 195; James, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 390.

²⁹ No one can say just where the purely physical and chemical reactions leave off and the purely psychic begin, nor can we draw a line of demarcation between the psychic and the so-called spiritual. In the interest of clarity it seems better not to make the attempt.

is expressed in such phrases as the "nexus of life," "*l'élan vital*," "the will to live," "the will to power,"³⁰ etc. And what lends plausibility to this view is that "the evolution of the animal world may properly be conceived as primarily and essentially the differentiation of instinctive tendencies from some primordial undifferentiated capacity to strive. . . . We may regard the instincts as so many differentiated channels through which vital energy pours itself into or through the organism."³¹ Those who think that the "differentiation" is not sufficient to justify a list of specific instincts speak of the "instinct of self-preservation." Others would add the "instinct of propagating and preserving the species." The self-regarding impulses of "self-assertion" and "self-abasement" seem so fundamental that one could easily regard them as the primordial stuff for other so-called instincts which might be conceived as native reactions to specific stimuli—a type of reflex having greater flexibility than the ordinary reflex. But the differentiation seems to be too well established to allow such an interpretation. Moreover the distinction would be purely verbal and not especially enlightening. Whatever we may choose to call these impulses they are vital facts in the mental life and the term instinct is about as good as any, provided we bear in mind that *instincts represent elementary, irreducible, innate, persistent tendencies*.

Specific instincts presuppose certain criteria for making the selection. There are several sets of cri-

³⁰ Cf. Hocking, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

³¹ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 113.

teria offered by various psychologists. Perhaps Drever's list is as good as any. It has the advantage of being comprehensive. Drever's five tests are: "(1) Irreducibility by introspective analysis to simpler components. (2) Arousal of impulse and emotion, with its specific and unmistakable expressive signs, by specific objects or specific kinds of objects, prior to individual experience of these objects. (3) Manifestation in the early months of child life. (4) Wide diffusion in the animal world. (5) Occurrence in exaggerated form under pathological conditions."³²

The classification or grouping of the specific instincts varies according to the purpose or point of view. Pillsbury groups them under three heads: personal, racial, and social.³³ Woodworth classifies the instincts as responses to organic need, responses to other persons, and play responses.³⁴ Drever calls them "tendencies" and classifies under appetite tendencies (general, specific), instinct tendencies (general, specific—pure and emotional).³⁵ Warren gives the instincts in six groups as nutritive, reproductive, defensive, aggressive, social, and individual development.³⁶ There are other and different types of classification.³⁷ But there is no real significance in the grouping, for in actual life the various instincts overlap.

³² Drever, *Instinct in Man*, p. 173.

³³ Pillsbury, *Fundamentals of Psychology*, p. 224.

³⁴ Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

³⁵ Drever, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

³⁶ Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

³⁷ Cf. MacCurdy, *Problems of Dynamic Psychology*, p. 262; Jones, "The Classification of the Instincts," *British Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1924, pp. 256-261; Drever, "The Classification of the Instincts," *British Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1924, pp. 248-255.

SPECIFIC INSTINCTS

There is no general agreement concerning the specific instincts. Many psychologists seem inclined to avoid the responsibility of naming definite instincts and prefer to speak of "instinctive tendencies," "instinctive propensities," and the like.³⁸ Among those who still believe in specific instincts is McDougall whose list contains the minimum number of instincts, namely, flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-assertion, self-abasement, and the parental instinct. As minor instincts he mentions reproduction, gregariousness, acquisitiveness, construction. Under general innate tendencies he lists sympathy, suggestion and suggestibility, imitation, play, and temperament.³⁹ Warren's list may be taken as an example not so much of specific instincts as of instinctive behavior having to do with walking, feeding, wandering (hunting), acquiring (hoarding), cleanliness, diffused expression, fighting, submission, hiding, avoiding, modesty (shyness), clothing (covering), constructing (home-making), family (parental and filial), tribal (herding), "apopathetic," sympathetic, antipathetic, coöperative, mating (sexual attraction, courtship), maternal, filial (of infancy), fighting, resenting, domineering, rivalry, imitateness,

³⁸ Allport substitutes six "prepotent reflexes"—starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reactions, sensitive—zone reactions, sex reactions, *Social Psychology*, p. 50.

³⁹ McDougall, *Social Psychology*, Chaps. III, IV. In his later book, *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 130 ff., the list of instincts includes the parental or protective, combat, curiosity, food-seeking, repulsion, escape, gregariousness, passive sympathy, self-assertion and submission, mating, acquisition, construction, appeal.

playfulness, curiosity, dexterity (right-handedness), communicativeness, æsthetic expression.⁴⁰

These two lists are fair examples of the minimum and maximum number of specific instincts. In the absence of a consensus of opinion we must select a list of our own. Omitting the native tendencies that resemble reflexes and appetites more than instincts proper and keeping in mind the criterion of irreducibility to simpler components, we may name the following as specific instincts: physical activity (random movements), flight, self-regarding impulses (self-assertion and submission), curiosity, pugnacity, acquisition (construction and manipulation), mating, parental, gregariousness. All the others included in some lists are names of emotions or reflexes or appetites (vegetative instincts) or compounds of two or more legitimate elementary instincts.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SPECIFIC INSTINCTS IN MOTIVATION

1. *Undifferentiated activity* (random movements). Among the native tendencies none is more primitive and fundamental than activity. Without this urge to begin with it is difficult to see how the animal could function, to say nothing of acquiring new mechanisms and habits. Life itself is dynamic and hence the organism "craves" activity. Every adverse situation is a challenge, so to speak. From the very first the vegetative instincts, appetites, reflexes begin to function in response to the environment. Aside from the purely physical and chemical reactions there is a real urge

⁴⁰ Warren, *op. cit.*, p. 238. For a comprehensive summary of the various classifications of specific instincts see Bernard, *Instinct*, Chap. VIII, "The Classification of Instincts," pp. 148-171.

here in the activity itself. Not only the end (nutrition, physical comfort, etc.) but the means (the act) is gratifying and constitutes a drive. At first activity is necessarily undifferentiated. But gradually by repetition of the pleasant or satisfying and rewarding movements the individual comes to acquire new mechanisms and new drives. The original urge, however, is never destroyed. It continues to manifest itself in uneasiness which is characteristic of all instincts during the "persistent" stage. Sheer activity is here included among the instincts because it meets all the tests of instinctive conduct. Possibly it is the only one that is "pure" in that it is scarcely modifiable and may always be counted upon as a definite, particular urge. It constitutes about the only truly instinctive drive in play and games which, as such, are learned movements—acquired mechanisms with possibly acquired drives. Physical activity has a legitimate place as an element along with the other instinctive tendencies which motivate our everyday life.

2. *Curiosity, flight, pugnacity.* Although these are separate instincts and often antagonistic, not infrequently they go together. It is the urge in curiosity that prompts the individual to explore, to venture, to take risks—and in consequence to learn. Curiosity often initiates activity which may acquire a drive of its own. It is the condition for practically all learning. It is the chief urge in adventure, wanderlust, dangerous games and risky adventures of all kinds. As a sort of check upon this urge is that of flight or escape, the drive to run from the strange, the untried, the terrifying. This is the impulse which makes for discretion as well as for cowardice. Facing danger

and escaping unhurt is a thrill worth having. The interest in many a game is furnished by this factor. A young child was observed to approach cautiously (impelled by curiosity) the open mouth of a fierce-looking toy crocodile, touch the object and run away (flight). In this instance the two drives were so well balanced that it was virtually a game. If the escape motive had been stronger the child would have been frightened to tears and wailing instead of being agreeably thrilled. Pugnacity, or the fighting instinct, may be aroused in the interest of curiosity or on its own account when the urge is to attack rather than to run away. This impulse may lead a person to be cruel and destructive or it may be sublimated into heroic conduct, championing a cause, sacrificing himself for the group, overcoming an obstacle for the sheer joy of exercising the instinct itself. It may be recalled that *all* instinctive acts normally bring satisfaction. Curiosity, escape, pugnacity are primitive drives which serve the individual to fit the environment to the needs and wants of the organism as well as to adapt the organism to the environment.

3. *The self-regarding impulses (self-assertion and self-abasement).* The self-regarding impulses of self-assertion and submission taken together constitute the most important drive in human conduct. They furnish dynamite for a large percentage of all our behavior and are the main agencies for socializing the individual. It is because we have the innate desire to "shine"⁴¹ before our fellows that social pressure has such a tremendous hold on us. The same urge puts

⁴¹ Cf. Hall and Smith, "Showing Off and Bashfulness as Phases of Self-Consciousness," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. X, pp. 159-199.

the force in self-respect, shame, self-control, sacrifice, work, perseverance, ambition, leadership, law, etc. In the present study this urge is regarded as so fundamental and far-reaching in our complex life in society and so effective in modifying other drives in socialization that a whole chapter is devoted to it.⁴²

4. *The instinct of acquisition.* A boy's pocket is the best proof for this instinct. It is quite natural for a boy to gather a miscellany of strings, marbles, jack-knives, bits of broken glass—anything that he may call his own. This is the urge in work in most instances, especially when one keeps on accumulating wealth long after the practical necessity for it ceases to exist. In its extreme or perverted form it leads to miserliness, avarice, greed, and stealing. But the innate impulse of acquisition is not in itself bad. This is true of all the instincts. The evil in any instinct is due to perversion, oversuppression or overindulgence.

Acquisitiveness is closely allied to self-assertion. Possession adds to a man's self-respect and general self-satisfaction regardless of the intrinsic value of the thing possessed. The story is told of a preacher who once borrowed five dollars from a friend on a Saturday evening and returned it early Monday morning. The curious friend wanted to know why he had borrowed the money, seeing he had had no opportunity for spending it. The reply was, "I can preach a whole lot better when I have something in my pocket." The "sense" of possession, or rather the absence of the feeling of "being broke" added to his power and effectiveness. By virtue of the fact that we come to identify

⁴² See Chapter XI.

ourselves with our possessions the urge in this instinct is intensified. The more we have the greater and more significant we appear in our own eyes and in the eyes of others. Hence, as is true of many other instincts, there is considerable reënforcement of the original urge by aid from other instincts and from acquired and associated drives.

5. *The instinct of construction (manipulation).* Even among the lower animals and insects the instinct of construction is evidenced by nests, holes in the ground, hives, and, in the case of the beaver and some others, more elaborate dwellings. Obviously, man as the "tool-using" animal is more strikingly motivated by the urge of construction. Among animals this instinct has rather limited and fairly stereotyped ways of realization; whereas in man the practical means are almost limitless. The human desire to create, to make, to construct, to erect is practically universal. There is special fascination for those occupations, other things being equal, which give opportunity for creative endeavor. And the more intricate and valuable the thing created, the more highly prized, the greater the urge and the satisfaction therefrom. This is well illustrated by ability in the fine arts. Here again, the instinct is scarcely ever a pure impulse for construction, for many other factors and motives are likely to contribute driving power. Nevertheless, the chief drive in many instances is furnished by this instinct together with the related impulse of manipulation. For man, and possibly also for some apes, there seems to be satisfaction in manipulating objects. It brings a certain sense of mastery.

6. *The gregarious instinct.* Whenever we find ani-

mals who herd, flock, pack, school, drove, hive, fold, swarm, in fine, who eat or work or play or live together we find evidence of the drive of the gregarious impulse. Animals of this type have found it to their advantage to coöperate to a greater or lesser degree. As a result when one member is isolated from the group he feels uncomfortable, uneasy, restless, lonesome and strives to join the group. Gregariousness is sometimes called the social instinct. With the possible exception of the white ants and some other insects who have a highly organized communal life, human beings are the most social of animals. Of course in the strict sense of the term social there can be no exception to human beings as the most social. This instinct together with others furnishes the incentive for all forms of social organizations and activities. People belonging to the same religious faith, organize; those passing through unusual experiences, such as a war, an earthquake, an ocean disaster, anything out of the ordinary, organize. The papers recently reported that a club had been formed whose membership was limited to people of a particular type of nose. There are many forces other than gregariousness that bring people together. The social impulse is nevertheless a very potent element—so potent that solitary confinement is now almost wholly tabooed because it is considered decidedly inhuman. In solitary confinement men frequently lose their minds. The pathetic side of this cruel form of punishment is seen in the fact that people in solitary confinement make friends with any and every living creature that may chance to come near them—mice, rats, lice, flies, even flowers or any sort of vegetation that may come within their reach, are cared for and

treated with such tenderness and regard as to move the most heartless. The social impulse is not always recognized as such nor is it likely to be consciously perceived as a motive force, nevertheless it is one of the fundamental elementary drives.

7. *The parental and mating instincts.* The mating impulse is prompted by the sex urge, the parental instinct, and gregariousness. It operates to maintain the life of the species. From the viewpoint of the individual, however, this urge may not seem very strong. The individual is more likely to be conscious of the sex appetite, although the parental instinct is a powerful contributing force not prominent in consciousness. Courtship is a stage in the process and regarded by some as a separate instinct. These urges individually and collectively are among the strongest that motivate conduct. They lead to lasting relationships and heavy obligations often entailing personal risk and exacting self-sacrifice. The mating instinct as expressed in conjugal love may lead the lover through "fire and water." The strength of this urge is proverbial. It is immortalized in story and song and drama and painting. The drive in parental love is stronger than self-love. A parent worthy of the name is ready to make any sacrifice for his own children. Parental love, with its counterpart, filial love, is the force that holds the institution of the home inviolate. It also furnishes the drive for many philanthropic institutions and enterprises. Love is the motive *par excellence*. We cannot do it justice here. Chapter XX is devoted to "Love as Motive" where the subject is discussed more fully in its various phases.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY OF INSTINCTS AS MOTIVES

The instincts do not account for *all* the springs of action. But they certainly do account for a very large percentage of our acts. They are insistent, primary, innate drives of compelling magnitude. The large majority of our acts may be traced directly or indirectly to some instinct or instincts. For the problem of motivation, however, the general statement that instincts furnish the motive for all or nearly all of human behavior, is not especially enlightening because: (1) There is no pure instinct in actual life. No instinct ever functions by itself, it is always influenced by other motives. (2) All instincts are prejudiced from the start by habits.⁴³ (3) They are constantly altered by social pressure. (4) Instincts may be, and often are, sublimated—hence, the present attempt at a comprehensive discussion of the problem.

And yet, despite these limitations, instincts are prime movers and their significance may be summarized as follows: (1) However obscured by habit and social pressure they determine to some extent at least the set or purpose, the sort of things we shall be interested in.⁴⁴ (2) They direct the subconscious in many important ways.⁴⁵ (3) While the instinct may acquire a new association it is not thereby destroyed; the trigger for the release of its energies is placed in other hands, that is all.⁴⁶ (4) Instincts control a large share of the in-

⁴³ Cf. Watson, *Psychology*, p. 264.

⁴⁴ Cf. MacCurdy, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

⁴⁵ Cf. Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious," *British Journal of Psychology*, Nov., 1919, pp. 20f.

⁴⁶ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 110: "Native human nature supplies the raw materials, but custom furnishes the ma-

dividual's stock of general energy and carry the fuse.⁴⁷
 (5) Instincts are adaptable in their means of realization, hence their real strength is seldom fully realized.

The sublimated instincts in the process of socialization⁴⁸ make it necessary to study the various phases of social life, in order to understand the motives and drives actuating human beings in a social environment. This is the task to which we address ourselves more specifically in the latter half of the book.

chinery and the design"; cf. Fosdick, *Twelve Tests of Character*, p. 145; Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, p. 114.

⁴⁷ Cf. Horton, "Origin and Psychological Function of Religion according to Pierre Janet," *American Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1924, p. 21.

⁴⁸ Cf. Ellwood, "The Instincts in Social Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1919, pp. 71-75; Kantor, "The Problem of Instinct and Its Relation to Social Psychology," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, 1923, pp. 50-77; Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 123-141.

CHAPTER VI

EMOTIONS AS MOTIVES

EMOTIONS DEFINED

Emotion is dynamic. Once you have an emotion you must do something with it or it will do something to you. Psychoanalysts claim that habitual repressions and "short-circuiting," or allowing an emotion to drain off in unnatural channels, results in mental derangements, social maladjustments, and neuroses. "No person," says Carver, "has ever satisfactorily defined emotion, and any attempt to isolate it from its setting, so to speak, is foredoomed to failure; for emotion is only one part or aspect of a more comprehensive internal adjustment which takes place in higher animals in order to enable them to react as a whole and more completely to dominate any sudden change in their environment. The individual can no longer be regarded as made up of body and mind; he is a biological entity whose activities are manifest at various levels representing successive stages of his evolutionary progress."¹

Some of the physical manifestations of the emotional state may be objectively observed in facial expressions, muscle tension, labored breathing, reflexive responses such as pallor, or flushed appearance, showing the teeth, flashing eyes, tremors, "goose flesh,"

¹ Carver, "The Generation and Control of Emotion," *British Journal of Psychology*, April, 1919, p. 52.

"hair raising," etc., in case of anger, fear, and rage. The more pleasant emotions find physical expression in smiling, with corresponding reflexes and bodily reactions.

There is also an inner organic accompaniment in emotion. This has to do largely with the visceral and glandular systems.² The glands of "external secretion" in an emotional state become more active in some instances and less in others. Sweating is stimulated in fear and anger, the tear glands are likely to be called on in the event of sorrow or grief. On the other hand, fear and anger are likely to reduce greatly the activity of the salivary glands and completely stop the digestive juices in general. The glands of "internal secretion" are also profoundly influenced. Chief among these is the increased activity of the adrenals which are the emergency glands. They are instrumental in liberating the stored-up sugar in the liver which in turn energizes the muscle cells by bringing to them, through the blood stream, just the food they want. This type of reaction utilizes the whole of the autonomic nervous system and places the organism in a state of "preparedness."

Emotion, then, is the general reconditioning of the mechanisms and drives; a mobilization of available reserves, inhibiting unnecessary movements and functions, accelerating the emergency forces. It is a demand for quick mobilization. It is a powerful motive, but needs a stimulus.³ The stimulus may be ex-

² Cf. Prince, *The Unconscious*, p. 441.

³ Cf. Calkins, *A First Book in Psychology*, p. 172; Wechsler, "What Constitutes an Emotion?" *Psychological Review.*, Vol. XXXII, p. 238; Bernard, *Instinct*, p. 507; "Emotion is not the cause of activity."

ternal or internal. Objects, persons, ideas, easily become attached, through associations, to typical emotional states. Some of these are associated to primary emotions, others to more complex or compound emotions and sentiments. Moreover the same emotional experience may become "conditioned" by a number of different stimuli. This is especially true in sense perception.

To arouse the emotion a sensory channel is indispensable. For fear it may be smell; it may be contact; it may be sight; it may be sound. It depends upon how the organism is sensitized. The like is true of anger, the great counterpart of fear. Smell-induced fears are common in animal psychology; the deer is alarmed by the human odor and is approached by the cautious hunter from the leeward; the fittings of the trap are suspected by the fox because of the taint of human manipulation. Kittens with eyelids still sealed will spit and hiss when a hand that has fondled a dog carries the canine scent to them. For animal rage the smell of blood is as exciting as its color. Touch has its play in instinctive emotion; the contact of fur causes violent alarm in some infants, and shrinking dislike in others.⁴

The force of the stimulus is modified by (1) the organic state; (2) the nature of the object; (3) past experience; (4) strength of the association bonds; (5) presence of inhibitory or conflicting factors; (6) reinforcements and summations; (7) compound emotions and sentiments.

As a rule opposition intensifies the emotion. In many instances interference with an instinctive activity acts as a signal to arouse an emotion or the emotional state. The powerful urge of emotion is usually em-

⁴ Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, pp. 121-122.

ployed in the service of instincts. Emotion is sometimes defined as the conscious phase of instinct, the affective side of impulse. Ellwood reminds us that "*the whole emotional life is instinctive*. Love and hate, fear and trust, pity and revenge, and all the other emotions are simply feeling sensation complexes attached to hereditary reactions—although not all instincts have attached to them distinct emotions. What we call the 'passions' are simply the human instincts with their attendant emotions, roused to such a point that the intellect no longer has full control." ⁵

The main distinctions between instinct and emotion may be summarized as follows: (1) while both are innate, unlearned tendencies, emotion has wider range of possible associations.⁶ Almost any object may arouse an emotion depending upon the previous affective associations. This is the basis for sentiment, also for compound and derived emotions as well as compounding of impulses and other mental factors. (2) The tendency in instinct is to "do something"; in emotion the adjustments are subjective, "feeling somehow," a "stirred-up state of mind." (3) Instinct is an impulse to direct action; emotion is indirect so far as the end result is concerned or when the end result is outside the self—it is a preparatory reaction. Aside from reinforcing impulsive and instinctive urges, emotion is a powerful drive in its own right, especially when the end-result is confined to a bodily state. Not infrequently the quality of an emotional state is a drive and end in itself. (4) Emotional conduct is contagious;

⁵ Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 193; cf. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage*, p. 2.

⁶ Cf. Shand, *Foundations of Character*, p. 192.

instinctive reactions, as such, are not. It is very easy to communicate emotions. It was the first language, and the only language among some of the lower animals. Among gregarious creatures emotions and emotional states are communicated by physical manifestations of the emotion on the part of a member of its group, by cries and other vocal indications of danger. Fear, because of its survival value, is more fundamental and hence most easily aroused and communicated: witness panic and stampede. In human beings emotion with its physical manifestations is a good clue to judging the motives of others, their attitude towards us (whether friendly or otherwise). Subjectively the bodily states accompanying emotion make us aware of our own impulses and motives. Emotion then is useful in discriminating the intensity and quality of objective and subjective conduct in others and in ourselves.

The fact that both instinct and emotion are teleological, are persistent tendencies leading to end-results, makes the alliance between the two very close, so close, indeed, that not infrequently their names are used interchangeably as synonyms. Even James lists the emotions of anger and fear among the instincts. The close coöperation of instinct and emotion is emphasized by McDougall ⁷ who insists that the drive is in the instinct which has more or less specific affective or emotional accompaniment. For example, the instinct of combat

⁷ Cf. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 324; cf. Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 457; "Since emotions represent the inhibition or modification of neural processes rather than constitute their conscious correlates, they occur as readily in connection with the interruption or modification of habits as of instincts."

88 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

(aggression, pugnacity) is accompanied by the emotion of anger (rage, fury, annoyance, irritation, displeasure). To bring this out more clearly he lists the instincts with their corresponding emotional accompaniments. As stated in our discussion of instincts as motives, it is doubtful if the two can be considered as coterminous, for the reasons given. The so-called primary emotions, however, are strictly analogous to the primary instincts.

PRIMARY EMOTIONS

If we are to speak intelligibly of compound emotions, derived emotions, and sentiments it is necessary to have a clear notion of the elementary, specific emotions. These are known as primary emotions. There is no general agreement on a list of the primary emotions, much less on a general classification of all the emotional states.⁸ Perhaps the discrepancy is due in part to the criteria employed. Shand adopts the following four tests to determine primary emotions: early manifestation in child-life, wide diffusion in the animal world, irreducible to further elements, and genuinely instinctive in earliest manifestations.⁹

Shand arrives at the conclusion that the primary emotions are fear, anger, joy, sorrow, curiosity, repugnance, disgust. The rest are compounds derived from these elementary emotions and attached to specific objects or ideas in the form of compound emotions and sentiments.

⁸ Cf. Warren, *Elements of Human Psychology*, p. 215; Watson, *Psychology*, p. 199; Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, p. 286; Watson, "A Schematic Outline of the Emotions," *Psychological Review*, May, 1919, pp. 165-196.

⁹ Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIMARY EMOTIONS IN MOTIVATION

1. *Fear and Anger.* These two emotions are antagonistic, yet often reënforce each other. Both are fundamental in that they serve the organism as protectors in its struggle for survival and supremacy. The instincts of flight or escape and submission or self-abasement are central in fear. Pugnacity furnishes impulsive drive in anger. As a rule fear and anger tend to replace each other because the organism must act as a unit—must either fight or flee. But one is often motivated by both emotions in succession. Anger may finally give way to fear or fear may turn into anger. Unless the stimulus is unusually strong or the organism unduly “timid” the tendency is for fear to enlist anger in its service, or rather to be replaced by it, for, as a rule, the organic status, the preparatory reactions, are quite different in fear from what they are in anger. The whipped cur, motivated by fear, his body cringing, his tail between his legs, crawling on his belly with every mark of submission, presents quite a different picture from the angry brute with his arched back, and bristling mane, making a loud, gruff noise and showing his teeth, his whole bearing one of defiance, the aim being to strike terror in the heart of the enemy and secure his destruction or submission. When fear becomes terror it defeats its own ends. The organism is no longer capable of taking advantage of escape movements, and may have to succumb to his enemy. Perhaps this is a preliminary to an easy quietus. If the stimulus to fear is sufficiently strong to induce a state of desperation without striking terror and its accompanying weakness and paral-

ysis you have a very dangerous animal to deal with: witness a "beast at bay" fighting "with his back to the wall." Bravery means the overcoming of fear and cowardice means giving in to it.

If there are any "original" fears they are certainly very few compared with the numerous objects and situations we come—through unpleasant and hurtful experiences—to associate with objects of fear that produce fear responses in us. Watson, experimenting in this field, comes to the conclusion that

the principal situations which call out fear responses seem to be as follows: (1) To suddenly remove from the infant all means of support, as when one drops it from the hands to be caught by an assistant . . . ; (2) by loud sounds; (3) occasionally when an infant is just falling asleep or is just ready to waken, a sudden push or a slight shake is an adequate stimulus; (4) when an infant is just falling asleep, occasionally the sudden pulling of the blanket upon which it is lying will produce the fear responses.¹⁰

It is obvious that most of our fears are acquired—not the impulse nor the emotion, but the association of objects and situations with their native tendencies. Fear, in moderation, is natural and wholesome. It has protective and survival value, but when carried to extremes or perverted it may develop into a chronic state known as the "phobias" of various types, depending on the object of the obsessive fear.

Fear is certainly a potent force in motivation. But aside from the common objects of fear it is of no real value to list the various fears of mankind. There is too great a variation from person to person depending on

¹⁰ Watson, *Psychology*, p. 199.

(1) past experience, (2) temperament, (3) mood, and (4) organic state. Some of the common fears that motivate our conduct are: fear of losing one's reputation or position, the love of those that are dear to us, health, fear of violence or physical injury, pain, disease, fear of discovery of past misdeed or injustice to another (where such exist), fear of hell (not as common or pronounced as it used to be), and the fear of death.¹¹ Besides these and many others, there are numerous worries and anxieties over the wardrobe and cupboard and social club. There are differences to be sure, but many fears are common and may be counted on as definite drives and motives in our conduct. Keen competition and the terrific struggle for existence keep most of us on the *qui vive* and make neurotics out of some and criminals out of others.

Anger is likely to be more intense or violent than fear, but shorter in duration unless it turns into revenge, in which case it may become the dominating passion of a man's life for years or the rest of his natural

¹¹ MacDonald, "Death Psychology of Historical Personages," *American Journal of Psychology*, Oct., 1921, p. 553, *Fear of Death*; "In life the fear of anything is often much worse than the thing itself. This is especially true in the case of death. When the dying hour comes, the fear of death disappears. Whether it is the brain, heart or lungs which give the signal of death, the brain forces are usually weakened or destroyed first, causing sensation to lessen or cease. Whether there be consciousness to the last, or only at times, depends upon the nature of the disease and the mental and moral character of the person dying; and this in connection with surrounding conditions. In old age death is the last sleep, showing no difference from normal sleep. The general consensus of opinion based upon the experience of all ages is that the dreadfulness of death and its physical pain are for the most part in the imagination." Cf. Hall, *Morale*, pp. 361-364: "I have compiled from medical literature a table of 276 phobias or morbid fears showing man's manifold proclivities to timidity."

life. But as a rule anger is an emergency motive and of comparatively short duration.¹²

Anger is usually aroused by some unpleasant or hurtful stimulus or situation as in fear, the main difference being in the type of response—an effort to get rid of the displeasing stimulus by attacking it, injuring or destroying rather than merely seeking to escape it as in the case of fear. It is therefore always some sort of opposition¹³ or obstruction that calls forth the emotion of anger which once aroused may become a terrific drive in itself.

2. *Joy and sorrow.* This pair of emotions represents the greater extremes of affective tones of “being pleased” and of the opposite or “sadness.” They are more moved than moving, more truly organic states than fear or anger. As sources of motivation their contribution is indirect, they “color” or modify other motives. And that is a very real influence. Joy is thoroughly satisfied with the “status quo,” it seeks to continue contact with the stimulus. The physical manifestations in joy or sorrow vary greatly, especially in sorrow. There is a type which runs out at the eyes to the tune of sobs and groans. The other type is more inward and possibly deeper.¹⁴

3. *Curiosity.* Here, more than anywhere else, it is difficult to make a distinction between the instinct and the emotion. So close is the connection that the same term is used to cover both. We have already discussed curiosity as an instinct.¹⁵ On the emotional side curiosity is the chief element in wonder, mystery, astonish-

¹² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 65.

¹³ Cf. Shand, *op. cit.*, pp. 227, 229, 233.

¹⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 302, 305, 311, 314, 316.

¹⁵ See pp. 75-76.

ment, surprise, attractiveness in the new, the novel, the strange, the sudden, the unexpected (the state of expectancy). In these instances not only the attention, but the whole personality is "captivated," roused, stimulated, quickened, even startled it may be. Each of these contain a true elementary emotion or a combination of such emotions. Whether it shall be a pleasant or unpleasant shock depends upon what follows. If fear, anger, sorrow, repugnance or disgust are aroused the total impression is likely to be unpleasant. But even here the first shock of surprise itself is exhilarating, not exactly pleasant perhaps, but having a strange fascination nevertheless.

Wonder and astonishment tend to continue the state of suspense because the stimulus is pleasant or desirable or fascinating. "*Wonder is a complex emotion due to the conjunction of joy, astonishment, and curiosity, which pursues as its end the knowledge of that which causes it.*"¹⁶ The lure in fairy tales, mystery religions (to some extent, mysticism), outstanding costumes, strange odors (not unpleasant), rehearsal of impossible exploits, magic, dreams and daydreams, fortune-telling, astrology, the "philosopher's stone," the "fountain of youth," in fine, an opportunity for the play of imagination under appropriate circumstances is to be found in the impulse and emotion of curiosity. That this is a real motive in life no one can deny. In the section on "Thrill as a Motive"¹⁷ the subject is discussed more fully and from a slightly different angle. Of course the so-called artistic, imaginative temperaments are more susceptible to the curiosity

¹⁶ Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

¹⁷ See pp. 114ff.

and mystery motive than the practical man of affairs, children more than adults, the naïve more than the *blasé*. And yet, it is perfectly normal to a greater or lesser extent to be motivated by the emotion of curiosity, with its associated emotions of wonder, astonishment, and the rest. Shaftesbury's description of this urge bears repeating. ". . . What stronger pleasure is there with mankind, or what do they earlier learn or longer retain, than the love of hearing and relating things strange and incredible? How wonderful a thing is the love of wondering, and of raising wonder! 'Tis the delight of children to hear tales they shiver at, and the vice of old age to abound in stories of times past. We come into the world wondering at everything, and when our wonder about common things is over, we seek something new to wonder at."¹⁸

4. *Repugnance, disgust.* Doubtless repugnance and disgust are primary emotions, but they are "contentless" at the outset and become associated with objects of unpleasant sensory experience. Once these associations are formed the mere thought of the object is sufficient to arouse the emotion. There are doubtless objects naturally repulsive or disgusting to most people at the very first contact, such as slimy or clammy substances, crawling, wriggling reptilian forms, scraping, shrill or rasping noises, nauseous odors, foul tastes, and the like. It will be noted that for every one of the senses these objects exist and excite an emotion of disgust. Hence while each sense is a source of pleasure and amusement it is also subject to the opposite

¹⁸ Shaftesbury, *The Moralists, a Rhapsody*, p. 325, quoted by Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 451.

affective state. They possess survival value in that they protect the organism from danger of poisoning and other destructive influences. To safeguard the organism and make repulsion doubly sure a strong affective state is added to the reflexive responses charged with the duty of shutting out or rejecting incompatible and dangerous substances and objects from the body and experience of the organism. The reflexes of repugnance and disgust are: shivering, spitting, coughing, vomiting, all of them designed to get rid of the intrusion. The sense of sight is protected by turning the head; the organism as a whole, by pushing the object away. The gesture of negation and scorn is made quite unconsciously by a speaker when he brushes aside the imaginary person or objective idea in effective pantomime with a brisk swing of the arm away from his body.

There is considerable spread in the association of a disgusting object with the various sense perceptions. Thus the mere sight of a clammy object is enough to rouse the emotion of disgust and loathing that was originally experienced by coming in actual contact with a similar object although this particular one may have proved upon examination to be quite free from clamminess. The same is true of all the other senses. No matter by what sense we first experience disgust in connection with an object, the moment we perceive a similar object by any one sense or a combination of senses, we reëxperience the appropriate emotion. If one steps on a rope in the dark and mistakes it for a snake he will have all the physical reactions that would be his in seeing an actual snake, or in hearing one swish through the grass. Sometimes the mere thought

or idea or image of the object is sufficient to induce the emotion.

We have different terms to express the degree of repugnance and disgust, running from the milder states of "dislike" and "aversion" to "loathsome" and "nauseous."

Unlike the other primary emotions, repugnance and disgust are more direct in their end-results although they are also preparatory reactions, or rather the end-result in these instances seems to be practically identical with the preparatory reactions.

SECONDARY EMOTIONS

The emotions have a wide range of adaptability through the laws of association. The primary emotions have a great number of "blends" into more or less complex compounds. The sources of stimulation are almost limitless and yet the emotional states resulting therefrom, though differing in degree of intensity from person to person and from time to time in the same person, are fairly definite and furnish intelligible descriptions of actual situations. For example, grief, revenge, scorn, gratitude, awe, pity, shame, etc., stand for definite emotional states on the basis of which we may predict conduct. A person "actuated" by gratitude may be expected to act quite differently from one who is moved by jealousy or hate. In other words, these compound and complex emotions, as well as the primary emotions, are important in motivation. The main distinction is that in the complex emotions the motive is secondary, whereas in the primary emotion the motive is also primary, and resides, for the most part, in the instinct side of the instinct-emotion com-

bination. Nevertheless, a secondary compound emotion is a drive in itself once it is aroused or comes into being as such. As soon as the emotion is born the drive is also present. Moreover, a secondary emotion may be a compound containing not one but two or more instinctive drives in its make-up, unified and harnessed for action. Hence the push is much stronger than in the case of a primary emotion or a primary instinct. The sentiment of patriotism, for example, usually combines the primary instincts of gregariousness, parental instinct, fear, possibly pugnacity and anger, and many other elements. This sentiment is strong enough to drive a man out from his fireside and loved ones to risk his health and life and to do it, in many instances, cheerfully. Now, if patriotism has any meaning at all it must be taken as such and not split up into its elements and the motive power ascribed to those elements any more than one may take a chemical compound and say that it is made up of such and such elements. While made up of elements the compound has distinctive characteristics not found in any of the elements and often quite different. The same is true of emotional compounds, to a greater or lesser extent, true compounds that have names conveying definite meaning descriptive of unitary states. This unitary state has a drive of its own.

This truth should become more apparent from the following classification of compound emotions. While an attempt is made to name at least some of the essential elements the chief concern is with the compounds as unitary facts in mental life and in motivation. These secondary emotions may be compounds of: (1) two or more primary emotions; (2) primary emotions plus in-

instincts; (3) primary emotions plus sensibilities; (4) emotions due to conflicts of one sort or another; (5) association of emotions with persons, ideas, and objects giving rise to sentiments and "complexes"; (6) emotions plus feelings; and (7) all possible combinations of the foregoing factors.

COMPOUND EMOTIONAL STATES ¹⁹

A. COMPOUND EMOTIONS

1. *Altruism* (benevolence, charitableness, unselfishness, philanthropy)
2. *Ambition* (initiative, persistence, perseverance, aspiration, eagerness, ardor, zealousness, impetuosity, venturesomeness, aggressiveness, adventurousness)
3. *Anguish* (grief, mournfulness, pang, agony, torture, incubus, "heart-ache," "broken-hearted," "crushed feeling")
4. *Aversion* (dislike, displeasure, distaste, malice, antipathy, hostility, animosity, enmity, detestation, hate)
5. *Anxiety* (restlessness, solicitude, fretfulness, vexation, worry)

B. CHIEF COMPONENTS

- Self-assertion, tender emotion, parental instinct, sentiment
- Self-assertion, pugnacity(?), fear(?), curiosity, acquisitiveness (possession)
- Fear, sorrow, shame(?), anger(?)
- Fear, anger, envy, repugnance, disgust(?), scorn(?)
- Tender feeling, fear, dread, curiosity, sympathy

¹⁹ These emotional states vary in intensity; each gradation has peculiar significance as an urge. Under A the terms in parentheses are names for degrees of intensity, but, it must be repeated, each name that is not an absolute synonym stands for a definite emotional state capable of directing conduct and hence significant as motive.

A. COMPOUND EMOTIONS

B. CHIEF COMPONENTS

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>6. <i>Asceticism</i> (self-denial, self-abnegation, self-effacement, masochism, "mortification," martyrdom)</p> <p>7. <i>Awe</i> (veneration, reverence)</p> <p>8. <i>Belief</i> (persuasion, conviction)</p> <p>9. <i>Boredom</i> (disinterestedness, unwillingness, loathness, weariness, ennui, satiety, surfeit, cloyment, sophistication, misanthropy, misogamy, blaséness)</p> <p>10. <i>Carefulness</i> (shrewdness, wiliness, heedfulness, watchfulness, alertness, wariness, prudence)</p> <p>11. <i>Carelessness</i> (indifference, irresponsibility, fickleness, capriciousness, shiftlessness, happy-go-lucky, untidiness; indolence, slothfulness, laziness; heedlessness, rashness, recklessness; wastefulness, lavishness, extravagance, prodigality)</p> <p>12. <i>Cheerfulness</i> (cordiality, joyousness, optimism, elation, blissfulness, felicity, rapture, transport, happiness, euphoria, ecstasy)</p> | <p>Submission, religious sentiment, self-regarding sentiment</p> <p>Fear, submission, wonder, curiosity(?), love sentiment</p> <p>Self-assertion, submission, hope, trust, confidence, prejudice</p> <p>Self-regarding complex, disinterestedness (lack of positive values), disgust(?)</p> <p>Fear, anxiety, self-regarding sentiment</p> <p>Self-regarding complex</p> <p>Joy, feeling of elation, energy</p> |
|--|---|

100 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

A. COMPOUND EMOTIONS

13. *Contentment* (ease, comfort, well-being, satisfaction)
14. *Contrition* (sorriness, regretfulness, penitence, conscience-stricken, remorsefulness)
15. *Credulity* (gullibleness, superstitiousness)
16. *Dejection* (the "blues," wretchedness, irritableness, "touchiness," hypersensitiveness, disappointment, disillusionment, helplessness, pessimism, unhappiness, melancholia, despondency, despair)
17. *Discontentedness* (dissatisfaction, restiveness, impatience, repining, sulkiness, moroseness, sullenness, acrimoniousness, bitterness, churlishness, crabbedness, crustiness, gloominess, gruffness, moodiness, surliness, grouchiness)
18. *Disgust* (loathing, nausea)
19. *Docility* (dependence, slavishness)
20. *Dominancy* (tyrannousness)
21. *Dread* (anxiety, horror, terror)

B. CHIEF COMPONENTS

- Self-regarding sentiment, a satisfied state following discharged impulses and desires
- Sorrow, grief, submission, sentiment
- Submission, belief
- Sorrow, inferiority complex (defeated self-assertion, negative self-esteem, balked desires)
- Self-assertion, balked desires
- Self-assertion, scorn(?), repugnance
- Submission complex (negative personality), inferiority complex(?)
- Extreme self-assertion, pride, pugnacity, superiority complex
- Fear, surprise, self-regarding sentiment

A. COMPOUND EMOTIONS

B. CHIEF COMPONENTS

- | | |
|---|--|
| 22. <i>Embarrassment</i> (discomposure, confusion, bewilderment, abashment, vexation, guiltiness, culpableness, sheepishness, secretiveness, humiliation, chagrin, shame, mortification, demoralization, suicidal emotions) | Gregariousness, social pressure, self-regarding sentiment |
| 23. <i>Enthusiasm</i> (excitability, exuberance, exultation, inspiration) | Joy, self-assertion, elation, energy |
| 24. <i>Envy</i> (rivalry, jealousy) | Self-assertion, fear, hate, anger, suspicion, possession |
| 25. <i>Faith</i> (hope, confidence, trust, courage, assurance) | Joy, self-assertion, submission, pugnacity(?) |
| 26. <i>Fascination</i> (charming, captivating, enticing, bewitching, enchanting, enrapture, ravishment) | Joy, thrill, self-regarding sentiment |
| 27. <i>Friendliness</i> (amity, kindness, fellow-feeling, comradeship) | Gregariousness, tender emotion, submission, self-assertion, possession |
| 28. <i>Gratefulness</i> (thankfulness) | Submission, joy, tender emotion |
| 29. <i>Greediness</i> (avariciousness, miserliness, covetousness, niggardliness, penuriousness, parsimoniousness, closeness, stinginess, sordidness, lustfulness, rapaciousness, selfishness) | Acquisition complex, self-assertion complex |
| 30. <i>Hesitancy</i> (doubtfulness, irresolution, vacillation, abulia) | Balanced self-assertion and submission |
| 31. <i>Humility</i> (lowliness, meekness) | Gregariousness, submission, self-regarding sentiment |

102 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

A. COMPOUND EMOTIONS

32. *Lawlessness* (criminality (?), anti-sociality, rebelliousness, insubordinateness, contumaciousness, intractableness, mutinousness, refractoriness, seditiousness)
33. *Meanness* (cruelty, hardness, harshness, baseness, cowardliness, pusillanimousness, dastardliness, viciousness, sadism)
34. *Mirthfulness* (pleasantness, c o m i c, h u m o r, "tickled," hilariousness)
35. *Modesty* (coyness, shyness, diffidence, timidity, bashfulness, demureness, sedateness)
36. *Morale* (*esprit de corps*, c o u r a g e, "do-or-die" spirit, team-work)
37. *Ostentatiousness* ("showing-off")
38. *Passion* (affection, conjugal love, amorousness, lasciviousness)
39. *Patriotism*
40. *Pining* (broodiness, lonesomeness, homesickness, lovesickness)
41. *Pity* (sympathy, forgiving, commiseration, compassion, condolence, mercifulness, tenderness)

B. CHIEF COMPONENTS

- P u g n a c i t y, self-assertion, envy(?), hate(?), jealousy (?), self-regarding complex
- Self-assertive complex, pugnacity, t h r i l l, a n g e r(?), hate(?)
- Joy, self-assertion, elation
- Submission, fear, flight, self-regarding sentiment, negative gregariousness
- Gregarious sentiment, self-regarding sentiment
- Self-assertion, self-regarding complex(?)
- Tender emotion, wonder, curiosity, parental instinct, sex impulse
- Parental instinct, self-regarding sentiment, tender emotion, gregarious sentiment, submission, possession
- Sorrow, love sentiment, possession, gregariousness, self-regarding sentiment
- Gregariousness, self-regarding sentiment

A. COMPOUND EMOTIONS

B. CHIEF COMPONENTS

- | | |
|---|--|
| 42. <i>Prejudice</i> (bias) | Ideational sentiment, 'self-assertion |
| 43. <i>Pride</i> (vanity, conceit, egotism, haughtiness, arrogance, narcissism) | Self-assertion, pugnacity, feeling of elation, scorn(?) |
| 44. <i>Quarrelsomeness</i> (querulousness, antagonism, pugnaciousness, "itching-for-a-fight") | Pugnacity, self-assertion, anger(?), fear(?), scorn(?) |
| 45. <i>Reproachfulness</i> (blaming, upbraiding, scolding) | Anger, tender emotion, self-assertion |
| 46. <i>Resentfulness</i> (pique-dness, abhorring, nettlesomeness, umbrageousness) | Anger, self-regarding sentiment, envy(?), repugnance, scorn(?) |
| 47. <i>Respectfulness</i> (admiration, esteem, regard, adoration) | Wonder, submission, tender emotion |
| 48. <i>Scornfulness</i> (disdainfulness, abhorring, contempting, spurning, sneering, scoffing) | Anger, self-regarding complex, disgust(?) |
| 49. <i>Sentimentalism</i> ("mushy," "soft," "slushy," mawkishness) | Tender-emotion complex |
| 50. <i>Spitefulness</i> (stubbornness, obstinateness, contrariness, contentiousness, adverseness, capitiousness, perverseness, petulance, sauciness, insolence, rudeness, wantonness) | Pugnacity, self-assertion, envy, jealousy, rivalry |
| 51. <i>Surprisingness</i> (astonishment, amazement, confounding, astounding, shocking) | Curiosity, fear |

A. COMPOUND EMOTIONS

B. CHIEF COMPONENTS

- | | |
|--|---|
| 52. <i>Suspiciousness</i> (distrustfulness, incredulousness, skepticism) | Curiosity, fear, jealousy(?) |
| 53. <i>Wanderlust</i> | Curiosity, self-assertion |
| 54. <i>Wrathfulness</i> (irascibility, raging, flaming, seething, foaming, fuming, boiling, passionate-ness, furiousness, ferociousness) | Anger, self-assertion, pugnacity, hate(?) |

This list of compound emotional states incidentally reveals the following interesting points:

1. That the self-regarding impulses, sentiments, and complexes of self-assertion and submission are fundamental and appear in almost all the compound states.

2. That the unpleasant emotions outnumber the pleasant emotions almost two to one, indicating that the person who "lives by his emotions" may expect many unpleasant moments, provided he runs the whole gamut of human emotions with equal frequency and intensity. It may be, however, that while the pleasant emotions are in the minority they, in some cases at least, operate more often or with greater intensity and thus offset the handicap mentioned.

3. That, from the viewpoint of religion and morality, the so-called bad emotions outnumber the so-called good emotions.

SENTIMENT

As compared with primary emotions: (1) sentiments are acquired, while the former are innate tendencies; (2) sentiments are attached to definite persons, objects, ideas, and situations—hence they are more perma-

ment;²⁰ (3) physical manifestations of sentiment are not, as a rule, quite so evident to the observer as those of primary emotions; (4) sentiments have a much wider range than emotions. Jastrow classifies sentiments as “(a) general emotional; (b) intellectual; (c) æsthetic; (d) moral; (e) institutional; (f) special complexes.” “Many of the sentiments,” he adds, “result from the interaction of the tendencies which these group-headings specify and accordingly belong to or spread across several groups; sub-types are readily distinguished.”²¹ Love and hate are typical examples of sentiment. The sub-types in each are numerous and significant. Love includes at least seven distinct types—conjugal love, parental love, friendship, philanthropy, altruism, patriotism, reverence—depending upon the objects and persons associated with tender emotion. Love, with its sub-types, is extremely significant in motivating social conduct. Chapter XX is devoted to a fuller discussion of “Love as Motive.”

The sentiments, like the primary emotions, are springs of action—important motives. “The sentiment retains the motive power of the emotion, with the specific carrying power and center of radiation of the idea.”²² It has already been pointed out how the compound emotions are sources of motivation. It is not too much to say that every phase of the emotional life is dynamic. In a very real sense we live by our emotions.

Thus far in the chapter we have discussed primary

²⁰ Cf. Shand, “The Relation of Complex and Sentiment,” *British Journal of Psychology*, Oct., 1922, p. 128.

²¹ Jastrow, *op cit.*, p. 549.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 219.

emotions, secondary emotions, complex emotions, and sentiments as motives. We take up next the important groups of moods, temperaments, "thrill," and happiness. These are also emotional types and quite significant in motivation.

MOOD

Mood is a relatively more permanent affective state of mind than emotion but less so than temperament which is a fixed, innate emotional attitude. Mood is less turbulent than emotion or sentiment. It is more strictly a subjective state of mind as affected by the previous emotional experience and as affecting the present and future emotional life of the individual. Mood gives tone and color, twist and direction to the content of mental life—to experience and conduct. There are no separate names for moods. In every instance we use the name of some emotion or emotional state: i.e., brooding, resentful, hateful, contemplative, sad, glad, joyous, scornful, sentimental, sociable, worshipful, reverent or irreverent, appreciative, docile, arrogant, angry, fearful, hopeful, despairing, etc. However, mood is to be distinguished from emotion by its greater persistency and depth. We may or may not be conscious of our mood; in either case, it reaches down deeper than the conscious. A temporary switching of the attention to a thought or experience or even an emotion to the contrary need not necessarily dispel the mood. The mood may persist even after the original cause has disappeared. Moreover, we often have moods without any apparent (conscious) cause. We are not always able to say just why we had a "grouch" on a given day, and, perhaps, felt quite optimistic and

jovial on another occasion. No doubt the physiological and environmental conditions play an important part, both consciously and unconsciously. The glands of internal secretion certainly have some influence on moods.

As a source of motivation the mood is not as violent as an emotion and yet it is significant in that it predisposes the organism to certain types of conduct; facilitating some, inhibiting others. When one is in a happy, optimistic mood, the ordinary strain and stress of the day's work are not especially trying. But in the opposite mood, every jar, or slight (perhaps unintentional), or cross word, or the gentlest opposition to one's wishes will be greatly exaggerated and conduct motivated accordingly. The salesman would rather talk business with a prospective buyer after getting him in the "proper" mood. When we want favors we are careful to broach the subject when our "patron" is in good humor. The wife and mother will often say, "Now, George and Alice, you must be very quiet this evening. Father is very tired and must not be disturbed." This is her charitable way of interpreting the obvious fact that her husband is in an irritable mood. Perhaps something has gone wrong in his work—at the office or shop or factory—or perhaps he is really ill. In any case, his conduct is different and the members of the family approach him differently.

Hence, to a certain extent, the conduct of others may be predicted by their mood. We are often, though not always, governed by our moods. We postpone certain acts till the appropriate mood is upon us; some few things we can do only at such moments. Directly and indirectly mood plays a significant part in motivation.

TEMPERAMENT

Temperament is a native constitution of the mind which determines the type and intensity of the various emotional states. Traditionally every person was supposed to belong to one of the four principal types—sanguine, phlegmatic, melancholic, and choleric. Wundt's explanation is that the sanguine is quick and weak, the choleric is quick and strong, the melancholic is slow and strong, and the phlegmatic is slow and weak. Temperament, then, is the personal factor. It is the way in which men differ. Classifying human beings according to temperament is really an attempt to separate into types. This is an interesting and difficult problem. It is also very ancient. Very little progress, however, has been made in a scientific way. It is obvious that human beings differ according to heredity, race, sex,²³ age, and environmental influences. In fact, no two persons are exactly alike in their psychophysiological make-up. Recently, Jung has attempted a classification under introvert and extrovert types. The introvert is characterized by turning inward on the self as compared with the extrovert who is more attached to objects. These represent roughly subjective and objective types. Says Jung, "When the orientation to the object and to objective facts is

²³ Hollingworth, *Advertising and Selling*, p. 297. "The fact that women have definite and mutual *aversions*, with fewer common *preferences*, while men have fewer determinate *dislikes*, but definite and mutual *preferences*, is an exceedingly interesting discovery." Witness the fact that no woman will wear a hat just like the hat of another woman; while every man wears only those hats which are identical in design with what all other men are wearing. Cf. Thorndike, *Individuality*, pp. 30, 31.

so predominant that the most frequent and essential decisions and actions are determined not by subjective values but by objective relations, one speaks of an extroverted attitude. When this is habitual, one speaks of an extroverted type.”²⁴ In another connection he makes the distinction that “the extrovert finds himself in the fluctuating and changeable, the introvert in the constant. The self is not ‘eternally constant,’ least of all with the extrovert, for whom, as an object, it is a matter of small moment. To the introvert, on the other hand, it has too much importance: he therefore shrinks from every change that is liable to affect his ego. For him affectedness can mean something directly painful, while to the extrovert it must on no account be missed.”²⁵

There may be some advantage in classifying human beings into extrovert and introvert types, but this classification is too broad and fluctuating to have a great deal of scientific value. Jung admits that an introvert may become an extrovert and vice versa.²⁶ The situation is further complicated by introducing four distinct types or sub-types in connection with the two main types. Jung remarks, “I therefore discriminate thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition types. *Every one of these types can moreover be introverted or extroverted* according to his relation to the object.”²⁷ In philosophy, James recognizes two types, the “rationalist” or the “tender-minded” and the “empiricist” or the “tough-minded.”

There is another point of view that is represented by

²⁴ Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 417.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

the "endocrine criteria" which divides types or temperaments "into the adrenal centered, the thyroid centered, the thymus centered, the pituitary centered, the gonad centered, and their combinations."²⁸ This theory states that there is a close relationship between the autonomic system, chiefly the glands of internal secretion, and what is generally known as temperament, that these ductless glands throw autocoids (hormones and chalones) into the blood stream and the type or temperament is determined by the dominating gland and its secretions. Thus, "the thyroid temperament is the restless, excitable, nervous type; the adrenal temperament is the vital, aggressive, pugnacious type. . . . Furthermore, anything which temporarily upsets the normal endocrinal balance will lead to moods or temporary aberrations of temperament."²⁹

As a factor in motivation, temperament is more a mechanism than an urge. It colors the real impulses and motives, directs their paths and rate of speed. Although motivated by the same sort of drive, the act will vary according to temperament. The quick, nervous, excitable temperament will react differently from the slow and melancholic type. The organic and psychic states represented by temperament predispose to varying types of specific behavior. The close connection between instinct and temperament is also significant. It may be that temperament is nothing more or less than a name for the quality and intensity of an instinct in relation to other instincts and innate tendencies. If this be true then temperament becomes a

²⁸ Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, p. 203.

²⁹ Bridges, "Theories of Temperament," *Psychological Review*, Jan., 1923, p. 39.

primary urge. But whether primary or secondary or both, temperament must be reckoned among the factors of motivation.

THRILL

More and more we are forced to realize the motive force of "thrill" in our lives. We are constantly seeking thrills. Men and women fear monotony, the asphyxiation of the "deep rut," the insipidity of the common task, the trivial round, more than they fear sin and hell-fire. Else why do so many risk reputation, endanger health and life in their mad rush for some new form of excitement? What is the incentive to ride in a Ferris wheel, the shoot the chute, the scenic railway, the roller coaster, and a score of similar devices at the summer resorts where the holiday crowds spend their time and hard-earned cash? Why is football so popular? Why do people risk their own lives and jeopardize the lives of others on the public highways by speeding in high-powered cars? The answer to all these questions is perfectly obvious—*thrill*.

The biological reasons are not far to seek. Historically, the race was reared on thrills. In the savage stage our ancestors were in constant danger of violence and often had to fight for their lives. They fought for food, for mate, for conquest, for survival. Somehow the body and mind became adjusted to this type of life. And we are heirs to this native equipment. But modern life in organized society is somewhat artificial, goes "against the grain" of our animal natures. Social pressure represses many of our instinctive drives and hence we have many "balked desires" which instinctively seek outlet. Some of these find expression in

legitimate ways—not injurious to the individual or the group: witness athletic contests, plays and games, hunting, fishing, camping, etc. But, in many cases, these are not available or, perhaps, undesired.³⁰ Where the tendency is morbid and suppression and repression great, there is likely to be an abnormal or even criminal outburst, for the thirst for thrills is as insistent as any of the appetites. Juvenile crime is motivated largely by the desire for adventure and excitement. Narcotic drugs and alcoholic beverages are often resorted to for the same reason. Even pain may not be unwelcome and often it is preferred to monotony and suppression. It is not surprising that the monks resorted to self-inflicted physical tortures and gladly submitted to the scourge. Pain is at least a stimulant. Graham Wallas says, “A man or boy, living a sheltered life, may find a rather high degree of sensation of pain (as he may also find the sensation of fear) actually pleasant.” He adds, “I can myself remember being one of a group of boys who, one evening, varied the intolerable monotony of boarding school (prep) by running needles through the lobes of our ears in order to enjoy the sensation.”³¹

³⁰ Tridon, *Psychoanalysis and Man's Unconscious Motives*, p. 91; “There is also a class of persons whose organism constantly needs a stimulus. Certain glands of their body are deficient and that physical inferiority drives them to seek some thrill. Some of them take drugs, alcohol, strong coffee, etc.: others make scenes. A good fight, seasoned with exaggerations, slander, misstatements, the raking up of a hundred old grudges, is to those people a first-class tonic. It flushes their face, speeds up their breathing, makes their heart beat faster, creates in all their muscles contractions which mimic rather well athletic power, lets out of their system poisonous forms of activity which they do not know how to utilize properly and all sorts of repressed death wishes. To them it spells relaxation; to everyone else, misery.”

³¹ Wallas, *The Great Society*, p. 102.

The life that is emotionally starved is ripe for questionable and risky adventure. This is the testimony of social workers who come in close contact with cramped souls. Incidentally and doubtless quite innocently, the social worker gets quite a thrill out of "slumming." "Browning had no distrust of the passions" says Winchester, a noted literary critic. "He wasn't afraid of them. He didn't believe, as some good folks seem to, that our passions are given us merely to test our ability to sit down on them and keep them under. The emotions, as their name implies, are the motive power of life, and no large, efficient life is possible without a full and strong emotional nature. Indeed, deep and absorbing emotion, if it be healthy, is itself one of the ends of life. Better an hour of entire surrender to a noble joy than years of sluggish bondage to convention and commonplace." ³² One might go further and say that we live for the thrilling moments of life; we endure the rest. We look forward to the time of relaxation, of complete "letting go," of absolute abandon to some game or hobby or whatever it is that affords the thrill. This is the genius of a vacation. It brings relief from monotony and removes some of the restraints. Then we are free to choose our actions to some extent at least.

Denied these moments of exhilaration one may develop a "mental complex" or some other abnormality. The great problem of modern times is to furnish proper thrills and to sublimate the desires that are unsocial or injurious in ways that are at least safe if not actually beneficial to the group. As the psychoanalysts point

³² Winchester, *An Old Castle and Other Essays*, p. 319.

out, the dreams and daydreams reveal how persistent and deep-seated are some of these balked desires.

As a motive force, thrill can scarcely be surpassed. It is the urge in the desire to "see life," it is the zest of adventure, of wanderlust. It drives the individual to new and worth-while achievements; it also fills our jails and almshouses, insane asylums and hospitals. It wrecks happiness in some instances as it enhances it in others. To be sure, the drive in thrill is for the most part, in native impulses and instincts, primary emotions and other motives. Sometimes it is a conflict of these native tendencies that furnishes the thrill; witness the "escape motive" in the balancing of fear and curiosity. Nevertheless, thrill is often a drive in itself as a composite of all these elements. This is manifestly true when the end is not the satisfaction of an instinctive urge, but the thrill itself. In such a case the person is likely to be quite indifferent to the means or consequences so long as the end (the thrill) is realized. The momentary thrill outweighs everything else; it is the important thing, an end in itself, real life.

HAPPINESS

The desire for happiness is certainly strong in all of us. Without knowing exactly what it is or how we are to attain or retain it, we are, nevertheless, on the quest. It is regarded as one of the "inalienable rights." The pursuit of happiness is guaranteed to us by the federal constitution and placed on an equality with life and liberty. And, curiously enough, the pursuit of happiness involves a paradox. It is commonly reported that the more diligently we pursue happiness the further it

flees from us, but that if we give up the chase and lose ourselves in activities that absorb the faculties and cravings we may find happiness, or rather, that happiness will overtake us. This idea suggests that happiness is not an end in itself, although many people so regard it, but a by-product. It is a state of mind achieved when the organism functions properly, when the sum total of one's acts—past, present, and probable future—are harmonized, producing a sense of well-being and the realization of values that are more or less permanent. Happiness is more than feeling, more than pleasure, no matter how intense. It is a more permanent state of mind than either of these. "Happiness may be understood as a harmonious arrangement of pleasures, a system of synthesis in which each of the constituent pleasures supplements and strengthens the rest."³³ Joy, delight, euphoria are passing phases of happiness.

The ground for happiness differs from person to person, depending upon factors of personality—ideals, convictions, principles, past experience, temperament, general outlook upon life, sense of relative values, in fine, the harmony and unity of the self. Hence a certain type of existence that brings happiness to one man may bring the opposite to another. It takes a great deal more to satisfy some people than others. Apart from the elementary units—the individual impulses, instincts, incentives, and drives whose satisfaction contributes to happiness—there is an urge in hap-

³³ Wright, *Self-Realization*, p. 292. Cf. Dewey, *Interest and Effort in Education*, p. 35: "The emotional accompaniment of the progressive growth of a course of action, a continual movement of expansion and of achievement, is happiness."

116 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

piness itself as an end, as the harmonious working of all the unitary forces. Thus, directly and indirectly, happiness is a strong motive.³⁴

The feeling qualities of pleasant and unpleasant, the mingled affective quality of feeling, emotion and sensation in pleasure, and the sensation of pain are often included as factors in happiness and not infrequently some of these feeling and sensation qualities are identified with happiness. This phase of the problem is discussed in the next chapter, "Feeling as Motive."

³⁴ Cf. Newfang, *The Development of Character*, p. 12: "In the last analysis, the motive of every human being is the desire for happiness, and this will be found to be the only motive to action in the constitution of man."

CHAPTER VII

FEELING AS MOTIVE

PLEASANT-UNPLEASANT: PLEASURE-PAIN

Traditionally, feeling was identified with pleasure and pain. But pain is now regarded as a sensation because distinct sense organs have been discovered. The senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell, temperature, pressure, equilibrium, strain, and pain furnish sensations which may have pleasant or unpleasant feeling accompaniments which are not to be confused with the sensations. The awareness of a sensory experience is distinguishable from the accompanying pleasantness or unpleasantness. For example, a toothache makes one aware of definite sensations of pain and, in addition, there is usually an affection of dislike for the sensation. The conscious quality as distinguished from the pain or other sensory experience is known as affection. Feeling is the complex of the sensation plus affection. The feeling qualities of pleasant and unpleasant may be interchanged with regard to the same sensation. Thus a pain sensation may be unpleasant at one time and pleasant at another or it may be indifferent to feeling. All conscious activity as a rule has feeling tone, but there are innate likes and dislikes as well as acquired likes and dislikes associated with certain sensations or acts. Feeling is distinguished from sensation in that the latter is localized, has distinct

118 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

sense organs, and can be analyzed; while the former is vague, has no specific organs and cannot be localized.¹ Feeling is a general state or attitude that is either pleasant or unpleasant. So far no one has been able to break up these states into further elements successfully.

Feeling, then, has but two recognized qualities, i.e., pleasant and unpleasant. What marks the distinction between these two is not easy to say. In general, pain sensations are also unpleasant: excessive stimulation, too bright light, harsh sounds, pungent odors, extremes of temperature, and the like, are annoying, distasteful, unpleasant. On the other hand, to react to an instinctive urge when one is ready is satisfying, pleasant; to be denied is unpleasant. This is true of all acts whether instinctive or habitual. No matter how the desire has come into being, once it is present and ready to function the feeling of pleasure accompanies the act and, if thwarted, displeasure. In a pleasant experience the tendency is to prolong the act or affective state and to destroy or inhibit an unpleasant state. There is, obviously, survival value in this for, as a rule, unpleasant acts or sensations are likely to be injurious; while the pleasant ones are likely to be beneficial or, at least, neutral. The seeking or preparatory movements may or may not be pleasant.

The characteristics of the unpleasant response, according to Young, are that "(1) there is a tendency to react away from the stimulus-object; (2) a tendency

¹ Wohlgemuth, "Feelings and Their Neural Correlates—Pain," *British Journal of Psychology*, June, 1917, p. 476: "... the center for feeling has probably its seat in the lateral zone of the optic thalamus." Cf. Meyer, "The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness," *Psychological Review*, July, 1908, pp. 201-216, 292-322.

to put the stimulus-object away from one's self or to prevent its action; (3) a tendency to inhibit or resist the normal response; (4) bodily twitches, shocks, waves of sensation, and other reverberative responses." ² The excess or defect of sensory experience is more likely to call forth a feeling than a normal discharge. This again is a protective factor and was doubtless evolved to aid mere sensation. "The character of the feeling," says Münsterberg, "depends upon the duration, upon the spatial extension, upon the alteration, and most of all upon the combination of the stimuli." ³

Our immediate concern is the place of feeling in motivation. To clarify the problem it is necessary to dispose of an ancient and widespread theory which makes feeling (pleasure and the avoidance of pain) not only the greatest of all motives but also the criterion of right and wrong in moral conduct.

HEDONISM (THE PLEASURE-PAIN THEORY OF MOTIVATION)

It will be recalled that in discussing the various theories accounting for the springs of action the pleasure-pain theory of hedonistic psychology and ethics was listed and briefly discussed to show its inadequacy as a final explanation of conduct. ⁴ Here we examine its claims in greater detail.

Hedonism (*ἡδονή*=pleasure) represents a system of ethics taught by the Cyrenaic school whose founder was Aristippus who flourished in the late fourth and early

² Young, "Pleasantness and Unpleasantness in Relation to Organic Response," *American Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1921, p. 51.

³ Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, p. 198.

⁴ See pp. 9-10.

120 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

third century B.C. Aristippus taught that the highest good, the supreme value in life is pleasure, that all men are and should be motivated by the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. He said that there is no qualitative difference in pleasure, but merely one of degree and intensity. Physical or bodily pleasures are more significant than mental. Epicureanism, founded by Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), regards pleasures of the intellect superior to pleasures of the body because of their longer duration. For this reason one might even endure pain for ultimate pleasure. Epicureanism differs from the teachings of the Cyrenaic school in some respects and is superior to it in many ways; nevertheless, both are hedonistic, both make pleasure the highest good and the most important source of motivation.

These views have come down to modern times with some modifications but essentially unchanged. The English philosophers have been pronouncedly hedonistic. Locke (1632-1704) was an egoistic hedonist. Hobbes (1588-1679) also regarded enlightened self-interest as the chief human motive. Hutcheson (1694-1747) was the first to introduce the social phase of hedonism as characterized by the famous utilitarian formula, "the greatest happiness to the greatest number." Bentham (1748-1832) determined the value of pleasure according to intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent. For him there was no qualitative difference. Other things being equal, "push-pin is as good as poetry." J. S. Mill (1806-1873) insisted on a qualitative difference in pleasure. "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; it is

better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." While both agree that pleasure is the highest good, Bentham believes it on the ground of self-interest; Mill, on social grounds.

The variety of types and nice distinctions in hedonism do not concern us here. The central fact which must be reckoned with is that hedonism, in one form or another, has been seriously regarded as the highest good, the strongest motive. The notion is current to-day. It is a tacit practical philosophy that many hold and live by. Both consciously and unconsciously multitudes make pleasure the *summum bonum*. Nor is there always a distinction made between pleasure and happiness. Strictly speaking, hedonism is a system of ethics, one of the three great types or points of view. It presupposes, however, a hedonistic psychology. Ethical hedonism asserts that men *ought* to make pleasure the highest good and apply it as the criterion of right and wrong. Psychological hedonism asserts that men are actually motivated by pleasure, that "Nature has placed mankind under two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure." (Bentham). The ethical phase of the problem does not concern us at this point.⁵ But the widespread notion that pleasure-seeking is the one great human urge is significant for motivation and needs to be examined closely.

PLEASURE AS MOTIVE

Traditional hedonism is based on a faulty psychology. It assumes that we are motivated by conscious drives; it confuses happiness with pleasure; it con-

⁵ See pp. 396ff.

122 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

fuses feeling with pain sensations; it fails to distinguish between "pursued pleasure" and a pleasant act; it ignores too many factors in our complex mental life—it insists that pleasure-pain is not only *a* great urge but that it is *the* great and *only* drive or motive in behavior: it contains a serious ambiguity in the terms "pleasure" and "that which pleases." There is, however, an important element of truth in hedonism. But before we proceed to discuss the truth, let us first dispose of the errors.

1. *Pain not a feeling.* The historical hedonist is not to blame for calling pain a feeling. Only recently it was discovered that pain is not a feeling but a sensory experience: it is localized, has specific sense organs, and gives a distinct sensory impression in consciousness. As previously stated, pain is usually accompanied by a feeling of unpleasantness. And yet the two are distinct. Not infrequently pain may be accompanied by pleasant affection. Thus, while it is untrue to say that we *always* avoid pain, it is true that pain is generally avoided. This fact furnishes the basis for whatever there is of value in punishment as an educational factor, also of a great deal of the learning process in general.

2. *Happiness not identical with pleasure.* Pleasure is a sensory experience plus the feeling of pleasantness. Happiness is not any specific experience. Nor is it made up of two or more "pleasures." It is not even the sum total of these. A person may experience pleasure without being happy. Conversely, he may be happy without a pleasurable sensation at any given time. There are many factors involved in happiness which are more or less independent of pleasure. Hap-

piness involves almost the whole of personality and runs deep, is more akin to mood, than a feeling or sensation or emotion. To say that we are motivated by happiness is not the same as saying that we are motivated by pleasure. Nor is the reverse true. Assuming that both are motives in conduct is not to make them identical.

3. *Not all incentives to action are conscious.* The hedonist assumes that we are always motivated by conscious drives. This is especially pronounced in Bentham. His celebrated criteria for determining the relative value of pleasures are based on their (1) intensity, (2) duration, (3) certainty or uncertainty, (4) propinquity or remoteness, (5) fecundity, (6) purity, (7) extent or number of persons affected. Imagine any one going through this list and balancing these points one against the other in exact mathematical order and finally selecting the act that will bring him the greatest amount of pleasure! What about the great number of acts that are wholly impulsive, instinctive, habitual, automatic? As set forth at the outset and restated often in this book, the large majority of our acts are motivated by unconscious drives. Moreover, in many of these acts pleasure and pain are not even factors. When a man risks his life to save another in an emergency, he acts from impulse without hesitation or any thought of pleasure or pain. In many cases pleasant or unpleasant feelings are aroused *after* the act has been performed and not motivated by a cold calculating valuation of them beforehand as Bentham asserts.

4. *Pleasure-pain theory does not account for the whole of conduct.* "Pleasure and pain are motives of

only part of our activity," says James.⁶ This was implied in part in the previous statement that not all incentives to action are conscious. We might go further and say that not all of our consciously motivated acts are impelled by pleasure and pain. Some acts are neutral, neither pleasurable nor painful. And in a great many others pleasure and pain are merely accompaniments and modifiers—to say nothing of acts that are actually antecedent to feeling qualities. This will be made clearer in what follows.

5. *Ambiguous use of the term pleasure.* It is often argued, on hedonistic principles, that no matter what a man does it can be shown that he does it because it brings him greater satisfaction than to do the opposite or refuse to do it at all. Thus, the slacker is a slacker because he is obviously moved by motives of self-interest. The true patriot who gives of his means or jeopardizes his life for his country is moved by the same motive, that is, secures pleasure and satisfaction in making the sacrifice. It all amounts to the same thing, some hedonists would say. If we yield to our appetites we do it because it pleases us; if we control our animal natures we do it because that brings us greater satisfaction than yielding to our impulses. This sort of reasoning is obviously based on an ambiguity. The terms pleasure and satisfaction are used in different senses. The fallacy of this ambiguity is clearly expressed by Wright:

Is it true or false that *man always seeks that which most pleases him*? It depends entirely upon what is meant by these words. If one means that man always chooses and

⁶ James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 555.

pursues the object or action whose idea is pleasantest to him—most strongly suffused or colored by pleasant feeling—it is true. In this sense, the person about to have a tooth extracted, the mother going to nurse a child sick with some very dangerous and communicable disease, the martyr going to the stake, are all of them doing what pleases them most. But this tells nothing about the end, the motive of their action. To say that a man in his conduct always follows the pleasantest course is merely to recognize that the end chosen and pursued is the end most interesting, most attractive, to the agent who chooses and acts. In this first sense, therefore, the statement that man always seeks the object which most pleases him is true, but is entirely irrelevant to the question at issue, which concerns only the end of action. If, in the second place, this statement is understood to mean that man always seeks the object which promises to yield him the most pleasure, it is quite false. The mother does not undertake to nurse the sick child because she expects to derive pleasure from it, but because the idea of the child in pain and danger fills her mind, and then the further idea of relieving his pain and preserving his life appeals to her with overwhelming force. The martyr does not go to the stake moved by the thought of the pleasure he expects to enjoy during the experience or, later, in Heaven, but in order to uphold the principles to which he has devoted himself, to defend the cause to which he has consecrated his life. To maintain in these cases that men act, not in order to realize objects—to save a stricken child or to defend an honored cause, but to produce certain subjective states in themselves—is to do violence to the plainest facts of human experience. Thus we see that the dictum on which the hedonist relies to prove his case is capable of two interpretations. According to the one it is true, but irrelevant to the question; according to the other, it is relevant, but untrue. Undoubtedly many have been convinced by the arguments of hedonism because they thought that such a statement in the same sense in which it was true was also relevant.⁷

⁷ Wright, *Self-Realization*, pp. 105-106.

6. *A pleasant act versus "pursued-pleasure."* The distinction between pleasure pursued as an end and the pleasant feeling attached to an act goes to the heart of the problem of hedonism and of feeling as a motive force. The hedonistic position is that pleasure is what motivates the act and that the whole of conduct is thus motivated. Modern psychologists incline to the view that pleasure and pain are not always involved and even when they are the act is the thing desired and the "feeling tones" of pleasantness or unpleasantness are merely accompaniments. Hence they cannot serve as motives for the act. The most that can happen is for pleasure to act as modifier, controller, director, not as a primary motive but only secondary at best. They argue that by the time feeling is aroused the act is already under way, having been prompted by an instinct or habit or some other primary motive. Some go so far as to assert that "Apart from the satisfactions experienced in the fulfillment in action of such impulses, pleasure does not exist."⁸ James calls attention to the distinction between "pursued pleasure" and a "pleasant act." While he maintains that in most instances the act (with its feeling accompaniment) is the real motive he allows that frequently "*the pleasure of achievement may itself become a pursued pleasure.*"⁹ He adds, "I am far from denying the exceeding prominence and importance of the part which pleasures and pains, both felt and represented, play in the motivation of our conduct. But I must insist that it is no exclusive part, and that co-ordinately with these mental

⁸ Edman, *Human Traits*, p. 446.

⁹ James, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 557.

objects innumerable others have an exactly similar impulsive and inhibitive power.”¹⁰

The pleasure-pain theory, far from being an adequate explanation for the whole of conduct, nevertheless, accounts for motives that are usually secondary and occasionally primary. This is significant for our problem. It deserves closer scrutiny.

PURSUED PLEASURE: PLEASURE AS A PRIMARY MOTIVE

It is not always easy to distinguish between the act and the pleasure accompanying it. Nevertheless, there is just ground for asserting that at least occasionally pleasure is a primary motive—when it is decidedly the sole end of an act. Of course it cannot be divorced from the act, yet, from the viewpoint of motivation, the pleasure is a primary motive when it initiates the act, is its sole end without which the act would not be “started” or when the act itself would be meaningless or downright foolish and absurd without the pleasure involved: witness baseball, gormandizing, excess or abuse of any game or appetitive satisfaction. Possibly the major portion of all hobbies and games would come under this head.

Another bit of evidence that the hedonist is partially correct, that pleasure is occasionally a primary drive, is furnished by daydreams, especially in their excessive and exaggerated forms. There are people who shrink from the world of reality, spending their time in daydreams of what they would like to do and be. Now, if the act is more desirable than the pleasure accompanying it, then why do not these folk go out and act? Is

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 558.

128 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

it not, rather, that in these instances at least the pleasure and not the act is what motivates this type of conduct—daydreaming? It must also be admitted, regardless of the false psychology involved, that many people actually believe that they are motivated by pleasure rather than the act. Stekel points out that "Reality is very chary in its distribution of pleasure. Life consists of work, duty, renunciation, and those very rare moments of pleasure. Now there are people who do not wish to renounce pleasure; these are the daydreamers who have the gift of living with open eyes in another self-centered world, the pleasure principle reigns supreme. . . . What has reality to offer these daydreamers? Reality is so poor, and the way to success so wearisome, that they prefer to forego the pleasure of all work, and visit the 'cinema of their souls.' " ¹¹

Thus the pleasure principle is a true urge and, while not as significant as the hedonist would have us believe, it is, nevertheless, a vital source of motivation. In many instances it is a primary motive. Its influence, however, does not end here. It is also a great modifying and controlling urge.

PLEASURABLE ACTS: PLEASURE AS A SECONDARY DRIVE

The significance of pleasure as a secondary drive is apparent from the fact that very few acts are really neutral or devoid of feeling tone. Practically all sensory experience is colored by feeling qualities. This includes all conscious acts, most of the instinctive, and some of the reflexive responses. There is scarcely an

¹¹ Stekel, *The Beloved Ego*, pp. 82-84.

act that is wholly lacking in feeling tone. Sheer activity is pleasurable. All readiness to action, no matter what the original motive, is pleasurable; opposition and inhibition are unpleasant. But whether pleasant or unpleasant, feeling is important, for both are affective states. "It is important to bear in mind," says Everett, "the wide range of the pleasure-displeasure series. It extends from the humblest physical gratifications and discomforts up to the most refined and exalted intellectual, æsthetic, and religious experiences."¹² Furthermore, *all* motives are subject, to a greater or lesser degree, to support or hindrance from feeling tones.

Thus while we may deny hedonism in its extreme form, we are compelled to admit that the pleasure-pain principle is a real motive force in everyday life. And if it is not always a primary urge, its wide associations as a secondary source are unsurpassed in the mental life. The far-reaching implication of this is further illustrated in its value and importance as the motive force in punishment, the learning process, and "profiting by experience."¹³

REWARD-PUNISHMENT MOTIVES

The wide use of rewards and punishments in all walks of social life bears eloquent testimony to the motive power of feeling. These exist in almost limitless varieties: a smile, a frown, a gesture, a word of praise or blame, applause, indifference, gifts, threats, physical violence, money, fines, promotions, demotions, etc. The principle is the same in all. The difference

¹² Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 121.

¹³ Cf. Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, p. 105.

is one of degree and practical application. Reward as a means of training aims to encourage an act by associating it, consciously and unconsciously, with pleasurable or pleasant feeling. On the other hand, the same principle is used in punishment to associate an unpleasant feeling with the given act. In each instance there is set up an after-image which determines future conduct. A positive after-image leads to a repetition of the act and a negative after-image arouses the inhibitory reactions because of unpleasant associations. The after-image provides a "new hypothesis for dealing with a similar situation." It means "the reaction of the *whole will* upon the partial impulse, when the full meaning of that impulse is perceived in the light of its results."¹⁴

Rewards and punishments do not create new drives. They merely link up the feeling values with new objects, ideas, situations, and modes of conduct. Ideas which are at first indifferent may be reënforced by attachment to feeling. This is the great secret of socializing the individual. The young child is egoistic. Many of his natural reactions are not conducive to good manners, to say nothing of social and moral standards. In the great school of "hard knocks" (rewards and punishments) he *learns* to be a good social animal. The learning consists in acquiring a new set of feeling values: in the home, in school, in business, in the club—everywhere in all forms of social intercourse we are guided by feeling values. The moral quality of character is concerned with pleasures and annoyers. The allurements in a bad act is the pleasure or gain (antici-

¹⁴ Hocking, *Human Nature*, p. 162.

pation of pleasure) attached to it; in neglecting to perform a good act the inhibitory force is pain or loss (anticipated pain) connected with the act. This principle pervades every level of conduct.

In teaching a dog tricks the trainer offers a lump of sugar or some other titbit as a reward when the act is properly performed; a whipping for punishment when the animal fails to respond or makes false responses. The aim of punishment is to disjoin a response from its natural stimulus. In training children it is one of the fundamental principles so to arrange the situation that desirable conduct will result pleasantly and undesirable conduct unpleasantly. This is essential in the crude and elementary types, but a deeper problem is here involved. So far as the individual act is concerned it may not be difficult to associate the appropriate feeling tone, but to induce the learner to give up an immediate pleasure for a greater remote pleasure or to undergo displeasure or even pain for a remote good or satisfaction, requires imagination to dissociate the momentary feeling tone from the present act and substitute in its place the remote feeling tone by projecting the present act into the future. "In the very highest type of conduct," says Bagley, "the individual is even able to read his own pain very largely out of the problem and to base his conduct on the future good of others."¹⁵

In other words, motives are transformed from one type of conduct to another. If this were impossible the process of socialization and most kinds of learning as well would be a hopeless task. For, after all, "the

¹⁵ Bagley, *School Discipline*, p. 164.

appeal of reward and punishment alike is to something that one cares for; the something may be both material like confiscating or payment of damage, and far more usually sentimental and spiritual—loss of rank, honor, esteem. The disgrace of punishment becomes its sting.”¹⁶ But once the new attachment is achieved the feeling tone greatly reënforces the urge in the original motive. This is the basis of prejudice; and it is a matter of common observation that men live by their prejudices. The feeling tone and affective values attached in association to ideas, persons, events, acts and situations—prejudice—much more than reason or thinking in any true sense, motivate our daily life.

No matter what view is taken of feeling it will be found a potent force in motivation.

¹⁶ Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 235; *cf.* Everett, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

CHAPTER VIII

IDEAS AS MOTIVES: IDEO-MOTIVES

Are thoughts and ideas dynamic? Do they lead to acts? If so, are they significant for motivation? This problem has been the center of controversy for many years. The discussion, in a general way, is represented by the arguments for and against the so-called ideomotor theory.

THE IDEO-MOTOR THEORY

We are familiar with reflex and sensori-motor action in which there is a present stimulus or stimuli. In ideomotor conduct the stimulus is centrally (internally, cerebrally) aroused by an idea. The idea itself is "the reproduction, with a more or less adequate image of an object not actually present to the senses."¹ Originally all experience is sensory, comes through the gateway of one or more of the nine senses. But once retained in memory as part of the apperceptive mass it may be recalled through association as a response to some stimulus, and, in turn, become stimulus to some other idea. This chain of centrally aroused ideas is called thinking. Not all ideas are of equal value in the process. Some have richer associations with images, emotions, habitual types of reactions, and instinctive reaction patterns. In a sense, the idea is a motive only

¹ Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 507.

in so far as it arouses another idea or train of ideas and their association which need not necessarily lead to action apart from the process of thinking. On the other hand, an idea may persist at the focus of consciousness till it works itself out in conduct supported in this by the psychophysical associations of affective and impulsive reaction patterns. The time that elapses between the inception of the idea and the action resulting therefrom varies greatly with circumstances and the type of personality. Sometimes the act follows immediately and almost simultaneously. Sometimes the idea will persist for a long time before it leads to action. There is such a thing as a "fixed idea" which will be discussed later.

The question of opposition is important. An idea will lead to action provided it is not opposed by some other idea or inhibited in some way. This is especially true in case of previous linkage of the idea with an act. It is merely another type of habit response. There are certain ideas that need simply to capture the focus of consciousness in order to lead to action—habit does the rest, provided nothing prevents it. With each successive repetition the inhibiting force will be less and less potent and the ideo-motor reaction pattern more and more likely to function undisturbed.

A good share of the controversy over the ideo-motor theory can be eliminated by pointing out the distinction between an abstracted notion of an idea and an actual idea of everyday experience. It may be true that "an idea which is only an idea, a simple fact of knowledge, produces nothing and does nothing."² But, as a

² Ribot, *Psychology of the Emotions*, p. 19.

matter of fact, a detached idea which is merely cognition is a pure abstraction. The idea to exist at all, to be an idea, must have some meaning and content, and this implies more than cognition. All ideas have attached to their "meaning" a greater or lesser number of associations, i.e., images, impulses, feeling, emotion, sentiment, etc. Now, it is argued by some that the idea is not a motive force, that the motive is in these very associations.³ Nevertheless, we insist that the idea with its numerous associations *is* the idea, that it is this unity or compound of associated motival forces that constitute the drive. In a very real sense the idea is the motive because it cannot be divorced from its associates or broken up into elementary impulses and drives. It is not any of these elements; it is all of them in a given configuration designated by the "idea" that constitutes the subject and it is this unit which must be responsible for the drive, is the drive. This is based on the main thesis that there are not only elementary drives but also compound drives which cannot and need not be broken up into their elements, because, when thus dissolved, they cease to be. The special configuration of the elementary drives is of fundamental importance; it is that which makes the compound what it is and not the elements as such. Now, an idea may be regarded as this type of compound, capable of motivating conduct. As already indicated, not all ideas have equal force in motivation. This is determined by the nature of the idea—the number and richness of the associations, the control and meaning. A fuller discus-

³ Cf. McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 224; Thorndike, "Ideo-Motor Action," *Psychological Review*, March, 1913, pp. 92, 97.

136 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

sion of this point will be found in a succeeding section of this chapter.

There are at least four ways in which ideas motivate conduct: (1) by arousing other ideas; (2) by arousing psychophysical reactions confined to the organism; (3) by leading to voluntary and involuntary action; (4) by inhibiting any one or all of these processes.

1. *Ideas may arouse other ideas.* No matter how an idea is stimulated, whether by sensation, perception, an image, concept, recall, imagination, instinct, emotion, thinking, etc., it is usually capable of becoming in turn a stimulus, a motive in arousing another idea or ideas. It is claimed that the brain is not self-active, but it is admitted that once the brain is started, its activity "spreads": witness the reverie, dream, and daydream. Thanks to the law of the association of ideas one idea arouses another idea and this arouses another, etc.; a great chain of ideas may thus be recalled lasting for hours—until some inhibitory force puts an end to the series, e.g., waking from a dreamful sleep or "pulling one's self together" after a long daydream or reverie. Without some inhibitory idea or purpose or desire the series might go on indefinitely. In this sense, however, an idea is only a secondary drive in that it needs to be aroused by a previous idea or a sensory experience, by an internal or external stimulus.

2. *Ideas may arouse psychophysical reactions confined to the self.* The dynamic nature of the idea is more pronounced in its influence upon the body. It is commonly observed that the mere idea of a luscious peach is often sufficient to make the "mouth water." Similarly, the idea or picture of a cut lemon may cause

the characteristic acid taste of lemon in the mouth. Erotic ideas also cause a stimulation of the gonad glands. The idea of a horrible experience is sometimes sufficiently "vivid" to give one the "shivers." Anger, fear—any of the primary and many of the secondary emotions—may be aroused by an idea or a series of ideas. It would seem that the autonomic system is especially susceptible to motivation by ideas. And perhaps on account of this possible unbalancing of the elementary functions of the mechanism it is possible to become actually sick by the idea of sickness or in acquiring the various phobias and complexes listed by the psychoanalysts. The influence of ideas over the psychophysical mechanism is tremendous. As Münsterberg points out "it is difficult to remember a name without the impulse to speak it, or to remember very marked forms without an impulse to follow their outlines by eye movements, or vivid actions without slight motor imitations. We sing internally the melody which we remember. Such movements may be carried out to a very slight degree only; and yet they may furnish fresh kinesthetic material to fill out some blanks in memory reproduction."⁴

The force of suggestion and autosuggestion depends almost wholly on the close relationship of idea with its motor discharge.⁵ So far-reaching is the influence of the idea over the physical mechanism that it reaches down to the subconscious or autonomic level as well; witness the capers of the ouija-board, the planchette,

⁴ Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, p. 165; cf. Baudouin, *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, pp. 10, 64, 91; cf. Scott, *Influencing Men in Business*, p. 47.

⁵ Cf. Edson, *Getting What We Want*, p. 146.

hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestions, and muscle reading, the phenomenon of discovering a hidden object by following the subconscious lead of a person who knows where the object is hid but does not communicate the information consciously. His muscles tell the truth.⁶ A man's gestures are more truthful of the real ends and hidden motives than his lips. He may lie with his tongue, but will tell the truth with his muscles despite himself.

The motive force of an idea is quite intelligible in the light of genetic psychology. In a sense, every idea is a challenge to the organism to meet a given situation and the tendency is to make the adequate response in meeting the situation. Historically, most of the ideas were warnings. Those who were too sluggish or ill-adjusted to make the appropriate response failed to survive. The present generation is descended from those who met the situation successfully by appropriate coördination of idea with response.

3. *Ideas often lead to overt action.* Conduct motivated by ideas may be involuntary or voluntary.⁷ Of the involuntary group there are several types. In one type the action follows the idea in mind in a mechanical way. Photographs taken of spectators on the sidelines at a football game during a tense moment when a drop-kick was attempted showed the sympathetic "rooters"

⁶ Cf. Myers, *Human Personality*, pp. 242-243.

⁷ Some confine the ideo-motor theory to unconscious and involuntary conduct. Cf. Seashore, *Introduction to Psychology*, p. 345. "When the idea is expressed immediately and unconsciously in action, the idea is said to be ideo-motor." Cf. also Baldwin, *loc. cit.*, "The term (ideo-motor) is sometimes limited to actions which are non-voluntary or involuntary; but the better usage includes voluntary action in the ideo-motor class."

had raised their "kicking foot" slightly in an unconscious effort to help the player. The writer once observed himself at a football game to be leaning considerably to the right in an unconscious effort to help his college halfback gain the needed distance in a line plunge. Seashore remarks that "a child, watching the piston bar of an engine, was observed to move his arms sympathetically with the piston of the engine and was surprised at the fact when his attention was called to it. Most of our gestures are ideo-motor. Recall a few typical gestures, such as indication of distance, of approach, of bigness, of littleness, of quickness, of slowness, and it can be readily seen that the gesture activity which often profusedly accompanies speech, and even silent thought, will fall under this rubric."⁸ Recall the fact that a great number of sympathetic people in an audience will cough or clear their throats when the speaker gets hoarse or is suffering from a cold. James, commenting on this phase of the ideo-motor theory, says:

Whilst talking I become conscious of a pin on the floor, or of some dust on my sleeve. Without interrupting the conversation I brush away the dust or pick up the pin. I make no express resolve, but the mere perception of the object and the fleeting notion of the act seem of themselves to bring the latter about. Similarly, I sit at table after dinner and find myself from time to time taking nuts or raisins out of the dish and eating them. My dinner properly is over, and in the heat of the conversation I am hardly aware of what I do, but the perception of the fruit and the fleeting notion that I may eat it seem fatally to bring the act about.⁹

⁸ Seashore, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-346.

⁹ James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 522.

A second way in which ideo-motor conduct functions mechanically and involuntarily is dependent upon habitual responses to the particular idea. Thus I have the idea of writing these words. I am not conscious of forming the letters or even of spelling out the words. The letters, words, and often phrases and sentences are mechanically inscribed through habit by the force of ideas. This is the secret of skilled movements generally. There are also habits of thought as well as of motor responses dependent upon an idea, usually a recurring idea.

The conscious and deliberate, the voluntary motor discharge of an idea is the result of thinking or of choosing. Through memory and the association of ideas we recall relevant ideas and form judgment ideas which, held at the focus of consciousness, lead to action. "Consciousness," says James, "*is in its very nature impulsive*. We do not have a sensation or a thought and then have to *add* something dynamic to get a movement. Every pulse of feeling which we have is the correlate of some neural activity that is already on its way to integrate a movement. Our sensations and thoughts are but cross-sections, as it were, of currents whose essential consequence is motor, and which no sooner run in at one nerve than they run out again at another." ¹⁰

The mental life is active. To be conscious is to have some sort of mental activity. The idea at the focus of consciousness is likely to express itself in action provided it is not inhibited by some other idea or motive.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 526.

Reasoning as a motive force consists in meeting new situations on the basis of past experience by putting old elements into new combinations. It is "mental exploration." "Deliberation," says Dewey, "is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action. . . . It is an experiment in finding out what the various possible lines of action are really like. . . . Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster."¹¹ When one performs an act that is not mechanical or instinctive or habitual, not previously performed (although many old elements will be present) but prompted by deliberate decision after considering the various alternatives, we call it the result of reasoning. The mental exploration as a substitute for the trial and success method is carried on in the mind in the form of ideas and judgments. It is a selective process. The decision may remain a final idea or a judgment idea—a potential motive; or it may be immediately realized in action. "Reasoning in idea is but an action postponed, reasoning in action is but an idea expressed."¹² When a person is thus able to adjust himself to a new situation for which he has no "ready made" reaction pattern, no "response mechanism," he acts from reason and acts "intelligently." Intelligence is often measured in terms of ability to make adequate responses to a new situation. As a rule the thinking process involves a puzzle, a

¹¹ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 190; cf. Edman, *Human Traits*, pp. 390, 430; Dewey, *How We Think*; Wheeler, "A Psychological Description of Intelligence," *Psychological Review*, 1924, p. 174.

¹² Pillsbury, *The Psychology of Reasoning*, p. 8.

142 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

problem, some aim, and a choice from two or more alternatives.

It is this aim or purpose which motivates the process, keeps the individual trying until a solution is found. It also directs the "line of thought," the relevant ideas and judgments to the exclusion of the extraneous. Thinking with no particular aim or purpose is scarcely ever anything other than mere reverie in which ideas succeed each other guided by the laws of association. It would seem that reasoning is not a primary motive, since it is motivated and directed by ends and purposes. The individual ideas included in the process of thinking, reasoning, recall, and imagination are necessarily motive links in the relay of ideas which make the process possible. But since the various links are selected, even here, idea as motive is only secondary in its force. Ordinarily, thinking is employed in the service of some desire; usually one that has met opposition from the outside or from inward conflicts among impulses or ideals.

4. *Ideas may inhibit action.* We have seen how ideas motivate other ideas, psychophysical reactions confined to the self, and overt involuntary and voluntary acts. We need to note further that ideas may inhibit action. Ideas frequently inhibit other ideas. This may happen at the very threshold of consciousness in what is known as a mental block. For example, when one has the name or word he wants to recall "right on the tip of his tongue" but cannot quite speak it he is probably experiencing a mental block in that another name or term is seeking to cross the threshold at the same instant. Persisting in the effort is often of no avail; letting the subject drop removes the competi-

tion and after a while, quite unexpectedly, the term "pops into the head."¹³ But even after an idea has gained the focus of consciousness it may be suddenly replaced by another idea. This may be involuntary or voluntary. The former is characteristic of so-called weak-willed people who have little or no power of concentration; the latter is likely to take place with the "strong-willed" people capable of directed thinking. The extreme form of involuntary shifting of ideas is almost a mechanical process depending on chance or accident. It is illustrated in the feeble-minded person who starts to tell of an experience but presently wanders far from the original narrative because of his inability to reject a passing idea that may be only remotely connected with the subject matter at hand. He shifts from one thing to another in rapid succession; no coherency is maintained. Such a person is also usually handicapped by inability to resist irrelevant comment on every passing sensory experience. If an automobile whizzes by he must stop in the midst of his narrative to say something about it, if his eyes fall on the watch charm of his listener he must immediately make some remark concerning it. In modified form something of the sort obtains in normal life.

On the other hand, one may deliberately inhibit an undesirable idea by replacing it with a more favorable one. This may happen to a judgment idea all ready to function in conduct. I may decide to go for a walk and be on the verge of acting on the judgment, then suddenly reverse my decision as I recall that an ap-

¹³ The Freudians have another explanation for this phenomenon. See Chapter XVI of this book.

144 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

pointment in my room is about due. In this connection one must be careful not to confuse the motive source of the idea with the motive force of personality as the agent in voluntary activity. Here we are concerned with the drive of the idea itself—with all the elements and associations that constitute the idea an idea.

The chief force and function of ideas in motivation are not primary; they are directive and selective. Thinking and reasoning aim to harmonize discordant and conflicting elements in mental life, among ideas and judgments. The "reasonable" person is one who has mastered the art of peace-making among his ideas and the facts of his experience. Says Ellwood, "As soon as we view the human intellect as an instrument of adaption, the part that it plays in human society becomes plain. Roughly we may say that in the social life instinct has to do with early beginnings, habit with order or organization, and intellect with change."¹⁴

KNOWLEDGE

Ideas, judgments, thinking, reasoning, inference, decision, choice are closely related to knowledge. Knowledge may be regarded as a composite of all these elements and processes. Knowledge is "knowing," having the right relationships to facts and reality. In a restricted sense it means having the proper judgment relation to a particular situation or a group of facts. In a wider sense knowledge is more like wisdom. Although a man may possess great knowledge and not be

¹⁴ Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 209; cf. *ibid.*, p. 214.

considered wise and vice versa, yet, theoretically at least, the man of knowledge should be the man of wisdom. Knowledge is usually sought as a means, hence it is a secondary source of motivation. But frequently it is an end in itself, in which case it becomes a primary source of motivation. The urge to know, to possess the right solution or explanation, is often very strong in inquiring minds. No doubt the instinct of curiosity plays an important part as drive, at least in the inception of the "knowing interest" in any particular field or in developing a general habit of inquiry. The so-called thirst for knowledge is a very complicated affair. Rarely is it a pure urge. Perhaps the recluse and the bookworm approximate this type of motivation. Most seekers after truth, however, are motivated by many other drives to boot. The desire to satisfy curiosity, to express one's self more adequately, to make a contribution in a specific field of knowledge, to gain fame, prestige, wealth, position, power, influence, to achieve renown as a savant, or, in the less ambitious, the drive of escaping the stigma of ignorance, the wish to keep up with the times, to "be in the swim," and hundreds of such urges may and do operate in motivating the drive for knowledge.

Then, too, the evolutionary urge may also be present, prompting the individual and the race to ever higher and higher mental development, to knowledge and mastery of physical and cosmic forces. The cultivation of the mind means power. Power means expansion. And this in turn appeals to the self-regarding instinct, one of the most compelling of all motives. Some want knowledge for ornament, some for curiosity, some for exploitation, some for the desire to serve their fellows

146 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

by relieving pain and enhancing pleasure, some want it to satisfy an inherent restlessness, some for the sense of mastery, some want it to aid in the discovery of further wants, some for the joy of the conquest, some for the pleasure of knowing; all want it for power.

IDEO-MOTIVES

Not all ideas have equal force in motivation. There is a wide range of difference in this respect. The motive force of an idea is determined by its meaning. The meaning is all that the idea represents to the individual, fact and value associations. The richer the meaning, the more potent the idea as a motivating force. And by richness is meant the number, degree, and extent of such associations as feeling tone (pleasant or unpleasant), images, emotion, sentiment, concepts, symbols, and most important of all, the "motor set." We have already pointed out that it is an unnecessary and impossible abstraction to break up the idea or its meaning into its component elements and point to them as the real motives. We have a composite sentiment here to deal with designated by the term "idea." If anyone objects to calling this an idea let him name it what he will. Our concern is with the psychic fact represented; not with a quibble over terminology. Once more we insist that every idea with a meaning represents a psychic fact, a compound situation, a motor set or motive. McDougall prefers to call an idea an "enduring cognitive disposition."¹⁵ Whenever an idea or cognitive disposition is at the focus of consciousness its

¹⁵ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 259.

"enduring" quality, that which gives it identity is also present, that is, the whole complex represented, in brief, the meaning. Meaning seems to be a mooted problem in psychology.¹⁶ We prefer the view that "meaning is, at basis, a 'cue' which suggests a certain adjustment."¹⁷ The meaning in perception is the set or attitude or adjustment to a sensory experience or, rather, to the object experienced, based on past experience with that or similar objects. The same is true with relation to the imagery in concept, the meaning of the recalled image or constellation of images.

The idea as an enduring cognitive disposition has a physiological phase represented by the term "motor set." Indeed, if it has any enduring quality at all it must be based on the neural connections or in some way integrated in the psychophysical mechanism so as to be repeatable in recall. This will represent, perhaps in modified form, the original physiological reaction as well as the more strictly psychical accompaniments. The physical motor set plays no small part in motivation. It furnishes an explanation for those habitual, ready, quick, unerringly identical responses that follow upon the appearance of ideas at the focus of consciousness that are frequent visitors.

With the physiological motor set as a basis we have ample reënforcements from the emotional and impulsive attitudes and adjustments associated in experience as the meaning of a given concept or idea. The meaning may become richer through experience, but always there remains identity through change. In popular

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 252.

¹⁷ Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, p. 322.

terminology we say "that means more to me now than it did five months ago," or, "It means more to John than it does to William." The process of thinking often enriches an idea (usually an abstract idea) by logical reference to related ideas.

IMAGERY AND SYMBOLISM

In sensory experience the meaning is in perception; in a concept the meaning is attached to an image. There may be abstract ideas devoid of imagery but most of our ideas exist in terms of images. There are various types of images. Since they are representations of sensory experience there are as many types of images as recallable sensations. The images that do not correspond to any actual past experience are mere "figments of the imagination" and rated as fancies or fantasies such as mythological characters and fairies. Images which reproduce objects of sensory experience are called concrete. As contrasted with this there is symbolic imagery which is a representative of an object. Thus the word "mouse" is a symbol. It stands for the creature which that word arouses in memory. Symbols often have strong affective accompaniments amounting to sentiments and hence have great moving force: witness such symbols as the cross, the flag, the sacraments, an engagement ring, etc. Various symbols are used in posters and advertising devices which are designed to motivate the prospective buyer. Imagery, both concrete and symbolic, plays a large rôle in motivating our daily conduct. They are more vivid than abstract ideas, they have many emotional and instinctive accompaniments which are strong drives. More-

over, a very little goes a long way. Frequently a slight token will be the symbol for a long chain of ideas with their comprehensive meanings and rich associations. A lock of the fair lady's hair or her glove may start reactions in her lover that recall almost endless images of the lady herself. The accidental discovery of a tiny shoe belonging to a deceased infant will arouse memories and images in his fond mother and open wide the flood tide of her tears. The wearing of badges and emblems and tokens is supposed to remind the wearer of a whole train of ideas, ideas that might require volumes to describe verbally.

DOMINANT, OVERVALUED, FIXED IDEAS: FANATICISM,
OBSESSION

Besides the casual and frequently recurring ideas there are certain dominant, overvalued, relatively fixed ideas. In its extreme form it is known as fanaticism and when it reaches pathological proportions it is called an obsession. A dominant idea somehow gets the focus of consciousness and refuses to leave or retract from the focal point. There are various types of such ideas. Frequently a nonsensical rhyme or tune will persist for days. The harder you try to banish it the more it dominates your waking and, perhaps, sleeping thoughts as well. Sometimes one has a ridiculous impulse that demands expression and will not be denied: counting the stone flags between two points on the sidewalk, touching all the door knobs of a string of stores in succession, spitting at a certain spot each time one passes it, making a foolish gesture at a particular sign post, etc. The normal person is aware of this freak impulse

but finds it almost impossible to resist the dominating idea. Somehow it has gotten a start and has founded a dissociated hierarchy of its own, refusing orders from the integrated personality.

There is another type of dominant idea that may be intrinsically of more value but which will not be restrained; it must be expressed. It is like the coin in the boy's pocket which cannot be coaxed to remain there. It must be spent or "burn a hole in the pocket." We all have our pet ideas which we like to parade on all occasions in season and out of season. Most public speakers have such themes. We are not now concerned with master motives in the larger sense,¹⁸ but with dominating and persistent *ideas* as motives. We are strongly influenced, when it is a conscious process, by the higher values we attach to the idea.¹⁹ There are also "overvalued ideas," a phrase which Stekel ascribes to Wernicke. In highly figurative language Stekel writes: "The instincts surge upward from the depth, the inhibitions bear down from above, and between them—owing to stimuli from within and without—the sea of ideas rocks up and down, during which time another idea rises to the mirror-like surface of consciousness. Suddenly one remains on top and becomes stationary, like a buoy anchored deep to the sea's bottom. This is the 'fixed idea' of older writers, and the 'overvalued idea' of modern psychotherapists."²⁰ As a sample illustration of an overvalued idea he cites the case of the lover whose lovesickness is a species of "physiological paranoia." The lover's exaggerated

¹⁸ See pp. 267ff.

¹⁹ Cf. Link, *American Journal of Psychology*, 1922, p. 11.

²⁰ Stekel, *The Depths of the Soul*, p. 154.

valuations are not accepted by the environment. Overvalued ideas are quite common. "In this sense," he says, "there is really no difference between fools and healthy persons. Everyone of us bears within himself a hidden quantity of neurosis and psychosis. What saves us from the insane asylum is perhaps only the circumstance that we hide our overvalued ideas or that so many persons share our folly and that the multitudes accept it as wisdom. . . . The tremendous power of overvalued ideas can be understood if one thinks of the crusades, the witchcraft persecutions, hysterical epidemics, the Dreyfus affair, anarchism, etc." ²¹

Ideas are tremendous factors in motivation. We recognize this in the attempt to instill "proper" ideas in the minds of the young and in shielding them from "erroneous," destructive, negative, lewd ideas. The person suffering from neurosis or psychosis is sick from false ideas which have diseased his mind. An obsession is a persistent false idea which usurps the unfortunate patient's time and energy, dominating the whole of his life.

There are also dominant ideas peculiar to a race, or nation, or an age. The "psychic dominant" is not one but several in the present age. McDougall points out that "The four ideas, liberty, equality, progress, and human solidarity or universal responsibility, seem to be the leading ideas of the present era." ²² Ellwood states that "The search for truth, the search for reality, and the search for social redemption distinguish the motives

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

²² McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 254.

152 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

of our age from those of many, though not all, preceding ages." ²³

²³ Ellwood, "What Are Human Motives Today?" *Religious Education*, April, 1923. Cf. also Hocking and Horne on the same subject, *Religious Education*, Feb., 1923; also May, *ibid.*, April, 1923, pp. 69-71.

CHAPTER IX

INTEREST AS MOTIVE

The term interest is almost a synonym for motive. We are attracted by the "interesting"; we are moved by what interests us. We *have* interests, we *take* interest. Interest is obviously a factor in motivation. But it is necessary to inquire whether interest is a distinct motive force or merely a descriptive term announcing the presence of primary motives and drives. "Interest, desire, and attention enable us to guide and control the course of our experiences and actions. In this respect they belong among the *motives* of human life."¹ To bring out the various phases of the problem it may be well to discuss: attention, the so-called interests, attitude, desire, intention, purpose, wish.

ATTENTION

Attention is not a motive, it is not even a mental process. It is a descriptive term telling something about a person's mental attitude. To pay attention means to focus consciousness on an object or idea or act. To do this the field must be narrowed. The process is selective and "exploratory," very much like the process in gazing on a definite object selected from the field of vision. The image of the object has to be

¹ Warren, *Elements of Human Psychology*, p. 337.

focused on the fovea of the retina in order to see it to the best advantage. The object is then said to be focused. Attention is a "motor attitude," it is tension towards an end. Attention is fleeting, transitory. It cannot be focused for more than a moment at a time—it "goes and comes." One cannot attend to more than one thing at a time unless all but one of the processes are habitual, automatic, do themselves. The woman who knits and reads performs the knitting act quite mechanically. Of course it is possible to read poetry and add a column of figures seemingly at the same time. But what actually happens is that attention is shifted from one to the other process and shifted so rapidly that the performer may not be conscious of the alternation.

Why we attend and to *what* we pay attention are determined by the so-called objective and subjective conditions of attention. The objective conditions are concerned with the nature and type of stimulation. The more important factors are intensity, duration (change, action, repetition), and novelty. The subjective conditions are heredity, experience (education), and present purpose.

OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF ATTENTION

1. *Intensity*. Other things being equal, the more intense stimulation will secure attention. Intensity finds various expressions according to the sensory gateway to consciousness. In auditory terms intensity means loudness; in cutaneous sensation it means severe pain, sweltering heat, biting cold, etc.; taste and smell have degrees of intensity of stimulation subjectively

registered as pungent, astringent, and the like; intensity of stimulus for the eye means bright light, variegated colors, large size, rapid motion.

2. *Duration.* Other things being equal, change, motion (action), repetition are more effective in securing attention than a stimulus of steady intensity. One of the most common characteristics in all sensory experience is fatigability, adaptability. It varies for the different senses, but is nevertheless a factor in all. We become accustomed, fatigued, adapted, disinterested, inattentive to familiar objects, color-combinations, designs, sounds and noises, odors, tastes, and even pain. Intensity may attract attention but will not hold it. People who work in machine shops and factories where the noise seems maddening to a novice are almost wholly oblivious to it. Similarly, those who work in manufacturing fertilizers or chlorine products do not notice the obnoxious odors. The same is true for all sensory experience. But when change is introduced the stimulus becomes more effective in capturing attention: witness the electrical lighting systems used in advertising—where some trademark or slogan, or what not, is flashed on and off intermittently. Frequent repetition through change is very effective.

3. *Novelty.* The novel, the strange, the extreme, the extraordinary will attract attention. This factor utilizes the urge of curiosity which is another way of describing the fascination of the unknown, the mysterious. The trait is general in the animal world. The present generation descended from ancestors who paid heed to strange objects, were thus able to avoid danger and lived to propagate their kind. Anything out of the ordinary, the commonplace, is bound to arouse

curiosity and become the object of attention. This principle is extensively and skilfully used in modern advertising.²

It will be noted that the so-called objective conditions of attention which we have just been discussing are really subjective in their force. For attention is an attitude of mind. The objective factors, the external stimuli, can have no force or meaning apart from the subjective ability to respond. Attention is typical of the conscious state. To be conscious is to attend. However, psychologists make a distinction for purposes of classification and recognize more pronouncedly subjective factors in attention—heredity, experience, present purpose. In other words, interest is the central fact in attention.³ We have native interests, such as impulsive and instinctive tendencies, to which we add many, many new interests through experience and affective associations. The acquired interests together with the original interests make up our stock of motives.

The problem of interest as motive will become more apparent in a review of the subjective conditions of attention. Interest and attention are different ways of looking at the same thing. "To have an 'interest' in an object," says McDougall, "is to be ready to pay attention to it. Interest is latent attention; and attention is interest in action. The essential condition of both interest in and attention to any object is that the mind shall be so organized, either natively or through experience, that it can think of the object, and that such

² Cf. Hollingworth, *Advertising and Selling*, p. 91.

³ Cf. Hart, *Psychology of Insanity*, p. 27.

thinking shall evoke impulse or desire which maintains a train of activity in relation to the object.”⁴

SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF ATTENTION

1. *Heredity and attention.* By virtue of the fact that we are human beings we possess certain general and universal “interests.” This includes all the drives of “original nature,” innate automatisms, reflexive reactions, primary instincts, primary emotions, and sensory experiences with their affective accompaniments. “Natural interests” are attached to objects, persons, and situations. The cat has a natural interest in the mouse and the mouse in the cat. The criteria for these innate interests may be stated in value terms: (1) survival value, (2) pleasure value, (3) activity value (also play value). In the above illustration, the purpose or end result of the cat’s interest in the mouse is food and play, while the interest of the mouse in the cat is self-protection. Both of these have survival value and are typical of many acts. Human beings as well are “naturally” interested in objects and situations that threaten harm, injury, pain, death. We are also intensely interested in what promises to enhance life—possessions, comforts, luxuries, delights, pleasures, friends, a mate, in fine, the whole class of “goods,” of positive values. Conduct is also motivated by the natural interest in sheer activity,⁵ which is only indirectly

⁴ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 277.

⁵ Dewey, *Interest and Effort in Education*, p. 18. “Wherever there is life there is activity, an activity having some tendency or direction of its own.

“In this primitive condition of spontaneous, impulsive activity we have the basis of natural interest.”

concerned with positive values and may even involve disvalues in danger and possible death. This includes the play motive in general. Thus we are interested, we pay attention, we are moved to action by all those objects and situations which have survival, pleasure, and activity values. And this interest is hereditary, innate: it constitutes the first phase of the subjective conditions of attention.

There are, however, not only common natural interests, but, by virtue of the fact that we are individuals, we possess specific interests also—the interest of the genius, of special aptitudes and capacities, of native likes and dislikes for colors, tastes, odors, people and objects. Woodworth asserts that some of these native likes and dislikes are independent of “the gratification of any pre-aroused instinct,” that “we like or dislike it for itself.”⁶ It would seem that native capacity for special “aptitudes,” likes and dislikes, cannot be separated or distinguished from the interest or the ability and desire to pay attention to special objects and experiences. They are two ways of expressing the same idea. “From the introspective side, an interest is somewhat similar to an emotion; from the side of behavior it is a drive towards activity of the capacity to which it is attached.” Woodworth states in the same connection that “along with the capacity for handling numerical relations goes an interest in numbers; along with the capacity for mechanical devices goes the interest in mechanics; along with the capacity for language goes the interest in learning to speak; and so on through the list of capacities, both those that are

⁶ Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 180.

generally present in all men and those that are strong only in the exceptional individual.”⁷ Interest, then, is “the feeling that comes from innate capacities.”⁸ So much for the factor of heredity in interest motivation.

2. *Experience and interest.* Native interests, however, are greatly modified by experience. Not only that, but new interests are constantly acquired.⁹ Education and social pressure play an important rôle. Education trains the capacity for observation and attention. This introduces the “types of attention” usually given as involuntary, voluntary, and non-voluntary. The involuntary and non-voluntary require little or no conscious effort in attention. In the former instance it is due mainly to the objective conditions of attention—intensity, change, and novelty in the stimuli. We attend because the stimulus places the object at the focus of consciousness almost mechanically. In the instance of non-voluntary attention the interest is supplied mainly from innate desires or acquired interests

⁷ Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 74.

⁸ Cf. English, “Dynamic Psychology and the Problem of Motivation,” *Psychological Review*, July, 1921, p. 244: “There is a growing tendency to place interest definitely as a feeling. Drever argues, for example, that interest is the affective aspect of the instincts and that the emotions described by McDougall form only a special case. Woodworth calls the feeling that comes from innate capacities, interest.” Cf. Carver, “The Generation and Control of Emotion,” *British Journal of Psychology*, April, 1919, p. 52. “For the purpose of clarity, I wish to define the ‘interest’ of an instinct as the affective tone which accompanies the whole instinctive process when it has carried through in a normally satisfying manner; and to define emotion as the subjective experience which develops when gratification of the instinctive impulses is held in check by higher level control.”

⁹ Cf. Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 206.

that are sought as ends. Of course these divisions are more or less arbitrary; there is no sharp line of demarcation. Nevertheless, they may help to clarify the situation. In this particular connection we are concerned mostly with the voluntary type of attention because it is based on education and social pressure. Effort is another name for this type of attention. When the individual is exercising the selective function of attention he is conscious of strain and effort. The conflict is known as distraction. This may sometimes be so intense as to permeate the conscious and subconscious state and prevent a man from following a strong interest. Self-consciousness will seriously handicap a man in competition, in a game, or in securing a position, no matter how strong the interest or the desire to succeed. In fact, the distraction will be in direct ratio to the strength of the desire. Witness also the power of distraction over the strong impulses of hunger and interest in food when one is hungry. Sad news or extremely glad tidings will "take away the appetite"; and similar causes may have a similar effect upon the desire for sleep.

Distraction may also be caused by conflict of a momentary interest with a remote interest. This is where education and social pressure lend their aid to voluntary attention in keeping the remote interest in the foreground of consciousness. Hence we learn by experience to attend to unattractive details as means towards desirable ends. There must of necessity be interest somewhere; in the means, or end, or both ¹⁰—conscious

¹⁰ Cf. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 562.

choices on the basis of value judgments. Another problem of distraction is the relation of interest to fatigue. It is a matter of common observation that we tire easily of activities which have no "natural interest" or which make too great a demand on voluntary effort. Thus a man who regards himself as completely worn out by the drudgery of his day's work as a laborer may suddenly find himself a vigorous individual when called upon to participate in a game of baseball, provided he has a natural interest in the game. Or, when one is engaged, let us say, in writing a book, he will often think he is too tired to continue. This is likely to happen in the more difficult sections when interest in the means is at a low ebb and the remote interest rather dim. But let him get a new insight in the difficult problem at hand or somehow visualize more vividly the satisfaction to be derived from the completion of the task and he will continue working for hours, seemingly tapping new resources of energy. In all mental and physical effort there is quite a margin between the loss or lag of interest and actual fatigue.¹¹ This is more pronounced in mental activity because interest is likely to be in the end rather than in the means. Furthermore, it requires voluntary attention, hence greater effort. The converse is also true. When fatigue begins to set in, it becomes increasingly more difficult to exercise volun-

¹¹ Cf. Kempf, *Autonomic Functions and the Personality*, p. 122. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 124. "Old men and women of the Kentucky mountains trudged the moonlighted trails to the township schools to learn to read and write in order to acquire the affective gratification to be had from reading the letters of their absent children. The rate of learning of men and women of seventy astonished the educated world. There is no such thing as being too old or too stupid to learn when the object fits the vital acquisitive needs of the personality."

tary attention.¹² Perhaps it is for this reason that interest is in constant need of reënforcement.

Concentration is the overcoming of distraction; is a more permanent state of attention. The extreme of concentration is known as absent-mindedness. An absent-minded person is so engrossed in a particular enterprise that he is almost wholly unconscious of other impressions. In ordinary attention the focusing is not so complete but that one is also conscious of impressions in the immediate vicinity of the focal point—like the field of vision in which one perceives a central object less and less vividly as the distance from the focal point is increased, gradually fading out entirely. Absent-mindedness usually indicates a consuming interest or a remarkable degree of concentration or both.

Further implications of interest-modification through social pressure, training, and experience will become more apparent in a discussion of *present purpose* as the third subjective condition of attention; for, present purpose is determined by native interests modified by social pressure resulting in numerous acquired interests.

3. *Present purpose and interest.* The idea in mind, the present purpose, is the greatest selective force in attention. When you are waiting to meet a friend, on a busy street corner, for example, you scarcely notice irrelevant objects and overlook people who are unlike your friend in appearance. But how often you will mistake even a remote resemblance for the person you have in mind. In everyday life we observe only those things which concern us, have an interest, harmonize with our purposes; we pass by many details. Thus one

¹² Cf. Moore, *Foundations of Psychology*, p. 186.

may not know the number of steps on the front door entrance of his own dwelling. The classical illustration of our blindness to irrelevant details is that very few are able to tell offhand whether the Roman numeral used on the face of a clock to designate the fourth hour is "IIII" or "IV." When looking at a timepiece the purpose is to find out the time, other factors are ignored. After one's attention has been called to the matter one may note the marking of the fourth hour. In other words, the idea in mind has then expanded to include that item also, a new purpose is created. A question has the force of suggesting a new purpose. It concentrates attention and is valuable in noting various phases of a problem. The suggestion or question may come from within as well as from without.

The present purpose or idea is usually consistent with the habitual interests based on past experience. Watch a man read the newspaper and you get some insight into his interests. If his chief interest is in sports he will turn to the sporting section at once or merely glance through the paper till he comes to the favored page. Even here he betrays his specialized interest by reading about football or wrestling or boxing, etc., as the case may be. Of course, it is possible and quite likely that a sportsman will be interested in several sports, but very rarely will you find a man who is interested in all of them to the same extent. Our baseball fan, for example, may have little or no interest in billiards or hunting or boxing or bowling. If so, he will obviously read more extensively of those sports which interest him most. In addition to his interest in athletics our man may be interested in political news or the quotations of the stock market, but is not inter-

ested, let us say, in music or new books: we should expect him to pass over the musical section and the book reviews without hesitation. He may not even be aware that his favorite daily contains such material. On the other hand, if he is a physician he will be quick to notice announcements of new methods for treating diabetes or cancer or what not—any matter connected with his profession.

There is, therefore, a more permanent purpose known as "set" or "readiness" towards certain objects and situations that come very close home. One has a special set for his own name. He may be able to hear conversation but unable to distinguish words and yet if his name is mentioned he will hear it. Similarly, a nurse will be awakened from deep sleep by the slightest disturbance on the part of her patient. The mother is set for the cry of her infant which may be too faint to awaken any other member of the household. On a railroad train not all the passengers will note the engine whistle, yet a brakeman, though off duty, will hear it instantly. He knows the signals, he has a set for the sound.

In the final analysis interest is a personal affair and closely related to values. We are interested in what is of value to us. A thousand objects may present themselves to the senses, but only the "interesting" items will enter into experience. The core of interest is the self. Dewey says, ". . . interest is personal; it signifies a direct concern; a recognition of something at stake, something whose outcome is important for the individual . . . interest marks the annihilation of the distance between the person and the materials and results of his action; it is the sign of their organic

union.”¹³ This raises the question as to the selective agent which involves the place of interest in motivation. Is the agent distinct and apart from the interest or is it identical with it? What is the force of self or personality? The selective nature of consciousness must not be confused with a selective agent in interest although the two are very closely related.¹⁴ Consciousness is broader than interest; it is the field of awareness in which interest operates. The self, whatever its ultimate nature, is the selective agent in that phase of consciousness which is volitional—in deliberate choices. The selective agent in all the rest is the urge or drive or motive itself. To take interest in an object often means to identify it with the self which places it at the focus of consciousness in order to get more of it, realize it, live it more richly. But, again, the self as selective agent is not identical with the interest. The self may arbitrarily select an uninteresting object which it regards as of greater value. The selective power of the self in the exercise of will is an important source of motivation. It is discussed more fully in the next chapter. We are here concerned with the drive of interest.¹⁵

It is difficult to distinguish between interest and its drive. Interest is dynamic, it *is* the drive. The interest is the selective agency; the selective agency is the motive. Every interest is a tendency and the motive power of this tendency is determined by the objective and subjective conditions of attention which we have been discussing. Other factors in interest are

¹³ Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Cf. Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 521.

¹⁴ Cf. James, *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 139.

¹⁵ Cf. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 125-126.

intention, purpose, desire, wish, attitude. These will now be considered.

ATTITUDE

Attitude may be regarded as a composite of all the subjective factors of attention, heredity, experience, and present purpose. It is a conscious and unconscious set or readiness of the mind to react to stimulus in a given way. The attitude seems headed for an objective, it implies relationship to an object or situation, it is expectant. An attitude is the result of habitual modes of conduct and in turn becomes a determiner of future conduct in modifying and regulating the primary drives. "Thus," says Ross, "frightened persons are peculiarly susceptible to warnings, angry persons to denunciations, expectant persons to promises, anxious persons to rumors. An agitated gathering is tinder, and the throngs that form in times of public tension are very liable to become mobs."¹⁶ Attitude may be but another name for the state of expectancy, of uneasiness, that is characteristic of a phase of conduct motivated by a primary interest. It is the persistent stage between the arousal of an impulse and its discharge. In addition, attitude possibly contains the marks of previous acts which lend background and perspective appreciation to the impending or expected act. Or, it may be that an attitude is an affective habit or the feeling and emotional accompaniment of habit.¹⁷ When the attitude becomes permanent and fixed it may take the form of an obsession. Warren gives attitude

¹⁶ Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 45.

¹⁷ Cf. Kempf, *Autonomic Functions and the Personality*, p. 68.

a very prominent place in mental life. He classifies interest as perception or ideational attitude, desire as feeling attitude, and attention as conative attitude. These he calls primary attitudes to which he adds a list of secondary attitudes: dispositions, appreciation, conscience, proclivities, language and ideals.¹⁸ There are, then, motor attitudes, affective or emotional attitudes, perceptual or ideational attitudes, and combinations of these. They are habitual modes of experience coloring the whole of behavior. The individual number of these attitudes is almost limitless. As motives and drives they have what force there is in habit; never more, usually less.

INTENTION, PURPOSE, DESIRE, WISH

Intention, purpose, desire, wish are terms denoting consciously perceived valuable ends with varying degrees of probable attainment. A wish denotes the least probable of fulfillment. We usually wish for ends that are not within our grasp, for the time being at least. Every wish is a wish for something. The urge is in the desire for the thing wanted. The wish itself is not a motive, but may become one, and, when it does, it ceases to be a wish; it has transformed itself into intention or purpose.¹⁹ Intention is a highly conscious attitude.

¹⁸ Warren, *Elements of Human Psychology*, p. 334.

¹⁹ Woodworth, *Psychology*, pp. 70-71: "A purpose is itself an inner response to some external stimulus, and acts in its turn as a 'central stimulus' to further reaction. . . . The purposeful person wants something that he has not yet got, and is striving towards some future result. Whereas a stimulus pushes him from behind, a goal beckons to him from ahead. This element of action directed toward some end is absent from the simple response to a stimulus."

Warren, *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*,

When one intends to perform an act his "mind is made up." All that remains is the proper or opportune moment which shall act as a reflex stimulus very much like the trigger of a loaded gun. The psychoanalysts use the term wish as synonymous with desire. They often speak of suppressed wishes and desires. The drive here is clearly an instinct or innate or acquired impulse which the individual is forced to suppress because it runs counter to some social taboo. This phase of the problem is discussed more fully under "Motives of the Subconscious Mind" in Chapter XVI.

To desire is to perceive an end consciously in ideas or chains of ideas. Desire implies all three phases of which any mental process is capable—conscious, affective, motor—to a marked degree. Desire is very close of kin to appetite except that it is more decidedly conscious of the end. The whole group of instinctive drives are in a sense desires. "Desire," says Dewey, "is the forward urge of living creatures. When the push and drive of life meets no obstacle, there is nothing which we call desire. There is just life-activity. But obstructions present themselves, and activity is dispersed and divided. Desire is the outcome. It is activity surging forward to break through what dams it up. The 'object' which then presents itself in thought as the goal of desire is the object of the environment *which, if it were present*, would secure a re-unification of activity and the restoration of its ongoing unity."²⁰

Vol. XIII, pp. 70-72, includes the following factors in purposive consciousness: (1) forethought, (2) assent, (3) potency-feeling, (4) the self-notion, (5) the sense of fitness.

²⁰ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 249; cf. Kantor, "The Psychology of Feeling or Affective Reactions," *American Journal of*

Desire is an urge for change; change of status, change of environment, new experiences, possessions, feelings, anything. Desire as motive is secondary in that it is aroused by some impulse-urge or a conflict of urges together with internal ideational drives. But once aroused, it achieves a unity and identity of its own, which may thenceforth be regarded as a motive.

Psychology, July, 1923, p. 437; Bushee, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 51 ff; Snow, *Psychology in Business*, p. 11; Bernard, *Instinct*, pp. 502 ff.

CHAPTER X

WILL, CHOICE, PERSONALITY AS MOTIVE

WILL

In the economy of motivation, will occupies a unique position. It is popularly regarded as the one great motive force in all human action—a veritable dynamo constantly generating motives. “Will power,” an “iron will,” the “unconquerable will,” the “indomitable will” are expressive phrases descriptive of will in motivation. In fact, so spectacular is will that spontaneous thought conceives of it as an entity characterized by excessive energy, movement, effort, strain, stress, strife, tireless activity. Will dictates, directs, controls, inhibits. Will is often conceived as the pilot at the helm steering the course, or the captain in command of the speed and destination of the vessel. The theory of punishment is based on responsibility and accountability which in turn rest on will, on the relative freedom of will.

But where does will power come from? How is it brought to bear on a given situation? What is the mechanism and what the agency? Is it an entity? Is it a phase of conation? Is it a primary or secondary urge? Is it a mysterious force? Can it be distinguished from desire, from conscious striving toward an end? Is it merely a name for the self in action? What is meant by “strong-willed” and “weak-willed”? Can

will power be cultivated? If so, how? How much of our conduct is motivated by will? What is the relation of will to unconscious or subconscious conduct and to mechanical and "involuntary" behavior in general?

Answers to these and similar questions should determine the place of will in motivation which is our chief concern here.

Let us approach the problem in the light of the previous discussion on interest and attention. It was pointed out that interest as conative tendency, implies action, realization of an end-result. It is teleological; it is purposive. In other words, there are conscious and unconscious ends to be realized in interest-tendency. Some of the conscious interests are called desires. Some of these desires differ from the unconscious urges mainly in the degree (intensity) of the drive, in complexity, and the degree of consciousness of ends; and hence need not necessarily come under the jurisdiction of will. But others of these desires are subject to will. Again, in certain types of conflicts among interests, will plays no part; in others it plays the leading rôle. Below the threshold of consciousness the strongest urge wins in case of conflict. Above the threshold, the interests or desires first fight for the focus of consciousness and the winner here is quite likely to win in conduct, in realizing the end-result, unless will intervenes to hold one or the other (usually the weaker desire) at the focus of consciousness. This reënforced drive is not always successful. Its chances of success, however, are greatly increased though not guaranteed. The problem of choice will be discussed later. The essential consideration in this connection is the matter of agency. The agency in all urges and drives, as already pointed

out, is none other than the interest itself except where will operates. And, to anticipate the section on personality, when will is operative the agent is personality, the ego, the self. Will is the self in action. This would seem to be the chief distinction between will conation and all other phases of conation. Wherever there is true volition there the ego is expressing itself in keeping with the idea of the self as projected or merged into the ideal self. Memory and imagination are essential factors in the exercise of will and in all deliberate choice.

Will is itself guided by: (1) sentiment ("self-regarding sentiment"); (2) character references, habitual modes of conduct; (3) principles; (4) ideals; (5) deliberate judgment. All these are referred to the self; it is another way of saying that the type of personality determines the type of choices made by will. This will be treated more fully a little later. For the present it may be advantageous to regard the problem from the viewpoint of interest and attention. Will, in this sense, is another expression of attention. It is effortful attention. It is a form of interest and desire. The interest resides in the factors of personality as does also the urge or motive.

LIMITATIONS OF WILL

No matter how will and volition are defined, the limitations are apparent. There are large and important groups of human activities which are quite independent of will. Will has no jurisdiction over innate automatisms. The heart beats, the lungs breathe air, the alimentary system assimilates food, the glands secrete,

and numerous other purely mechanical (vegetative, physical, chemical) reactions take place with practically no interference from will. Many habits, particularly the acquired automatisms, also belong to this group. Skill in motor reactions is independent of will. The exercise of will would confuse a person and lessen efficiency. All unconscious activity is free of volitional control—and this includes a large and significant group. The psychoanalysts insist that the unconscious or subconscious drives are what we really live by. They also state that these are in conflict with will and triumph in dreams, daydreams, slips of the tongue, etc., often securing vengeance in abnormalities and neuroses.¹

The instincts and instinctive tendencies, although in a measure conscious, have not yet been subjugated by will. They refuse to pay tribute or, at times, even respect. These impulses carry their own drives, they need no motive power from the will. Primary emotions stand in the same relation to will. It is generally recognized that emotions cannot be controlled directly. And indirect control consists in manipulating the environment so that the particular emotional state will not likely come to pass. Fear, for example, cannot be controlled. One may school himself to refrain from running away but no amount of willing can prevent the emotion itself. On the other hand, a volitional attempt at control might only add to the intensity of the emotion. When tender emotion has been aroused in the lovesick swain it takes something other than will power to quell it. Habits also stand in a rebellious

¹See Chapter XVI.

state as regards will. One proof of this is found in the sorry attempt of will to break a definite habit once it has become established. If will were more potent here the mortality among New Year resolutions would not be nearly as great as it is.

Thus will is seriously limited in its sphere of activity. In actual everyday life we are motivated almost wholly by instinctive urges, emotions, feelings, habits, sentiments, mechanical adjustments, chemical forces, acquired interests, and an innumerable array of combinations of these. However, this is not the same as saying that will is not a motive. Despite serious limitations will does function as motive. In a sense it represents the highest type of motivation. It refers to action that is highly conscious and deliberately directed toward definitely chosen or perceived ends. Will, choice, personality, mark the superiority of the human animal over all the others in motivation. They invest him with a moral sense and responsibility for conduct which all others lack. But just how and to what extent is will a factor in motivation?

PROVINCE AND SCOPE OF WILL AS MOTIVE

It has already been noted that will is not involved in conduct that is motivated by unconscious or sub-conscious drives; nor in impulsive, instinctive, emotional, and habitual acts in keeping with natural or acquired interests—so long as the action is unhampered and does not run counter to other motives and drives. But will does function in at least four situations: (1) in case of obstruction to a tendency ready to function, or in case of opposition or interference with a desirable

act already under way; (2) in case of acquiring new habits and drives; (3) in case of putting into practice decisions reached by reasoning; (4) in case of conflicts among motives involving choice.

1. *Will as motive in case of opposition.* While the organism maintains its normal functions there is no need of interference, no occasion for will to assert itself. This is true not only of mechanical acts, but also of the instinctive and emotional and all the rest. It would be a needless waste of energy and wholly uncalled for. Moreover, in some instances, will might initiate the act and depend upon other motives and interests to carry it out, very much like starting an automobile motor by a battery and switching it over onto the magneto. But let obstruction or impediment of any sort come between the act and its discharge and will is at once aroused, mobilizing in turn the full resources of the mechanism. In illustrating this form of volition Woodworth says: "I start for the train, it may be, in plenty of time; and while this primary motive of catching the train is sufficiently awake to keep me to my course, I am carried forward from moment to moment by habit or by the interest of my walk and of the things I see. But an obstruction appears, and the primary tendency awakes to full activity as I remember that I must catch that train." He continues:

Still more complex cases occur, in which some motive, not concerned in the course of the activity up to the moment of obstruction, is then aroused and adds its force to the force of the motive already in action. I may have started for the train without any further motive than that it is my routine to take it. But when an obstruction threatens to prevent my catching it, I may remember that on this particular day I have

an important engagement which will be missed if I fail to catch this train; and this additional motive lends increased energy to my efforts, or, my self-esteem may be touched, since it would be humiliating to miss the train. Or again, my ideal of myself as one who can be depended upon to meet his engagements may awake; and some of the deepest forces of my personality may thus be drawn into an action that was at first quite superficial in its motivation.²

Thus it is apparent that in the instance of obstruction will reënforces the original motive and enlists additional drives. The conflict here is ostensibly between a desirable act and an outside interference. The personality presents a "united front" against the intrusion. This is quite different from the instances where the conflict is internal and the function of will is to choose between two impulses or against both. The motive force in this "civil strife," so to speak, is referred more specifically to the self or personality as we shall see presently. But in the instance under discussion it is not always necessary to "spread the alarm." A more thorough awakening of the original motive is often quite sufficient. The office of will is to keep this motive more steadily at the focus of consciousness. If the opposition is of sufficient intensity other motives may be enlisted. Those most ready to "join the colors" are the self-regarding sentiments

² Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 150-151; cf. Dewey, *Interest and Effort in Education*, p. 52: "Meeting obstacles makes a person project more definitely to himself the later and consuming period of his activity; it brings the end of his course of action to *consciousness*. He now *thinks* of what he is doing, instead of doing it blindly from instinct or habit. The result becomes a conscious aim, a guiding and inspiring purpose. In being an object of desire, it is also of endeavor."

which dislike to be worsted against an alien foe. The fighting instinct, the whole psychophysical "set" which finds pleasure in the normal discharge of an act and displeasure in the thwarting of the act once the tendency is thoroughly aroused, may also be enlisted. What additional specific motives are aroused depends upon the nature of the thwarted motive and the strength of the opposition. The possibilities are almost limitless and are not easily predictable in any particular case.

The chief point to be stressed here is that will, as a motive, merely directs, arouses, organizes in these instances. It utilizes motives; it is not itself a motive in the sense in which the interests are motives. As already pointed out the difference is one of agency. In the case of original motive that is more thoroughly awakened by will and the other motives enlisted in its service, the desire or motive is its own drive, no distinction can be made between it and its mechanism; whereas, *the agency in will motivation is the personality*. These are not separate entities; they are two phases of the conative process. Both draw upon the common store of the organism's energy. There is of course no other source. To state the case a little differently, the non-will motives are specific (also possessing in most instances specific mechanisms); while will as motive is general, undifferentiated. Or, again, will refers to the total self as motive; while specific motives, though included in the total self, are yet individualistic enough to carry their own drives and function through a given mechanism. Jung makes a distinction on the basis of consciousness and unconsciousness. He says, "Will, I regard as the sum of psychic

energy which is disposable to consciousness. In accordance with this conception, the process of the will would be an energetic process that is released by conscious motivation. A psychic process, therefore, which is conditioned by unconscious motivation I would not include under the concept of the will."³

The characteristic feature of will or volition is action accompanied by a feeling of effort. For this reason volition makes a greater demand upon energy than non-volitional activity. Consequently, voluntary effort is more fatiguing. In the interest of economy and consequent efficiency, most of our conduct is more or less mechanical and habitual. This no doubt accounts in a measure for the limits of voluntary activity.

2. *Will as motive in acquiring new habits and drives.* Wherever an end is consciously chosen and sought after, will is exercised. Without such an agency we should be at the mercy of our native urges, chance habits, and the force of feeling-tones attached to types of conduct. Will power must be used to initiate an act which is known to be unpleasant. In breaking an old established habit there is usually a strong motive or incentive or inducement. But this is not true when a person determines to break from a habit (perhaps a harmless habit) for no other reason than because he wants to—wants to test his will power. One might say that the motive here is the instinct of self-assertion which would be merely another way of saying that our man is exercising will. Every act motivated by conscious self-assertion is motivated by will.

³ Jung, *Psychological Types*, pp. 616-617; cf. James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 561.

3. *Will as motive in case of acting upon decisions reached by reasoning.* The reasoning process involves choice. The selection of the elements is a function of will. Association of ideas doubtless plays a part. Nevertheless in all real thinking, the weighing of evidence, perceiving value judgments, and drawing inferences, will holds the attention steady. The thinking process requires effort. It uses up energy. For this reason many people find it quite irksome and hence almost never indulge. To think consecutively, consistently, and conclusively is a rare gift. It demands the highest type of volitional effort and attention. Will is involved not only in the process, but also in executing the conclusion reached through deliberation.

4. *Will as motive in case of conflict.* Among the conflicts of interests, will is concerned only with the conscious desires. Conflicts among the reflexes and mechanical reactions are settled on the basis of (1) the strongest stimulus, (2) the striking or novel stimulus, (3) the relative readiness or "set" of the organism to each competing urge, (4) the relative urgency of each, i.e., the protective and pain-avoiding reactions have the right of way ⁴—in fine, the objective and subjective conditions of attention are operative here. According to the psychoanalysts there are numerous subconscious conflicts and "complexes" which, obviously, do not come under the jurisdiction of will, although they are supposed to represent the rebel drives cast out or suppressed by will at some previous encounter. Still, every motive is a potential antagonist to some other motive or motives and may become a factor in choice.

⁴ Cf. Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

MOTIVES IN CHOICE: VACILLATION, ABULIA

Abulia is an abnormal state of extreme inactivity. The patient dislikes to choose, he has no will. Even the native drives find little room for expression. Those who give themselves up to constant daydreaming approximate this type of character. The world of action and reality seems too stern and forbidding. They do not care to meet people or assume any responsibility. They are timid, afraid of decisions. Procrastination is a fixed habit. In milder cases many plans are laid for the future, but the time for action never comes.

Hesitation and vacillation are much milder than abulia and quite normal up to a certain point. We hesitate in our choices when the alternatives are about equally attractive. The selection of the one means the giving up of the other, hence we shrink from "casting the die." The "halting between two opinions," "hanging fire," is a very unpleasant state. It occurs frequently in shopping. Even in such a trivial matter as purchasing a necktie one may hesitate for some time if several attract him with equal force. Sometimes a man will end by purchasing the whole lot, or will let the clerk choose for him, or, to break the unpleasant spell, he may arbitrarily grab the one nearest him. Barrett's experiments show a number of random choices, the subjects reporting "I couldn't arrive at a decision. Then I preferred B without really knowing the reason." Another says,⁵ "I chose X to escape the hesitation, without having any conscious motive for

⁵ Barrett, *Strength of Will*, p. 88; cf. Wheeler, *An Experimental Investigation of the Process of Choosing*; Kantor, "An Objective Analysis of Volitional Behavior," *Psychological Review*, pp. 116-144.

X." The motive in such choices may not always be apparent, but usually it is the desire to escape the distressing experience of indecision. The desire to make a wise choice, to choose the most valuable, gives way to the desire to quit the torture of the process. There is a pleasant feeling of relief the moment a decision is reached. "Any way that is over with!" "I am glad that is settled!" The vacillating person may go back and worry over the choice, wondering if he had not better change his decision, but as a rule, most people will act upon the decision as though it were the best choice even though they may question its superiority over the other alternatives. Of course much depends upon temperament and character, which leads us to the heart of the problem of will and choice as expressions of personality. A "decisive character," a "man of action," etc., describe the thing we call personality. In deliberate choosing this is even more significant.

The factors of choice are numerous, but all of them, involving will, refer back to the personality. So long as my actions run along smoothly and are consistent with my character my will does not function, but let an alien desire or motive seek fulfillment and the self is aroused to self-defense to cast out the intruder. *Will is the name we give for the self in action.* It is not an entity. It cannot be divorced from character and personality. The reason we have conflicts is that almost never do we find a personality so completely integrated as to be a complete unity.⁶ In most of us the integrat-

⁶ Cf. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 137: "We arrive at true conceptions of motivation and interest only by the recognition that selfhood (except as it has encased itself in a shell of routine) is in process of making, and that any self is capable of including

ing process is faulty, is in process of development; hence, division and strife. We are like the house divided against itself. Furthermore, it is this very struggle that integrates character and tends toward unity more or less successfully according to the choices made, whether consistent with the ideal self or not. The strong-willed person, then, is one who acts promptly, vigorously, and successfully against a momentary impulse, one who is motivated by remoter goods and the realization of ends in harmony with the ideal self as projected into the future—the unitary self rather than a fragment of the self. Conversely, the weak-willed person is one who is overcome by a momentary desire, whose personality lacks cohesion and integration. Weakness of will is a “loosening of the unity” of the ideal self.

Historically, the “desires of the flesh,” the instinctive tendencies with their feeling and emotional accompaniments, came first. They are inherited. They belong to the race. They make up our native endowment. But they are greatly modified by learned reactions, moral taboos, social codes, and personal ideals. The struggle for the most part is between these superimposed motives and the original impulses. And because the latter are more firmly rooted they are usually stronger in motivation, not infrequently winning over the more recently integrated habits and ideals. Hence the weight of personality must be “heaved” into the fray on the side of the weaker motive. The process

within itself a number of inconsistent selves, of unharmonized dispositions. Even a Nero may be capable upon occasion of acts of kindness.” Cf. Allport, “Personality and Character,” *Psychological Bulletin*, 1920, pp. 441-455.

consists in holding the weaker impulse at the focus of consciousness until it wins. But it is not always possible to do this. The momentary desire may win over the ideal self. Or success may be purchased at too great a price. According to psychoanalysis the suppression of a desire in denying it a place in consciousness may result in driving the urge beneath the threshold of consciousness where it remains to carry on a kind of guerrilla warfare, emerging now and then in dreams and daydreams but always warring against the conscious self in an underhanded way.

The motive which holds the focus of consciousness tends to discharge itself unless will intervenes. The strain and effort accompanying this interference shows that possession is really nine-tenths of the law. James reminds us that "*we feel*, in all hard cases of volition, as if the line taken, when the rarer and more ideal motives prevail, were the line of greater resistance."⁷

To will, then, is to assert the self. The process is accompanied by a sense of effort. To choose is to identify the object of choice or the "line of action" with the personality.⁸ It means that the chooser is saying, "This is the type of person I want to be. My momentary inclinations might lead me to break the dinner engagement, but I will go nevertheless because I do not want to be known as a person who breaks engage-

⁷ James, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 548; cf. Galloway, *The Use of Motives in Teaching Morals and Religion*, p. 43: ". . . it is in choosing how to act that the individual really expresses himself. Here the sum total of external influences, of internal desires, of instincts, of knowledge, of habits, and of ideals are balanced, and the personality expresses its real self by deciding what to do. This is not a special faculty, but is the whole of personality at a critical stage in its work."

⁸ Cf. Reid, "Reason and Freedom," *The Monist*, Oct., 1924, p. 535.

ments. I will sacrifice my present desire for the ideal self." Consciously and unconsciously, we are concerned with the consequences of each choice, with what it will make of us as well as what it will do for us. The more completely one is able to regulate his choices on such a basis the more complete rational, moral, and social life he will live and the stronger personality he will become. "A self," says Hocking, "may fairly be defined as a permanent principle of selection."⁹ On the other hand, volition is a great organizing agency. Choices are made by reference to a constantly integrating personality. The ideal itself is a "flying goal." With each advance it includes wider and wider concepts of selfhood and personality. The ends of choice though more and more remote include richer associations and higher values. Thus the various objects of desire are subordinated or become means to more comprehensive ends. In a highly developed personality desires are serially classified and subordinated to purposes and ends. Each choice is made in the light of a higher purpose and these are regulated by a supreme purpose or an "all-inclusive ideal."

PERSONALITY AS MOTIVE

So far, motives in will and choice have been referred to personality. But what is personality? Is it an entity? Is it the sum total of all the factors of the mental life? Or is it separate and distinct? Is it material or transcendent? Is it a unity? If so, how shall we explain double and multiple personality? And,

⁹ Hocking, *Human Nature*, p. 70.

most significant for our problem, is personality a primary motive force and what is its relationship to other motives? The answer to the last question depends on the answers to the preceding ones. Unfortunately there is no satisfactory definition of personality. It is one of the most difficult problems alike to the metaphysician and psychologist.

Perhaps it is well to begin with the concept of experience and the agency of integration and disintegration of experience. Dunlap points out that "There are three sorts of things which are immediately postulated as soon as we begin to talk of experience. First, the items which are experienced. Second, the experiencing of these items. You can no more talk about the object without postulating the experience of these objects than you can talk about experience without postulating something which is experienced. Third, in postulating the object, or in postulating the experience of the object, you postulate that which experiences . . . all experiences which are other than merely hypothetical, intrinsically postulate the 'I' " ¹⁰ One view of personality avoids a distinction between these three aspects of experience, asserting that personality is the sum total of all mental phenomena. The tendency in modern psychology is to stick to the "empirical me" and avoid the "pure ego of metaphysics." ¹¹

Now on the basis of this interpretation the self or personality is integrated into a constantly expanding unity. It assumes that the mental life is only a potential unity with many discordant elements which in real-

¹⁰ Dunlap, *Psychological Review*, Vol. XXI, p. 68.

¹¹ Moore, *Foundations of Psychology*, p. 75.

ity never become integrated.¹² This accounts for differences in personality as so many varieties and degrees in the process. It also accounts for the fact that we seem to exhibit a different self on different occasions, in different circumstances, and in different groups. The man at home in the family circle, at his place of business in his dealings with other men, at the country club, at his lodge, at church, usually exhibits various phases of his personality which in some cases almost approach a type of multiple personality. The thoughtful husband and gentle father may be a tyrant in the shop. The timid boy in school may be quite a swaggerer among his gang-fellows. Personality is an achievement. It is subject to many hazards. Success is relative and uncertain. There are numerous "slips," dissociations, and disintegrations as well as progress and integration. Minor dissociations occur in daily life in temporary lapses of memory, slips of the tongue, absent-mindedness, dreams, and somnambulism.¹³ Rivalry and conflict may be so intense among the discordant elements in personality as to cause a deep and permanent dissociation resulting in double and multiple personality. This is pathological.¹⁴ Ordinarily the adjustment is made on the basis of past experience and habitual modes of behavior without serious disturbance to the integrity of personality. The person who wants to satisfy all his desires no matter how inconsistent and mutually destructive is not a person of strong character. He is weak-willed. He has not a sufficiently unified personality to which he might refer each possible

¹² Cf. Prince, *The Unconscious*, p. 537.

¹³ Cf. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-201.

¹⁴ Cf. Geley, *From the Unconscious to the Conscious*, p. 256.

alternative. The strong-willed individual has achieved a sufficiently stable character which determines the issues of each conflict.

James makes an interesting observation on this situation. He says:

I am often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my empirical selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a *bon-vivant*, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a tone-poet, and saint. But the thing is simply impossible. The millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's; the *bon-vivant* and the philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same tenement of clay.¹⁵

Thus since we are compelled to choose, the selection is usually made with reference to the type of character we cherish most. Frequently a man will save his face and self-respect by stressing the fact that "that is out of my line." He refuses to compete. If his chief interest is in music he is not particularly disturbed if another man outstrips him in literature or athletics or something else. "Shucks! what do I care about those things!" On the other hand, if some one questions his standing in his chosen field he will become greatly disturbed and agitated. He has come to identify his real self with it. We are all more or less sensitive over the values we regard as supreme, as making our individual world, our personality.

Nevertheless, personality is capable of integration

¹⁵ James, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 301.

on a relatively large scale. Usually consistent but often inconsistent with the ideal self, elements are included which broaden the scope and annihilate the distance between the "me" and the "mine." This expansion of the self takes in the physical frame or body through which the self functions, the clothes he wears, the friends he values, his wife and children, the God he worships, the business to which he devotes his energies, the creative works of his brain and hands, his home, his garden, his automobile, his dog, etc. Not all of these will be equally "dear" to him, not all will have the same attraction and value; yet the loss of any of them is a lessening of his personality by just so much. The death of a child makes him feel that a very vital part of himself has gone. Every author regards a serious criticism of his work as a direct blow at his personality. A man's reputation is a very intimate part of his make-up; hence he is allowed redress at law if wantonly attacked in this particular. If sufficient losses are sustained by the "mine," the "me" may seem so divested of value as not to be worth its perpetuity—suicide may and does often follow.

FREEDOM OF WILL

Since will has been identified with the acting phase of personality what is really meant here by "freedom of will" is the relative degree of independence of personality as a motive force. There are two ways of looking at this problem, the analytical and the synoptic.

1. *The analytical view of personality.* Personality may be regarded as purely a chance integration of conflicting motives and habitual modes of conduct based on

instinctive tendencies modified by environmental forces as stimuli. This is clearly mechanistic. "Freedom" is non-existent and meaningless on this hypothesis. The strongest motive wins. Its triumph blazes the trail for future victories. Gradually certain reaction patterns become established which give conduct a certain bent. This cluster of reaction patterns forms a unity which may be called personality. This sort of personality cannot be a source of motivation. It is merely the accidental by-product of the play of chance motives, hence cannot be a drive—it is driven.

2. *The synoptic view of personality.*¹⁶ Personality may be regarded as the sum total of all the mental factors of the individual constituting a relatively unitary cluster of motives with a number of lesser units and scattered individual drives. In case of conscious and deliberate choice the larger unitary cluster may be said to exercise power in controlling consciousness and thus terminating the issue in favor of the act that is more or less consistent with the integrated self. Here the principle of selection, the agent, the source of motivation is none other than will, the integrated personality, the synoptic self.

Freedom of will is real, but it is relative and is conditioned by the following factors: (1) the physical constitution—(a) limitations of mechanisms, (b) motor habits, (c) general health, (d) amount of mental and physical energy available, (e) and all other mechanical and environmental limitations. Of course some people are more completely bound by these con-

¹⁶ For an able defense of "Self-Psychology" and "Personalism" see Brightman's *Introduction to Philosophy*, Chaps. VIff.

ditions than others, but no normal human being is so completely circumscribed by them as to lose his freedom entirely. "I am, for instance," says Taylor, "more truly a self-determining agent than a hemisphereless fish, because while the fish is so constituted that he cannot but snap at the bait that is dangled before his nose, even though he has but this moment been released from the hook that lies concealed behind it, I can put down the glass that I am raising to my lips and consider the probable effect of the indulgence upon my health, my work, and my reputation."¹⁷ (2) Freedom is further conditioned by the degree of integration of personality. This includes the relative strength of isolated and "irresponsible" motives as compared with the motives that are referred to the higher or more inclusive self. The most completely integrated personality is the freest, also the strongest-willed. We are free to choose, but our choices are limited.

¹⁷ Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*, p. 40; quoted by Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 359.

CHAPTER XI

SELF-REGARDING MOTIVES

SELF-ESTEEM

Every one is in love with himself. No one wants to exchange places with any other person unless it means continuing his personal identity under the coveted conditions. Apologies are in order when one mistakes Mr. A for Mr. B. We are all necessarily self-centered. Each man is the hub of the universe, so far as he is concerned. He is more important to himself than the king or the president. Our attention is easily diverted to what concerns us personally and to what we have come to identify with our real selves. "No mind," writes James, "can take the same interest in his neighbor's *me* as in his own. The neighbor's *me* falls together with all the rest of the things in one foreign mass, against which his own *me* stands out in startling relief. Even the trodden worm, as Lotze somewhere says, contrasts his own suffering self with the whole remaining universe though he have no clear conception either of himself or of what the universe may be. He is for me a mere part of the world; for him it is I who am the mere part."¹

We are likely to take ourselves more seriously than other people. We laugh readily at others, but resent being the "butt" of a joke. We magnify our virtues

¹ James, *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 289.

and condone our faults and weaknesses.² A veteran of the World War relates how he had grown relatively indifferent to the frequent misfortunes of his comrades in action. To see men shot down all around him had become the expected thing. But when he was finally wounded, he bitterly resented a common enough remark which he heard just before losing consciousness, "poor Bill got it." He said it was well enough for others to fall right and left, but when he "got it," he felt that "the whole regiment should lie down and weep."

The self-regarding motives are based on the instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement which in actual life become associated with all sorts of objects and situations in the form of "self-regarding sentiments." The directing force is the herd instinct and social pressure. The self-regarding motives are tremendously important and far-reaching. They pervade practically every phase of a man's life as a member of society. The socialization of the individual could not be accomplished without them. Consciously and subconsciously we are motivated by self-regarding urges. Some of these motives are: self-expression, the love of freedom and independence, reputation, fame, empathy or the expanded self, success, hero worship, ambition, the desire to be "great," to secure power over others, domination, exploitation, pride, vanity, flattery, display, shame, envy, jealousy, suspicion, rivalry, emulation, revenge, self-respect, self-realization. We will discuss these topics and endeavor to show their significance in motivation.

² Elliot uses the term "Bovarism" to express this contrast between fact and imagination. See *Human Character*, pp. 145ff.

But first of all we need to understand more fully the bases of the self-regarding motives—the self-regarding instincts and sentiments.

SELF-REGARDING INSTINCTS: SELF-ASSERTION,
SELF-ABASEMENT

In discussing the instincts as motives³ the specially important rôle of the self-regarding instincts was hinted at. We owe to McDougall the clearest exposition of this instinct which he classifies into two phases, the instinct of self-assertion and the instinct of self-abasement. The corresponding emotions he calls elation and subjection.⁴ The desire to “show off” is clearly marked in some forms of animal life as well as among children and adults. The expression of self-display takes different forms according to capacity, training and circumstances, but the urge itself is manifestly one of the strongest: witness the prancing horse, the strutting peacock, the brilliant plumage of the male among animals and their eagerness to display their “coat of many colors” especially at mating time. For a normal young child, a new pair of shoes, a new hat, a new suit, or a new toy is an occasion for display and showing off. In their actions, too, they are eager to be observed. “Look! Look!” “Watch me!” “See me do it,” etc., are common enough expressions. Without a spectator the worth of a new possession or a “skilled” act loses most if not all of its value. Older boys will swagger and strut and show off. They perform “stunts,” stand on their heads, walk on the edge

³ See Chapter V.

⁴ McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 64.

of a tight-board fence, climb trees, anything to attract attention and gain the admiration of their fellows. No doubt many of the so-called bad habits among boys, smoking, swearing, chewing tobacco, even stealing, and other forms of vice and crime are performed to show how brave and skillful and strong the doer is. The self-regarding instinct, despite its leaning towards selfishness, has a socializing tendency. Whether it will make a criminal or a good citizen depends upon circumstances and training.

Adults are motivated fully as much, if not more, by this motive. A great deal of our reckless living and reckless spending is due to self-display. Self-display, however, is only one form of expressing the self-regarding instinct. This phase is discussed more fully in the section on pride as a motive. Here we are concerned with the basic urge of the instinct of self-assertion which may find expression in countless ways. We agree with McDougall that there is such a *primary*, basic, elementary urge as a specific innate tendency. Its force is greatly enhanced by the development of the self-regarding sentiments. As McDougall points out, the instinct of self-assertion is supplemented by the instinct of self-abasement or submission. While it is instinctive to assert one's self, to expand the Ego, to "lord it over" others, to experience the emotion of elation, of superiority, to be "it;" on the other hand, it is equally instinctive to submit, to efface one's self, to "give in," to suppress one's self. The negative self-regard, however, is not nearly so attractive. It operates in fear in the interests of a positive self-feeling having survival value, or in cases where there is no chance for competition, where the person to whom we submit is so

superior that we are even glad to acknowledge him as lord and master. Take the case of worship: the worshiper humbles himself before his God, chants His pæans, sings of His might and power, boasts of His superiority, His omnipotence, belittles himself in posture, in mien, in words. He may refer to himself as a "worm of the dust." Nevertheless, it is not an abject cringing with no compensation in self-assertion and positive self-feeling and elation. The pride and self-respect of the true worshiper are increased rather than diminished because in the very act of humble adoration he has become a "partaker of the divine nature"—identifying himself with the God of all the world. He has dared to call Him "Father." Thus self-abasement is usually another phase of the self-regarding instinct. We belittle ourselves in the presence of the divine, speak of sitting at the feet of a great teacher, gladly yield to the sway of the statesman, orator, hero, in order to shine by reflected glory—to become "partakers" in the special virtue of the admired person or trait or achievement. The subjection in sheer defeat where there is not even the consolation of having put up a good fight, where the self-regarding instinct is denied, the person is crushed, broken in spirit, completely demoralized, is quite different from the ordinary functioning of the instinct of self-abasement.

So powerful an urge is the self-regarding instinct and so far-reaching in motivation that one is tempted to call it *the* great motive. The self is constantly involved in all conduct. Practically all the instincts and tendencies may be classed under the one great self-regarding instinct. Take pugnacity, curiosity, repulsion, sex, acquisition, construction—any instinct or

near-instinct you please, or even habits and the whole autonomic system—and you may well classify them under the self-regarding tendency. They all serve to expand the self, promote the interests of the self in one way or another. From this particular angle at least the self-psychologists have the right of it. In a very broad sense self-realization seems to be the goal of life, the supreme motive as well as the *summum bonum* and the highest moral ideal.

In making the self-regarding instinct supreme, one might speak of it as the primary, general, sole instinct in the sense of the old-school theory of instincts, and the rest of the so-called primary instincts as reflexes in the sense of the mechanistic theories of instincts—native reactions to specific stimuli or as chains of reflexes. Aside from emphasizing the self-regarding instinct, such a classification would be of little value. The problem of motivation, as we have stressed over and over again, is not the discovery of *a* motive, but *the motives*; not even merely the elements, but also the compound motives; not simply the instinct drives, but also the acquired motives, in a word, all the simple and complex situations that are or may become motives to action, that may motivate conduct. To reduce a situation to its elements may have value, but cannot solve the problem of motivation. We claim that the complex situation as such, and not the elements as such, is the motive. In the case of the self-regarding instinct, for example, it is important to take the “self-regarding sentiments” as distinct motives. To break them up into their component parts is a fatal abstraction which destroys the motive.

SELF-REGARDING SENTIMENTS

Self-consciousness, self-knowledge, self-expression, self-realization, are the result of experience very much like knowledge of objects and abstract ideas except that they are more likely to be colored by affective factors prompted by the emotions of elation and subjection. As the individual gradually builds up his world, he also constructs his own personality or his idea of selfhood. He learns to distinguish the *alter* from the *ego*. But without clearly perceiving the distinction between the "me" and the "my," he continues to expand the self (both the me and the mine). He identifies experiences as *his* own, he associates the self with objects, persons, and situations. These in turn furnish him with an outlook, a standard of judgment—motives of conduct. The attachments rooted in persons, objects, and situations arouse self-regarding sentiments of elation or submission. Our conduct is determined by such attachments. Ordinarily we prefer conduct that is likely to arouse elation rather than subjection. Who would not rather be the giver of a gift than the recipient? One who is puzzled over ingratitude fails to realize this fundamental fact in human nature, the fact that acknowledgment of a gift or favor places one in an inferior position. Similarly, it is hard to apologize, to correct a mistake, to right a wrong. In each case one must admit awkwardness, stupidity, base motives, all of which place one in an inferior position not conducive to the feeling of elation. One is likely to turn against a benefactor because the latter is a constant reminder of inferiority. We

resent personal questions for the same reason. A question forces the situation, it puts the questioned one on the defensive, in an inferior position. The judge, the teacher, the employer, are privileged to ask questions by virtue of their superior position—the defendant, the pupil, the employee recognize the right of their “superior officers.” On the other hand, a question aimed to secure information is a compliment to the one who is asked. In this case, the one asking the question is in the inferior position. A good deal that passes for courtesy is this tacit sop to the feeling of elation that a person feels when a stranger inquires the location of a street or office building. Ask directions of a man of affairs and he may answer you out of sheer courtesy, for the compliment is no bait to his feeling of elation, but inquire of a domestic or of a man whose self-regarding instincts are starved and he will “fall all over himself” to help you out. No matter how celebrated you are, in the given instance, you are inferior. He knows something you admit you do not know. He feels complimented. This in itself is only a minor point, but suggestive of the far-reaching nature of self-regarding motives. This is the chief motive in philanthropy. Nothing contributes to the feeling of elation so much as munificence. Selfish extravagance may have its rewards, but it cannot begin to compare with benevolence and charity as means of satisfaction and self-importance. Many of our kind acts of the helping-hand variety are similarly motivated.⁵ The misfortunes of a friend, though in less degree than those of a rival or open enemy, feed the undercurrent of self-esteem.

⁵ Cf. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 163.

Nevertheless, the self-regarding sentiments are capable of great expansion in many diverse ways.

EXPANSION OF SELF-REGARDING SENTIMENTS

The extension of self-regarding sentiments is a species of empathy, of identifying one's self with all sorts of objects and persons. Naturally the individual's first sentiments are attached to his own body and the things that minister to it. Without completely overcoming this attitude, his self-regarding sentiment expands gradually to include his playmates, his family, and later, his books, his home, his rifle or golf clubs or fishing rod, his wife and children, his friends, his lodge, his club, his church, etc. All of these objects are capable of arousing a sentiment, are sentiments, referred to the self. Multiplication and expansion of the self-regarding sentiments are the chief factors in socializing the individual. He is driven by the instinct of self-assertion to realize certain values and goods, but the criteria for measuring these relative values are furnished by social pressure. The goods that bring the highest satisfaction are those which bring social rewards of recognition by our fellows. Not only material objects, but also æsthetic values are almost worthless apart from some person or persons with whom they are shared. No one would care to remain long in a heaven with no other person present or any one to congratulate him on his good fortune. Complete egoism and complete altruism are absurd abstractions. "The circles of the ego and the non-ego everywhere intersect." The main distinction between the so-called selfish person and the unselfish person is the nature

and number of things and ideas that are identified with the self, the sources of the satisfiers and annoyers—the nature of the self-regarding sentiments. It has been rightly said that a man's character may be judged by the nature of an idea that will arouse an emotion. In other words, a man's moral and social integration, the type of values which he comes to regard as consistent with his personality, determine his place in society.

Social pressure with its rewards and punishments, its disciplining agencies of success and failure, fame or disgrace, and the general force of repetition directs and controls the type of personal integration, the values to be realized, the nature of the self-regarding sentiments and the objects and ideals to which they shall be attached. But always the primary urge is to be found in the self-regarding instincts and emotions. To put it figuratively, social pressure furnishes the pattern or mold; the self-regarding instinct-emotions furnish the power; experience, the materials in the formation of self-regarding sentiments. And once these are "set," they furnish their own drives.

The most difficult problem in socializing the individual by the forming of proper sentiments is a problem of sublimation, of finding the proper outlet for the self-regarding instincts and the proper balancing of the self-assertive and the submissive. Ordinarily too much stress is placed on submission and too little scope provided for the self-assertive. Failure here, due to lack of wisdom and inherently insoluble difficulties incident to an increasingly complex social order, is partly responsible for a large class of criminals, neurotics, and insane, to say nothing of a still larger class who manage to keep out of our jails and eleemosynary in-

stitutions, but who live starved, cramped lives, who are only "half-men" and only "half-women." To take a single illustration that has wide application: in our modern industrial world the individual wage-earner has very little opportunity to express his personality in his work. Creative ability is stunted and fool-proof machines take away the last incentive for enthusiasm over one's work. Years ago the cobbler was personally acquainted with his customers, measured their feet, and made the shoes himself. When the job was done he could take some pride in his workmanship. His skill was appreciated, he found expression for the instincts and emotions of self-regard and elation. The modern cobbler works in a factory at some fool-proof machine and punches holes all day long, week in and week out, the year round, or performs some other equally monotonous task out of nearly a hundred such standardized tasks necessary to turn out the finished product. He does not see the result of his labor. He will never know the wearer of the shoes. His responsibility is less: so is his joy and pride in the work of his hands. And what is more significant still, he must look elsewhere than to his daily task for opportunity of self-expression. Standardization and machinery have made the problem of sublimation more acute and pressing for the sociologist. Self-expression is a fact that must be reckoned with. It is based on the most fundamental urge of all.

SELF-EXPRESSION

One form of exercising the self-regarding instincts is self-expression or desire for freedom. Freedom may be stated in terms of independence and dependence. In-

dependence (initiative) means freedom from restraint; dependence (timidity) means freedom from responsibility.

1. *Independence.* One of the most grievous offenses against human nature is the suppression of one person by another. The hampering of another's activities and the cramping of his personality is always a serious matter. This is another way of saying that one of the most fundamental of all urges is the desire to be free to express one's self. A great many wars have been fought in the name of freedom. Much blood has been shed for liberty. Poets and orators have waxed eloquent over the theme. Independence is an important term in human history. Freedom is more than a word or a sentiment. It is part and parcel of our physiopsychic make-up. It is written not only in the constitutions of nations as the basic principle of government; it is also recorded in the nervous structure of the normal person. It is the first law of conduct. The earliest manifestation of activity may be only random movements, but they represent the beginnings of a developing personality. Any interference with these movements brings resentment. It means a declaration of war. No one will accuse Watson of including too many facts among the innate tendencies, for he is the chief exponent in denying them. The following remarks are, therefore, all the more significant.

Observation seems to show that the *hampering of the infant's movements* is the factor which apart from all training brings out the movements characterized as rage. If the face or head is held, crying results, quickly followed by screaming.

The body stiffens and fairly well-coördinated slashing or striking movements of the hands and arms result; the feet and legs are drawn up and down; the breath is held until the child's face is flushed.⁶

Anger, rage and hate are the natural reactions to outside interferences. To deprive a person of freedom in any form is regarded by that person as an impertinence. Offenders against society are punished by having their freedom seriously restricted. The life of most convicts is surely more regular and possibly more healthful and wholesome in a penal institution than out of it. And yet very few are really contented with their lot. Many are decidedly unhappy if not actually miserable. One who has had wide experience in state and federal prisons says that it is quite common for men to cry themselves to sleep night after night. Many convicts become mentally deranged, their spirit is broken, they are shattered in body and mind. Of course there are numerous contributing causes, but the obviously outstanding one is lack of freedom for independent self-expression. Give the men in prisons something to do, something that calls for initiative and freedom of management and they live a more contented life. The self-assertive impulses and self-regarding sentiments need exercise to keep a person in a healthy-minded condition. They are essential to good morale.

Another illustration of the tremendous force of freedom as a motive is furnished by the rebellious youth in the home, in the school, in the small town. Fond parents, well-meaning enough, do not always realize

⁶ Watson, *Psychology*, p. 200.

that William or Sue are after all separate entities, distinct personalities, have their own views of life, their own ideals and dreams for the future—must live their own lives. Strict parents learn, when perhaps too late, that their oversolicitous care has alienated the love of their children. This in some cases may amount to positive hate. It is a serious matter to hamper and restrict another's personality, even of one's own flesh and blood. Overstrictness has a tendency to lead in the opposite direction. Often a man says, "When I was young, I was made to do this and that and compelled to refrain from other actions, but I vowed that if ever I gained my independence, I would use it to the limit." There are those who do not wait till they are of age, they rebel at once and throw all restrictions to the winds. It seems that the self-assertive impulse can stand just about so much repression and no more. I am reminded of a half-humorous, half-pathetic incident of a young freshman in college who came from a very strict home. College life, despite its many restrictions, was a new and free world to him. For one thing, when he found out that the college dormitory was never locked, that he could go and come at any hour of the day or night, he stayed out all night on several occasions during the first four weeks with absolutely no object save to enjoy his freedom. He merely walked the streets. "Why boys and girls leave home" is a topic often referred to in a flippant way, but it is far more serious than most people imagine. The motive is the impelling desire for freedom.

Similarly, people from small towns flock to the cities not always to make "bigger" money or to secure better living conditions, nor even for the sake of amuse-

ment directly. In the majority of cases, they are not nearly as well off in the city as they were in the country. The chief and primary urge is the love of freedom. They are running away from Mrs. Grundy whose bookkeeping on their life is altogether too accurate. On Main Street every one knows everything about every one else; in the city one may live for months in the same apartment and not even know the name of his nearest neighbor in the same house, in the next room it may be. It must not be assumed, however, that this desire for freedom means always the desire to "go to the dogs." It does imply the desire to be free to go if one should wish to choose that course. In a country community the self-appointed guardians of public morals will not permit a man to damn his own soul. Here is a strange paradox, quite familiar. We often lose the desire for an object or an experience the moment we realize that it is within our grasp. Remove the opportunity and the desire is intensified. We "hanker" after forbidden sweets. In the light of motivational psychology this phenomenon is not so very strange after all. It is merely another expression of the self-assertive impulse. In any contest the object is accomplished when the rival admits defeat. There is no satisfaction in carrying on after that point, the self has asserted itself, the goal is reached, the prize of elation is already won.

Children as a rule want to grow up fast. They play at being adults. Girls wear long skirts and don the garments of their elders and feel quite big. Boys smoke and do other things because they think it is "manly." Younger brothers like to be with their older brothers. Every boy who has a younger brother knows

how difficult it is to keep him from wanting to "come along." To the eyes of youth, adult life is exceedingly attractive primarily because it is freer from restraint, affords greater opportunity for self-expression. Adults do many things that the child is told he may not do until he is grown up. Perhaps the greater freedom accorded to boys and men than to girls and women, at least in the past, is responsible for the open secret that most girls some time or other wish they had been born boys. Whereas it is unheard-of for a boy to wish he were a girl. Call a small girl a boy and she merely corrects you; call a boy a girl and he will fight you.

2. *Dependence.* Dependence as well as independence is a form of freedom. It is the freedom from responsibility, the desire to escape forced decisions and prompt action, the necessity of overexertion. It is based on the instinct of self-abasement or submission. Some find greater satisfaction in following than in leading, in submitting than in dominating. These are for the most part the less energetic or timid, but often choice spirits. They are found in all walks of life. In religious and political affairs, they want their creed and policies ready-made. They are willing that the church or the editor do their thinking for them. They are satisfied to let well-enough alone. They are disturbed by innovation, they are the conservatives. While this is true of a certain type of mind, it is also true of individuals of every type at times and under certain conditions. All of us pay some deference to the opinion of an expert in a field in which we ourselves are strangers. We take pride in the judgment of the man we trust and find satisfaction in submitting to his decision. This, however, is essentially negative and will

not find our self-regarding instincts unless they are at the same time our self-regarding sentiments, that is, unless we have come to identify ourselves with the empire, the church, the lodge, the state or what not. In such a case, the self has been magnified a thousand-fold, according to the vision of the statesman, the strength and pomp of the monarch, the membership and influence of the lodge, etc. This is decidedly a culmination of the self-regarding instincts. The honors or indignities heaped upon an ambassador in a foreign country are heaped or resented by the whole nation whose representative he is. In a monarchical form of government the people identify their interests with those of the king. His beautiful palace is their palace, his magnificence and dignity is theirs also. A wedding in the royal household is a matter of enthusiastic interest throughout the empire. The prince or princess is their prince or princess. The excitement is as great as though a wedding were taking place in every household in the realm.

Likewise we identify ourselves with the national representations in any sort of international struggle, in war or athletic contests, endurance tests, scientific discoveries, round-the-world flights—anything, even to establishing a world record in continuous dancing. An insult to the flag is an outrage against every citizen who swears allegiance to that flag. So we come to identify ourselves with our country, our state, our town, our college, our fraternity, our club, our family, our possessions. To belittle one's home town or college is to belittle the person who is identified with the town or college. On the other hand, the dweller in a great metropolis is likely to assume an attitude of false im-

portance which has been unconsciously transferred from the city to himself. He comes from the greatest city in the world, therefore he is greater than a man who comes from a small town. The same fallacy holds for those who are graduated from a famous university or who belong to an ancient and honorable lodge, or are descendants of famous ancestors, etc.

A curious blending of negative and positive self-feeling in the exercise of the self-regarding instincts takes place when a person finds satisfaction in humbly accepting congratulations or praise from a recognized superior. People make great sacrifices to hobnob with the social élite. This is but another form of empathy, of identifying one's self with important people. One's ego is fed by the unconscious transfer of the supposed greatness of the great. Visitors to the shrine of a noted poet, or artist, or hero wish to carve their own names on the premises or take home some souvenir. For in this way one "partakes" of the great man's greatness. It is something to be able to say "I have been to Stratford-on-Avon. I have seen Shakespeare's birthplace and his final resting place." It gives one a sense of kinship. It is about as close as many of us will ever come to being a Shakespeare. It is a clever bit of applied psychology on the part of the custodians of shrines to provide a large and impressive-looking book in which the shriner may inscribe his name and thus add to the dignity of the saint, incidentally fattening his own ego. The ruse reminds one of the request written near the telephone in the rooms of a hotel: "Use this pad and spare the wall."

Despite a thousand and one innocent methods of sublimating the self-regarding instincts and emotions,

there always remain a goodly number of pioneer souls who like to blaze new trails. These are the ambitious ones whose hunger for self-assertion must find food in domination and exploitation, in lording it over their fellows.

DOMINATION

The will to power, the desire to be great, the ambition to sway others—domination, is the mark of an over-ambitious self-regarding complex. Like many other human traits, it has its extremes as exemplified, on the one hand, by the meticulous person who must show his authority on any and all occasions no matter how trivial or silly the pretext, and on the other hand, by the “captain of industry” and the tyrant on the throne who do it on a much larger scale. Most people seem to get along on a moderate amount of exercise for the self-regarding urge that comes to them in the course of the day’s give and take. There are some in the more menial walks of life, janitors, domestics, etc., who make up quite unconsciously for lack of important responsibilities by a more intensive use of what little authority they do have: witness the gruff talk and exacting performances of petty officials. Others there are who “take it out” on their family and near of kin who put up with it to avoid “scenes.” Extreme stubbornness and contrariness sometimes, though not always, is a mark of an under-fed self-regarding urge. How much more “important” it makes one to oppose the will of another than to acquiesce! And the greater the person opposed, the greater becomes the man who sets up his will, his ideas and opinions over against the other. “The boss wanted me to do thus and so but

210 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

I wouldn't do it." Or again, the aspiring youth, in a given profession, will criticize the men who have already established a reputation. To defeat the "champion" in any field is a real victory. Sometimes a man finds consolation and outlet for his self-regarding complex by belittling the achievements of his rivals or colleagues. It is intimated that their greater success is due to luck or "pull."

With some it is a habit to oppose anything and everything on general principles, so much so that it is often a matter of good diplomacy to suggest the opposite of what one wants such a person to do. The more extreme cases are found among the "born" revolutionists, who are "agin" all established customs and traditions. Nothing satisfies them. Everything is wrong, religion, laws, customs, conventions—the whole world is upside down and they must set it right. How thrillingly important one may feel in opposing the ideas and tastes and achievements not only of one's friends and contemporaries, but also of all mankind! The reformer is always with us. Usually he considers himself the voice of God or of the people, the champion of the helpless, the down-trodden, the enslaved. But frequently the unconscious motive for his zeal is to be found in an excess amount of self-assertive impulse which cannot be satisfied by ordinary means. The reformer complex is quite prevalent.

But aside from the peculiar quirks at flattering the ego, there is a normal desire to be great that is fairly universal. Almost every one at some time or other has hoped to do something big, something impressive, something important, something of permanent value, something great.

The megalomaniac is one in whom the delusion of greatness has become an obsession. In any insane asylum, there are many such people who are great in their own estimation. The nurses and doctors are their servants. They are in the institution because people do not appreciate them, are not worthy of them. But wait till they are gone. Posterity will acclaim their virtues and extol their excellencies. They will be numbered among the great. In many people outside of insane asylums there is a milder form of "delusional greatness" which, according to Stekel,

is an over-compensation for an oppressive diminution of the ego-consciousness. The daily life about us offers innumerable proofs of this assertion. Persons particularly prone to delusional greatness are those who suffer from certain defects and who in youth had been subjected to painful, derisive, scornful, or depreciative criticism. Amongst these we find especially the halt, the lame, the partly blind, the stutterer, the humpbacked, the red-haired, the sick—in short, persons with some stigma.⁷

EXPLOITATION

Among those who achieve greatness or have it thrust upon them, the successful ones who have authority, position and rank, power over others, there is a strong tendency to exploit their fellows. Power is intoxicating.⁸ Very few are willing to give up power of their own accord. Once in the saddle, the tendency is to stay there. The "lust of exploitation" has a tremendous appeal. Many who are adamant to ordinary

⁷ Stekel, *The Depths of the Soul*, pp. 95-96.

⁸ Cf. Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, pp. 356-357.

"temptations" will yield to the lure of domination and exploitation. It is so easy to find laudable reasons for wanting power when all the while one is consciously or unconsciously moved by the love of mastery. It is so easy to take advantage of the helpless, especially if social pressure is not against it and one's own conscience can be lulled to sleep by reasoned motives. "Exploitation," says Ross, "appears between a great variety of elements. The principal forms are: (1) offspring by parents; (2) women by men; (3) poor by rich; (4) few by the many; (5) the industrious by the leisured; (6) the ignorant by the intelligent; (7) the unorganized by the organized; (8) laity by priests; (9) conquered by conquerors."⁹

Megalomania, the superiority complex, domination, and exploitation on the one hand, and the inferiority complex, fear, vacillation, servile submission on the other, are terms representing various degrees of what Janet calls the "authoritarian maladies," or in the phraseology of our present discussion, the pathological, and the exaggerated normal expression of the self-regarding impulses of self-assertion and self-abasement. The urge of success, reputation and fame, the desire to be great, to realize permanent values, to be "somebody," to make something of one's self, is quite normal. Individual differences in this respect are of degree and not of kind. The elation due to a sense of superiority, whether fancied or real, is meaningless apart from other people. Superiority is relative,—relative to inferiors. Hence envy plays an important rôle.

⁹ Ross, *Principles of Social Psychology*, p. 187; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 152.

PRIDE AND ENVY

We find satisfaction in being envied. Pride and vanity are fed by envy. Take away envy and you have removed the greatest incentive for reckless spending, display, and extravagances of all sorts. It is not the intrinsic value of our possessions so much as their envied value which makes them worthy of such sacrifice and diligent toil. Or at least the intrinsic value of an object is greatly enhanced by its ability to arouse envy in others. Envy, pride, vanity, conceit, display, and extravagant luxury are responsible for castes and exclusive clubs. If no one envied the "four-hundred" they would soon disband. Even in such democratic times as ours, almost every one looks up to some clique and looks down on some other. Houses are mortgaged, ruinous expenditures are indulged in, in order to "keep up with the Joneses," in order to satisfy pride, to be envied by those below. This fact is so well-known as to be proverbial. But what may not be quite so fully realized is that it all goes back to the self-regarding sentiments of pride and vanity, of the self-assertive impulse, of wanting to be somebody and to be a bigger somebody than somebody else. It is said that women do not dress well in order to attract men half so much as they do it in order to excel other women. This may or may not be true. The fact remains that in all of us there is a certain amount of vanity and pride which is enormously enhanced by envy. While another has something we do not possess, we want it or a duplicate, ever so badly, but possession seems to dispel the illusion. The other fellow's piece of pie looks larger. Exchange

with him and your former piece looks larger. This is an interesting phenomenon that may be called the illusion of envy.

One motive in the urge of acquiescence in conventions, customs, and traditions seems to be that when all are acting and living by well-known regulations, we feel a sense of ease and security in the thought that we are as well off as the next fellow. But when conventions are broken, we know not what others are "up to" and we fret lest they should "put something over on us"—not play the game according to Hoyle. And that's not fair.

Flattery is the bait of pride. Almost any one will swallow it if properly administered. There is a type of person who cannot live without it. It must be served red hot at regular intervals or his pride and vanity suffer accordingly. He must be constantly reminded of his worth. The slightest rebuke wilts him; praise, ever so tiny, has a tonic effect. He is a chartered member in the organization of "suckers" who "fall" for anything for a little flattery. If he happens to be wealthy or possessing rank or power of dispensing patronage, the human leeches are not slow at capitalizing his weakness. By feeding him a ration of "taffy" they may extort all they want. For this consideration he becomes a willing host to any parasite. So little does it take to "set up" most of us that the humorist has found here a rich field for his satire. The following press comment will serve as an example:

A check girl in a luxurious Back Bay hotel solved the problem of satisfying among the goodly proportion of vain guests the lust for the feeling of personal importance. Every

guest wants to feel as though he is a privileged and well-known patron always getting special little favors and attentions. This is the type that tips the head waiter fabulously. The head waiter in return says a loud and broad "Good evening, Mr. Dusseldorf," carefully pronouncing the name when this patron walks into the dining room with a party. Similarly, this gentleman regards it as a bit of distinction to be so well known that the check girl doesn't even give him a check when he leaves his coat. But the moment his back is turned this particular check girl writes on a slip, "little, fat, bald man," and slips the paper in the hat band. For the next vain customer she writes, perhaps, "cute mustache." In this way she identifies the clothing of the "special customers." The big thing is to indulge the patrons' passion for that feeling of personal importance. Sometimes as many as thirty patrons have their clothes checked by this method of "special identification." But each thinks he is being singled out.

Flattery as a motive is too obvious to need lengthy elaboration. A "refined" person may be offended at some "cheap" and "vulgar" flattery. But give him a neat compliment of some real or fancied accomplishment and he will respond like the rest. It is all in the way the dish is served.

Vanity and pride find curious expression in endless varieties: good looks, money, prestige, power, rank, reputation (for all sorts of things from being the champion "tough" to that of saint), proper in dress and manners, special gift or aptitude of any kind, or one may even be so humble as to be proud of his humility. The opposites of all of these and many more are also prolific sources of pride. Any oddity may be regarded as a distinction in personality and made an object or basis of pride. The tendency is to exaggerate the importance of the gift or trait, and to overlook or make

light of deficiencies and deformities unless these very defects are the bases of pride. One often finds people who boast of their misfortune and their unusual hard luck. Why! they are the most unlucky people in the world. The motive here is not merely to secure recognition as a champion, but also, and more fundamentally, to convince themselves and others that failure is not due to lack of ability or initiative, but to "cruel fate" and "blind chance." They are really great but people are too stupid or indifferent to see it.

Every one resists suggestions of inferiority. We dislike any one who makes us feel small. It may be by what is said or the condescending manner or the general attitude. More especially do we resent a statement or hint regarding an actual and obvious defect in personal appearance or trait of character. There is a sort of compensatory reaction designed to make good the deficiency.¹⁰ The same sort of defect in another person is intolerable. It is too forceful a reminder of one's own.

When one is worsted in repartee his wounded pride at once sets to work to think up answers that might have been given but he would not stoop to use them, or else an answer coming some time after the encounter is seized upon as really coming at the proper moment and the opponent is considered squelched, or one may think up a great number of ways in which he is superior to the other and thus console himself by the conviction that he is the superior person after all. Oh, the many things we could do if we only wanted to, or if we had the leisure or opportunity! The fault is al-

¹⁰ Cf. Fielding, *The Caveman Within Us*, p. 207.

ways with some other person or group or institution or circumstance or conditions in general.

On the other hand, we find satisfaction in taking a vain or boastful fellow down a peg or two. No joke is funnier than one on a pompous person or on one's superior officer. When the teacher slips and falls on the ice, the glee of the schoolboy knows no bounds. In college he enjoys especially a joke at the professor's expense. For the time being at least the schoolboy and the college student are superior to their "task-masters" who may be in an awkward or embarrassing position. Some go so far as to assert that the psychology of humor and the comic is based on the fact that we laugh when the joke is on the other fellow—when he is in an inferior position and we, by contrast, are in a superior position.¹¹ A joke at one's expense is too humiliating, too painful to be funny.

In applauding an artist we show our appreciation; we also give vent to our suppressed feelings of self-expression. While the artist is performing he is "it," when he gets through it is our turn to be "it." We applaud, we make a lot of noise, we are now the critics, we are important, we are pleased—what matter if such discordant noise as we make by clapping and stamping and shouting wholly destroys the exquisite emotional effect produced by the artist.¹²

Many of the games enjoyed by children and adults, too, are interesting because they allow each to take his turn at being "it"—"Drop the Handkerchief," for instance. In games of this type the one who is "it"

¹¹ See Chapter XXIV.

¹² Cf. Tridon, *Psychoanalysis and Man's Unconscious Motives*, p. 102.

is the center of attraction, is moderately envied, hence feels big and important. There are other games, such as "Blind Man's Buff," in which to be "it" is more or less of a humiliation, for one is usually laughed at and no one enjoys that. But it is endured for the privilege of laughing at the other fellow when his turn comes to be "it." Initiation stunts imposed by sophomores, fraternities, lodges and clubs serve a similar purpose. In ordinary conversation, "speaking in meeting," or even in a "deliberative" body, the listener patiently waits his turn in the spotlight. The forum is an interesting study for this very reason. After the lecture is over and the meeting is thrown open for questions from the floor, very few, if any, ask questions for information merely or primarily. They do it from the desire to hear themselves talk, to make an impression, not so much upon others as upon their own self-esteem. When you oppose or criticize, you set yourself up as superior to the one criticized and this feeds the motive of self-regard or rather is urged by it.

The appeal in secret organizations, with their elegant regalia, flowery ritual, colorful paraphernalia, gorgeous banners and odd insignia, may be traced to the self-regarding sentiments. How wonderful a thing it is to belong to a club whose membership includes great and influential men. That puts us on the same footing. Our puny self is enlarged by so much. And the more organizations we belong to, the greater our prestige. It is indeed a humble individual who does not belong to at least a dozen organizations. The "joiners complex" is a very real means of fattening our self-regarding sentiments.

Benjamin Franklin, who was a keen observer of

human nature, discovered that in gaining friendship it was more effective to get the prospective friend to do something for you than to do something for him. In his *Autobiography* he tells of how he asked to borrow a rare book, not for its intrinsic value, but because he wanted to gain the friendship of the possessor who was proud of it and felt greatly complimented that others also valued his book.

In playing the host, the rescuer, the benefactor, the philanthropist, the dispenser of gratuities, we feel big and important. The opposite is the case when we are on the receiving end.¹³ That is why we do not care to be reminded of favors received. That is the why of ingratitude, of "biting the hand that feeds." One dislikes to be corrected because the one who presumes to do the correcting assumes superiority. For the same reason we dislike to have our faults mentioned.

Thus in a thousand and one ways we are constantly motivated by pride and vanity. But, on the other hand, it is equally true that many people, the truly modest folk, despise the ostentatious. What shall we say of them? Such terms as embarrassment, modesty, shame, express the sentiments of the person who would avoid the "limelight." It would seem that the self-regarding sentiment at times takes the form of submission and self-abasement rather than of self-assertion. But both are really one, they are two aspects of the same thing. Customs and traditions have much to do with this. A man usually feels embarrassed when he is praised in public because polite society places a greater value on modesty than on pride and vanity.

¹³ Cf. Kelly, *Human Nature in Business*, p. 157.

What greater compliment can you pay a man of parts than to say that he is modest and unassuming despite his achievements and benefactions. The embarrassed man, therefore, is not necessarily averse to being well-thought of by his fellows. It means he has advanced in the method of securing satisfaction. There are degrees all the way from naïve ostentation to a feeling of elation at the thought that "generations yet unborn shall rise up and call me blessed." No matter at what stage or from what point of view the situation is regarded, the motive of self-regarding sentiments is manifest.

RIVALRY AND JEALOUSY

Rivalry, jealousy, suspicion, revenge are self-regarding sentiments of great motivating force.

1. *Rivalry*. "The whole history of man is only the terror of standing second," so great is the urge of rivalry.¹⁴

Rivalry seems to have an important place in the development of the individual and the race. Emulation would have very restricted meaning apart from the urge of competition and rivalry. Rivalry is exhibited very early in life. Most games are built upon and use rivalry as the chief urge. We speak of competitive games and refer to the game of life as such, for, from the cradle to the grave, we are competing for something or other against our fellows who are after the same goods or objects of desire.

Rivalry and competition are the basic laws of the evolutionary urge. In Darwinian phraseology they

¹⁴ Cf. Crile, *Man an Adaptive Mechanism*, p. 376.

constitute the urge in the struggle for survival, for supremacy. Hence it runs all through life. In civilized society we have not eliminated rivalry—far from it—we have extended the field from the purely physical to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual. A man must compete with his fellows for the means of livelihood, for his mate, for his social position, for his friends, in fine, for everything that is worth while. Sometimes this competition becomes too keen, making neurotics or criminals of some who cannot stand the pace. On the other hand, an entire lack of it robs life of one of the greatest incentives to live, to fight, to achieve. It may lead to mental and moral derangements. There is nothing so trying to a person's morale as to be a chronic loser. He is likely to develop an inferiority complex.¹⁵

Rivalry as a principle of motivation is universally recognized. We make practical use of it in the home, the shop, the school, the playground, the athletic field. It is the greatest urge for increased production and social control. Rivalry need not always be confined to competition with others. One may compete with himself, with his past performances, with a standard self-created and self-imposed, with an ideal. There is almost no limit to the uses made of the urge of rivalry, and as a motive it is one of the most powerful in persistency and universality of appeal.

¹⁵ Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 172. "The Young Men's Christian Association workers in the prison camps no doubt saved thousands of war prisoners from moral collapse, melancholia and death by applying the prick of emulation. Encouraging these half-starved, homesick, miserable captives to organize competitive games calling for strength, skill and quickness seems a mockery till one marks how the eye kindles, the form straightens and hope revives as their dejected hearts respond to the challenge of a chance to beat."

2. *Jealousy*. When the fear of losing a desired object is great enough to wound the self-regarding sentiments, we call it jealousy. Jealousy itself is a sentiment containing the elements of anger, hate and fear plus the instincts of possession, pugnacity and self-regard. It is always directed against the rival or the agent which threatens to rob one of something that has become identified with the self, as making up a part of the self-regarding sentiment. Hence it comes pretty close home. So tremendous is jealousy as an urge that it is regarded as a sufficient motive for so strong a reaction as murder. Suspicion and revenge are the fruits of jealousy. History and literature abound in illustrations of the awful fruits that may grow on the tree of jealousy. A person bent on revenge is a dangerous person indeed. He is motivated by a combination of the strongest instincts, emotions and sentiments—anger, hate, jealousy, envy, pride, pugnacity, self-assertion, possession, wounded self-regarding sentiment, and the self-regarding complex. All of these taken together make a compound motive that is unsurpassed in intensity and ferocity except perhaps the opposite sentiment of the crusader, of the champion in a noble cause the triumph of which is infinitely dearer than life itself. But in either case the self-regarding sentiment is the central motive.

3. *Resentment and indignation* are milder forms of jealousy. They represent reactions towards the person or agency which threatens harm to the self or the self-regarding sentiments—"a menace to the mirrored self." The threat must be removed before equilibrium is restored. Jealousy, in one form or another, is strong in the race. It has been one of the chief means of survival.

Hence it is also strong in children. "Cruelty may be similarly favored," says Jastrow, and adds, "This means that the social-psychological nature of man makes human competitors jealous and vengeful. The sympathy which is counted upon to offset its hold is a slighter and later growth. . . . Thus anchored in urgent instinctive need, and capable of vast social expansion, jealousy remains one of the strongest motives of human action and offers a problem in the higher phases of regulation through all levels of social organization."¹⁶

SELF-RESPECT

Self-respect is the culmination of self-regarding instincts and sentiments in their best form, the most effectively adjusted and evenly balanced. It amounts to good personal morale. At its best it is self-expression, self-realization of the ideal self. As a motive it has stabilizing and socializing value. It is a sentiment of self-regard. According to McDougall, self-respect represents a proper balancing of the impulses of self-assertion and submission.¹⁷ In a well-ordered life with sufficient opportunity for self-expression and self-realization in the exercise of self-assertion and self-abasement, the chief motive is self-respect so far as the self-regarding sentiment is concerned as a motive. When there is a preponderance of submission, the motives may range from timidity (lack of self-confidence), inferiority complex, to jealousy, and revenge as we have pointed out. Or on the other hand, when the self-

¹⁶ Jastrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.

¹⁷ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 428; *cf.* also Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

assertive impulse is too frequently indulged, the prevailing motives are likely to be arrogance, conceit, pride, vanity, domination, exploitation, and the like.

There are at least three ways of regarding self-respect as a motive. There is, first, the urge of self-expression and self-realization as a human being, to live the fullest, completest life possible to a human being; second, expression and realization of the ego-ideal set up by each person by virtue of being a distinct personality; third, the relatively egoistic or relatively social ideal types of selfhood to be expressed and realized.

1. *Self-respect on the grounds of a common humanity.* The intrinsic worth of human personality is expressed in this phase of self-respect. As a motive, self-respect here prompts a man to live his life according to his capacities as a human being. Paulsen remarks: "We may say in a most general way that the goal at which the will of every living creature aims, is *the normal exercise of the vital functions which constitute its nature*. Every animal desires to live the life for which it is predisposed. Its natural disposition manifests itself in impulses, and determines its activity. The formula may also be applied to man. He desires to live a *human life* and all that is implied in it; that is, *a mental, historical life, in which there is room for the exercise of all human, mental powers and virtues.*"¹⁸ The normal person cannot accept anything less and maintain his self-respect, or, to put it the other way, his self-respect urges him to accept certain standards compatible with his nature and capacities as a

¹⁸ Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*, p. 270.

human being. This means that human life has a peculiar dignity and value. It means that one is constrained to respect other personalities by respecting his own. Kant's categorical imperative is applicable here: Always treat humanity, whether in yourself or another, as an end, never merely as a means. After all, as Buckham points out:

the struggle for character is the supreme struggle of life—a struggle not with others but within one's self. Say what men will of the struggle for bread, the struggle for wealth, the struggle for pleasure—the struggle for character is the most widespread, the most intense, the most absorbing, as well as the most worth-while, of any human interest in this or in any age. Slowly but certainly, with many forgettings and recoverings, with many loyalties and re-devotions, men and women are coming more and more clearly to catch the vision of the true self within, which is the center of all true judgments and appraisals, and to honor character which enshrines it. In our finer moments, our "seasons of calm weather," we feel the immortal youth of the True Self within and know that while we are loyal to that no loss or defeat or death can come to us, but only immortal gain and progress.¹⁹

Self-respect prompts a man to be true to himself as a human being, as a rational and moral animal. His true self is expressed only in conduct which is consistent with his inner nature as a man. Self-respect leaves him no other alternative. There is not, however, unanimity of interpretation as to just what these human values are in practical life. Therefore, self-respect as a motive is conditioned somewhat by the "ego-ideal"—the type of personality one is aiming consciously and unconsciously to become.

¹⁹ Buckham, *Personality and the Christian Ideal*, pp. 65-67.

2. *Self-respect and the ego-ideal.* By virtue of being a distinct personality, each one has a specially integrated self which he wants to express and realize. Self-respect as a motive here means being true to the ego-ideal in maintaining personal morale. In an intelligent normal individual, almost every act is motivated by a very subtle reference to the ideal, a reference to the type of character one wishes to become. Certain acts are so distinctly inconsistent with the ego-ideal as to be well nigh impossible. To maintain one's integrity, poise, confidence, morale, self-respect is essential and often acts as a motive. Happiness itself is dependent upon the ability to live harmoniously—"the ability to live in accordance with one's dispositions, impulses, and dreams"²⁰—the ego-ideal, the integrated self.

The unique thing about the nature of self-respect is that it can be trusted in the dark, it needs no watchman. On a vacation, traveling in a strange land among strange people of low or different moral standards, in the teeth of severe temptation, often a man has no other motive to keep him "straight" than his own self-respect, one of the strongest and best of all motives.²¹ This

²⁰ Stekel, *The Beloved Ego*, p. 145. Cf. Buckham, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113: "One never feels a keener sense of self-reproach than when he has *let go of himself*, as the phrase is, in surrender to some instinct or caprice of his lower nature. That is why anger, passion, intoxication, are so wrong. They mean a temporary defeat of personality. *Going to pieces* we rightly call it when one loses self-control. It is an explosion of personality; and to put one's self together again, after it, is like restoring the Portland vase. The man who can be himself in the stress of excitement, danger, pain, provocation, is the man whom we admire. He has attained at least one strong, essential trait of personality."

²¹ Cf. Fosdick, *Twelve Tests of Character*, p. 36; Hocking, *Human Nature*, p. 117.

motive also keeps a man from taking unfair advantage, of indulging in trickery and sharp practices, and impels him to do the "manly" thing. It is the price of living at peace with one's self, and since we must live with ourselves constantly, this urge of self-respect is a powerful one.

3. *Self-respect and types of ego-ideals.* There are many types, but for convenience it may be well to make an arbitrary classification of the relatively egoistic and the relatively social, recognizing a wide divergence in each group as to intensity or degree. (a) By the relatively egoistic we mean what is commonly regarded as "selfishness." Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as complete selfishness or complete altruism. Both terms are relative. The completest egoism is the completest altruism: the completest altruism is the completest egoism.²² (b) Relatively more social integration of personality is exhibited by one who somehow sublimates his so-called selfish desires to social ends.²³

Love is usually recognized as a compelling altruistic motive, yet its force is great precisely because it offers the best opportunity for the most complete self-expression. The self apart from society and social influences is an abstraction. It does not exist in everyday life among normal people.

Thus self-respect is one of the strongest of motives, reaching down to the very depths of the springs of human conduct. Defense mechanisms in the normal, and particularly in the pathological, show how far-

²² Cf. Sharp, "Psychology of Egoism and Altruism," *Journal of Philosophy*, Feb., 1923, p. 88; Stekel, *The Beloved Ego*, pp. 170, 172.

²³ Cf. James, *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 317; McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 110.

reaching is this urge as a drive. Every one resents a blow at self-respect. The "rationalization" of undesirable traits or of bad conduct indicates how loath we are to admit our faults. To do so would be to lose caste in the eyes of our fellows and, when the defect is very serious, the complete breakdown of personal morale; hence, we try to "justify" ourselves by denying the fault, or shifting the responsibility, or curing it whenever possible. In pathological cases the "cure" is worse than the disease. The patient, unable to overcome a fancied or real defect develops a complex or neurosis of some sort as a defensive mechanism, because the integrity of the self must be maintained at all cost.

No matter at what angle we view self-regarding motives we find them strong and impressive. They are the most fundamental, most persistent, and most inclusive of all the springs of human action.

CHAPTER XII

PREJUDICE AS MOTIVE

PREJUDICE AS A FACTOR IN CONDUCT

Prejudice has long been recognized as a factor in conduct. As a motive force it is indirect, it serves to color the primary motives, to modify them, to give them a bent in this or that direction. Prejudice may become a primary motive in propaganda when it is an end in itself. But as a rule prejudice is merely another name for one's attitude, the "set" or readiness to react to given situations in a given way. In the broad sense prejudice includes the "set" of the whole personality, the general outlook upon life in all its relations. It includes all the innate capacities plus the acquired propensities—native and acquired likes and dislikes, instinctive tendencies, dispositions, temperament, habits, in fine, every phase of the mental life that creates a behavior bias in the human organism. The commonly accepted usage of the word, however, restricts its meaning to conduct that is more or less consciously swayed by feeling, emotion, and sentiment. Prejudice might be regarded as an idea-pattern after the likeness of the so-called action-pattern and "brain pattern." Perhaps another way of regarding it would be as a type of habit or habitual response to situations on the basis of sentiment, ideas, familiarity (at-homeness). Even in this restricted sense prejudice is important in motiva-

tion as we shall attempt to show presently. We interpret events in the light of prejudice. We read our fears or hopes into them. We judge or misjudge the motives of others in the same way. Prejudice constitutes the spectacles out of which we view the world. Our impression and consequently our reaction to these impressions are decidedly colored by prejudice. Just what is the force of prejudice in motivation is the task to which we address ourselves in this chapter. First of all we need to remove certain prejudices concerning prejudice and then indicate the general line of approach to the problem itself.

One of the prejudices concerning prejudice is that it is usually regarded as an evil, an undesirable trait. The courts discount it, the reformers denounce it, the legislature passes laws against the more flagrant manifestations of it, and the scientist fights it. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the father of Inductive Logic and the great exponent of the scientific method of objectivity, gives a very interesting account of the various types of prejudice which he designates as idols of the mind that must be cleared away before any progress can be made in the world of science. He says there are four of these idols of prejudice: "The idols of the tribe (*idola tribus*) are such as inhere in the very nature of the human mind, among them being the notion of final causes (teleology) and the habit of reading human desires into nature. The idols of the den (*specus*) are peculiar to the particular individual, to his peculiar disposition, his education and intercourse, his reading, the authority of those whom he admires, and the like. The idols of the market (*fori*) are the most troublesome of all; they come from the associations of words

and names. Words are often used as names of things which have no existence, or they are the names of actual objects, but confused, badly defined, and hastily abstracted from things. The idols of the theater (*theatri*) are the result of false theories or philosophies and the perverted laws of demonstration.”¹

However much we may deplore prejudice we cannot dispense with it. Prejudice creates a serious problem for the sociologist, the reformer, the internationalist; but it also makes possible unified, concerted action both individually and collectively. To be entirely without prejudice one would have to divest himself of all convictions, conventions, beliefs, principles and conscience itself. The man of principle is one who has a closed mind on certain subjects, that is, more strictly, certain types of conduct are taboo for him. Certain matters are settled once and for all. To be absolutely “open-minded” one would have to live perpetually on the proverbial fence. The moment he decides in favor of an alternative he descends from his perch, he is prejudiced. Surely one could never be an enthusiastic lover without the aid of prejudice which provides him with a “logic-tight” and light-proof compartment. That is why love is blind. It is prejudiced. The same is true, in a measure, in all cases of ardent devotion to a cause or principle or party. The testimony of such a person is discounted because it is universally recognized that he is not in a position to view the facts abstractly (or objectively), he cannot separate himself from the object or situation. His emotions and sentiments give it a rosy hue that he, and those of like mind, alone per-

¹ Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, p. 257.

ceive. They read into the situation what is not really there, or is present only to a moderate degree. Prejudice is subject to hallucination, illusion, and exaggeration. This is true of extreme forms of prejudice; it is also true in modified form in all cases of prejudice. If one is to act at all and to act effectively he must become prejudiced to the extent of taking sides, of casting in his lot, of identifying his fate and fortune, so to speak, with the fate of the project. One cannot avoid prejudice in a practical world.

Thus in a sense the criminal is more openminded than the scholar and the social worker, for he has an "open mind" regarding such problems as stealing, illegal sex relations and many similar subjects that for the cultured, the law-abiding, the socialized persons are not open for debate. Hence prejudice is good or bad according to the results it produces in the life of the individual or the race. The pragmatic test must be applied. Both extremes are doubtless bad. The problem is to approximate the golden mean. Race prejudice, for example, is usually condemned. But it is not an unmixed evil. It has good, that is, useful, functions as well. For one thing it protects the purity and integrity of the races, it compels each race to prove its worth, it introduces rivalry that need not necessarily be malicious or bellicose, and, as Gault points out, it is an important incentive to the amalgamation of the immigrant.²

Moreover, there is a certain amount of survival value in prejudice. By means of prejudice the individual protects himself against unpleasant, undesirable and

² Cf. Gault, *Social Psychology*, p. 189.

hence, usually destructive tendencies that militate against his integrity, his peace of mind, his settled convictions. Similarly institutions and the nation itself are protected by prejudices which are really nothing more or less than habits attached to sentiments—are sentiments. It is only the extreme manifestation of prejudice that is bad, blocking progress and coöperation, and in the long run, if pushed far enough, destroys itself, defeats the very purpose it had at the outset. But as to eliminating prejudice entirely from human conduct and motivation, it cannot be done. Prejudice constitutes an important condition for the effective functioning of the mental life. "The demand," says Jung, "that one should see *only* objectively is quite out of the question, for it is impossible. We may well be satisfied if we do not see *too* subjectively . . . it is just the beam in one's own eye that enables one to detect the mote in the brother's eye. The beam in one's own eye, in this case, does not prove that the brother has no mote in his. But the impairment of vision might easily give rise to a general theory that all motes are beams."³

Thus prejudice has its advantages and disadvantages. It is good or bad according to one's point of view (prejudice) in judging the result produced. However, we are not here concerned so much with the normative phase of prejudice, when and where and how prejudice *should* function, as we are with the descriptive phase, how it *does* function in motivating conduct. We propose to discuss the place of prejudice in motivation under five main heads: taste (native and acquired),

³ Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 17.

convention (mores, institutions), belief (opinion, conviction), principles, conscience.

TASTE

Reference has already been made to the native and acquired likes and dislikes as motives. Their importance is second to none. The native likes and dislikes are as original and primary as the instinctive tendencies. In so far as they give a certain bent or bias to conduct they are prejudices also. Even the instinctive tendencies are prejudices in this sense. Looked at in this light prejudice is no new entity. It is merely another name for the original drives. The broader interpretation of prejudice, as we have seen, includes all the factors of motivation, but more especially is it concerned with the subjective conditions of attention, attitude, temperament, and sentiment. Taste takes in something of all these and other elements besides. In so far as these elements act separately as urges they are the motives, and it is merely a verbal distinction to call these prejudices; but in so far as they act in a given way, as a compound, they become true motives themselves.

CONVENTIONAL PREJUDICES

Folkways, customs, conventions, fads, fashions, mores, institutions as important factors in motivation, are treated separately in Chapter XIX. Our immediate concern is a brief discussion of these problems from the viewpoint of prejudice. There is no denying that custom predisposes the individual to specific types of reaction. Custom is for society what habit is to the

individual and in so far as the individual shares the life of society, customs are personal habits also. There are conventional ways of doing things and these are very extensive. "‘It is difficult to exhaust the customs and small ceremonial usages of a savage people. Custom regulates the whole of a man’s actions—his bathing, washing, cutting his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. In his life there is nothing free, nothing original, nothing spontaneous, no progress towards a higher and better life, and no attempt to improve his condition, mentally, morally, or spiritually.’ All men act in this way with only a little wider margin of voluntary variation."⁴

Thus, while the savage and the civilized man are both greatly influenced by custom and convention, there is considerable variation in the type of ceremonials not only between the savage and civilized man, but also from savage to savage and from one type of civilization to another, from one race or nation or locality to another. In fact it is this very difference among the folkways, mores and institutions that give rise to prejudices. There is therefore a real distinction in motivation between the force of customs as such and the variation among these customs which give rise to prejudice. As already stated the former phase of the problem is discussed in other connections; the latter phase will occupy our attention for the present.

Prejudice, in this connection, arises from a lack of sympathy with and appreciation for the differences in the social and personal habits of people of another race

⁴Quoted by Case, *Outline of Introductory Sociology*, pp. 52-53.

or civilization or locality or training and background. Prejudices of this sort are very extensive. There are many gradations from race prejudice (perhaps the most intense) to local prejudices between the dwellers of neighboring towns and among the same townsfolk who move in different social circles. There are all sorts of prejudices in between these extremes: the city man against the country man and vice versa; the easterner against the westerner and vice versa; the southerner against the northerner and vice versa; or any of these against all the others, and even from one state to another; the rich against the poor and vice versa; the favored against the ill-favored and vice versa; in brief, prejudices between the various strata of society whether they be a matter of geography, education, wealth, position—anything that marks a difference. Prejudice extends even to the members of the same family and household as expressed in the Quaker's assertion to his wife, "All folk are queer but thee and me, and sometimes I think thee art a little queer."

It would seem that whenever there is individuality, difference of any sort whatever, there is likely to spring up some phase of prejudice. The false inference from difference to inferiority or superiority is easily made. It is quite in keeping with our egoistic tendency to assume that our point of view is the correct one. If others differ they must be in the wrong, if they are unlike they must be inferior. The element of rivalry intensifies prejudice. It forces the issue. Thus race prejudice, and partisanship of every stripe, smouldering harmlessly when there is no issue at stake, blaze forth like a mighty volcano in the event of serious competition. The negro problem is more acute in the

South when a black man deliberately or inadvertently challenges the supremacy of the white man. The Californians are more sensitive on the problem of Japanese immigration because they have a real problem to face in rivalry, the possession of valuable land. During the World War national prejudice unbalanced the sober judgment of men in both camps. Every conceivable incentive and base motive was imputed to the enemy and readily justified by either side issuing propaganda born of the prejudice of fear and rivalry. One of the serious consequences of the War is that it has intensified all sorts of prejudices making it harder for the world to accept seriously the doctrine of universal brotherhood.⁵

Thus, whether dormant or active, subconscious or conscious, prejudice plays its part in motivating conduct. It is a real motive, usually indirect and secondary, but occasionally primary. Prejudice is a type of mental complex, as will be more apparent in the next section where belief as a prejudice motive is discussed. There are certain pet prejudices in almost every group and locality. The demagogue and the propagandist know how to take advantage of these prejudices. The easiest and surest way of swaying an audience or inciting a crowd is by appealing to some prejudice. In logic this is recognized as the fallacy of *ad populum* and *ad hominem*.

The psychic factor of prejudice which gives it force and driving power in motivation is as fundamental as self-preservation. Prejudice is essentially egoistic and hence usually condemned from the humanitarian point

⁵ Cf. Hall, *Morale*, p. 69.

of view. In good society the petty prejudices must be overcome. The prejudice of nationalism subdues all local and subsidiary prejudices within the national group. Internationalism aims to overcome this national prejudice, at least the undesirable and dangerous features of it.

Familiarity, at-homeness, is the feeling and emotional quality attached to prejudices.⁶ This is the way of safety and ease. It is the way of easy, habitual, functioning for the individual by himself and in groups. The strange, the unfamiliar, the untried, require effort, are risky and hence undesirable. Moreover, one comes to have feeling and emotional attachments to his habitual ways of reacting and thinking. Sentiments often spring up.

Prejudice, then, is made up of habits, familiar ways of meeting situations, feeling, emotions, and sentiments which are integrated so as to give the personality a set or bent or readiness to react in ways that are relatively fixed. In addition there is the problem of individuality, differential psychology and psychological types which make it difficult for a man to appreciate the viewpoint of another.⁷ This gives rise to misunderstanding in the problem of social intercourse, peace, and coöperation.

⁶ Cf. Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, pp. 467-469; Loeb, *Forced Movements, Tropisms and Animal Conduct*, p. 168. "Whitman took the eggs or young of wild species, giving them to the domestic ring-dove to foster, with the result, that the young reared by the ring-doves ever after associated with ring-doves and tried to mate with them. Passenger pigeons when reared by ring-doves refuse to mate with their own species but mate with the species of the foster parents. This shows incidentally that racial antagonism is not inherited but acquired."

⁷ Cf. Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 620-621.

BELIEF: OPINION, CONVICTION

Belief is a specialized form of prejudice, stressing the cognitive phase but not ignoring the emotional. As already indicated, prejudice, from the viewpoint of beliefs, might be regarded as a type of mental complex; not, however, in a pathological sense in which the word is ordinarily used except in the extreme form illustrated by fanaticism and obsession. Nearly every person is a "crank" on some subject or other. Mere opinion and belief have been strengthened by conviction and sentiments very like dominating and master ideas which prevent us from seeing the facts, especially those which militate against a pet notion. Even the scientist is in danger of seeing only those items which substantiate his theory and of exaggerating the importance of these data, while minimizing or altogether ignoring the data on the other side. It is said that Darwin was especially careful to make elaborate notes on observations which would tend to disprove his theories because he realized how easy it was to forget such data. Swift calls attention to the fact that "one of the striking effects of fixed opinions is that they prevent us not merely from accepting arguments in opposition, but also from understanding these opposing arguments—and this is far more serious. We cannot follow a line of reasoning which is antagonistic to a strong emotional prejudice. Cuvier, unable to see the meaning of fossils, and Owen laboriously gathering arguments for Darwin without understanding them, are illustrations."⁸ Thus the blindness of prejudice is in proportion to the emotional

⁸ Swift, *Psychology of the Day's Work*, p. 66.

intensity and the quality of the attached sentiments. The more attachments or more complete integration, the stronger the force of prejudice.

And if the scientist and scholar are in imminent danger of prejudice, where shall the layman and the untutored appear?⁹ As a matter of fact, they are almost wholly guided in their judgments and actions by it. The reason is not far to seek: "The wish is father to the thought." We believe in what we want to believe. Fear arouses a belief in danger. Imagination intensifies the complex by supplying vivid details. Memory and reasoning are enlisted in the service of our wants. Before long we have concocted a perfectly "rational" explanation for doing what we want to do or for believing what suits our wishes and desires.¹⁰ This is true of the beliefs we form more or less deliberately. But by far the greater majority of our opinions and beliefs are handed down to us ready-made. They are the product of early training and the force of circumstances, social pleasure, and conventions.

From a superstitious parent or nurse the child may come to believe in all sorts of weird and fearful superstitions which in adult life he repudiates as absurd, yet never will he be able to overcome completely the peculiar attachment to those same superstitions. If it is the number thirteen he has been trained to avoid he will always feel "queer" about it though he *knows* the notion is nothing but sheer superstition.¹¹ Now, if this be

⁹ Cf. Hart, *Psychology of Insanity*, p. 71.

¹⁰ Cf. Lund, "The Psychology of Belief," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. XX, pp. 63-81, 174-196. He found the correlation to be +.88 between belief and desire and only +.64 between belief and knowledge.

¹¹ Cf. Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 265.

true of trivial beliefs and beliefs that have to be unlearned because they do not fit in with the person's mature judgment and adult wishes, what about the beliefs of early training that are quite in keeping with one's wishes and desires? The fact is we are quite credulous in such matters. Some types of belief we must have. Belief is one method of mental growth. Belief is mental furniture. Hence it is not astonishing to find belief molded by desire. Emerson says, "We are born believing. A man bears beliefs as a tree bears apples."¹² We must have organized systems of thought. These take the form of beliefs because of the essential unity of the mental life which includes strong emotional as well as purely "intellectual" factors. And once these beliefs are "set" it is extremely difficult to dislodge them. They are part and parcel of the mental life itself. It is misleading to speak of the mind as having or holding beliefs. Beliefs are an integral part of mind itself.

The child builds up his world by acquiring systems of beliefs. Repetition, formality, social pressure, conventions are the agencies that mold opinions and beliefs and hence the set or prejudice of the mental life, i.e., accepted truisms as motives—axioms, proverbs, fables, slogans, symbols, etc., which represent signposts that point to ready solutions under similar circumstances. They are like the answers to problems in mathematics by which we check up our own findings. The individual readily gives assent to the belief that is expressed in a proverb because it embodies the wisdom of the race in such connections and because it has

¹² Emerson, *Conduct of Life*, p. 195.

been hammered into his consciousness by many repetitions. Stekel points out how "such notorious maxims as the following are trumpeted into our ears from the days of our youth: 'Work makes life sweet'; 'Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do'; 'the life of man is three-score, and ten, and if it has been a happy one it is due to work and striving.' These truisms are beaten into us, drummed into us, and hammered into us from all sides; we hear them wherever we go, till finally we accept them, completely convinced."¹³ The genius of slogans, in advertising and electrical displays, creeds, and the like, is to produce belief and conviction by the force of repetition. "There's a reason," "Eventually, why not now?" "It floats," are common examples. If the statement is repeated often enough it will be accepted as truth: witness the terrible yarns that the alumni of any educational institution relate at reunions about what they did when they were in school. After many such repetitions they come to tell them as facts and really believe what they say.

Specific beliefs are numberless and varied from age to age and from person to person. But there is, nevertheless, a certain degree of uniformity, at least in the types of beliefs, such as superstitious, social, religious, scientific, philosophical, and a miscellaneous group including beliefs due to peculiarity of temperament and idiosyncrasies.

Superstitious beliefs—belief in a lucky star, charms, soothsaying, fatalism, etc., are certainly important beliefs in motivation. They color the believer's experiences and give a bent to his reactions. The man who

¹³ Stekel, *The Depth of the Soul*, p. 29.

believes himself born under a lucky star is likely to show more confidence and daring under trying circumstances than the man who has an "inferiority complex." The fatalist likewise has a peculiar attitude to the occurrences of his daily life. It does make a difference what a man believes and how intensely he believes.

PRINCIPLES AS MOTIVES

Attention was called to the fact that prejudices might be useful and good as well as dangerous and bad according to the purpose they served and the results attained. Among the good prejudices, are principles. The beliefs and convictions which guide conduct are called principles. They are more or less permanent ways of looking upon fundamental problems—usually of a moral nature though not always confined to that field. They may be regarded as moral habits, moral dispositions, except that they are more conscious, more definite and clear-cut.¹⁴

Principles cannot be denied a place in motivation. What do we mean by the judgments: "He is a man of good principle," "He acted from principle," "I cannot trust him, he has no principles"? Or, when a man replies, "It is against my principles to do a thing like that," what does he mean? For one thing, principles betoken a disciplined life, a steady character, an integrated personality. Principles also imply good (moral) prejudices although there may be bad ones too, despite the seeming contradiction in terminology, for principles are regarded as laudable molds of behavior. The principle of "never snitch on a person,"

¹⁴ Cf. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 238.

among thieves, illustrates the latter type of prejudice. As a motive force principles share the general nature of prejudice in being essentially directive, controlling, modifying, i.e., secondary factors rather than primary urges except perhaps when the principle is an end of conduct in itself.

CONSCIENCE AS MOTIVE

Conscience is very much like principle except that it is more inclusive, more thoroughgoing. It is expressive of the whole self, the moral judgment which passes on the validity of conduct in every detail. It operates more inexorably in after-thought, in the form of shame, reproach and remorse. Conscience has great deterring effect in one's life, hence it is a strong factor in motivation. It is essentially a prejudice in that it predisposes our attitude towards classes of objects and types of conduct. Conscience is primarily negative in its motive force for it is mostly accompanied with prohibitions. "You must not do this, you should not have done that," is the message of the "stern daughter of the voice of God."

It is not profitable to take up the controversial problem as to the exact nature of conscience, its origin, fallibility or infallibility.¹⁵ Our concern is with its

¹⁵The reader is referred to any good textbook in ethics for a discussion of these points. The two contending theories of conscience are intuitionism and empiricism. The former asserts that conscience is innate; while the latter claims it to be the product of experience. There are many variations of each of these views by different writers, but the consensus of modern opinion favors the empirical interpretation in general outline, namely, that conscience is moral judgments and moral ideals impressed upon the individual by social pressure from his environment. It is not innate, but rather

place in motivation. The psychoanalysts claim that nearly all neurotics are people who have not the strength to do the wrong acts they so much desire to do. "All neurotics," says Stekel, "suffer from too sensitive a conscience."¹⁶ This reminds us of Hamlet's remark: "Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all." Humanity, however, has found this type of cowardice (that keeps us from doing wrong) a wholesome restraint and beneficial to society.¹⁷ Hadfield brings out a curious point in balancing temptation with conscience.

So far as their purely psychological mechanisms are concerned, temptation and conscience are identical, for both are the voice of suppressed desires. Temptation is the voice of suppressed evil; conscience is the voice of the repressed good. When our impulses are aroused by the delights of evil, we are said to be tempted; when we awaken to the liveliness of the good, our conscience is aroused. . . . It is only if we are evil that we can be conscience-stricken, and only in so far as we are good in our dominant psychology that we can be tempted to evil.¹⁸

Whatever view is held of conscience its place in motivation is obviously important. It would indeed be all-important if we could make it an infallible guide in conduct. This would be like finding the "philosopher's stone". The problem of moral conduct would be solved. We should have a rule-of-thumb method in morals.

an educative process representing a composite of customs, standards, the mores of the particular group to which the individual belongs. This view has a better explanation for the seemingly wide discrepancy in the dictates of conscience from age to age, from country to country, and in the same individual at different periods in his life.

¹⁶ Stekel, *The Beloved Ego*, p. 99; cf. *ibid.*, p. 110.

¹⁷ Cf. Wright, *Self-Realization*, p. 57.

¹⁸ Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 37.

246 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

But such a "find" is unlikely. The best we may hope for is to train the man to have good moral judgments, a socially integrated self, an "enlightened conscience," and trust him to live up to the best light he has with the moral obligation of securing more light as a developing personality.

CHAPTER XIII

MOTIVES AS PREPARATORY REACTIONS

PREPARATORY AND CONSUMMATORY REACTIONS: MEANS AND ENDS

Thus far we have regarded motives as drives towards specific ends, but many motives are only temporary ends. They are means to further ends. So far as the ulterior or final motive is concerned, the means motives are often designated by such terms as "delayed reactions," "preparatory reactions," "conditioned reactions." The final motive correspondingly may be called the consummatory reaction. Very few motives are capable of immediate satisfaction. In most cases certain preliminary reactions have to be gone through. The motive is a persistent tendency, which means that the drive will persist for a relatively long period and maintain itself in the face of opposition or bide its time for lack of opportunity. So long as the tendency persists the individual is restless. He will go through a number of preparatory reactions. Satisfaction and quiescence is obtained with the consummatory reaction, when the end motive is realized. Although true of all motives this is especially noticeable in instinct-motives, i.e., hunger, hunting (in animals, sex, curiosity, gregariousness, etc.). The homing instinct of the carrier pigeon will direct the creature through many hundred miles of trackless space and all sorts of weather condi-

tions until he arrives at his destination. All unnecessary reactions, those inconsistent with the consummatory reactions, are inhibited and all others are means to the end motive. A dog running full speed to keep up with his master's automobile was so intent on the end motive that he "passed up" a tempting opportunity of chasing a cat who crossed in front of him. He was observed to hesitate just a trifle but kept to his course. His "inner steer" overcame the temptation.

What was said in connection with attitude applies here (for an attitude is a predisposition towards certain end results) also the numerous references to the secondary motives which provide a "set" or readiness already alluded to. The organic state as well as the psychic must always be taken into account as a modifying and directive factor. There is, however, another point which deserves special emphasis: interest may shift from the end to the means, that is, a project undertaken for a specific end may develop many drives of its own. There is a distinction between the motive which drives a person to undertake a project and the urge which keeps him at it once the activity is enjoyed for its own sake. Woodworth rightly observes that "Gauss, so immersed in his original mathematical work that his attention could not be got away by hunger, or bodily fatigue, or the solicitations of his friends, was certainly not driven at such times by an economic motive or a sex motive, or a self-regarding tendency; but by nothing else in the world than his interest in what he was doing."¹ The first time the writer played golf

¹ Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 200; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 10, 201. For the opposite view cf. McDougall, "Motives in the Light of Recent Discoveries," *Mind*, July, 1920, pp. 277-293.

he did it to please a friend who insisted on his playing. The motive was purely to humor his enthusiastic and well-meaning friend. But once started, the game itself was motive enough and has been ever since.

It is indeed a fortunate fact that the means may borrow interest and drive from the end, that preparatory reactions may be as attractive as the consummatory reactions. This has far-reaching consequence in socializing the individual, in making education more attractive and hence more effective, of taking out some of the drudgery of work. A man's chief motive in his daily toil is usually the pay check, but that is no reason why he should not also take some pleasure in earning it. Thus means and ends are really very close. The motive of each step as well as the first step has a vital relationship. Dewey points out that "anything indifferent or repellent becomes of interest when seen as a means to an end already commanding attention; or seen as an end that will allow means already under control to secure further movement and outlet."²

Nevertheless it must be admitted that not always are we able to derive pleasure and satisfaction in the means as well as the ends. A great many acts will always remain drudgery and would never be undertaken were it not for the desirable end-values. This is true of enduring pain in having a tooth extracted, undergoing an operation of a painful nature, or sacrificing one's strength and risking one's life for a friend or a cause. The martyr in his intense enthusiasm for a noble enterprise may be less sensitive to the pangs of mortal

²Dewey, *Interest and Effort in Education*, p. 25; cf. also Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 34, 36.

wounds by fire or crunching jaws of wild beasts than ordinary folk, but he surely does not enjoy the agony for its own sake. The drive of an end motive needs to be especially strong if it is a very remote end. Walsh tells of "a physician who, having had to work his way through college, often became discouraged and thought of giving up the struggle. However, at such times, his daydreams, in which he pictured himself working among deformed children for whom he had always a tender feeling, were sufficient to stimulate him, so that he won the fight."³

THE FATE OF MOTIVES

It is pertinent to inquire as to the fate of motives. Obviously we have more urges and drives than we are able to express—than we dare express. What becomes of these? What do we do to them and what do they do to us? This conflict is perennial and constitutes the deepest problem for society as well as the individual. It involves the question of proper adjustments to one's environment, and what could be more significant than that? Every crime is a maladjustment. The unfortunate victims of mental, moral and physical maladies represent maladjustments. In a highly complex social organization, as our modern civilization, these maladjustments are quite pronounced and constantly on the increase. This strenuous life with its severe competition for survival, for self-expression and mastery is likely to make neurotics of us all. "Man is born free but he is everywhere in chains," said Rousseau. It is true that almost with the first breath we draw we are

³ Walsh, *The Psychology of Dreams*, p. 287.

subjected to some taboo or inhibition of custom. To the "tyranny" of the home is added that of the school and church. Playmates and associates add their quota. Social amenities, etiquette, laws and tradition written and unwritten, find a worthy climax in Mrs. Grundy. On every hand, from the cradle to the coffin, one is constantly under restraint. Some motive or other has to be constantly suppressed. No wonder so many find the process irksome or impossible and become tramps, social outcasts, criminals or neurotics.

The Freudians claim that our suppressed desires, though pushed out of the conscious mind, find shelter in the subconscious from where they carry on a guerilla warfare. In Chapter XVI, on "Motives of the Subconscious Mind," Freudianism and psychoanalysis are discussed at some length. In Chapter XV, on "Negative Motives," we shall have occasion to refer to the problem from another angle. Here our concern is more directly with the theory as a means of explaining the fate of motives. Orthodox psychologists do not seem inclined to accept the Freudian interpretation that all suppressed desires and wishes are buried alive and necessarily bound to make trouble. Aside from the questionable psychology of the *libido* concept and the prominence given to the sex urge, the psychoanalyst's view is too narrow, it is untrue to the facts. While it may be true that the suppression of some of the more fundamental urges, especially in the mentally and emotionally unsteady and ill-balanced, are likely to lead to disorder, it is by no means true that *all* unfulfilled desires remain intact in some subterranean crevice to sally forth at any possible and impossible occasion to seek gratification.

Motives undergo a great diversity of fates. The fate of unfulfilled motives would seem to be something like this: they are sometimes temporarily postponed, delayed, inhibited, dissipated, disjointed, reënforced, sublimated.

1. *Motives realized.* The most natural outcome for a motive is to find expression. This is the fate of many, many motives. If no motive was ever realized it would be meaningless to talk of motives at all, for by very definition a motive means a drive or urge to some realizable end. Appetites and habits are the outcome of certain motives which find frequent expression. These in time become almost mechanically the stimulus and response, assume the aspect of a reflex reaction. But as a rule most realizable motives are delayed. They persist, however, long enough to get ultimate recognition, perhaps after many preparatory reactions referred to above. With the exception of a favored few which are almost mechanical, practically all motives have to fight for expression. There is usually a preliminary skirmish among motives, if not an actual pitched battle, before one (or a combination of motives) captures the "final common path." Motives take precedence over each other according to their intensity,⁴ their urgency, and their ability to remain at the focus of consciousness. The issue is not always clear-cut. Frequently motives will be evenly matched, in which case there is a curious balancing of one against the other, each simultaneously succeeding the other in expression. Fear and "escape" are motives that are quite likely to deadlock each other. This happens in games

⁴ Cf. Crile, *Man an Adaptive Mechanism*, pp. 61-62.

involving some risk, also vicariously in watching the exhibitions of daring feats by skilled performers. There is no special risk to the actors who are experts, but we are thrilled in the realization that for us the act would be fatal.

2. *Inhibited motives.* As already indicated, most of our motives are inhibited because they are too numerous for expression or run counter to some social taboo or are worsted in conflict with other motives. Many of these are so trivial and superficial as to need no further consideration. They simply drop out. They are dissipated, they vanish. Transiency is so characteristic of our mental life, chiefly among the feelings and emotions (consciousness itself is in constant flux) that it would be strange, indeed, if some of the motives were not also but passing desires. The insistence of the psychoanalysts to the contrary is one of their chief errors. They assume that no matter how trivial or puerile a wish may be it never wholly passes out of existence, but is retained somewhere in the subconscious. The infantile desires (especially the sex urges) they claim are the most virile drives of all and persist throughout life. This is certainly extravagant. Take, for example, the intense desire of practically any normal boy to own a candy store when he is grown up, the wish to become in turn a chauffeur, a postman, a policeman, a milkman, or anything his fancy dictates. These are very real and intense longings in most cases, but their failure to materialize does not make neurotics of the boys, either at the time or when they come to years of maturity.

On the other hand, there are deep-seated, elementary urges which may not be suppressed with impunity for

long. Complete inhibition, suppression, repression of the more powerful instinctive motives is likely to lead to some sort of disorder or the development of some unnatural means of gratification. There is certainly that much truth in the claim of the psychoanalysts which can easily be verified by a visit to a psychopathic hospital, or, by introspection to discover in one's self some adjustment or other of a native desire that is somewhat extravagant or far-fetched if not actually abnormal.

In fine, some motives may be inhibited with impunity and doubtless with beneficial results, but there are other motives which are inhibited at some risk if not at the peril of disaster. Which it shall be and to what extent is determined largely by the native constitution and habitual responses of the individual. There is a wide range of difference from person to person in the way one may react to a suppressed desire. The spoiled child, for example, finds it exceedingly difficult to adjust himself to inhibitions, restraints, and thwartings of his desires and wishes. The emotionally unstable are quite susceptible to serious derangements in such cases. This is a problem to which psychiatry addresses itself and some remarkable work is being done here that promises much for the future of the science.

3. *Disjuncted motives.* Motives are not either completely realized or completely inhibited; they may be partially realized and partially inhibited. Motives may be disjuncted, broken up into two or more parts. The "all or none" theory applies only in such cases where the desire is for a definite object, yet even here substitution is sometimes possible. But in the case of disjuncted motives the inhibited portion, if sufficiently

strong, may join other "rebels" and possibly bring about a dissociation of personality. That, of course, could happen very rarely and only in certain types of people of unstable emotional and mental constitution, of poorly integrated personality. In normal people, disjuncted motives suffer the same fate as other motives which, as a rule, are realized or inhibited.

4. "*Disguised*" motives. There are many motives which dare not present themselves for recognition in their naked state. They take on certain forms of disguise to satisfy the æsthetic and moral sense of the personality. These are the motives that the socialized conscience calls base, unworthy, illegitimate—sex impulses, undignified means of expressing the mastery motive, spite, envy, jealousy, fear, hate, etc. It is necessary to give them a goodly outside at least. Hence when prompted by one of these motives the individual begins to philosophize and ere long he finds perfectly good "reasons" for doing the glorified act. It is this phase that obscures the study of true motives. We get so in the habit of dressing up the ugly forms of so many motives that presently all our motives become disguised, more or less. It is difficult to trace any motive to its ultimate source as was pointed out in the introductory chapter in dealing with some of the problems of motivation. (The Cheerful Cherub in the *Boston Post* observes: "I ought to trace my motives to the bottom of my mind—it's good for me, but often it's embarrassing, I find.") The desire to disguise our motives is itself a powerful motive. It consists mainly of the self-regarding motives which urge a person to appear in the best light before his fellows and in his own estimation, hence the tendency to cover up the ugly and deformed

portion of the anatomy of certain motives. Thus, where the self-regarding motive is not operative directly, it is often acting indirectly in regulating other motives. Disguised motives are the rule rather than the exception.

5. *Reënforced motives.* While motives may be completely or partially inhibited, disjuncted or disguised, they may also be reënforced. A motive is reënforced when opposition serves to release additional energy in favor of the motive opposed or when several motives combine their forces in seeking simultaneous gratification when that is possible, or in securing individual gratification successively. Reënforcement and summation take place in mechanical reactions according to the intensity of the stimulus or stimuli and the condition of the mechanisms involved. This is often referred to as the phenomenon of facilitation. "When two or more stimuli, each having a similar influence on a common effector, are given at once, each facilitates the others with the result that the response is more certain, prompt, and vigorous."⁵ An analogous situation is produced in motivation. For example, the motive of fear facilitates anger and vice versa. The fighting impulse is also very closely related and easily facilitated.⁶ "If one is frightened while walking alone at night, one tends to speed up a little on slight stimuli; a crackle, the chirp of a night bird, or the sudden perception of a dark object may stir us to flight. The sight of food on the table, added to the odors and sounds from the kitchen, makes our hunger more acute.

⁵ Gates, *Psychology for Students of Education*, p. 60; cf. Crile, *Man an Adaptive Mechanism*, p. 62.

⁶ Cf. Drever, *Instinct in Man*, p. 180.

We shout at the horse, in addition to other stimulation, to get the greatest action.”⁷ Opposition serves to arouse the whole personality, to enlist additional drives in the service of the opposed motive. It is queer, but true, that we want a thing more badly if there is danger of our not getting it than if it were readily annexable. This is especially true when another person is seeking the same object: witness the scramble at a bargain counter.

6. *Coördinated, substituted, sublimated motives.* The psychoanalysts have much to say about sublimation of original tendencies and suppressed wishes. The theory is that:

Civilization was forged by the driving force of vital necessity, at the cost of instinct-satisfaction, and that the process is to a large extent constantly repeated anew, since each individual who newly enters the human community repeats the sacrifices of his instinct-satisfaction for the sake of the common good. Among the instinctive forces thus utilized, the sexual impulses play a significant rôle. They are thereby sublimated, *i.e.*, they are diverted from their sexual goals and directed to ends socially higher and no longer sexual. But the result is unstable. The sexual instincts are poorly tamed. Each individual who wishes to ally himself with the achievements of civilization is exposed to the danger of having his sexual instincts rebel against this sublimation.⁸

Although Freud himself admits that sublimation is likely to be unstable yet he makes considerable of the notion that the original impulses may find harmless outlets in socially-approved channels or even attached to counter processes decidedly useful in social life.

⁷ Gates, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁸ Freud, *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 8.

Woodworth is inclined to question the validity of the concept of sublimation as a legitimate factor in motivation. He says:

Freud's "sublimation" is an attractive concept. It is "nice" to believe that crude motives that cannot be allowed their natural outlet can be drained off into other activities so that a libidinous infatuation, sluiced out of its natural channel can be made to drive the wheels of an artistic or humanitarian hobby. But there is no clear evidence that this can be accomplished. What does happen sometimes is that, in the effort to escape from, and distract one's self from, a strong but unwelcome impulse, one turns to some other activity capable of enlisting interest; and, since the unwelcome impulse is not easily resisted, one has to become as absorbed as possible in his other activity. Under such conditions, interest in this other activity may grow into a strong motive force and effectually supplant the unwelcome impulse. But this is distinctly not making the unwelcome impulse do work foreign to its own tendency. This impulse is not drawn into service, but is resisted. If there were no other and contrary motive force, the impulse in question would have its own way. We did see that the tendency towards a "consummatory reaction" acted as the drive to other mechanisms, but these were mechanisms that subserved the main tendency, whereas "sublimation" would mean that the tendency toward a certain consummation could be made to drive mechanisms irrelevant or even contrary to itself. There seems to be really no evidence for this, and it probably is to be regarded as a distinctly wrong reading of the facts of motivation.⁹

Without quibbling over the exact meaning of the term sublimation and its place in motivation, we may safely say that a great deal of the original force and drive in a natural tendency or an acquired wish or desire may be at least temporarily diverted to some

⁹ Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 175-176.

other channel without serious consequences to the individual and possibly even with beneficial results, for, as Woodworth rightly observes in another connection, "it is the individual that must be satisfied, rather than any specified one of his tendencies."¹⁰ The main thing, then, is to keep the self happy and contented. Whether this is done by sublimation in the Freudian sense or by "coördinated" and "substituted" motives as Woodworth¹¹ prefers to put it, depends on the point of view. If attachment and detachment of feeling and emotion to objects and persons and situations is possible (in the study of sentiments we find them to be going on constantly) then it is also possible to coördinate, substitute, and sublimate motives. Take the sex impulse with its social taboos and inhibitions and regulations: a man must not marry until he has established himself sufficiently to provide a suitable home, until he has attained maturity, etc. But these restrictions laid down by the social and moral code are not necessarily prohibitive. It does not imply complete and permanent inhibition. It simply means postponement until certain conditions are met. This is for the protection of the individual as well as society. In the interim something resembling sublimation takes place. The youth is "fired with ambition" to make something of himself, to appear well in the eyes of the community, and more especially in the eyes of his prospective bride. This new sentiment becomes in itself one of the greatest of all motives. But so far as the mating impulse is concerned, it may be said to be sublimated or at least sub-

¹⁰ Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 535.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 533 ff.

ordinated to the higher motive of love. Incidentally the individual and society are the gainers by what a person achieves under the influence of the sublimated urge. The original impulse is not exactly thwarted, it is merely redirected, harnessed to useful and valuable ends.

This illustrates but one of the many impulses and drives that may be redirected. Almost every motive is capable of modification in this way to a greater or lesser degree. Many motives find substitution, coördination, and sublimation in various forms of amusements. These will be treated more fully in "*Æsthetic Motives*"—art, drama, literature, entertainment, hobbies, games, etc. The play of each country is a veritable commentary on the attempt that each is making to solve the problem of substituted gratification of the more aggressive impulses. There are those who believe that in athletic sports, the right sort of hobbies and amusements, we have a most promising field for helping the individual to make the proper adjustments to his environment without undue suppression of his impulses and tendencies, both native and acquired. Recalling the statement that the essential thing is to satisfy the personality rather than any one craving, the problem of substitution takes on new meaning of far-reaching proportions.

In this chapter we have tried to see the significance of motives as means and motives as ends and to trace the fate of motives. We find that certain motives are in the nature of preparatory reactions; others, consummatory reactions. The fate of motives is not always easy to predict because of personal difference in the important matter of adjustment to the environment. But we find

certain possible fates awaiting motives. They may be realized, inhibited, dissipated, disjuncted, delayed, disguised, reënforced, coördinated, substituted, sublimated. In view of these deflections, substitutions and modifications it is pertinent to inquire concerning acquired and substituted motives. The next chapter deals with this problem.

CHAPTER XIV

ACQUIRED AND SUBSTITUTE MOTIVES

NEW MOTIVES

One frequently hears the remark: "You can't change human nature," often delivered with an air of finality as though it were a universally accepted truism. If it were true that human nature cannot be altered, then our schools and churches and reformatories and all social and moral enterprises would be all in vain. *You can change human nature.* In fact you can't keep from changing it. Every experience is an education; it has modifying value. Every psychologist will admit the factor of education. A great deal is written concerning acquired traits and characteristics. Thorndike expresses the notion tersely in the statement that, "The original tendencies of man have not been right, are not right, and probably never will be right. . . . Man is eternally altering himself to suit himself. His nature is not right in his own eyes. Only one thing in it is, indeed, unreservedly good, *the power to make it better*. This power, the power of learning or modification in favor of the satisfying, the capacity represented by the law of effect, is the essential principle of reason and right in the world."¹ Ben-

¹ Thorndike, *Original Nature*, p. 281; cf. Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, p. 57; Ellwood, *Christianity and Social Science*, pp. 13, 17.

jamin Kidd in his *Science of Power* goes so far as to state that given the proper emotional ideal we may completely transform human nature in a single generation. However that may be, it is certainly true that original nature can be and is constantly changing. New traits are acquired.

But is this equivalent to saying that new motives are acquired? Many of the original drives remain in force though greatly modified but it seems to be equally true that new motives and drives are also acquired. Woodworth is outspoken on this issue. He says: "Besides the elimination of drives, their attachment to new stimuli and their combinations, there is another source of acquired motive forces . . . we are interested in successfully overcoming difficulties."² On this point he takes direct issue with McDougall, who insists that the instincts are the original and only source of motivation. In refutation Woodworth replies that:

The point at issue is very well brought out in the case of a game of skill. The motive that drives the chess player to his chess, or the golf player to his golf, is not at all adequately accounted for by referring to an undifferentiated reservoir of curiosity or manipulativeness. The one is driven precisely by an interest in chess and the other by an interest in golf. The driving forces are specific, and acquired in the learning of these games. In the same way, while a man may enter a certain line of business from a purely external economic motive, he develops an interest in the business for its own sake (unless he is entirely out of his element), as he acquires mastery of its problems and processes; and the motive force that drives him in the daily task, provided of course this does not degenerate into mere automatic routine is precisely an interest in the problems confronting him and in the processes

² Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 102.

by which he is able to deal with those problems. The end furnishes the motive force for the search for means, but once the means are found, they are apt to become interesting on their own account.

In short, the power of acquiring new mechanisms possessed by the human mind is at the very same time a power of acquiring new drives; for every mechanism, when at the stage of its development when it has reached a degree of effectiveness without having yet become entirely automatic, is itself a drive and capable of motivating activities that lie beyond its immediate scope. The primal forces of hunger, fear, sex, and the rest, continue in force, but do not by any means, even with their combinations, account for the sum total of drives actuating the experienced individual.³

If there is anything certain in mental life it is uncertainty. In a shifting environment and a changing world, desires, purposes, wants, likes and dislikes, in fine, if not all our motives at least a great many of them are constantly altered. At the same time many motives are entirely eliminated while new ones are added. The pressure of society upon the individual is one of the strongest factors in the shifting of emphases and values, hence of motives. The young child is decidedly egoistic by nature. He is gradually socialized and made more and more altruistic by his contacts with others. The transfer is punctuated by systems of rewards and punishments. He is forced to make pleasant associations with what society regards as good, and unpleasant associations with what society regards as evil. This means a revaluation of values, a readjustment of motives. Society is actively engaged in rearranging personal motives.⁴ It is to be

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

⁴ *Cf.* Cooley, *Social Process*, p. 132; *cf.* Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

hoped that some day the enterprise will be placed on a more scientific basis. In the integration of personality and the adjustments to his environment a person is constantly making new attachments and breaking old ones, creating sentiments, weakening some and strengthening others. All the while the process of socialization continues he is broadening his sympathies, taking in larger and larger groups, identifying himself with greater variety of objects, persons and situations. Substituted and acquired motives are a necessary sequence to organization, integration and development of personality.

Some of the methods in which these motival changes are brought about may be summarized as follows: (1) by substituted satisfaction; (2) by transfer of "interest" from the end-motive to the means-motive; (3) by acquisition of new sentiments; (4) new tastes; (5) new knowledge; (6) new skill; (7) new point of view; (8) new ideas; (9) changes in the physical and social influences from the environment; (10) one's own changed physical and mental states.

The aim here is not to deprecate either the original drives nor unduly emphasize the importance of those that are acquired but rather to give due weight and value to both and if possible to make a just appraisal of them in motivation. In the preceding chapters the original motives and some of the acquired drives have been discussed. The following sections of this chapter will deal with some of the more important acquired and substituted motives, namely, mixed and compound motives, master motives, ulterior motives, persuasion, conviction, conversion.

MIXED AND COMPOUND MOTIVES: CONSTELLATION
MOTIVES

In enumerating the problems of motivation in the introductory chapter the extremely complex and elusive nature of motives was pointed out. In addition to this there are compound motives, clusters of them, which might be called constellation motives. Allowing for differences in size and configuration of the constellations we might say that such motivation is the rule rather than the exception. Even among impulsive urges we find, upon examination, accessory drives. Motives sometimes keep very strange company indeed. The expression, "mixed emotions" may well apply to mixed motives. Frequently one is impelled by such a strange admixture of motives as love and hate, fear and anger, joy and sorrow, by such curious and often antagonistic desires as wishing to laugh and cry at the same time, to fight and to run away, to want an object and not want it, to say "no" and mean "yes" and vice versa. Of course, there are instances in which incongruity is not so apparent. In discussing the fate of motives this phase was illustrated among the motives which are re-enforced, coördinated, sublimated. The possibilities are almost limitless. Native drives may combine with each other and with acquired motives in endless varieties. Moreover sentiments may also spring up in these connections. Thus constellation motives include mixed and compound motives, complex compounds within compounds as well as simple elements. These constellations, as such, must be regarded as distinct motives.

MASTER MOTIVES

A master motive is one that dominates conduct. The ardent lover's passion for his beloved is a good example. This sentiment motivates his every act. All that he does is focused around this drive. It is the one great impelling principle in his life, all his energies are directed to the sole end of serving his lady love. There is a hierarchy of values and motives with this master motive at the apex. All others are subordinated and range themselves in such a way as best to serve the supreme motive. The patriot, the prophet, the reformer, the explorer, the inventor, the advocate, the crank, the faddist, the fanatic, are further illustrations. In violent and abnormal cases this madness is called an obsession. The obsessed person is one who has a dominating idea in his mind which leads him to absurd conduct in speech and action. The extreme force of this motive in pathological cases serves to illustrate how powerful a drive a master motive may be even in the normal or in the temporarily insane as in the case of the love-crazed suitor.

Master motives are very real drives in everyday life. It is said that Abraham Lincoln would test each prospective decision by this master motive: "Will it preserve the Union?" Almost all of his decisions were regulated by the master motive of his life—the preservation of the Union. The student, tempted to waste his time or drop out on account of unusual difficulties is held to his course by a master motive of completing his course, of securing his degree. Another might peter out were it not for a master motive of securing a most

desirable position. Some people are almost constantly under the spur of a master motive. It may be the same motive throughout the major part of one's life or one might exchange masters rather frequently. Nearly every person is dominated by a master motive at some period or periods in his career.

An emergency furnishes a good illustration of a master motive that is more or less momentary—to escape an accident, get out of a burning building, slay the attacker or subdue him, rescue a child or any one in imminent danger, etc. A person so motivated has the “courage born of desperation.” The animal at bay, the army fighting with its back to the wall are dangerous antagonists. This is further illustrated in a contest of any kind—boxing, wrestling, racing, games of all sorts, where victory is desired and fought for. So intense is the master motive of victory that often it becomes paramount and the contestant “loses his head” and violates the rules of good sportsmanship. For the time being victory is wanted more intensely than anything else. It is the master motive. In a hobby the master motive is usually milder than in a closely matched contest, but with some people a hobby is a very real and paramount drive in their lives.

Now these master motives are not always of a helpful or desirable sort. Sometimes the master motive is a “bad habit,” some urge or appetite, an uncontrolled temper, etc. So that instead of unifying the person's acts for effective conduct as in the case of a noble master motive, they make for disintegration and handicap and embarrass the person.

Master motives dominate not only individuals but communities, sections of the country, the whole nation,

and there are some that dominate the world. There are certain local enterprises, sectional ideals, national aspirations, and so-called trends in history which sway men singly and *en masse*. Every age has its peculiar interest, its point of view, its prejudices.⁵ The nation in times of war is typical of domination by a master motive among a large group of people who subordinate every other motive to the one great desire of winning the war and protecting their institutions.

The importance of master motives can scarcely be overemphasized. Under scientific management large numbers of people, indeed the whole world, may be directed toward sublime ends and worthy achievements. Benjamin Kidd's *Science of Power* anticipates something of this contention.

ULTERIOR MOTIVES

Ulterior motives are "reasons" given in lieu of real motives to account for "disguised" motives. The disguised motive, previously discussed, may be sincere to the extent of deceiving the person himself. But an ulterior motive is designed to deceive others. Unscrupulous people who are motivated by strictly selfish and anti-social considerations go to great lengths to cover up their real motives and assume ulterior motives that look good. To listen to some bogus "promoter" talking, you would think him the most altruistic person alive. He seems so solicitous of his prospective victim's welfare, of securing large returns for his money, that he may become wealthy over night, have all the good

⁵ Cf. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 172, 173, 175.

things of life, etc. Frequently, in transactions which are in themselves honest and praiseworthy the exponent pays a great deal of attention to the motive of appeal. It would not do to be too transparent with the true motives.

Propaganda thrives on ulterior motives. Its effectiveness would be almost, if not completely destroyed were the real motives given to the world. The appeal ostensibly is made in behalf of public health and safety. The sacred names of patriotism and religious convictions are frequently drawn in. An interested group whose illegitimate business might suffer from the passage of laws that are clearly for the best interests of the people, will becloud the issue by appealing to such motives as "personal freedom," "state's rights," "the sanctity of the home." They appear before the public as great patriots, wave the flag vigorously, sing "America" vociferously, shed crocodile tears copiously, but all the while their true selfish motives are concealed. Their public-spirited activities are merely a "cloak," which constitute ulterior motives. Sometimes a person may justify such methods on the grounds of the larger good that in his opinion will result: witness the significant phrase, "the end justifies the means." What wrongs have been committed under this criterion of conduct! It is the supreme example of ulterior motives. Strange as it seems, a person may even be quite honest and sincere in carrying out a dastardly act under this compulsion; at any rate, he will often argue himself into believing that he is in the right. One of the greatest abuses of the reasoning faculty is to cover up a sinister motive with laudable "reasons." For suggestion is so powerful that if presented repeatedly

the individual himself will finally come to accept masked motives for the genuine.

ARTIFICIAL (SOPHISTICATED) MOTIVES

The disguised, substituted motives just referred to may also be regarded as artificial or sophisticated motives. This type of motivation may be either sinister or beneficial. The evil phase is illustrated by abnormal attachments, in perversions and so-called bad habits. The more desirable (socially acceptable phase) is illustrated by the whole penal system and all education calculated to break old attachments and to substitute new ones. Rewards and punishments are sophisticated motives.

PERSUASION AND CONVICTION

In persuasion we have another expression of acquired or substituted motives. The persuaded person is one who has "made up his mind" concerning a definite proposition. Persuasion is through belief and conviction. Properly speaking no new motive need necessarily be added although considerable rearrangement and reorganization of motives often take place, sometimes from outward pressure and sometimes from inner conflict or deliberation. On the other hand, the new configuration worked out by reorganization of motives already existent in a sense constitutes a new motive—a compound or composite motive is formed which, as such, did not exist before. This state of affairs is brought about in making so-called good resolutions.⁶ Conviction casts an emotional glow over belief, having

⁶ Cf. Bligh, *The Direction of Desire*, pp. 6-7.

special value in persuasion where something more than sheer logical cogency is required to induce action.⁷

CONVERSION

Conversion, though usually regarded as a religious phenomenon, is of course a psychic phenomenon as well. In its broader meaning conversion is a complete "face-about." In motivation it means a radical change of desires and purposes and ideals—a complete remodeling and reorganization of one's important drives. It amounts to a revolution among motives. The individual is jarred loose from his old moorings, thrown out of the old rut and forced to make new adjustments. Above all a sense of unity and harmony is achieved in the integration of personality which adds force and power to conduct. It creates a better morale. Dresser states that "conversion no longer appears to be a sudden change, but the result of a gradual process: (1) new desires have come into power, and the expressions of the instincts have been sublimated; (2) repressions have been overcome in a freer mode of life; (3) conflicts have ceased, and power once lost in friction has been utilized; (4) potentialities long unrecognized have been realized; (5) a new standard of life has come into view."⁸

Revival is another religious term which has psychic meaning and value in the larger field of motivation closely related to conversion. Periodic strengthening of purposes, clarifying of ideals, unifying the self in its attitude towards a definite situation is quite prevalent

⁷ Cf. MacPherson, *The Psychology of Persuasion*, p. 16.

⁸ Dresser, *Psychology in Theory and Application*, pp. 683-684.

in practically every phase of human endeavor. Pratt points out that "Revivals of religion, revivals of morality, of insight, of patriotism, of ideals, are necessary to the best and noblest living. This is recognized by institutions quite remote from evangelism. . . . So long as human spirits are connected with human bodies, some kind of seasonal revival will be an important part of their food." ⁹ Dedication and consecration are two additional terms which signify the strengthening of master or major motives. It many cases these have the force of acquired or substituted motives.

⁹ Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 193.

CHAPTER XV

NEGATIVE MOTIVES

Thus far we have been discussing positive motives almost exclusively. In this chapter attention is called to the various types of negative motives. There are motives that dissuade and inhibit or modify conduct as well as motives which impel the organism towards a desired end. Barrett says, "Motives may be positive or negative. When a subject feels himself attracted or drawn by something, with a feeling of pleasure, and, even a muscular tendency to react and to take it, we say that the motive is *positive*. On the other hand, when the subject is repelled by something, hesitates perhaps, has feelings of fear or disgust, and feels an impulse to turn away from it, and to take something else in preference, we say that the motive is *negative*. In fine, attractions and likings mark positive motives, and dislikes mark negative motives."¹

From the nature of the case negative motives are not primary, original drives, excepting those that have survival value as in the instinct of flight and in some of the pathological urges which we shall examine a little later. Negative motives for the most part are modifiers of behavior. The interference with positive motives may result in (1) complete inhibition, (2) partial inhibition, or (3) summation. The latter is possible

¹ Barrett, *Motive-Force and Motivation Tracks*, p. 69.

because of the fact that opposition often arouses the full resources of the self which may be hurled on the side of the threatened loss of a desirable end. Aside from the individual conflict between positive and negative motives there is a mental state that may be described as negative adaptation. "We thus become negatively adapted," says Woodworth, "to the ticking of the clock, to the presence of any object that does not call for action on our part, to the beauty of an always-present landscape or picture, to the amiable qualities of our husbands and wives, and to any demands on our attention and effort that can be disregarded with impunity."²

Negative adaptation may be relative to specific objects and situations or it may become a generalized attitude of mind, a chronic state of opposition. "Some people," says Prideaux, "appear to adopt 'negativism' as a habit; such are the people we call 'cranks.' I look upon the action of these people as being that of overdetermination, owing to the formation of complexes associated with painful experiences in the past."³ In certain types of obstinacy, contrariness, and stiff-neckedness there may be a positive motive of pugnacity and self-assertion,⁴ especially when the opposition is to another's positive assertions. When it refers to the inhibitions of the same person it may be due to force of habit, a matter of discipline or purely an "indoor sport."

Of the types of negative motives we shall concern

² Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 86.

³ Prideaux, "Suggestion and Suggestibility," *British Journal of Psychology*, 1920, p. 237.

⁴ Cf. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 158.

276 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

ourselves with inertia, malingering, fatigue, pain, illness, disease, dissuasive motives, balked desires, and perversions.

INERTIA

Inertia is a psychophysical state of inactivity or unreadiness to reaction which a positive motive must overcome to be effective. Hence inertia is a negative motive in that it modifies positive drives by providing a handicap, an impediment to remove. Rest, repose, sleep, hesitancy, doubt, vacillation, procrastination, and laziness are forms of inertia that have the force of negative motives. Inertia may be nature's balance against the native impulses to activity as a means of protection from overactivity. At any rate we have these factors to take into account as modifiers of positive motives in behavior. In so far as inertia and laziness are identified with the dispositions their influence in motivation is very like the psychophysical set or readiness (rather unreadiness) to react to stimuli. They may be both positive and negative, positive as motives seeking their own ends, negative when interfering to modify other motives.

MALINGERING

The malingerer is a person who feigns sickness or inability in order to shirk duty. There are many types of malingering. In each field the malingerer has a special name: the truant, the slacker, the "drone," the soldierer, the shirk, the shyster, the hypocrite, etc. The term is used in its wider sense to include all kinds of devices for avoiding an unpleasant task. Its significance for motivation is that the malingerer feigns motives. He is very careful not to reveal his real motives.

In fact he is a past master in the art of covering his true motives and deceiving people. What was said in the discussion on ulterior motives⁵ is applicable here. The main distinction is that the propagandist and all others who are actuated by ulterior motives are more positive and aggressive, while the malingerer is negative even in his aggressiveness, for his chief aim is to avoid something. In either case advantage is taken of the natural difficulties in motivation, in the elusiveness and inability to read the motives of another from outward manifestations. And in so far as there are such external signs they are feigned by the malingerer to suit his purpose. We have here the curious situation of attempting to trace the motive of the motive, the hidden real for the manifest counterfeit. The fact that one may successfully feign motives shows how difficult it is to understand and interpret the true motives. Says Woodworth, "There is no art to read the mind's construction in the face, or at least no sure art. One may feign sleep or absorption while really attending to what is going on around. A child may wear an angelic expression while meditating mischief."⁶

Besides the malicious hypocrite who is too well-known to need comment there is the "hallowed hypocrite" who feigns motives for exactly the opposite purpose—the sickly mother who hides her pain and appears cheerful before her family; the man who gives up something he really wants for the use of another, pretending he has no use for it; the lover who effaces himself because he believes the beloved would be happier with his rival and feigns indifference; the philanthropist who makes

⁵ See pp. 269-271.

⁶ Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 9.

the objects of his charity feel as though they were conferring a boon on him for the privilege; the clown and the comedian who amuse the populace with their pleasantries while they conceal some ache or sorrow.

DISSUASIVE MOTIVES

By dissuasive motives are here meant the drives which are the result of negative modifications of the normal positive motives as distinguished from the motives of perversion which are the dissuasive motives carried to the point of abnormality. The dissuasive motives are states of mind, such as disillusionment, apathy, discontent, ennui, boredom, blaséness, misanthropy, pessimism, discouragement, despair, sin or sense of guilt.

1. *Disillusionment*. The disillusioned person is usually listless, apathetic. He is defeated. The fight is gone out of him. The general attitude is one of indifference, the "what's-the-use" outlook. If the blow is severe enough and deep enough life will seem divested of all value. One may end by becoming *blasé*, sometimes acquire a pessimistic disposition, and live and die in despair. The types and causes of disillusionment are many and varied. The depression may be an inherited tendency to "moodiness"; it may be due to physical, organic conditions, irregularity among the glands; it may be the result of internal conflict, the sense of inadequacy, of failure, of guilt;⁷ it may be due to external circumstances, "hard luck," repeated calamities or one crushing misfortune such as disappointment in love, failure in business, the crumbling of

⁷ Cf. Hocking, *Human Nature*, p. 117.

a hero demigod, loss of a dear friend, overthrow of a pet theory, defeat of a project in which one has placed confidence and committed his all, a catastrophe like war or an earthquake.⁸

2. *Discontent, discouragement, despair.* No matter how the depression is brought on, the effect is to negate to a greater or lesser degree the fundamental positive motives. It detracts from the zest of living. The edge of desire is blunted. It will take a stronger stimulus to arouse such a person if he can be made to react at all. Moreover, his vision is likely to be blurred, he may find it difficult to "see life steady and see it whole," his perspective of life is likely to be faulty. His discouragement may reach the point of despair, despairing of his own fate and that of the rest of the world.

3. *Pessimism.* When the general outlook upon life is gloomy we say the person is pessimistic. He looks on the dark side of every experience. He sees more evil than good. He has little faith in the immediate or ultimate triumph of good. There are several terms for designating the types of pessimism: the disappointed lover is likely to be a misogamist as well as a misogynist; the insolent, sneering pessimist is called a cynic; one who has lost faith in his fellowmen is a misanthrope; perhaps we might also include the atheist as one who has lost faith in God. In any case, pessimism is a negative attitude greatly affecting the positive values and motives of life.

4. *Boredom.* There is still another phase of dissuasive motives to be considered—the state or attitude

⁸ It is said that the Lisbon earthquake made a pessimist and an atheist of Voltaire.

designated by such terms as *blasé*, boredom, ennui, satiety, surfeited, cloyed. This is a condition that may result from any type of disillusionment, but as a rule it is due to overindulgence in emotional reactions, the after-effect of an emotional "spree" likely to be permanent. It is the price of emotional excess. One may become "fed up" on almost anything from jazz to philosophy. We tire from the excess of almost anything. This is the reason for variety on the menu card, styles in dress, vacations and recurring rhythmic changes in our mode of life. Where a little change and recreation restores the original tonicity of the cloyed motive the situation is not so serious, it is perfectly natural and normal. A distinction should be made between the satiety of a specific desire and the satiety of the personality. The latter situation is more serious and more permanent. We speak of a *blasé* person as one who is worldly wise, highly sophisticated, who has drunk of life's experience to the very dregs, or at least one who has lived so intensely and indulged in so many "fancy" experiences that the ordinary workaday world seems like an anti-climax. The *blasé* person is to the "trivial round, the common task" what the drug addict is to his "dope." Just as the latter needs to increase the dose of his drug with each successive indulgence to get any satisfaction, so the former has to have unusual experiences to get a thrill.

There is here implied a paradox of the emotional life. On the one hand, the repetition of an experience causes a diminution of the emotional accompaniment at each repetition until the experience is possibly reduced to a mere mechanical habit losing practically all emotional color and heat. On the other hand, the fires of emo-

tion rekindled by repetition become all the more intense with each repetition. In some respects the adult is capable of much keener emotional reaction than the child; in other respects he has lost something of the spontaneity and zest of the child's delight in the trivial and commonplace things so new and fresh and interesting to him. Is it a condition of growth and development that one loses the ability to thrill over the simple things of life? Witness also the difference between "old" races and "new" races in this respect—old and new civilizations, the old world as contrasted with the new, the East with the West? Lord Bryce in *The American Commonwealth* says that the American people are able to get enjoyment out of the most trivial things as well as the unusual and uncommon. There is no denying that the West is more optimistic, more jubilant, more progressive than the East with its older civilization weighted down by century upon century of traditions.

One might here raise the question of emotional bankruptcy: Is it not possible for a race as well as an individual to become *blasé*, apathetic, pessimistic by overindulgence and emotional excess? This is certainly worth serious thought, especially as it relates to the problem of motivation. What may the social reformer, the moralist, the religionist appeal to after the highest sentiments and objects of reverence have been made commonplace by repeated associations with trivial and unworthy objects or prostituted to the purpose of commercialization in the cheaper shows and motion picture films? The children of the present generation are a great deal harder to please than those of former generations. They want more expensive

toys, their amusements must be more elaborate. They seem to be prematurely sophisticated in matters that are of doubtful value. It is not in the defense of prudishness that the problem is raised—far from it—but for the purpose of challenging investigation in the field of emotional overstimulation and its effect upon children and adults as well. There is scope here for the experimental psychologist. His findings will have great value for directive motivation, a normative science of moral conduct on a psychological basis.

FATIGUE, PAIN, ILLNESS, DISEASE

Something of the same effect as that of boredom may be produced by such natural causes as fatigue, pain, illness, and disease. When a person is tired or sick he does not react to stimuli in the same way as when he is rested and well. These are negative motives. They inhibit or modify the original appetites and drives. Even food does not taste the same and may be entirely dispensed with for days with great benefit. The whole mechanism is slowed down in order to give the organism a chance to recuperate. Desire must not be too strong. It is nature's method of adjusting the situation with an eye for survival. One may be too tired or too sick to desire the things that are ordinarily appealing—music, picture galleries, baseball, the theater. Even his particular hobby may fail to get a "rise" out of him.

Thus, the tired or sick person is not only apathetic to the positive motives but is also unable to make the proper adjustment to an unfavorable or disturbing experience, such as, shame, calamity, grief.⁹ At such moments a person is likely to exaggerate his losses and

⁹ Cf. Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, p. 305.

to suffer correspondingly. Sad news and shocking announcements of all kinds are kept from the sickroom for the obvious reason that a sick person must not be unduly excited. Aside from the risk of a physical relapse, the man is in no mood to appraise properly a distressing experience. Often allowance is made in the courtroom and elsewhere if it can be shown that the crime was committed under nervous tension, or as the result of a sick or diseased mind.

Another point is worthy of consideration: not only does physical fatigue and illness affect one's general attitude and will power, but a mental shock, or "mental fatigue" affects the physical organism profoundly.¹⁰

Thus there are two sides to the question of fatigue and debility: there is the physical and psychic on the one hand, and the motival on the other. In other words, the factor of motivation must not be left out, either as cause or as effect. Fatigue certainly affects motives; motives also play an important part in fatigue. Despite the enormous amount of excellent experimental data on fatigue, not enough attention has been paid to this phase of the problem.¹¹ As we have pointed out

¹⁰ Streeter, *The Spirit*, Chap. III; *The Psychology of Power*, pp. 80-81; "*Fatigue of purely mental origin is often misinterpreted and is attributed to a physical origin.* Man has not yet learnt to discriminate clearly between mental and physical sensations, hence mental pain tends to express itself in terms of physical injury. . . . This is the explanation of not a few apparently physical, but really functional, diseases. For this reason, when the mind is itself fatigued by worry, anxiety, depression, or fear, this fatigue, though purely mental, is often *felt* to be physical, and we have the same sensations as if it were the body that was tired out."

¹¹ Cf. Dodge, "The Laws of Relative Fatigue," *Psychological Review*, March, 1917, pp. 89-113; Whiting and English, "Fatigue Tests and Incentives," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Feb., 1925, p. 49.

284 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

in another connection,¹² boredom or lack of interest is often mistaken for fatigue and there is quite a margin between the first indication of fatigue, which is usually due to loss of interest, and the time when actual fatigue sets in. Increase the incentive and the erstwhile tired person can go on with increased efficiency. A word of encouragement, the urge of necessity, the stimulation of achievement, reduce the first steps of pseudo-fatigue to a remarkable extent. The fatigue curve of the workman shows a decided drop just before quitting time like the long-distance runner's sprint on the home stretch. Overcoming pseudo-fatigue and real fatigue by means of effective motivation has its limitations. One cannot go on indefinitely without certain danger of collapse, which shows that fatigue is real. But it may be modified to some extent by proper incentives. From the viewpoint of applied psychology, the problem of motivation and fatigue is to determine experimentally how to utilize the margin between boredom and real fatigue, and the quantity and quality of the incentive to be applied safely and profitably. This implies a knowledge of the safety fatigue point which must be determined on a basis other than the quantity and quality of work performed.

PERVERSIONS AS NEGATIVE MOTIVES

So far in this chapter we have treated negative motives that are normal, that occur in the life of the average person. But there are also negative motives that are on the border line between the normal and abnormal and some that are decidedly pathological. The patho-

¹² See pp. 161-162.

logical motives usually appear among those of poor inheritance or who go through unusual experiences. The most susceptible are those of unstable emotional qualities, the unbalanced who are not capable of proper adjustment to balked desires. Certain natural desires have to be suppressed or inhibited by all. Normal people find outlets and sublimations and make adjustments that are more or less natural and conventional. Some who are emotionally unsteady, or are mentally or morally inferior, react in abnormal and pathological ways.¹³ They make adjustments that are perverse or chaotic. The former is an unhealthy adjustment while the latter is a complete failure at adjustment. Some of these perversions and maladjustments or lacks of adjustments are: neuroses, psychoses, phobias, manias, criminality, gross immorality, drug habits, insanity, mental complex, dual and multiple personality, suicide.

This is not the place to attempt an adequate account of these perversions.¹⁴ Mental complexes, neuroses, psychoses, dual and multiple personality, certain phobias and special forms of insanity are briefly considered in the following chapter in discussing subconscious motives and psychoanalysis. We want now to mention a few general factors of perversions as negative motives.

In the manifold variety of neuroses, two well-defined forms stand out, and are often regarded as types, the others being regarded as approximations to these. . . . The two "types" are what are called hysteria and psychasthenia. They have

¹³ Cf. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 161.

¹⁴ See Taylor, *Readings in Abnormal Psychology and Mental Hygiene*, for well-organized valuable excerpts from the best writers in the field; Bridges, *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, for an excellent syllabus and bibliography; Beers, *A Mind That Found Itself*, for a fascinating introspective description.

in common a deficiency of mental energy, or, we might say, a deficiency of drive or motive force. This deficiency is often called "abulia" or lack of will.¹⁵

In its extreme form this abulia or mental apathy is exemplified in the so-called "emotional dementia" which characterizes a large proportion of the chronically insane. As contrasted with emotional dementia, where the patient is apathetic and motiveless, there are types of complexes and obsessions in which the patient is driven by a master motive which has become dissociated, staying permanently at the focus of consciousness.¹⁶ "There are two kinds of obsession," says Tridon, "obsessive fears and obsessive doubts. Both kinds vary in degree from a simple annoyance to positive torture. Obsessive fears are known as phobias. The best known are mysophobia, the fear of dirt; claustrophobia, the fear of enclosed spaces; agoraphobia, the fear of open spaces, and pyrophobia, the fear of fire."¹⁷

Even the normal person is greatly influenced by fears of one sort or another.¹⁸ In the mentally deranged person these fears are exaggerated, sometimes take the form of obsessions. G. Stanley Hall has prepared a table of 276 phobias or morbid fears showing man's manifold proclivities to timidity and fear.¹⁹ These fears dominate the unconscious, replacing all other motives. There are obsessions not only of morbid fears, but also of illusions and hallucinations, the delusion

¹⁵ Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 163; cf. Hart, *Psychology of Insanity*, p. 27.

¹⁶ Cf. Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹⁷ Tridon, *Psychoanalysis and Man's Unconscious Motives*, p. 172.

¹⁸ See pp. 89ff.

¹⁹ "A Synthetic Genetic Study of Fear," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1914, pp. 149, 321.

of persecution being one of the more common and sinister. No matter what form the obsession takes the patient is tormented by the fixed idea which completely upsets the balanced life with all its values and motives. In the dipsomaniac the positive element of an appetite is added with such terrific force that nothing but physical barriers can prevent a man from getting what he craves. "The craving for drink," says James, "in real dipsomaniacs, or for opium or chloral in those subjugated, is of a strength of which normal persons can form no conception. 'Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room and were a cannon constantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not refrain from passing before that cannon in order to get the rum'; 'If a bottle of brandy stood at one hand and the pit of hell yawned at the other, and I were convinced that I should be pushed in as sure as I took one glass, I could not refrain'; such statements abound in dipsomaniacs' mouths." ²⁰

Suicide shows inability or unwillingness to adjust one's self to the environment. It is the result of a type of obsessive fear and is usually pathological although there are instances of suicide that have very little to do with fear and are not at all pathological in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather motivated by custom and conventions: witness the Japanese custom of committing *Hara-Kiri* to show one's love for a friend or loyalty to a cause as well as being the national method of securing a convenient quietus from any mortal ill. Although the act of committing suicide is positive and requires a type of courage the motive is decidedly nega-

²⁰ James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 543.

tive ²¹—to avoid extreme embarrassment, shame, disgrace, pain, grief, any situation which, in the eyes of the prospective suicide, has turned the balance in the scale of values to the side of disvalues.

Thus negative motives play their part in opposing, deflecting, modifying, and inhibiting positive motives.

²¹ *Cf. James, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 317.*

CHAPTER XVI

MOTIVES OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS MIND

Historically the theory of the subconscious was invoked to account for the continuity of personal identity, for memory, for the ability to recall past experiences and recognize them as valid. It was also invoked as an explanation of the phenomenon of intercommunication between minds. But orthodox psychologists have been rather wary of all theories of the subconscious. Freud with his method of psychoanalysis has brought the subject into prominence in a spectacular way.¹ Among psychologists, Freud has enthusiastic followers and severe critics. All, however, will agree that Freud has made valuable contributions. The alleged discovery of a new source of motivation in the subconscious in the form of repressed desires is significant for our problem. It will be worth while to examine this claim critically.

¹ Valentine. *Dreams and the Unconscious*, p. 22. "Most 'orthodox' psychologists would mean, then, by the unconscious chiefly such mental dispositions, and traces of past experiences which had once acted in full consciousness, and which may at any moment rise into full consciousness, provided there is an appropriate stimulus or association. . . . They apparently 'function' without entering consciousness, though exactly how remains a mystery.

"Freud's view of the unconscious goes much further than this. For him the unconscious includes many impulses and memories which remain buried in the depths of the mind, and *never*, except in dreams, rise to consciousness unless dragged to the surface by psychoanalysis."

Cf. Northridge, *Modern Theories of the Unconscious*, pp. 174, 186, 191.

PSYCHOANALYSIS

It is a common practice among psychologists to study pathological cases in order to get insight into the normal. The abnormalities are for the most part exaggerations of the normal and hence valuable for research. Thus, a study of neurosis and psychosis reveals hidden motives which operate without the subject's conscious knowledge, presumably from the subconscious. Psychoanalysis is the method used to ferret out the subterranean drives. The psychoanalyst gains the confidence of the patient, then gets him to reveal all he knows concerning his complex. The most intimate experiences must be related. Nothing must be held back. The method of procedure is to follow every clue by means of association in the endeavor to recall a forgotten experience.² As an aid in securing avenues of approach, the patient's dreams are carefully scrutinized. Every symbol is significant. It stands for some suppressed wish object. This introduces the fundamental doctrine of psychoanalysis.

The main hypothesis is the theory of repression and suppression due to a censorship in consciousness. There are numerous natural desires which the individual must repress because they are tabooed by society or even by one's own conscience which reflects, in the main, the social standard of one's group. This process dates back to early infancy. Almost with the first breath, a person must submit to social customs, convention, tradition and, most significantly, inhibitions. Now, these desires may be sublimated (find outlet in some legiti-

² Cf. MacCurdy, *Problems of Dynamic Psychology*, p. 126.

mate way) in which case no very serious injury results. But if they are merely suppressed by the "censor," banished from consciousness, they will become lodged in the subconscious, reappearing only in dreams and daydreams. They may also betray their presence in slips of the tongue, forgetfulness and stammering. Frequently, the banished wish will have sufficient force to start an insurrection in the domain of the subconscious and cause a dissociation. The conscious personality is severely handicapped in being opposed by the subconscious. For example, Stekel describes a neurotic woman who seemingly had every comfort and luxury to make her happy yet failed to take interest in anything. Psychoanalysis revealed a hidden wish of tremendous force which she had not the strength to gratify; hence she attempted to repress it with the result of developing a serious neurosis. Following is Stekel's account of the case: "As she (the neurotic woman who wanted to divorce her husband but didn't dare) could not accomplish this *one step*, which would have given her freedom and happiness, so all other actions became valueless to her. What did she care about getting up and lying down, about theaters and a country house, compared with the one great question, the only question of her life? Her soul was obsessed by one idea only, and this idea was: 'I cannot do it!' And everything she did and left undone reflected this terrible sentence, which contained all her tragedy, and wrecked all her life's happiness: 'I cannot do it!'"³ Further along Stekel makes the assertion that "Every neurotic is a criminal lacking the courage to commit

³ Stekel, *The Beloved Ego*, p. 61.

crime.”⁴ Examples of neuroses and psychoses⁵ are numerous in the literature of the Freudian school. The problem in each instance is some balked desire or fear that motivates conduct despite conscious efforts of the personality. The conscious self may have completely forgotten the incident leading to the complex. He might be shocked at the mere suggestion of his harboring such a desire. The cure consists in bringing the hidden motive to consciousness.⁶ This is done by the “free association” method in following every clue furnished by the symbols in dreams and daydreams, automatic writing, hypnosis and the establishment of *rapport* between the psychoanalyst and the patient.

According to Freud, there are three levels, the conscious, the foreconscious, and the unconscious carefully guarded by two censors, one at the threshold of the foreconscious and the other at the threshold of the conscious. The subconscious is a double-chamber affair being composed of the foreconscious (or “preconscious”) and the unconscious. A certain amount of resistance must be overcome to pass from one to the other and finally reach the conscious. Freud asserts that whatever is in the foreconscious may appear in the conscious with the proper incentive since they are but inactive, dormant or potential states just below the threshold of consciousness. Nevertheless, a certain amount of resistance must be overcome and the censor at the threshold must be satisfied. The lowest level of the subconscious represents the unconscious. Now, to reach

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁵ For a distinction between neurosis and psychosis see Fielding, *The Cave Man Within Us*, p. 182.

⁶ Cf. Freud, *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 378.

the conscious from the unconscious, the psychic states or wishes must pass through the foreconscious and, according to Freud, this never happens except in dreams and the artificial methods of the psychoanalyst. It is this unconscious which represents the "real self," all the past experiences, memories, desires, thoughts, all suppressed and banished from the conscious by the censor.⁷ The conscious may recall the contents of the foreconscious but not that of the unconscious. On account of the suppression and repression a dissociation has taken place which requires psychoanalytic methods to reunite. The claim that this unconscious is the supreme source of motivation will be appraised later.

The psychoanalysts account for the following phenomena by the theory of the subconscious: errors in act and speech, forgetfulness, unconscious type images, humming tunes, paramnesia, intuition, acting contrary to ostensible persuasion, fetishism, narcissism, exhibitionism, libido, the œdipus complex, ungratified wishes (all types of complexes), neuroses and psychoses, dreams, daydreams, sadism, masochism.⁸

While psychoanalysis deals in the main with pathological cases, it nevertheless asserts that such cases are but exaggerations and perversions of the normal desires which have been suppressed, that the suppression

⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 256-257.

⁸ For expositions of these terms with numerous interesting illustrations see the literature on psychoanalysis, especially Freud's *Introduction to Psychoanalysis* and *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*; Fielding, *The Caveman Within Us*; Carrington, *Your Psychic Powers*.

For a critical estimate of psychoanalysis in general and the various shades of differences among the leading psychoanalysts see Bernard, "The Psychoanalyst's Theory of the Conflict-Neurosis," *American Journal of Psychology*, Oct., 1923, pp. 511-530.

of desires serves but to push them into the unconscious where they are likely to make trouble for the conscious, that sublimation is better than suppression and repression. Coriat summarizes the chief characteristics of the unconscious thus:

1. It is the result of repression and this repression occurs because the unconscious mental processes are of a character incompatible with the civilized conscious personality.

2. It is dynamic in nature, for in the unconscious the most active mental processes are active and elaborated. This active striving is of the nature of wishing and these wish impulses form the external manifestations of the unconscious.

3. It is the repository of crude and primal instincts.

4. It is infantile in character and this infantile characteristic persists throughout the whole of life.

5. It is illogical and tends to ignore the ordinary standards of life.

6. Its sexual characteristics (using "sexual" in the broad, psychoanalytic sense) are predominant and, as a rule, these characteristics manifest themselves in a symbolized rather than in a literal form.⁹

THE SUBCONSCIOUS AS SOURCE OF MOTIVATION

It is not necessary to espouse the cause of psychoanalysis nor to sponsor the questionable emphasis upon the sex urge in order to utilize the findings of Freud and others in the important field of the unconscious. Despite serious, and, perhaps in part justifiable, criticism it is generally conceded that evidence of scientific importance has been contributed which cannot be ignored or lightly set aside. Dismissing the psychoanalysts with a vote of thanks for at least their emphasis upon the problem of the subconscious, we may

⁹ Coriat, *Repressed Emotions*, p. 18.

enumerate some of the points in subconscious motivation that are more pertinent to the task in hand.

Besides the subconscious motives in normal and pathological behavior listed by the psychoanalysts, there are a number of other facts that find their best interpretation upon the hypothesis of the subconscious mind. Some of these are: personal identity, permanency in change, memory, revival of lost experiences with conscious causation, otherwise unaccountable ideas and feelings, telepathy, paramnesia, intuition, suggestion, inspiration, inventive insight, unconscious memorizing, solution of problems, indefatigability of subconscious processes, dissociations.

1. *Permanency in change.* The phenomena of continuity of experience, recall, recognition, personal continuity, prove that despite our forgetting, and apparent dissociation incident to sleep, unconsciousness, delirium, etc., the stream of consciousness, though in constant flux, is nevertheless permanent. Personality would be impossible without the ability to recognize our past experiences as belonging to us. Socrates at sixty was a man entirely different from what he was at twenty, and yet he and his friends recognized him as the same Socrates. I now recall the experience of a delightful camping trip which took place four years ago. The swimming, canoeing, hiking, the friends—their faces and remarks—all come back to me as I re-live that summer in my memory. Where has all this been “stored”? Where are at this moment numerous other experiences of which I am not thinking but may do so a moment later?

Another phenomenon fully as wonderful is the way in which facts of past experiences come to the focus

of consciousness and retreat back to the subconscious. No wonder the subconscious has been called the "potentially conscious." There is only partial dissociation in the normal, the whole is a unity. The conscious is potential subconscious as well as vice versa. There is constant shifting.¹⁰ When we act from conscious motives we seem to act consistently with the whole of personality; and since the conscious is a very small part of the whole, this would seem to indicate that the subconscious is dynamic, that it is a true source of motivation. Just how this is true and to what extent will be our immediate problem.

2. *Memory.* "Lost" ideas and feelings are often recalled with apparently no conscious causation. Sometimes you try to recall a name and fail. Repeated attempts are unsuccessful. You let the matter drop. Afterwards while you are engaged in some activity or line of thought, seemingly irrelevant to the lost name, all of a sudden it "pops into your head." More wonderful still is the recall of forgotten and buried experiences which no amount of conscious effort can possibly resurrect, but which are nevertheless brought to consciousness by means other than volitional effort as in dreams, automatic writing, hypnosis, delirium, crystal gazing, and the like. There are likes and dislikes, fears and prejudices, moods of all kinds which have no explanation in terms of the conscious. The "feelings" are almost wholly in this class. We cannot account for them nor analyze them but they are there and they influence our conduct. The source seems to be in the subconscious.

¹⁰ Cf. Moore, *Foundations of Psychology*, pp. 205-206.

3. *Paramnesia*. Paramnesia is an hallucinatory phenomenon of duplicating an experience when all the while you feel fairly certain that it is brand new. It may be meeting a person, visiting a strange country or city, listening to music or engaging in conversation, a thrill—almost any experience which somehow makes you feel that you have had that experience before. It is claimed that the doctrine of transmigration of souls is based on this phenomenon. The theory of the subconscious offers a most ingenious explanation of paramnesia. It states that the subconscious takes in the situation first and relays it to the conscious just previous to the impression's reaching consciousness so that a person gets the sensation of a double presentation of the same objective facts which he misinterprets as coming to him from the memory of a past experience. The subconscious "takes in" many more factors of a given situation and does it more readily. For example, as an observation test, if you take a person into a room full of various different objects and permit him to look around for a few seconds only and get him to tell you what he saw, the chances are he will recall less than a score of objects. Hypnotize him and he will recall two or three times that number. Often the dream, which is a subconscious phenomenon, will enable the person to recall details of experiences that the conscious never "registered" at all. One may pass an acquaintance on the street and apparently not notice the person at all, and the same night see him in a dream wearing a new and unfamiliar suit, which upon investigation proves to be the one worn the day before. Perhaps some of the presentiment dreams, so-called, are based on such psychic phenomena.

4. *Intuition.* In the light of what we have just said on paramnesia, intuition finds a plausible explanation as a subconscious phenomenon. Jung defines intuition as "that psychological function which transmits perceptions *in an unconscious way*. Everything, whether outer or inner objects, can be the object of this perception. Intuition has this peculiar quality: it is neither sensation, nor feeling, nor intellectual conclusion, although it may appear in any of these forms. Through intuition any one content is presented as a complete whole, without our being able to explain or discover in what way this content has been arrived at."¹¹ Intuition is not so irrational after all. Many people trust their intuition more implicitly than they do their conscious judgment and the laborious process of reasoning. It is often claimed that women are especially gifted with intuitional "insight."

5. *Suggestion.* Suggestibility is another psychic phenomenon based on the subconscious. The best illustration is offered by hypnotism. A person under hypnosis is extremely suggestible. He believes everything, sees everything, and will almost do everything that is suggested. This subject is discussed more fully in Chapter XVII, "Motives of Autosuggestion."

6. *Unconscious memorizing, solutions of problems, certain types of inspiration* are further examples. Memorizing is more economical if advantage is taken of subconscious memorizing during sleep. The greater efficiency of "spaced learning" furnishes additional proof that the subconscious is dynamic. In the well-known game of "If I were going camping," in which

¹¹ Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 567.

each person in the room takes his turn at giving the full list of objects already named and adding one of his own, the writer was unable to recall two objects after several "rounds" of the game. But the following morning upon waking from a sound and refreshing sleep he could name every one of the objects. Every one has noticed how a baffling problem set aside in despair will often "solve itself" when taken up again after some interval of time. The uncanny accuracy of the subconscious in recording time is also a matter of common knowledge. Most people are able to dispense with an alarm clock by simply making up their minds to wake at a certain hour.

THE SUBCONSCIOUS VERSUS THE CONSCIOUS

The subconscious is evidently capable of feats that the conscious may not perform at all or not nearly so well. On the other hand, the conscious is more effective in certain types of conduct.

1. *Limitations of the conscious.* (1) Conscious motives must be focused; (2) obviously only a limited amount of material may be focused at any one time and some not at all; (3) focalizing requires effort and the expenditure of energy, resulting in fatigue; (4) requires relatively long periods of rest when it is inoperative; (5) focalization requires selection, rejection, hence it is discontinuous and fragmentary relative to the whole of experience; (6) focalization presupposes succession, hence dependent upon time, while the subconscious is relatively independent of time;¹² (7) the

¹² Cf. the fact that many who have been rescued from drowning report that they saw a panorama of the whole of their past life in

conscious must draw upon the subconscious for its materials; (8) the conscious is a later development; the subconscious is therefore nearer the animal level, is more deeply ingrained, elementary, more fundamental, and, in some respects, more forceful; (9) the function of the conscious seems to be that of guide, control, selecting agent, superimposed so to speak, hence is not "so much creative as selective and inhibitive."¹³

In the life of the individual as well as of the race, the subconscious antedates the conscious; has a longer history. According to the evolutionary hypothesis man has developed from a lower form which we may assume to be represented more truly by the subconscious than by the conscious—the autonomic reactions, reflexes, instinctive activity. Consciousness and volition are a later development. Even modern man cannot escape the influence of the past. "Man bears his age-long history with him; in his very structure is written the history of mankind."¹⁴ The conscious may be roughly regarded as a top layer; the bottom layers of the subconscious are likely, at any time, to break through very much as an earthquake or volcano affects the various strata of the earth's crust. Instinct-emotion motives, the most powerful of all, are more closely linked up with the vegetative system, the anatomic apparatus, in a word, the subconscious, than with the conscious.¹⁵ In like manner the "infantile wishes" which Freud emphasizes, (perhaps overemphasizes) are the reaction

a moment. Cf. also the fact that a dream lasting only a few seconds may require many minutes to relate.

¹³ MacCurdy, *Problems of Dynamic Psychology*, p. 264.

¹⁴ Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

¹⁵ Cf. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, p. 195.

patterns of the individual before the dawn of consciousness and volition—of conscious motives and directed conduct. "The subconscious mind is the mind with which we are born. It is the mind that controls us before we develop a conscious intelligence, a thinking mind at all. It has a record of infantile experiences and conclusions that persist in all of us, though we are unaware of them. All these have a powerful, though unconscious, influence on us in our later years."¹⁶

2. *Advantages of the conscious.* The conscious, on the other hand, though a later development both in the life of the race and the individual, must not be denied its rightful place in motivation. The chief advantages are: (1) "conscious evolution," (2) exercise of volition, (3) ability to choose, (4) responsibility for choices made, (5) morality and moral obligations, (6) the inhibition of or direction of vegetative motives, (7) possibility of life on a higher plane of freedom and self-direction, (8) more independence of externals and control by the forces in the environment, (9) the realization and development of personality which stamps man supreme in the animal world.

COÖPERATION BETWEEN THE CONSCIOUS AND SUBCONSCIOUS

Too much emphasis has been placed upon the antagonism between the conscious and subconscious. While there is relative dissociation between them it is a mistake, except in pathological cases, to assume the dissociation to be absolute. For the most part there is fairly

¹⁶ O'Higgins, *The Secret Springs*, p. 76.

close harmony between the conscious and subconscious, one supplements the other in the interests of efficiency and the survival of the individual. The conscious is not a cancerous growth; it is a normal development and has value. One draws upon the other constantly.¹⁷ While conflicts inevitably arise, yet in the normal person, the two fields overlap with no sharp line of demarcation.

In the light of everyday experiences we must admit that our subconscious plays an important rôle in motivating our conduct. The subconscious is a primary source. The conscious is essentially secondary, directive or inhibitive. The roots of all motives reach down into the subconscious. Prince goes so far as to assert that "The records of our lives are written in unconscious dormant complexes and therein conserved so long as the residua retain their dynamic potentialities. It is the unconscious, rather than the conscious, which is the important factor in personality and intelligence. The unconscious furnishes the formative material out of which our judgments, our beliefs, our ideals, and our characters are shaped."¹⁸

¹⁷ Cf. Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 427-428.

¹⁸ Prince, *The Unconscious*, p. 262; cf. Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, pp. ix-x; Baudouin, *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, p. 153.

CHAPTER XVII

MOTIVES OF AUTOSUGGESTION

COUÉISM

Suggestion and autosuggestion are well known and widely recognized factors in mental life. Coué and his followers make practical use of suggestibility for therapeutic purposes. The chief contribution consists in the simplified, almost naïve application of the laws of suggestion. Mental healing and faith cures are by no means new. There are numerous cults and individuals who have learned to use the laws of suggestibility more or less successfully in acts of healing. It is not our purpose to examine these claims minutely.¹ In general, it seems that a great many genuine cures are effected by autosuggestion, especially where the ailment is due to a functional rather than an organic disorder. Hence, a summary of the main points of Couéism will also give the gist of the underlying principles in practically all of the "faith cures."

A distinction is made by Coué between the will and the imagination. While each is recognized as a source of motivation, the latter is given first place. Will and imagination may work in harmony, but often conflict and always the imagination is more important. This is central in Coué's method. From it he deduces four

¹ For a treatment of this subject from the religious point of view, see Brown, *Faith and Health*.

"laws": "(1) When the will and the imagination are antagonistic, it is always the imagination that wins, *without any exception*, (2) In the conflict between the will and the imagination, the force of the imagination is in *direct ratio to the square of the will*, (3) When the will and the imagination are in agreement, one does not add to the other, but one is multiplied by the other, (4) The imagination can be directed." ² Although the autosuggestion may be consciously made, it is made to the unconscious rather than to the conscious self. Repetition and the avoidance of interference from the will, secures the best results; hence, the simple formula, "Day by day, in every way, I am getting better and better."

The supposition is that we are motivated largely by the subconscious. If the subconscious contains ideas of health, confidence, ability to achieve, our conduct will be effective and the body wholesome: if the subconscious is full of fears and unhealthy desires, the body will suffer ill-health and the life will be ineffectual. Thus one can bring on a headache or some other ailment by suggesting it, by expecting it. One can also court defeat in an enterprise by the same process. As Baudouin puts it, "people fail to recognize that they are largely wrong when they speak of 'the ills that flesh is heir to,' and that they should rather, in many cases, speak of 'the ills that fancy breeds.' " ³ "When we set out to do something with the preconceived idea, or with the fear that we shall be unable to do it, everything will happen as if we were trying not to succeed. Unwittingly to ourselves, our dominant idea will inspire all

² Coué, *Self-Mastery through Conscious Autosuggestion*, p. 14.

³ Baudouin, *Suggestion and Autosuggestion*, p. 8.

the sayings and all the doings that are necessary to counteract our ostensible purpose.”⁴

This principle is illustrated constantly in normal behavior, but more strikingly in certain pathological conditions and in hypnosis. The profound influence of the subconscious was discussed in Chapter XVI. Couéism and psychoanalysis supplement each other at many points, especially on the insistence that subconscious motives are more important than the conscious, and that whatever is impressed on the unconscious is likely to influence conduct. The original experience or suggestion may be forgotten, but its influence lives on despite the best efforts of the will to overcome the phobia or illusion or obsession or whatever it may be. In hypnosis one is extremely suggestible. This is a phenomenon that sheds considerable light on many phases of mental life, chiefly on suggestion and suggestibility and indirectly on the theory of the subconscious.

HYPNOSIS

Hypnosis or the hypnoidal state is a type of sleep⁵ in which consciousness is not altogether lost. There is a kind of dissociation of ideas and appreciation of sensory experience. The hypnotic subject may be in a state of profound sleep regarding certain ideas and sensations, but acutely awake to certain others. He is especially susceptible to the suggestions of the person who put him in that state. He is open to suggestion because his critical faculty is asleep, the suggested idea or act stands alone in his mind in the absence of

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁵ Cf. Satow, *Hypnotism and Suggestion*, p. 107.

any standard to reveal the absurdity that would be apparent in the waking state when the full mind is active. Under hypnosis, the corrective ideas which act as a check in the waking state are lacking, are asleep. There is no competition of ideas. The dreamer is quite credulous, he believes his dream no matter how ridiculous and absurd it might appear when he awakens. At the time the dream seems real enough, the dragons are real creatures, the adventures are vivid and thrillingly perilous, the fortune or misfortune, the joy or fear—whatever transpires—is real. One skips from one event to another with remarkable rapidity. These may be quite inharmonious, incoherent, and impossible, yet the dreamer accepts them as valid because of the dissociation of ideas, the dream ideas stand alone, uncontradicted, hence wholly acceptable. The patient recovering from an anæsthetic has a similar experience. The essential characteristic is the same in all of these phenomena, dissociation. The main difference is the cause and the extent of the dissociation. When the dissociation is more or less permanent and continues in the waking state, we have cases of obsessions or dual or multiple personalities.

Hypnosis, then, is a kind of sleep, producing a state of mind very much like that of the dreamer in normal sleep, extremely credulous and highly suggestible. Hypnosis is induced by various methods, but all of them make use of concentration. Thus only small children, imbeciles, and others who successfully scatter their attention and fail or refuse to concentrate may not be hypnotized. If a person has been hypnotized several times, he may be hypnotized much more readily at each successive attempt. Like other acts it becomes

habitual. After a while he will not be able to resist it. Since concentration is the chief prerequisite, one may hypnotize himself by gazing at a crystal or any bright object or think intently of one thing. This is known as autohypnosis.

The phenomenon of hypnosis sheds considerable light on suggestion and suggestibility, on the so-called subconscious, and also has some therapeutic value.⁶

1. *Hypnosis has therapeutic value.* The psychoanalysts make abundant use of hypnosis as a means of aiding in recall of forgotten causes for the various forms of neuroses that they deal with. "It is almost common knowledge," says Prince, "that when a person is hypnotized—whether lightly or deeply—he may be able to remember once well-known events of his conscious life which he has totally forgotten in the full waking state. It is not so generally known that he may also be able to recall conscious events of which he was never consciously aware, that is to say, experiences which were entirely subconscious. The same is true, of course, of forgotten experiences which originally had entered only the margin of the content of consciousness and of which he was dimly aware."⁷ The theory is that as soon as the hidden cause is revealed the disorder disappears. This is especially true of fear complexes or phobias.⁸ Moreover, whatever therapeutic value there may be in posthypnotic suggestion is utilized. This is a curious phenomenon. The hypnotic patient is told, for example, that, after waking as soon as the doctor has counted three, the subject will take the

⁶ Cf. Fielding, *The Caveman Within Us*, p. 346.

⁷ Prince, *The Unconscious*, p. 31.

⁸ Cf. Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustments*, pp. 92-93.

umbrella from the rack, go to the next room and open it. When asked why he did such a foolish thing, the subject will say, "I knew it was foolish, but I felt I must do it, I did it to get rid of the impulse, to have it over with," or will rationalize an answer. Many similar experiments point to the significance of post-hypnotic suggestion. One experimenter suggested that, upon waking, the subject would not see, hear, or feel the touch of the doctor for he would not be in the room. The doctor stayed in the room, however, and when the patient was restored to the waking state she laughed and talked with other persons present just as any normal person, but absolutely ignored the doctor who had suggested he was absent. He talked to her. She replied, "I do not see you, you are not here," etc. He stuck a pin in her but she did not feel it. She had simply accepted the suggestion that he was not there. The value of this for curing certain functional ailments is obvious. Satow points out how "All post-hypnotic suggestions are much more easily realized if ordered to be carried out at a given time. For example: 'At three o'clock this afternoon you will sit in front of the looking glass in your room and say, plainly, and loudly, without stammering in the very least: 'I need not stammer again,' or 'You will come to me three weeks from to-day, at ten o'clock in the morning. You will forget your crutch-stick—you will leave it at home. When you come into my room it will occur to you that in spite of your lame leg you have been walking without a stick.' " " 9

One of the strongest aids to autosuggestion is hetero-

⁹ Satow, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105.

suggestion, which is suggestion given by another, most effectively during hypnosis.¹⁰ The Nancy School and the psychoanalysts have found hypnosis helpful, but are using it less and less because the cures affected by this method prove to be only temporary and have to be repeated over and over again. Furthermore, Coué insists that autosuggestion is more important than heterosuggestion, indeed, that all suggestion is really autosuggestion in so far as it affects the individual who could not very well practice autosuggestion by himself if dependent upon hypnosis. The rule laid down by Coué and his followers is that best results are obtained when the individual suggests over and over again a simple general formula such as "Day by day in every way I am getting better and better," or a special formula designed for a particular ailment and repeated at a time when the imagination is receptive and not interfered with by will. Hence the best time is the intermediate state between waking and sleeping.¹¹

2. *Hypnotism and the subconscious.* The fact that one under hypnosis may recall forgotten incidents and data not recallable in the waking state would seem to add weight to the theory of the subconscious mind. "Hypnotism resembles a half-opened door on the cryptoid portion of the self."¹²

3. *Hypnotism and suggestibility.* The extreme suggestibility of a person under hypnosis is the most characteristic feature of the phenomenon. "Hypnosis

¹⁰ Cf. Pierce, *Our Unconscious Mind*, p. 120.

¹¹ For further rules concerning the practice of autosuggestion cf. Pierce, *op. cit.*, pp. 112 ff. Also Baudouin, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

¹² Geley, *From the Unconscious to the Conscious*, p. 254. See Chapter XVI.

itself is a suggestion; a suggestion of falling asleep.”¹³ Once the *rapport* (a kind of emotional relationship) is established between the operator and the subject, the latter will accept all sorts of suggestions and act upon them uncritically. “The subject may be made to blush or turn pale on the word of command. The familiar reflexes: coughing, yawning, sneezing, may be produced or repressed as the hypnotist wishes. The thoughts and emotions are under his control. Anger, sorrow, joy, anxiety—all possible affects in short—may be run through, as commanded, in the most rapid alternation. In the deeper phases of hypnotic sleep, the memory may be controlled according to the operator’s will.”¹⁴ Certain suggestions, however, will fail, those which run counter to the fundamental principles of the subject or his deep character habits.¹⁵

All this goes to show that in hypnosis, sleep, and certain types of absent-mindedness the controls are temporarily removed. But in a real emergency the unity of the self is reestablished. The subject wakes, he comes to his customary selfhood, his integrated personality asserts itself. Sidis states it in the form of a law: “Suggestibility varies as the amount of disaggregation, and inversely as the unification of consciousness.”¹⁶

The phenomenon of hypnosis is a valuable sidelight on the general problem of suggestion and suggestibility. No new element, therefore, is added by hypnosis. It represents merely the dissociation of certain

¹³ Satow, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74; cf. Woodworth, *Psychology*, pp. 547ff.

¹⁵ Baudouin, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

¹⁶ Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 90.

inhibitory reactions. Suggestibility, however, is also characteristic of the waking self though not to so great an extent. We are forever accepting statements by others which we have no opportunity or inclination to verify. Hence it is habitual to accept, within certain limits, all that is presented to us. We are extremely suggestible whether hypnotized, asleep, or awake. The main difference is one of degree. Whether awake or under hypnosis some people are more suggestible than others, but all are amenable to suggestion to a greater or lesser degree.

We turn now to a study of suggestion as a motive in its wider application, in the waking state of everyday life.

SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY

Man is the social animal, and hence the suggestible animal *par excellence*. From early childhood we fall into habits of suggestion and suggestibility. Hypnotism, which we have just examined, is but an exaggerated form of this human trait of suggestibility. In normal everyday life, the critical faculties are not always operative. Most of our acts are motivated by suggestions from innumerable sources: what we see, hear, read, observe consciously and unconsciously. Suggestibility is a normal and essential part of man's equipment in a social environment. Suggestion, as we shall point out more specifically, is a potent factor in socializing the individual. It is a necessary accompaniment of the gregarious impulse. We say a person acts from suggestion when he accepts the opinions or beliefs or commands of another more or less uncritically. No new psychic element is added. Suggestion and

imitation consist chiefly in having the idea or image or proposed act brought to the attention—placed at the focus of consciousness. The natural tendency for impulses and ideas in the focus of consciousness to terminate in action does the rest. A man inquires of the waiter, "What kind of pie have you?" "Apple, all kinds," is the reply. "Give me apple." Perhaps the customer prefers apple to "all kinds," but the chances are that he orders apple because that is the kind that is vividly recalled and, in the absence of any disturbing association with apple pie, that is what he orders.

Added to this is the authority of the other person's act if the suggestion leads to imitation. The unconscious implication is that if the other person is doing it, it must be worth while. Salesmen make practical use of this form of suggestion and imitation by skilfully citing to the prospective customer a long list of impressive names of people who have invested in the enterprise. There is still another element involved in suggestion acts, the element of rivalry—not to be outdone by another. The three essentials are these: (1) focusing the idea or image or act in consciousness; (2) enlisting the authority of another person giving the command, making the suggestion or performing the act (tacit suggestion); (3) introducing the urge of rivalry. The instinctive basis for suggestion and imitation is to be found in self-assertion and self-abasement. To throw off suggestion and inhibit imitation is a mark of self-assertion. That is why as a rule children are more suggestible. On the other hand a very stubborn person, though not necessarily superior, is least suggestible, or rather is contra-suggestible. That may be his way of making up for his consciousness of in-

feriority, of feeding his self-assertive impulse. All suggestion is successful in reverse ratio to the opposition it arouses.

Hence psychologists often speak of direct and indirect suggestion.¹⁷ Direct suggestion is more effective with children and those accustomed to "taking orders." Here the authority and prestige of the source is the chief factor. The child accepts the suggestions of his elders uncritically because he recognizes their superiority. The laymen usually accept the suggestions of the expert, the doctor, the lawyer, the minister—any one who has prestige. Then, too, all men are suggestible to the prestige of institutions and traditions of long standing. In all these cases the impulse of self-assertion is not antagonized. The individual submits and often does it gladly because he readily admits his inferiority in these special fields and special respects. Indirect suggestion, however, is more effective among equals because it does not challenge authority or arouse the self-regarding instinct. This type of suggestion is used widely in advertising. "Men must be taught as though you taught them not, and things unknown proposed as things forgot." We naturally resent domination and all encroachments upon our pride and personality. Therefore, if the suggestion comes as though it were our own thought and purpose, we are more likely to follow it, otherwise a contra-suggestion may offset the intruding suggestion. We often forget the source of the idea or suggestion and pridefully assume it to be original with us. Many suggestions, conscious and unconscious, creep into the mind and become associated

¹⁷ Cf. Sidis, *op. cit.*; pp. 23 ff.

with the apperceptive mass. On the theory of the sub-conscious or the "sub-waking self," suggestion may be explained on the supposed fact of an idea or act becoming impressed upon and lodged in the subconscious and later when the "signal" is given, coming to the surface and out into overt act as the conduct of the upper or conscious self. Much of the clever advertising is designed to do this very thing.

By way of summary, it may be well to point out the subjective and objective conditions of suggestion and suggestibility.

1. *Subjective conditions.* (1) Hereditary temperament—racial, family, personal. The race and individual possessing approximately the sanguine temperament are more suggestible than the phlegmatic type. (2) Relative force of the native self-regarding impulses and the cultivated self-regarding sentiments. Persons with strong self-regarding impulses and sentiments are less open to direct suggestion, but may be more susceptible to indirect suggestion because of their greater sensitiveness to social pressure. (3) Age. The young, the immature, the inexperienced, the naïve, are likely to be more open to suggestion because they are more credulous for lack of experience and self-confidence. Self-abasement and submission are more easily aroused and enlisted. (4) Sex. It is claimed that women are more suggestible than men. For the most part this is a mere conjecture. What little scientific evidence we have tends to show that there is very little, if any, difference between the sexes on this or any other mental trait. (5) Physical condition. The state of health has a great deal to do with it. In ill health, lowered vitality, fatigue, under influence of drugs, one

is likely to be more suggestible, to accept uncritically whatever is presented to the mind because one is too tired or weak to resist. It takes energy to assert one's self mentally as well as it does physically. (6) Knowledge. The mind that is equipped with a great fund of general knowledge is more likely to resist suggestion, or at least to offer more resistance in virtue of possessing more confidence and the materials with which to judge fairly the relative worth of the suggestion. This is especially true when knowledge is specific and well organized. (7) Habit. The type of reaction elicited by suggestion depends somewhat upon past experience and habitual modes of response. "Reduced to its lowest terms," says Pillsbury, "suggestion is nothing more than habit on the one hand and association of ideas on the other. Give any man a stimulus that has been connected with a certain movement and he will make that movement at once. Ask him a question and the answer that has been most frequently given will come to his mind and in most cases to his lips. Suggestion is nothing more."¹⁸ (8) Attitude. The idea or purpose in mind, the attitude of expectancy is one of the most potent factors in suggestion. The superstitious person can easily see ghosts and experience other hallucinations if his mind dwells on the subject. The imagination often portrays one's desires, wishes, and fears so vividly that they appear to be objective, are placed outside and regarded as realities: witness the hallucination of a "guilty conscience." Tell a class of students or any audience that you are about to release some gas with a pungent odor, say of sulphur, then let loose a

¹⁸ Pillsbury, *Psychology of Nationalism and Internationalism*, p. 172.

little steam or any odorless gas. The chances are that at least some members of the group will "smell" sulphur. A surgeon reports that in going through the preliminary motions of administering anæsthetics to a highly sensitive patient, the patient lost consciousness just as though the anæsthetic had been applied when, as a matter of fact, the doctor had not administered anything but suggestion. Examples of this type of suggestion and autosuggestion are common in everyday experience. Some are rather humorous. A friend who is a psychologist told the writer that on a certain trip his razor blade became very dull and caused him much trouble in shaving, so he purchased some new blades at the first opportunity. The next day he had a wonderful shave and was reproaching himself for his failure to take extra blades along when he discovered that he had not even broken the seal of the new package of blades. He had actually used the same dull blade of the day before, but all the while "thought" he was using a new blade. (9) Attention. On the one hand, absorbed attention to a speaker or performer has a sort of hypnotic effect, rendering the observer highly suggestible. Actual hypnotism is brought about by concentration as previously indicated. On the other hand, absent-mindedness is also a highly suggestible condition. While looking up a reference a moment ago the writer discovered that he was humming a peculiar tune. Upon investigation it was found that some one in the house on the floor below had been singing that same tune a little while before.¹⁹ (10) Antagonism and rivalry. The suggestion, to be effective, must not

¹⁹ Cf. Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 12.

arouse antagonistic ideas, images, emotions and feelings. Counter-suggestion may be the result, defeating the original. This is one of the limitations of direct suggestion as discussed above. "A person is especially suggestible to ideas that are pleasing to him and which satisfy his egoistic instinctive tendencies; according as those specific tendencies are developed, so does his suggestibility vary towards ideas which evoke them, and we recognize that in the same family these tendencies are developed in each of the children in varying degree."²⁰

2. *Objective conditions of suggestibility.* These are the sources of suggestion, which may be classified thus: (1) Prestige. The authority, power and influence of the source varies from person to person and from time to time in the same person, but is always important in suggestion. The greater the prestige of the source, the more effective the suggestion will be. (2) Repetition. The more frequently the suggestion is offered, other things being equal, the greater will be the effect. This principle is utilized in advertising. We may not be especially impressed with the first few suggestions of an advertisement, but the constant repetition of it in magazines, cars, bill-boards, etc., finally produces a state of suggestibility to that particular commodity that is well-nigh resistless. (3) Positive. Other things being equal, a positive suggestion is more effective than a negative suggestion. The former feeds the imagination, gives it something definite to work upon. (4) Special conditions and unusual circumstances also make a difference.

²⁰ Prideaux, "Suggestion and Suggestibility," *British Journal of Psychology*, 1920, p. 232; cf. Pierce, *Our Unconscious Mind*, p. 94.

IMITATION

Imitation is but another phase of suggestion. Some writers regard imitation as the response to a suggestion. Bogardus says that "suggestion is the initiating part and imitation is the resulting phase. Suggestion is the process whereby an idea or mode of action is presented to the mind and accepted more or less uncritically. Imitation is the process of copying an idea or mode of action and carrying it out more or less immediately in a relatively unchanged form. The entire process constitutes a suggestion-imitation phenomenon."²¹ The older psychologists invariably listed imitation among the instincts, but the tendency at present is otherwise. The reasons given are: "Imitative actions are extremely varied, for every kind of action may be imitated; there is, therefore, nothing specific in the nature of the imitative movements and in the nature of the sense-impression by which the movements are excited or guided. . . . Further, if we consider the principal varieties of imitative action, we find that all are explicable without the assumption of a special instinct of imitation."²² Regarding imitation as "the process of accepting a suggestion," we may distinguish two types, conscious and subconscious, remembering that the line of demarcation is not fast but relative, with considerable overlapping.

1. *Unconscious imitation.* One type of unconscious imitation, according to Jung, is "identification." By this he means a more permanent form of what has here

²¹ Bogardus, *Social Psychology*, p. 117.

²² McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 106-107.

been called empathy ; reading one's self into a situation, making that situation (person or object) one's own, breaking down the barrier between the ego and the alter. In Jung's own words, "Identification is an estrangement of the subject from himself in favour of an object in which the subject is, to a certain extent, disguised. For example, identification with the father particularly signifies an adoption of the ways and manners of the father, as though the son were the same as the father and not a separate individual. Identification is distinguished from imitation by the fact that identification is an unconscious imitation, whereas imitation is a conscious copying."²³ Jung further points out that "Identification has always a purpose, namely, to obtain an advantage, push aside an obstacle, or solve a task after the manner of another individual."²⁴ Now, it often happens that the original "copy" of conscious imitation has been forgotten, or rather become submerged in the subconscious. In such a case we assume the resulting act to follow deliberate choice or spontaneous activity, when as a matter of fact it is an unconscious imitation of some idea or image or system not present in consciousness.

Unconscious or involuntary imitations are numerous in everyday life. We are more susceptible to our environment than we imagine. We "pick up" peculiarities of gesture, manners, accent and even ideals and sentiments quite unconsciously. If two people are together a lot, they are bound to imitate each other and grow more and more alike. It is a matter of common observation that happily wedded couples after

²³ Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 551.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 552. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 553.

some years come to look alike, as well as to resemble each other in mental traits and tastes and opinions. Even the master of the house is often influenced by the personality of his servants, imitating their speech or gestures and other traits unawares. Children are especially liable to this type of unconscious imitation chiefly for lack of formed habit of conduct. It is by imitating their "betters" that they build up their personality, become socialized. In a very true sense, "character is caught, not taught." The most effective method of teaching good morals and good citizenship is by example rather than by precept. The didactic method is likely to arouse opposition and antagonize the pupil's desires, whereas a good example enlists the conscious and unconscious desires of the personality very much like hero worship.

While it is true that there is an innate tendency to imitate,²⁵ only the acts for which we have some capacity are imitated. There are further mechanical limitations to imitation. We may imitate an admired act only in so far as our native endowment, physical equipment, and muscle habits will permit. Imitation is pleasurable because it is an energy-conserving device. It is like drifting with the tide, whereas initiative requires energy, force, and is like rowing up-stream. The game of "follow the leader," in which every member of the group does exactly as the leader, leaping over a fence, touching a tree, passing under a branch, turning at the exact spot, etc., is an indication of the natural bent to imitation as a pleasurable process. Quite unconsciously we imitate trivial acts such as feeling the texture of a

²⁵ Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, p. 88.

piece of cloth when the other person does so. One explanation is that this is purely a reflexive act. Humphrey defines imitation as "*action involving a conditioned reflex the secondary stimulus of which is similar to the reaction.*"²⁶ Woodworth takes exception to this view.

Imitation in children depends, perhaps always, on a perception of the act imitated, with some degree of understanding and with previously acquired power to execute the act. That is to say that the child's imitation, far from conforming to the simple reflex type, involves a certain intellectual activity, while also it does not free the child from the necessity of learning an act new to him by a process of trial and error. But what I wish especially to emphasize is the imitative motive. There exists in the child at a certain early age, and in some degree later as well, a tendency to imitate, a drive, easily aroused, towards performing acts like those perceived in other persons, especially in persons that possess for the child a degree of prestige. The imitating child, or youth or adult, is not a purely passive mechanism, but contains a drive towards imitation that can readily be aroused to activity. The child *likes* to imitate, this liking being part of his general social orientation. The objection to the imitation psychology, as usually taught, is that it makes of imitation a ready-made reflex mechanism, while it fails to recognize the drive towards imitation, or the drive towards social perception and behavior generally.²⁷

2. *Conscious imitation.* Thus we see that, despite the seeming mechanical nature of imitation and the apparent lack of consciousness in most imitative acts, imitation is nevertheless a "high-level product." Con-

²⁶ Humphrey, "Imitation as the Conditioned Reflex," *The Pedagogical Seminary*, March, 1921, p. 5; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 3, 20.

²⁷ Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 186-187.

scious imitation is almost distinctly a human prerogative. Without attempting to hold too rigidly to the classification of conscious and unconscious imitation, we may easily see its importance in motivation. This was clearly perceived by Tarde, the first writer in social psychology. He and others regarded imitation as the one great socializing force. Tarde states that "Society may be defined as a group of beings who are apt to imitate one another, or who, without actual imitation, are alike in their possession of common traits which are ancient copies of the same model."²⁸

Imitation is directly and indirectly conditioned and modified by social pressure. What society regards as valuable and for which it offers the highest prizes are usually the things most desired and therefore imitated by the individual. This phase of the problem is treated more fully in Chapter XIX, "Social Motives."

INTUITION

Intuition is direct, immediate, irrational perception. By intuition one grasps an idea, judges a person, makes a decision, sizes up a situation—in an instant. If there is any weighing and balancing of facts it is done by the subconscious which seems to work like a flash. There is something mystical and almost uncanny about intuition. For this reason many psychologists are rather wary of allowing a place for it in orthodox psychology. And yet intuition is a fact of everyday experience. Quite frequently one will act in accordance with his intuition despite his reason and the advice of friends. Obviously he cannot give a rational account

²⁸ Tarde, *op. cit.*, p. 68. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 11, 22.

of it—since it is quite irrational—the best he can do is to say that he had a “hunch,” a “feeling,” a conviction.

Now, the question arises as to the validity of the truths arrived at by intuition. This is a mooted problem in philosophy, the rationalists denying its validity as a criterion of truth, while the anti-rationalists, the intuitionists of various stripes assert it to be the only criterion of truth. Bergson is one of the outstanding exponents of intuition as a criterion of truth. He has done much to popularize this view. “By intuition,” says Bergson, “is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible.”²⁹ He asserts that the intellectualist’s method of analysis can never give us the thing in itself. The more you know *about* a thing, the more points of view you have, the more definitely you are on the outside of it; that the only way of really knowing a thing is by intuition, the intellectual sympathy which places you inside the object. Intuition as a criterion of truth is not our special concern here.³⁰ We are interested in intuition chiefly for the part it plays in motivating conduct and that is quite considerable.

Some people live almost wholly by their intuition. It is said that women use intuition more frequently and more effectively than men and that even among women there is a wide difference from person to person. Genetically regarded intuition antedates intellection.³¹ The supposition is that before men developed a rational

²⁹ Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 7.

³⁰ Cf. Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 48-49.

³¹ Cf. Baudouin, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

mind they had a way of sizing up situations in a hurry. It is still useful in an emergency or when the slower method of reasoning and mediate inference fail to arrive at a conclusion. In intuition there is a rapid summing up of many complex factors in a trice, irrationally and quite unconsciously for the most part and always directly, without any mediatory steps, that is, not perceived introspectively in consciousness.

An intuition has the motive force of autosuggestion: it is an autosuggestion. Intuition, by being opposed to rationalism and rationalistic analysis, obviously defies analysis. Just what part it plays in motivation, as an independent force or in collaboration with instinctive drives and other motives, is not easy to determine. Its significance for motivation can be stated only in very general terms. It shares something of the difficulties in interpreting instinctive drives³² with the additional difficulty of being more comprehensive. While instinct is an impulse or a series of impulsive discharges, intuition is a quick summary of many complex factors, impulses, sensations, feelings, etc., blended into a unity of impression as an immediate perception.³³

INSIGHT

Insight usually connotes a higher development of intuition. Intuition is native, it is given: insight is mostly acquired and based on past experience, breadth of knowledge (sometimes called "vision"). Insight is intelligence plus understanding and wisdom, all of

³² Cf. Jung, "Instinct and the Unconscious," *British Journal of Psychology*, Nov., 1919, p. 18.

³³ For a discussion of types of intuition see Dearborn, "Intuition," *Psychological Review*, Nov., 1916, pp. 465-483.

which means that the performer is making effective use of native endowment. It means seeing proper relationships and seeing them at a glance. In so far as the logic of the situation has force and meaning, insight becomes relatively a predictable in motivation. It approximates universality and necessity. In a given circumstance, any person of intelligence and insight will act in accordance with the logic of the situation. Many situations are too complex for exact analysis—they are usually solved by intuition and insight.

INSPIRATION

Inspiration has a mystical and religious connotation, but is applicable in other fields also as a motive force. It may designate any quick unpremeditated act from a crude instinctive impulse to an insight into scientific or religious truth.³⁴ The source of motivation in inspiration is supposed to come from the outside, objective to the "inspired" person. The apostles of the subconscious, however, insist that what most people call inspiration is nothing more or less than the outcropping of the subconscious, the unconscious becoming conscious.³⁵ Viewed in this light, inspiration is another form of autosuggestion, "spontaneous autosuggestion." If one thinks intently on any problem, he will not be long in arriving at a conclusion. It seems to be a faculty of the mind not to tolerate a question for long. The solution or answer may come in diverse ways: it may be reasoned out or verified by comparisons or grasped by intuition or imagined "out of broadcloth,"

³⁴ Cf. Geley, *From the Unconscious to the Conscious*, p. 86.

³⁵ Cf. Satow, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91; Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 47-48.

as the saying goes. Or it may come in the form of a dream, which shows that the subconscious mind is wrestling with the problem. Now, when the solution comes suddenly in the waking state, traditional usage regards it as an inspiration.

There are also various types and objective sources of inspiration as well as numerous methods. This is significant for motivation. One might be inspired by martial music, a poem, a landscape, a portrait, a friend, by contemplating æsthetic, moral or religious truths—in fine, one may be inspired by anything that is capable of arousing in the individual a keener appreciation of values or of furnishing him with an insight into truth or of impressing upon him the performance of a duty. In so far as the source is objective, the motive of inspiration is secondary, but the inspired person may be rightly said to be primarily motivated relative to the specific task imposed by the inspiration. Thus Hamlet is motivated to avenge the murder of his father, St. Paul, to become a missionary to the Gentiles, Joan of Arc to lead an army in war, etc. No matter what the original source of the inspiration, once it fires the imagination of the inspired person it becomes a primary motive having the force of a dominating or master motive already discussed.³⁶

“SOUR GRAPES”

Every one knows the fable of the sour grapes. There is a great deal of practical psychology in that fable. It is a type of autosuggestion that is constantly practiced by all of us. Every one is bound to have dis-

³⁶ See pp. 267 ff.

appointments. What a relief to be able to suggest to one's self: "Well, I didn't want that anyway. What a fool I was to desire it," "It would have done me more harm than good," etc. It is surprising how quickly one comes to really believe that the "grapes" are actually sour. It is positively the best shock-absorber for disappointments and disillusionments. Even the most violent cases, such as disappointment in love, will succumb if the sour grape ideas are persistently suggested for some time. Sour grapes autosuggestion takes a number of forms: (1) belittling the object of desire; (2) concentrating the attention on the unfavorable qualities; (3) exaggerating these undesirable qualities, the natural outcome of focusing the attention on them just as the fond lover exaggerates the merits of his lady love by concentrating on the qualities that appeal to him; (4) making light of the situation by laughing and joking, feigning indifference—witness the grim jokes incident to the World War and the man who seeks to drown his sorrow in drunkenness; (5) suggesting to one's self that it is the common lot (when that is applicable); (6) figuring out that a great deal still remains that is worth while; (7) suggesting that others are in a worse plight; (8) convincing one's self that better opportunities are forthcoming; (9) making a martyr of one's self and enjoying the compensating luxury of self-pity; (10) blaming it all on fate or bad luck, anything or any one but the self; (11) withdrawing from the contest as "too proud to fight." This is equivalent to renouncing the desire itself.

The sour-grapes psychology is so fundamental as to be the chief motive in certain types of religion and even of systems of philosophy: witness **Buddhism and**

Stoicism. Men have discovered that the one who desires most is the one to suffer the greatest; hence the doctrine of renunciation and the suppression of all desire. "Desire nothing and you will never be disappointed." If *Nirvana* has any meaning at all, it seems to designate a state of mind that has rid itself of every wish and desire and strife and strain, having arrived at a state of perfect tranquillity absolutely motiveless. While the state of *Nirvana* is as motiveless as the deep sea is quiescent, the desire to arrive at that "blessedness" is itself a master motive for the high-cast Brahman.

The real urge constituting the sour grapes motive is the self-regarding impulses and sentiments. The sour grapes psychology is merely a method of covering up "wounded pride" and the loss of self-esteem. It is a great defensive mechanism calculated to "save one's face," one's self-respect. If a man is compelled to acknowledge inferiority, defeat, failure, he reserves the right to regard that as incidental, as constituting but one battle in the campaign of life. Self-respect can not very well survive a sense of complete and total failure. Suicide, indifference, or a pathological mental complex are the usual outcome of such a state of affairs. Despite numerous defeats, failures and disappointments, life is made tolerable by some form or other of the sour grapes psychology. A system of compensation is subjectively instituted as part of the defense mechanism. The college graduate serving as a buck private under an illiterate brutal sergeant will stand up under the abuses and insults of his "superior" by constantly reminding himself or tacitly assuming his superiority in every other respect. On the other hand,

the assumption that superiority in rank is a sign of general superiority by the officer in question is what galls the subordinate more than anything else.

Thus autosuggestion as a motive force has great therapeutic value for body, mind, and pride. It is extremely subtle, complex, and elusive; but constantly operative, whether the individual be awake or dreaming, conscious or unconscious.

CHAPTER XVIII

MOTIVES OF GROUP SUGGESTION

In the preceding chapter we discussed at some length the significance of autosuggestion in motivating conduct. The viewpoint was that of the individual. In this chapter we approach the motive of suggestion from the viewpoint of the group. This is an arbitrary classification for the sake of convenience. In reality the two types of suggestion overlap considerably. The motives of group suggestion to be taken up now are mob psychology, sympathy, telepathy, and leadership.

MOB PSYCHOLOGY

Suggestibility is characteristic of all crowds, especially of mobs. The mob is a temporary crowd that is unorganized or very loosely organized and which is held together by a common purpose or project. While each individual member is highly suggestive he is not passive. The chief characteristics of the mob are: (1) lessened individuality on the part of each member; (2) a sense of power; (3) swayed by feelings and sentiments; (4) panicky in face of danger; (5) lowered sense of responsibility; (6) lower standards; (7) extremely suggestible always.

1. *Loss of individuality and personal identity.* "In the dense throng individuality wilts and droops." One of the causes is purely physical. One's freedom of

action is greatly lessened in a crowded hall or any type of mass gatherings where one is brought to very close physical proximity to his fellows. With this goes a sense of personal impotency. Sheer numbers also play a subtle part in subconsciously influencing the individual to realize how puny he is as compared with the vast crowd. And yet the impression is not unpleasant. On the contrary there is a certain satisfaction in being one of the crowd. The lure of the city, the popular performance, the resorts teeming with multitudes, the crowded streets, is apparent to all. Great throngs of people are always interesting, even heterogeneous crowds. The lure of numbers is much greater in crowds that are more or less homogeneous, alike at least in a common purpose—it may be anything from sheer curiosity to a common ideal. As the crowd grows in numbers the size of the individual shrinks proportionately until he loses personal identity almost completely. His will becomes the will of the mob. What is more, the individual will not tolerate opposition to the mob will on the part of others. A keen sense of satisfaction is the reward for being in perfect harmony with the group. In a sense the self is not lost, but gained; not diminished but enhanced, for the crowd is so much more powerful than the individual.

2. *Sense of power.* Thus identifying one's self with the vast crowd gives one a sense of power. He feels stronger, braver, more significant. What he would not think of doing alone he can now do most effectively with his expanded self which includes the whole group. He has appropriated the collective strength of the mob.

3. *Lowered sense of responsibility.* With the acquisition of a sense of power and the submergence of per-

332 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

sonality the sense of personal responsibility is greatly dimmed if not wholly lost. What is every one's responsibility is no one's responsibility. Moreover, as LeBon points out, it is so much easier on the conscience to do what you want to do when every one around you is doing the same thing and no one is left to point the accusing finger, or to bring you to account. "Every body is doing it" is one of the commonest of excuses, and in mob conduct there is no need of even making the excuse; it is tacitly and unconsciously assumed.¹ The anonymity of the mob offers the individual his chance to indulge his suppressed desires with impunity. Not only is the individual freed from responsibility to others, but he is also freed from the "voice of conscience." His better nature has gone to sleep with its bedfellows, social taboos and restraints. The primitive self, the naïve self, innate nature is stripped of its cultivated annoyers and cavorts unabashed in its Adamic simplicity. The more extreme the excursion from the beaten path of responsibility, the more severe and relentless the remorse that will follow when the mob breaks up and the individual is a self again.

4. *Lower standards prevail.* The mob is usually swayed by lower moral standards than the individual members because it is easier to level down than to level up. Moreover, it is the higher sentiments, the acquired suppressions, the inhibitions that are more distinctly individualistic; it is original nature that is common to all. Hence when the leveling comes and personal differences are given up to a common enterprise, that which is an acquisition as compared with native endow-

¹ Cf. Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, p. 336.

ment, and therefore less stable, is discarded. Impulsive conduct is characteristic of the crowd because men can unite on that level more speedily and effectively than on any other. The mob is characterized by "impulsiveness, credulity, and exaggeration" because these are primitive traits, naïve traits to which the mob reverts in surrendering the social culture traits acquired under the tutorship of civilization.

Like all highly bred traits civilization may easily revert to primitive levels in the mob. "Conduct of the highest type," says Ellwood, "is only possible when reflection is possible, and when, at the same time, the individual is conscious in the fullest degree of the social value of the standards which civilized society has seen fit to set up."² Mob conduct is certainly not reflective. Martin's "thesis is that the crowd-mind is a phenomenon which should best be classed with dreams, delusions, and the various forms of automatic behavior. . . . The crowd-self, if I may speak of it in this way, is analogous in many respects to 'complex neurosis,' 'somnambulism,' or 'paranoiac episode.' Crowd ideas are 'fixations'; they are always symbolic; they are always related to something repressed in the unconscious. They are what Doctor Adler would call 'fictitious guiding lines.'"³ This makes the crowd out to be lower than the savage, more like a pathological individual. LeBon does not go quite so far. He says, ". . . by the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated indi-

² Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 203.

³ Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, pp. 19-20.

vidual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct.”⁴

LeBon recognizes the fact that a crowd is also capable of “lofty acts of devotion” as well as base conduct.⁵ It would seem that the crowd is capable of rising higher and falling lower than the individual because it is more easily swayed by emotions and sentiments.⁶

On the whole, the mob is more likely to follow the lines of primitive conduct rather than of rational principles or of culture and civilization.⁷

5. *A mob is liable to become panicky and to stampede.* “Panic is a mob phenomenon that is caused by sudden and overwhelming fear.” The panic is the effect. While both are mob phenomena in reality they cause the dissolution of the mob. There is no concerted action but rather the opposite. They may all be motivated by like emotions of fear and terror, but in its effect upon conduct it is every man for himself. Under such a great strain all the rational, cultured, socialized traits are swept away. Conduct is on the

⁴ LeBon, *The Crowd*, p. 36.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 64. Cf. Conway, *The Crowd in Peace and War*, p. 311.

⁶ Cf. Buckham, *Personality and the Christian Ideal*, p. 53: “Pushing through the crowd at a vaudeville or a bargain counter, how one despises his fellow men as well as himself! How cheap humanity seems! But as he emerges in the company of his fellow immortals, under the spell of a noble emotion, from some great patriotic or religious or musical assembly, where all hearts have been stirred by a holy enthusiasm, the soul glows with the sense of human dignity and human achievement and fellowship.”

⁷ Cf. McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 64. For a criticism of the views on mob psychology held by McDougall, LeBon, Martin, Trotter, and others, see Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*; cf. also Ward, “The Crowd and the Herd,” *Mind*, 1924, pp. 275-288.

lowest possible level of impulse and emotion with almost no trace of rationality. The weak and helpless are trampled under foot. The panicky person who is one of a stampeding crowd is not in a position to benefit by his intelligence. He will do many foolish things as well as commit brutal and inhuman acts. He is so highly suggestible that he will see and believe anything. The high state of emotional contagion is carried over to other phases of mental life. This accounts for the remarkable collective illusions and hallucinations that occur under great emotional stress: witness the reports of hallucinations during the World War in which great companies of men testify they saw the figure of a noted saint or of Christ, or of some other "savior." Panic and stampede are not confined to collective groups within the confines of a building or any specific place where the members may see and hear each other. A whole nation may become panicky and stampeded into doing and believing all sorts of absurdities. This happens in times of national crises, financial depression, epidemic of disease or of fads and crazes.⁸ "Belligerent's psychosis" is the term applied to war-madness. Many nations may be affected by it at one time.

The most characteristic thing, then, about the mob is its extreme tendency to suggestibility based on the gregarious impulse and the high contagion of emotions. The actual working out of this tendency is determined by the type of leadership, propaganda, social pressure, and current events—accidental happenings.

⁸ Cf. Patrick, "The Psychology of Crazes," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LVII, pp. 285-294.

SYMPATHY

Sympathy is an important motive. It is especially significant for sociology. The various social groups and individual social contacts may be classified and determined by the type of sympathy that exists in each given case.⁹ As a psychological concept sympathy is used rather loosely. Perhaps some of the ambiguity can be removed by regarding it from various angles or points of view, calling each a type or a level of sympathy, namely: (1) physiological sympathy as a type of suggestion and imitation on the instinctive and reflexive level; (2) biological (organic) sympathy; (3) psychological (emotional) sympathy; (4) rational sympathy; (5) sympathy as a social motive.

1. *Physiological sympathy.* This is the lowest level of sympathy. It is almost wholly mechanical. The act of another is sympathetically reproduced by reflexive responses or series of reflexes. Ribot points out that "In man infectious laughter or yawning, walking in step, imitating the movements of a rope-walker, while watching him, feeling a shock in one's legs when one sees a man falling, and a hundred other occurrences of this kind are cases of physiological sympathy."¹⁰ Although this type of sympathy is fundamental, there is no adequate ground for assuming that it is characteristic of all sympathy to reproduce in the sympathizer the exact emotions and sensations of the object of sympathy. Hobhouse argues to the point when he says that "If I sympathize with the hungry, I do not feel hungry myself, but try to provide them with a

⁹ Cf. Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, pp. 122-123.

¹⁰ Quoted by Edman, *Human Traits*, p. 91.

meal. The actual irradiation of feeling, in such wise that the feeling of another becomes mine, is a rarer, a more emotional, and sometimes it would seem a quasi-physical incarnation of the same fundamental impulse which (like other effects of the order) sometimes works perversely. There are those who meet personal troubles by resolutely ignoring them, and (with more ease) treat the troubles of their friends in the same way."¹¹ Similarly, Graham Wallas points out that "The sight of a mutilated dead, and therefore painless, body may produce results indistinguishable from those arising from the sight of a mutilated living body."¹² Woodworth contends that:

It is open to considerable doubt whether ready-made mechanisms exist in our native equipment which are directly aroused by the sight of emotion so as to produce the same emotion in the beholder. But what is certainly true, here as in the analogous cases of imitation and suggestion, is that we have a *liking* to have others feel as we do and to feel as others do. This is distinctly "more sociable" than for one of two companions to be merry while the other is sad, or for one to be vexed at something which leaves the other unmoved. Companionship is more companionable, more successful, when emotions are "shared." The desire for companionship involves a desire for sympathy and a desire to be sympathetic. In other words, the individual in whom an emotion is induced is not a mere passive mechanism, but contains within himself a drive towards sympathetic emotion; and it is often by way of this drive, than by a direct and mechanical induction, that the emotional state comes to be shared by a group of companions.¹³

¹¹ Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 153.

¹² Wallas, *The Great Society*, p. 125.

¹³ Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 189.

How, then, shall we designate this reflexive type of sympathy? Perhaps we can do justice to the situation by regarding it as a suggestion-imitation which, after all, is characteristic of all sympathy to a greater or lesser degree. "Society may therefore be defined," according to Tarde, "as a group of beings who are apt to imitate one another, or who, without actual imitation, are alike in their possession of common traits which are ancient copies of the same model."¹⁴ If this is true we may designate the gregarious impulse as the native drive which carries the spark from person to person. The herd instinct is itself defined by McDougall as being suggestion on the cognitive side, sympathy on the affective side, and imitation on the conative side.¹⁵

2. *Biological sympathy.* What Giddings¹⁶ calls the consciousness of kind is based on organic or biological sympathy. Beginning with those of blood ties this type of sympathy gradually comes to embrace all those that are kith and kin. But consciousness of kind implies consciousness of difference. Both together form the social motives of groups. Where this biological sympathy does exist it is a strong drive not only in motivating conduct within the charmed circle, but also in the antagonisms toward other groups. This gives rise to all sorts of racial conflicts and misunderstanding which were discussed more fully under prejudice as a motive. Consciousness of kind sets up a barrier against the more inclusive and universal types of sympathy. It is responsible for the lack of harmony and is the cause

¹⁴ Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, p. 68.

¹⁵ Quoted by MacCurdy, *Problems of Dynamic Psychology*, p. 234.

¹⁶ Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, p. 17: "The original and elementary fact in society is the consciousness of kind."

of open hostility between the races and between groups of radically different opinions, social status, and wealth.

Biological sympathy is based on the parental instinct. Henry Drummond long ago argued that the law of self-sacrifice due to the parental instinct is just as fundamental as the law of self-preservation and that the trend in evolution is toward suppressing the latter and encouraging the former.¹⁷ This is doubtless true. The so-called higher and more inclusive types of sympathy are based on the physiological and biological. They represent a further development in evolution. "Sympathy," says Ellwood, "is primarily organic and instinctive, only in its later and higher development does it become reflective sympathy."¹⁸

The physiological and biological types are not really distinct but are classified here under these heads to bring out the several aspects. They overlap, but are of great importance as the bases for the higher types of sympathy.

3. *Psychological sympathy.* The third level or stage of sympathy is psychological. It might also be called emotional sympathy. In this group might be included acquired sympathy, sentiments as well as the native emotions of sympathy. Again, suggestion and imitation play a part. "The jest that in a small company raises a ripple of a smile, in a crowd creates a gale of merriment. The pathetic tale that momentarily depresses when read alone, in the larger thrill of the public theatre compels the free flow of tears."¹⁹ Love is a

¹⁷ Drummond, *Ascent of Man*; cf. Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁸ Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 248.

¹⁹ Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

term that stands for numerous emotions and sentiments which are decidedly of the psychological or emotional type of sympathy. Sympathy in this connection is not merely mutual understanding in the cold abstract sense, but a relatively enthusiastic interest and desire to share the emotional life of the other or others. There is no stronger motive than love because it takes the primary psychophysical urges and intensifies them by the glow of emotion. Chapter XX is devoted to a fuller discussion of love as a motive. Here the object is merely to call attention to an emotional type of sympathy that stresses the affective side of the other types.

4. *Rational sympathy.* This is a cultivated intellectual type of sympathy that is highly conscious and deliberate. It is more or less independent of the other types. It seeks to understand the other man's position in a logical way without becoming excited. This requires imagination and fair-mindedness. Justice is based on this type of sympathy. It consists in recognizing fundamental human rights and privileges, of being motivated by essentials rather than accidental differences that may or may not be pleasant. Intellectual sympathy is needed to carry on the work of the world, to live in peace and harmony and mutual understanding and respect. The lack of it results in heresy hunting, race riots, all types of domestic social friction and even war. Fortunately intellectual sympathy does not demand a sentimental attitude in problems of race and religion or any other of the perplexing difficulties of social life. It demands patience and some degree of culture and intellection to overcome the innate and acquired prejudices and antagonisms. It is not easy but it is immensely worth while if society is ever to rid

itself of intolerance,²⁰ race prejudice and war. Most of the social conflicts result from misunderstanding or failure to understand the other person's point of view. Nearly all of it could be avoided by practicing intellectual sympathy, and using intellectual sympathy to direct, modify, and control the other types of sympathy. This will come to pass as quickly as men become truly socialized by identifying larger and larger units, interests, and peoples with their expanded social self. The hope for this day of promise is to be found in the social motive and the trend of social evolution.

5. *Sympathy as a social motive.* Driven by the gregarious impulse man finds pleasure and satisfaction in being with his fellows, in coöperating with them, in the give and take of social life. Woodworth rightly insists in calling this a social motive requiring no other drive than the social drive itself.²¹ Now, this give and take of social intercourse requires sympathy and in turn increases sympathy and mutual understanding. As society becomes more highly complex, and individuals and groups more and more interdependent, sympathy becomes more difficult but also more essential. In socializing the individual he is made to modify his original nature quite radically. He learns to control his appetites, to respect the feelings and rights of others and even to sacrifice his life for the good of the community. The self-interest of the socialized animal comes to be at least an enlightened self-interest. He delights in the pleasure of another rather than in the pain of the other. This sympathy and the social motive

²⁰ Cf. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 154.

²¹ Woodworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 202ff.

acting and reacting upon each other will continue to produce higher and higher levels of human achievement through mutual understanding and coöperative effort.

Thus sympathy at every level is necessary for social life and in bringing about a better social order. But no matter on what level sympathy is regarded it is essentially a type of suggestion based on the gregarious impulse, the desire to be with the herd and to share its life.

TELEPATHY

Telepathy fascinates and baffles. Just what takes place when messages are communicated from person to person by means unknown to science? The lack of scientific explanation is not sufficient ground for rejecting the fact that some messages are communicated. There is too much cumulative evidence of such "telepathic" communications to dismiss the subject summarily as a fraud.²² It is better to suspend judgment and investigate the facts. Recent inventions, such as wireless, radio, and the transmission of photographs by radio lends some credence to the belief that possibly there is an adequate medium for the direct transfer of thoughts and ideas from person to person miles apart. The Society of Psychical Research is accumulating a vast amount of testimony concerning telepathic communication of all types.²³

Nearly every one has had, some time or other, the uncanny experience of thinking about a person long forgotten and then immediately receiving a letter from

²² Cf. Jastrow, *Fact and Fable in Psychology*, pp. 78ff.

²³ For a description of types see Carrington, *Your Psychic Powers*, p. 110.

that person, or waking in the night with the conviction that some friend or relative has met with fortune or misfortune, or being suddenly seized with a "premonition" that something unusual is pending to one's self or friends, etc. Some are more susceptible to this sort of thing than others.

Telepathy in the broader sense includes all of these mysterious pseudo-sciences and the speculative theories of spiritualism, clairvoyance, mediumistic trance, mind reading, etc. There is doubtless something back of all these phenomena but at the present time there is no real scientific principle of explanation. Some claim that the messages are communicated by means of the subconscious, but can offer no conclusive evidence for the hypothesis.

Since telepathy is not an accepted factor of mental life it would be unwise to speak of it as a motive except in so far as it is believed in and practiced by those who do, or as motivating scientific research on the part of others. It is listed here as a possible source of motivation yet to be established.

LEADERSHIP

The herd instinct necessarily involves leadership, for every herd has a leader. Leadership is a rare gift. It is sometimes said that leaders are born; not made. But whether leadership is innate or acquired it is rare, for, manifestly, the followers greatly outnumber the leaders. Most people find satisfaction in following a leader and submitting to his will; while a small minority, gifted with more of the self-assertive tendencies, are eager to take the initiative and find satisfaction in setting the

pace for the group. Just what is this almost mystic trait that often goes under the name of "personality," "personal charm or magnetism"? The characteristic traits of the leader are variously analyzed, approximating some such enumerations of qualities as physical size and prowess above the average, commanding personality, self-confidence, courage, poise, inscrutability, intelligence, sympathy, imagination, understanding, strong will, superabundance of vitality, etc.²⁴ Doubtless some of these and other traits are found in most leaders. Yet any one or a number of these traits will be found completely lacking in some famous leaders of history. It is difficult to say just what trait, if any, is essential to a leader, or exactly what leadership really is. For the present discussion it is not necessary to give an exact definition of leadership nor to speak of the various types of leadership, but to point out that whatever leadership is, it plays an important rôle as a factor of group suggestion in motivation.

Prestige, no matter how acquired, seems to be the primary requisite in leadership from the viewpoint of suggestibility at least. And the greater the prestige the more effective will be the leadership. The herd will follow the strong leader. The leader may commit any folly and maintain his position so long as he is strong. Weakness and vacillation are the unpardonable sins of a leader. The leader represents the group. His power and prestige is the power and prestige of each member of the group. They have come to identify themselves

²⁴ Cf. Nutting, "Some Characteristics of Leadership," *School and Society*, Sept., 1923, pp. 387-390; Myerson, *Foundations of Behavior*, Chap. XIII. "The leader, in no matter what field he operates, excels in some quality," *ibid.*, p. 175.

with their leader. They shine by reflected glory. Loyalty to a fallen leader fades rapidly. The herd will not tolerate a defeated leader. But so long as a leader remains in power he may exert an influence that is almost miraculous. The example given by LeBon will serve to illustrate this well-known fact. He says concerning Napoleon: "His prestige increased in proportion as his glory grew, and came to be at last equal to that of a divinity in the eyes of those devoted to him. General Vandamme, a rough, typical soldier of the Revolution, even more brutal and energetic than Augereau, said of him to Marshall d'Arnano in 1815, as on one occasion they mounted together the stairs of the Tuileries: 'That devil of a man exercises a fascination on me that I cannot explain even to myself, and in such a degree that, though I fear neither God nor devil, when I am in his presence I am ready to tremble like a child, and he could make me go through the eye of a needle, to throw myself into the fire.'"²⁵

The power of the leader is found in "the atavistic herd-instinct of the human race, and by mass suggestion." Thus "can we interpret the commanding influence which certain historical personages—such as Cæsar, Mohammed, Peter the Great, Napoleon I, Gladstone, Boulanger, Bismarck—to name only a few—have exploited."²⁶

²⁵ LeBon, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

²⁶ Satow, *Hypnotism and Suggestion*, pp. 200-201.

CHAPTER XIX

SOCIAL MOTIVES

Social motives are acquired motives. They are manifestly based on original nature and the instinctive drives but attain force and power of their own. They also serve to modify the innate and more pronouncedly personal motives. The social motives considered in this chapter are social pressure, folkways, ritualism, fads, fashions, mores, conventions, customs, authority-dolicity (prestige), institutions, law, veracity, justice, liberty.

SOCIAL PRESSURE

Social pressure is one of the most powerful of all motives. Every law-abiding citizen and socially-minded person is swayed mightily by this drive. It is constantly operative. By social pressure is meant every force exerted by society to make the individual "toe the mark." This influence may be conscious or unconscious. It is enforced by a system of rewards and punishments which may be physical, moral, or spiritual. By virtue of the fact that we are gregarious animals we crave the good will of our fellows, we want to stand high in their estimation; not simply to be with them but to be one of them, to share in a common enterprise, to do our part well and win the praise and esteem of the group. "The social motive," says Woodworth, "is the tendency to engage in group activity

which is interesting and satisfying to beings of a social nature.”¹ This desire is innate in so far as it is identical with the herd instinct. Very early in the life of the infant the desire to win the affection and esteem of its parents and others manifests itself.² This gives those entrusted with the care and education of the young a remarkable controlling force which they utilize to advantage in training them for life in society. The socialized adult has lost nothing of this innate desire for affection and esteem from others. Rather, he has had that desire strengthened and broadened and refined through experience. He is susceptible in a great many more ways than the child who is not expected to understand and live up to the multifold social taboos and customs that the adult must adhere to if he is to maintain his reputation and standing in the community. As the parent directs the conduct of the child by giving or withholding affection, rewards and punishments, so society regulates the conduct of its members by giving or withholding the goods and rewards of social value.³ Thus whatever has the stamp of social approval, is rated high by the majority of the group, will be diligently sought after regardless of its intrinsic worth.

¹ Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 197.

² Cf. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 166: “. . . as early as the fourth month a ‘hurt’ way of crying which seemed to indicate a sense of personal slight. It was quite different from the cry of pain or that of anger, but seemed about the same as the cry of fright. The slightest tone of reproof would produce it. On the other hand, if people took notice and laughed and encouraged she was hilarious.”

³ Cf. Ross, *Social Control*; Lumley, *Means of Social Control*; Bernard, “Transition to the Objective Standard of Social Control,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI, pp. 171-212, 309-341, 519-537.

The thing may be sheer folly or even worse: it might be decidedly dangerous to the health and life of the individual.⁴ Take the extreme case of martyrdom as an example. At first thought this would seem to be an exception to motivation by social pressure, for the martyr is one who is being put to death because he opposes the will of the majority. And yet, as Lofthouse points out, "Students of church history know how the martyrs actually welcomed the flames to which they were condemned, as the Hindu woman welcomed the funeral pyre which made her 'sati'—a good woman—in the eyes of the world."⁵ It will be recalled that in the catacombs of Rome special attention and unusual honors were given to the graves of the martyrs. This had its influence upon the living. It made them want to be held in as high esteem by the group. Many welcomed martyrdom and courted it with open arms. On the other hand there is a type of reformer and martyr who may seem wholly indifferent to the opinion of his contemporaries, but it may be that he is motivated by the thought of approval from "the great cloud of witnesses" of martyrs of the past and of the generations yet unborn who shall rise up and call him blessed.⁶

It is decidedly an abnormality for any one to be wholly indifferent to his fellows. Such a monstrosity

⁴ Cf. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, p. 114.

⁵ Lofthouse, *Ethics and the Family*, p. 152.

⁶ Lofthouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-155: "It is extremely doubtful whether an act which was universally condemned would ever be performed, by a sane person, except in the heat of passion or some other bewilderment of the brain which amounts to temporary insanity. The swindler and the prostitute may be defying other people's public opinion but they know that in their own society their conduct is regarded as normal and that success in their plans will be hailed as praiseworthy."

could scarcely exist in any community of human beings. On the contrary, "No more fiendish punishment," says James, "could be devised, were such a thing physically possible than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all members thereof. If no one turned round when we entered, answered when we spoke, or minded what we did, but if every person we met 'cut us dead,' and acted as if we were non-existent things, a kind of rage and impotent despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruelest bodily tortures would be a relief; for these would make us feel that, however bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention at all."⁷

The individual is not only inherently a gregarious creature whose happiness and well-being depend in large measure upon his contacts with fellow human beings, but he is what he is through these contacts. Personality is decidedly a social product. The force of social pressure and its manner of affecting a particular individual depends upon the type of personality integration. Not all forms of social pressure are equally strong to all men. The values and ideals of each person will make a difference.

Social pressure derives its force ultimately from the self-regarding impulses and sentiments as well as the herd instincts and social habits.⁸

No matter at what angle we view social pressure it is significant for motivation. There are many complex factors which determine the form and relative strength

⁷ James, *Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 293-294.

⁸ Cf. Drever, *Instinct in Man*, p. 194; Woodworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 178, 181; Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 112.

and particular outlet of social pressure in a given case but always it is important. No sane person can wholly escape its motivating force in his life. Being itself the criterion of social values it sets the standard for individual values and exerts tremendous force in approximating the standard in practice in every walk of life, in almost every social contact.

Some of the specific ways in which social pressure operates are through conventions, customs, ritual, fads, fashions, etc., which collectively are called folkways, mores, standards, institutions, laws—the habits of communal life among a relatively homogeneous people. Sumner uses the term folkways to designate the earliest, naïve methods developed by primitive peoples in their collective trial-and-error attempts at meeting the practical needs of life. Mores develop from folkways, implying at least the beginnings of a speculative philosophy, of seeing relatively true causal connections between the folkways and social welfare. Institutions and laws are further developments of folkways and mores.

FOLKWAYS

Folkways spring up from the sheer necessity of gaining a livelihood. In satisfying the primitive wants of food, shelter, clothing (in some climates), securing a wife, defense against the enemy, etc., it was soon discovered that some ways were better than others or some individuals or groups of individuals succeeded better than the rest. The more successful methods or supposedly successful methods were copied by the tribe and rigidly practiced. Manifestly it was a case of trial and error learning and quite unconscious.

Now, since folkways are not "creations of human purpose and wit" many of them were bound to be based on erroneous inferences, producing, in some instances, folkways decidedly injurious to individual and public welfare. Such seems to be the case. Obviously the primitive mind cannot distinguish true causal relations from the merely temporal, so whenever two events succeeded each other in time he thought he saw a causal connection and acted accordingly. Sumner gives these illustrations of folkways due to accident and the fallacy of confusing temporal relations with causal relations:

In Molemba a pestilence broke out soon after a Portuguese had died there. After that the natives took all possible measures not to allow any white man to die in their country. On the Nicobar islands some natives who had just begun to make pottery died. The art was given up and never again attempted. White men gave to one Bushman in a kraal a stick ornamented with buttons as a symbol of authority. The recipient died leaving the stick to his son. The son soon died. Then the Bushmen brought back the stick lest all should die. Until recently no building of incombustible materials could be built in any big town of the central province of Madagascar, on account of some ancient prejudice. A party of Eskimos met with no game. One of them returned to their sledges and got the ham of a dog to eat. As he returned with the ham bone in his hand he met and killed a seal. Ever afterwards he carried a ham bone in his hand when hunting.⁹

The following examples illustrate harmful folkways: "There is a tribe of Bushmen who will eat no goat's flesh, although goats are the most numerous domestic animals in the district. Where totemism exists it is regularly accompanied by a taboo on eating the totem

⁹ Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 24-25.

animal. Whatever may be the real principle in totemism, it overrules the interests in an abundant food supply.”¹⁰ In India, “every year thousands perish of disease that might recover if they could take proper nourishment, and drink the medicines that science prescribes, but which they imagine that their religion forbids them to touch.” “‘Men who can scarcely count beyond twenty, and know not the letters of the alphabet, would rather die than eat food which had been prepared by men of lower cast, unless it had been sanctified by being offered to an idol; and would kill their daughters rather than endure the disgrace of having unmarried girls at home beyond twelve or thirteen years of age.’”¹¹

On the whole folkways are useful and beneficial, for the more dangerous ones have a tendency of being modified and in time eliminated. Nevertheless, whether beneficial or harmful, the individual has no recourse but to obey implicitly. The group will tolerate no lapses on the part of any member, for all are supposed to be involved in every breach; hence the insistence upon ceremony, ritual, rites, festivals, worship in which every act must be performed in exact form, as it has always been.

RITUALISM

Ritualism is by no means confined to primitive peoples. It is a potent drive in modern times. In the savage the chief drive to formalistic practices is fear, fear of ghosts, departed ancestors, evil spirits, etc., together with the rudiments of motives that prompt the

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹¹ Quoted by Sumner, *ibid.*, p. 27.

modern ritualist, namely: (1) the joy of participation in a common enterprise; (2) feeling the power of numbers of those present and of past generations who have performed the ceremony in exactly the same way; (3) self-expression; (4) perfect ease and confidence in the feeling of at-homeness; (5) rhythm; (6) the æsthetic appeal. Ritualism objectifies the mystic, spiritualistic, and idealistic values. It makes effective use of the senses which give concreteness, mediateness, and focuses ideas in consciousness with the least expenditure of energy in attention. The æsthetic motive predominates. In most ritual there is music or rhythm, often gorgeous paraphernalia, order and uniformity in words and action. Repetition, familiarity, tend to reduce the emotional accompaniment and make it more or less a matter of habit and mechanical effort. And yet even this has a certain rhythm and feeling of mastery of the situation, at-homeness, a sense of elation that gives satisfaction. Repetition, conformity, uniformity, conservatism have an appeal somewhat analogous to the satisfaction that children express in listening to stories over and over again and their apparent delight in stories that refrain a familiar phrase or sentence.

Ritual has great socializing value. It brings people together, concentrates their aims and ideas, unifies their feelings, gives them a common tradition which instills a sympathetic mutual regard. To share in a common experience is doubtless one of the most effective means of achieving unity and solidarity. This is one of the chief elements of unity in a nation or a race or tribe. The rôle of the festival is quite similar.¹²

¹² Cf. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 398-400.

FADS, FASHIONS

Fads and fashions in their inception and spread are in reality a type of folkways which present a seeming paradox: on the one hand, they are innovations and hence different from the established usage;¹³ on the other hand, they spread like wildfire through the force of group suggestion and the desire for conformity. No matter how ridiculous the fad or fashion, it soon overtakes the scoffer as well as the chronic faddist. The motive in fashion, according to Ellwood, is essentially suggestion-imitation.¹⁴

In so far as this is true fads and fashions might be classed as mores, but in reality, for the masses, they are clearly folkways for none of them can tell where these come from and where they go. They are simply accepted on mass suggestion.

MORES

Mores represent a more advanced stage in the evolution of folkways. So long as the social ways of living the communal life arise spontaneously and are followed naïvely and uncritically with no question raised as to their value and utility for social welfare they are folkways, but when a relationship is seen between these usages and their contribution to the life of the group they attain a normative value and may be regarded as

¹³ Cf. Emerson, *The Conduct of Life*, p. 278: "I have been told by persons of experience in matters of taste that the fashions follow a law of gradation, and are never arbitrary. The new mode is always only a step onward in the same direction as the last mode, and a cultivated eye is prepared for and predicts the new fashion."

¹⁴ Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 235.

mores. The specific content of ethics and morality are the mores of any people. They are the established usages that have behind them intellectual and spiritual and æsthetic sanctions. The terms *morals* and *morality* are derived from *mores* and simply refer to the fundamental social habits of a given community, race, or civilization. That accounts for the lack of uniformity in moral standards from country to country, from race to race and from age to age. Mores and morals are self-perpetuating and carry their own standards as well as the specific injunctions of conduct.

In a sense the mores represent a standard of values. These are especially significant for the problem at hand. In Chapter XXI, "Values as Motives," is given a fuller treatment of ethics, morality, religion, philosophy, and science from the viewpoint of motivation.

CONVENTIONS, CUSTOMS

Conventions and customs ¹⁵ are the conservative element in society. They affect the influence of fads and fashions and transmit the social modes of doing things with slight modifications from generation to generation. Custom is to society what habit is to the individual, hence their remarkable ability to survive long after their usefulness is past.¹⁶ Custom may also

¹⁵ Cf. Gault, *Social Psychology*, p. 179.

¹⁶ Jenks, *History of Politics*, p. 41. Quoted by Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 217: "The desperate tenacity with which patriarchal society clung to a practice, merely because it was a practice, is illustrated by the well-known Roman custom of examining the entrails of victims to ascertain the prospects of an expedition. Originally, no doubt, it was a practical expedient adopted by the nomad tribes from which the Romans were descended, in their wanderings through unknown country. To test the fitness for food of the new herbs

be compared to the vestigial organs, or "the scaffolding of evolution" as Drummond calls them. Organs which were once useful and performed real functions persist despite their uselessness, e.g., the vermiform appendix. Similarly the custom of mounting a horse from the left is a survival of feudal days, when men carried swords which hung on the left side, making it awkward to mount a horse from the right. In more important matters we find customs and traditions continuing to unite or separate groups long after the original cause is removed and forgotten: witness the denominational cleavages among the protestant churches.¹⁷ On the whole, convention, education and custom serve to smoothen the path of social intercourse and concerted action. They curb the individual whims and natural propensities that are injurious or undesirable from the viewpoint of society. They exert an influence in motivating conduct. Certain things "are not done." The individual must learn and practice self-control.

The motives involved here as well as in folkways and mores, in general, come under social pressure, but more specifically they may be summarized thus: (1) conformity, the desire to be one of the group, not to appear odd or ridiculous; (2) inertia, drifting with the tide; (3) sense of familiarity; (4) imitation and suggestion.

These are some of the elementary motives. But are folkways, customs and mores distinct motives? No, not in the abstract sense. But in so far as they are

with which they came into contact, they caused a few of their cattle and sheep to eat them, and then by sort of rude *post-mortem*, judged of the result."

¹⁷ Cf. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 580.

embodied in definite concrete usages they constitute distinct motives whose drive is analogous to habit. In fact they are habits which may become so firmly fixed as to be quite automatic and reflexive. Frequently they are unconscious. As a rule, however, these social motives are regulative, enlisting the fundamental primary urges and drives. But they may become so firmly established as to acquire the force of habits as primary motives.

AUTHORITY, DOCILITY, PRESTIGE

Authority and docility represent the social phase of self-assertion and submission. Social pressure regulates our aims and wants which in turn determine our attitude towards others. Obedience, discipline, involving a certain amount of docility, is instilled in the young at a very tender age and constantly impressed on every member of society for the sake of socializing the individual. Respect for authority of the various stripes to be discussed presently is the price of living in society, of "getting on in the world." When carried to extreme, docility on the part of the majority is the inevitable result. On the other hand, the strong, the unscrupulous, take advantage of the situation to dominate and exploit the weak and docile.¹⁸

"Prestige," says LeBon, "is the mainspring of all authority. Neither gods, kings, nor women have ever reigned without it."¹⁹ Attention was called to prestige in connection with imitation and suggestion. Those possessing prestige have the authority, they set the standards of social pressure. "The possessor of power

¹⁸ Cf. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 121, 152.

¹⁹ LeBon, *The Crowd*, p. 148.

bedazzles and fascinates." Here is another paradox: on the one hand, the more highly organized society becomes the more opportunity for self-expression for the individual; on the other hand, the more closely the social fabric is knit the greater the force of social pressure tending towards standardized personalities. Sidis may be a little extreme, but he approximates the facts when he says that

In civilized society laws and regulations press on the individual from all sides. Whenever one attempts to rise above the dead level of commonplace life, instantly the social screw begins to work, and down is brought upon him the tremendous weight of the socio-static press, and it squeezes him back into the mire of mediocrity, frequently crushing him to death for his bold attempt. Man's relations in life are determined for him; he is told how he must put on his tie, and the way he must wear his coat; what should be the fashion of his dress on this particular occasion and such should be the form of his hat; here must he nod his head, put on a solemn air; and there take off his hat, make a profound bow, and display a smile full of delight. Personality is suppressed by the rigidity of social organization; the cultivated, civilized individual is an automaton, a mere puppet.²⁰

Thus authority and docility act and react upon each other through social pressure by means of folkways, mores, standards, ritualism, conventions, customs, fads, fashions, and all the other social motives—chiefly institutions, next to be considered.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Institutions grow out of folkways and mores. They are the more stable embodiment of a people's customs,

²⁰ Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 311.

standards, and ideals.²¹ Institutions are the machinery for realizing individual and collective wants. On the other hand, they are also the agencies of social control. Institutions are the product of the "collective mind" and represent it. They are the social inheritance of the race; the number and kind of institutions is a pretty good index to the type of civilization. The most commonly recognized institutions are the family, the school, the church, property, philanthropic and eleemosynary organizations, commercialized amusements, sacred, social and learned societies, political parties, the state, nationalism and internationalism.

Institutions are sometimes defined as social habits. They conserve the experience of the race as habits conserve the experience of the self: and, as personal habits are difficult to modify, so also are institutions, otherwise they would not be what they are. Conservatism is their essential, distinguishing quality. While habits and institutions often stand in the way of progress, at the same time they not only conserve progress but also make higher development possible by reducing to mechanical routine many details of experience that otherwise would take up too much of our conscious purposeful efforts, leaving little time or energy for the acquisition of new gains and accomplishments.

This conservatism, however good and necessary, is often carried to extremes. This happens when an institution has acquired sufficient prestige to be carried along by the force of its own momentum. The tendency is to revere an institution for its age and past service rather than for its usefulness in meeting conditions as

²¹ Cf. Palmer, *Altruism*, p. 132.

they exist now. There is very real danger of regarding institutions as ends in themselves rather than as means of social welfare, or worshiping them as idols. There is very little hope of modifying an institution that has been deified. A revolutionary attack becomes the only way open to progress, once institutions "ossify." As a rule, however, most institutions are subject to the laws of social evolution, the interplay of social forces, the impact of new inventions and strong personalities, "the lengthened shadow of a great man."

But occasionally institutions become so thoroughly petrified that nothing but the dynamite of a revolution can effect a change: witness the widespread overthrow of monarchies in Europe. Moreover, any sudden, complete change or downfall of one important institution is bound to make a difference for all the rest. This is especially true in relation to the institution of the state or form of government. It is indeed a critical period in the life of any people when the old standards are shattered and the old institutions have lost prestige. The people are left without their habitual guides, there is no telling what the future may bring forth. Russia and China are good examples. These people have broken so completely with their past that their freedom is not only a great opportunity but a grave responsibility and a source of serious danger as well.

INSTITUTIONS AS MOTIVES

No one can escape the influence of institutions as a motivating force in his personal conduct. We are born in the institution of the home; we are buried by the institution of the church. Every hour of our life we

are under the jurisdiction of the institution of the state or government. Every other institution affects us directly or indirectly.²² The modern adult of almost any social status belongs to a dozen or more societies, clubs, lodges, and organizations of all conceivable types. Many people boast of their numerous affiliations. They join everything that comes along. These "joiners" are not the exception. Who is there that can resist joining something? Even the man strong-willed enough to keep out of all organizations is yet a member of many institutions into which he is born and reared by virtue of being a social being and living in a community.

But what of the specific significance of institutions as forces in motivation? Obviously they are not innate drives, for the individual has to learn the meaning and place of institutions after birth. They are acquired as part of his social inheritance. Therefore institutions are secondary drives. They are the means of social control. In their inception they are motivated by the instinctive impulses and social pressure, but may come to have the force of primary motives as acquired habits. The instinctive drives need modification and regulation. In primitive society these are taken care of by the folkways and mores, by systems of taboos, rites, and ceremonies. In more highly civilized societies the mores become organized as institutions. But whether as mores or as institutions they serve to control and modify the instinctive impulses. Many of the human institutions can be directly traced to some specific in-

²² Institutions evidently seem very important to Judd. He suggests that the title, "social psychology," should be replaced by "the psychology of social institutions." See *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. XX, pp. 151-156.

stinct or instincts, i.e., the family to the sex urge and the parental instinct; property to the impulse for acquisition, manipulation, and the self-regarding impulses and sentiments; societies, clubs and lodges mainly to the gregarious impulse and self-regarding sentiments; etc.

The institution of the state or government which is ostensibly charged with the duty of exercising social control needs to be supported by religious and moral sanctions, by all the other institutions of social control. For the state must content itself with overt acts and cannot delve very deeply into the motives of individuals.²³ We must be on guard here against a shifting of point of view to the objective factors of motivation. The point of view throughout this volume is the subjective, how the individual is moved to do what he does. The objective considerations are incidental and necessary in explaining the subjective. From this point of view institutions are essentially secondary drives in regulating personal conduct, in disciplining the individual, in making him a better social animal.²⁴ The actual drive in institutions is the motive of social pressure.

LAW

Law makes a further advance in the process of civilization—from folkways, to mores, to institutions, to laws.²⁵ Not that one entirely supersedes the other—for all of them may exist side by side—but genetically,

²³ Cf. Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, pp. 107-108.

²⁴ Cf. Hocking, *Human Nature*, p. 211.

²⁵ For a concise survey of the views of outstanding writers in the field see Gehlke, "Social Psychology and Political Theory," Chap. X of *A History of Political Theories*.

written laws are a later development and embody public opinion in a democracy (the will of the rulers in an aristocracy or monarchy) as well as the wisdom of past experience in social control. The enforcement or non-enforcement of law shows the close relationship between law and the mores or public opinion. No law is ever enforced that lacks the sanction of public opinion. Hence many dead laws exist on the statute books which no executive dreams of enforcing. From time to time these dead laws are removed from the books but they die the moment they lack public sanctions. Moreover, uniform laws for the country are not equally enforced in all communities for there is likely to be a difference in public opinion regarding it; witness the law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages.

As a motive force, then, a law is as potent as the public sentiment back of it. In some instances fear may be the compelling motive for not breaking the law, but for the most law-abiding citizens the law merely embodies their own convictions, the taboos in which they already acquiesce and hence so far as their practical conduct is concerned they live as though the law did not exist.

VERACITY AND JUSTICE

Justice and veracity are the very ground and bulwark of organized society. They are two of the cardinal social virtues. Without them, or if their opposites prevail, all forms of social intercourse would be reduced to the law of the jungle. They are the earmarks of civilization itself. Law courts, business enterprises, commerce, trade, and all the important institutions are directly dependent upon them. They are assumed as

the first guarantee of stability, harmony, and progress. They are obviously social. Robinson Crusoe on the lonely island could not be unjust nor tell a falsehood, until the arrival of Mr. Friday.

In a highly organized social organism, where honesty is the best policy, justice and veracity have motive force and practical utility. Upright dealings with others insure reciprocal considerations. Society guards itself against too flagrant violators by segregating them from society. A reputation for honesty is desired by all; while the opposite is bitterly resented. Call a man a liar and you are likely to get an immediate reaction of a more or less violent nature. Such slogans as "square deal," "fair play," and others of like character have been used with telling effect by political parties. It is an appeal to that composite judgment we call a sense of right.

The appeal to positive justice and truth is not nearly as strong as an appeal to their negatives, injustice and falsehood. An outraged sense of justice will go to extremes of injustice. An appeal to an angry mob about to lynch the perpetrator of a vicious crime falls on deaf ears, opposition serves but to produce more violent deeds. In view of what has been said concerning the motive power of an emotion it will be seen that an appeal to the sense of injustice arouses not only a strong intellectual concept but a stronger emotional accompaniment. At Cæsar's funeral, Marcus Antonius made use of this appeal with telling results. In the World War nothing helped to stir the people as the systematic report of atrocities committed by the enemy. Ideas and emotions were thus welded into one tremendous motive force to action. The motive of revenge is

based on the appeal to the sense of outraged justice—usually personal.

Justice and veracity are important social motives, but because the positive phase is too abstract and dissociated from the emotions, its appeal is not nearly as intense as that of the negative phase.

LIBERTY

Liberty is a term applied to the socialized self-regarding impulses and sentiments. It is closely allied to justice, for when justice prevails, freedom prevails. There seems to be a natural limit to submission beyond which a man cannot go without jeopardizing his self-respect. Liberty and freedom are the antidotes to extreme docility. They fight back against overdomination and overexploitation. Liberty is especially desired in times of national peril and great political crises. Patrick Henry was expressing a value judgment in motivation when he exclaimed, "Give me liberty or give me death." Very few would be willing to live on as slaves. Our federal constitution names liberty as one of the three inalienable rights of a citizen of the United States.

Besides the urge for national freedom which is liberty, there is the desire for freedom within the national group; freedom of speech, freedom of equality before the law, religious freedom, personal freedom in so far as is consistent with social welfare. For this type of freedom also men are ready to wage war and to lay down their lives if need be. It is a powerful motive constantly appealed to by the public-spirited citizen and the demagogue alike. The latter's real motive is to becloud the issue in the minds of the people.

Nevertheless, the fact that he appeals to the motive of personal freedom shows how strong a motive it is regarded by all.

There is another type of freedom which irks at all restraints. The anarchist represents the desire on the part of some to remove all law and live in a state of anarchy, without law. Very few, however, go to such extremes. Many are merely radicals. They are dissatisfied with the existing order in some particular or in general. They are uneasy. They chafe at conventions, customs, and traditions. "Generally speaking," says Wolfe, "radicalism—the desire for and advocacy of thoroughgoing social innovation,—is the product of unrest. Unrest is the expression of personal discomfort. Thoroughly comfortable individuals never become radicals. The main reason why people desire innovative change in social organization or process is that they are uncomfortable under the existing *status quo* and see no prospect of relief by altering their own personal situation or in reactionary modification of the environment."²⁶

Social pressure acting through folkways, mores, customs, fads, fashions, institutions, laws and the other social motives would make the individual quite docile were it not for the saving motive of freedom. Each is a check upon the other to keep it within bounds. They are perpetual competitors in the mart of human motives.

²⁶ Wolfe, "The Motivation of Radicalism," *Psychological Review*, July, 1921, p. 280.

CHAPTER XX

LOVE AS MOTIVE

Love is the social motive *par excellence*. It makes the most universal appeal. Being a sentiment, love effectively enlists the emotions and, because the whole self somehow becomes attached to the beloved object, the moving force is correspondingly great. Love combines the strongest possible drives into a unitary whole—instinct, emotion, self-regarding sentiments.

In popular terminology, love is used very loosely and indiscriminately. It is applied to lust as well as the highest sentiments and affections of altruism, philanthropy and reverence. To discuss the subject in a scientific way, the term must be defined more closely. Love is extremely complex. It is composed not only of elements but many complex compounds within compounds. For the sake of clearness and convenience, love is here subdivided into: conjugal love, parental love, filial love, friendship (Platonic love), altruism and philanthropy, patriotism, and reverence. Hate is similarly a powerful motive illustrating the opposite of love by way of contrast. It is discussed at the end of the chapter.

CONJUGAL LOVE

The mating impulse, or conjugal love, is an urge whose nascent period is at the age of puberty. While the sex instinct and the reproduction impulse predomi-

nate, they are by no means the only drives. The parental, gregarious, self-assertive, and æsthetic impulses, fused by "tender emotion," are also present. It is essential that disgust and repulsion be not aroused. Where the æsthetic quality is absent, the purely sex instinct is likely to dominate to such an extent that it cannot be called love in any true sense: it is lust. This perversion of the sex instinct is responsible for most of the ignominy and shame associated with the instinct of reproduction which in itself is as sacred as any of life's phenomena. But in a case of real conjugal love, the so-called mating instinct summarizes all the above mentioned instincts and impulses into compatibility. Compatibility includes rational elements as well as the æsthetically emotional. There are two more or less distinguishable phases in conjugal love, which has been defined as "an affection of one sex for the other plus a sensible or rational consideration of all the elements of compatibility existing between the couple. The first without the second would be an elemental or childish infatuation. The second without the first would be but a cold commercial consideration."

"Head over heels in love" is the popular rendering of the psychic fact that true love enlists the whole self. Every important phase of a man's psychophysical nature must be called forth before he will "let go" of himself, fall in love. The "falling" is not an accident. It is the tacit unconscious willingness to attach one's self completely and unreservedly to the beloved person. Perhaps the term "falling" is justified in the sense that, when a person intuitively perceives the situation, he cannot refrain from making the venture. It is

somewhat misleading, however, to refer to it as a venture as though it were an act of choice; it is more a condition, a happy plight that one *discovers* himself to be in. Were it not for this synthetic intuitive perception of the situation as a whole, "love at first sight" would be impossible. Love, in its essence, is synthetic. Analysis destroys love just as it destroys any sentiment. It is like picking a rose to pieces in order to appreciate its beauty. That is why the term happiness is so intimately bound up with conjugal love. They both require that the whole of self, the integrated personality shall respond harmoniously. Happiness is a unified, more or less permanent state or self-regarding sentiment of personal morale, as contrasted with pleasure, which is relatively transitory and not necessarily coördinated with personalities: hence, lust and pleasure; love and happiness.

Further evidence for the fact that true love commands the whole personality is its permanency and complete domination of one's life. "The light of a whole life dies when love is gone" because it is very like physical death rather than the amputation of a limb or the loss of some cherished possession. Another significant fact in the synthetic nature of love is that the language of love is poetry rather than scientific analysis. With all due respect to science in an age of science, who wants to be loved scientifically? "Love," says Stekel,¹ "is the poetry of those who are not poets. That mood which we call 'poetic' is very readily created whenever there is an undercurrent of exotic emotion. People in love are always 'poetic'; they wan-

¹ Stekel, *The Beloved Ego*, p. 13.

der enchanted in the rosy twilight of a land of dreams."

Poetry is but one expression of æsthetics. Love commands the facilities of æsthetics to the limit. Love and beauty are inseparable. The lover always regards his beloved as the most beautiful of them all. Intrinsic beauty—physical, mental, spiritual, has a decided advantage in competition for love. It is doubtful if love can exist without beauty or æsthetic appreciation of some sort. In the absence of intrinsic beauty, love creates it. The hypothesis of "sexual selection" as a theory of explaining the origin of species or the cultivation of special qualities is based on the assumption of æsthetic appreciation even among the lower animals. Incidentally it shows the close relationship between the sex impulse and the æsthetic impulse.² Some go so far as to assert that the æsthetic impulse is derived from the sex impulse or vice versa. There is no way of determining the truth and, so far as we are concerned, there is no special need of it. It is sufficient to note the remarkable interrelationship of these important impulses.

There is another impulse closely related to the sex urge or conjugal love, namely, the self-regarding instincts of self-assertion, self-abasement and the self-regarding sentiments. The self-assertive impulse seems so prominent at times that some regard love itself as essentially selfish. The fact is that love, being so intimately personal, the acceptance or rejection of a lover is bound to have a reaction on "Ego Maximation." The successful lover is naturally elated over the

² Cf. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 172-173.

idea that he of all possible candidates has been selected, and the higher his opinion of the beloved the greater the unconscious recoil on the worth of his own personality. To have the exclusive right and possession of another person's love and personality is no mean compliment. He of course has selected her from all the world which fact is duly appreciated by both parties even if his "whole world" is often limited to a score of eligibles. On the other hand, the rejected suitor has exactly the opposite reaction to his ego maximization. His self-esteem is likely to suffer. He may take it as a great personal affront and assert his wounded self-regarding sentiments in a manner calculated to impress the world and one in particular.

Thus love is selfish in a sense, the sense of exclusiveness, ownership and possession of the other person's affection. No one can desire as intensely as the lover desires without being selfish in this sense. He has come to derive great joy and satisfaction, happiness and ecstasy from the object of his love which is the supreme value for him and without which life is not worth the living. To suffer great privations with her is better than many luxuries alone. If this be selfishness, it is certainly a very high type of selfishness. The true lover is ready to sacrifice anything, life itself if need be, and do it gladly, "selfishly." One might express the situation in the form of an Irish bull and say that this is a sort of unselfish selfishness. The true lover regards the beloved as possessing all the charms which he lacks. He has a sense of inadequacy and incompleteness, almost of helplessness, which the beloved supplies, supplementing and completing and enhancing his own personality. It is the realization of one's

ideal selfhood.³ Each person has an ideal prospective beloved. This ideal usually includes qualities lacking in one's self and is a composite of desirable qualities garnered from contact with members of the other sex in works of fiction and in actual life. It is very difficult to find this fictitious ideal in flesh and blood, but when it is at least approximated, the person falls in love. Love is the sentiment resulting from the attachment of the ideal to a particular person. Once the attachment is made and the sentiment established, the lover is subject to illusions of superior qualities in the beloved which he "reads into" the situation because of his in-

³ Hocking, *Human Nature*, pp. 359, 360:

"The truth seems to be that the minds of men and women are so made that each, by the aid of the other, may see farther into the universe than either can see by itself or by the aid of others of its own kind. And what one seems to see in the other is largely seen *through* the other: what appears to be a quality of the individual turns out to be a quality of the world. This is not to deny these qualities of the individual, however; for the beauty and worth of a person are not separable from the world of objects into which that person habitually looks. No doubt the lover comes into a kind of incidental power or confidence toward the world at large—if he is accepted; he may even be said to taste greatness: but the greatness is conferred upon him, the power is borrowed rather than his own. Between the lovers, also, there is a wholly mutual sense of dignity which comes from the awareness of validity: with their other metaphysical knowledge, the lovers also know that between them—not in either of them—*the tribe is present*; the promise and potency of humanity as a self-continuing stream of conscious life is, if not in their keeping, still within reach of their conjuring. But what thus seems their power is not their own: it is the power of nature and of society."

Cf. also Tennyson, *The Princess*:

" . . . seeing either sex alone
Is half itself, and in true marriage lies
Nor equal, nor unequal: each fulfills
Defect in each, and always, thought in thought,
Purpose in purpose, will in will they grow."

fatuation. He makes the picture of his ideal complete, and refuses to be disillusioned. That is why lovers are supposed to be blind.

In true love there is no selfishness or unselfishness. "In the mutuality of love egoism and altruism are reconciled." A balance is struck; complete harmony is achieved.

The gregarious impulse is also strong in the motive of love. Conjugal love is the climax of this impulse and represents its completest expression. Conjugal love is the gregarious impulse focused. It is this impulse individualized and personalized. The force of comradeship is a factor in conjugal love which is the most intimate of all human relationships.⁴

There is something in the contacts of comradeship or of association merely which unites people. Perhaps it is due to the creation of a common tradition, the "we-feeling," and, more particularly, the fostering of sentiments. Thus young people frequently "keep company" just for the fun of it with no idea of ever

⁴ Cf. Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, p. 252: "This clannishness which makes man long for men concentrated in the individualized desire for friends reaches its highest tension in the focused love between man and woman. Friendship demands a more complete mutual understanding and agreement than the chance relation between any members of the tribe, while love, of course, intensifies the social instinct by the entirely different element of the sexual desire. Yet this, too, is a craving for contact in which the strongest imaginable union of the personalities is passionately sought. The sensation of bodily contact directly felt or longingly anticipated becomes the center of consciousness, controls the complete psychophysical setting, secures by its emotional resounding the dilation of blood-vessels and the activity of glands, and forces mind and body toward the contact with the loved individual. The immediate wish for contact between men may thus vary from the most superficial preference for a mere being together with some one to a lifelong loyalty and an overwhelming desire for one individual."

marrying each other. But before they realize it they have formed attachments they cannot or do not care to break. They discover themselves to be in love. They marry. Sentiments spring up very easily. One may become attached to an old hat (possible for men only), a piece of furniture, a mannerism, a chronic ailment even—anything. It is no wonder, then, that frequently attachments spring up among young people, ending in marriage, while their friends are mystified if not shocked and horrified at the apparent impossibility of compatibility of the couple so far as outward appearances are concerned.

It will be observed that the account of conjugal love given here aims to bring out the motive factors only. Expositions of the subject from other angles we leave to novelists, playwrights, and poets. As a motive, conjugal love has no equal.⁵ Not only in stories, but also in actual life a large percentage of all noble deeds are prompted directly or indirectly by this urge, also a great many crimes are committed by its misdirection or abuse. Perverted forms of conjugal love, sexuality

⁵ Cf. O'Higgins, *The Secret Springs*, p. 120: "No failure in life is hopeless without a failure in love. And no man or woman, in my experience, commits suicide unless this instinct despairs. The failure to obtain love is the greatest tragedy of childhood, and the common 'death wish' of the child arises from it. The dominant subconscious fear in adult life is a fear of the loss of love that is greater than the fear of death; and the fear of death is often a substitute for it. The weakest personality can obtain happiness in an atmosphere of love. The strongest and most successful fails of happiness if he fails of love."

Cf. also "Poor Richard":

"The good or ill hap,
Of a good or ill life,
Is the good or ill choice,
Of a good or ill wife."

and lust motivate many people. The fact that this impulse is capitalized and exploited by the cheap shows and a type of "popular" fiction proves the universality of its appeal. The Freudians regard the sex drive as the strongest, most persistent, most subtle, and far-reaching of all motives.

Summary of motive factors in conjugal love: (1) the vegetative instinct of sex which is similar to other appetites; (2) the reproductive impulse; (3) the parental instinct as expressed in the desire to "father" or "mother" the beloved; (4) the self-regarding impulses and sentiments; (5) tender emotions; (6) æsthetic impulses and sentiments; (7) the gregarious impulse in its most intimate and completest manifestation; (8) the combination of all these and other elements into a sentiment called love. This is the most important of all. Any one or perhaps several of these qualities may exist without love. As we have repeatedly insisted, we reiterate once more most emphatically that love is synthetic. The motive force of love as such is in this synthesis and not in its elements as such. Love is a sentiment. It is a specific attachment of the self-regarding sentiments to a definite person or an imaginary person. If the sex urge were the only or predominating motive in love, then promiscuity would be the result rather than the strong attachments that we find in the monogamous marriage. A man will go "through fire and water" to secure and maintain the love of the "one girl in all the world."

Conjugal love is a powerful motive, not only in its intensity and comprehensive scope, but also in its duration. It may last for years, for life often, and grow in intensity all the while. "A love to which we con-

template an end, either in extent or duration, would be already ended.”⁶

PARENTAL LOVE

Parental love is closely akin to conjugal love except that the fundamental racial impulse called the parental instinct (the “protective instinct,” “tender emotion”) predominates. As a motive force it is stronger than life, for it is not uncommon for parents to sacrifice their own lives to save their children. And the sacrifice is made, not from a rational deliberate motive primarily, but from the impulse of the parental instinct.⁷ Some go so far as to claim that in any act of rescue the parental instinct (protective impulse) prompts the act. Even the soldier, it is claimed, in sacrificing his life for his country, is actuated by the parental instinct in so far as instinct plays a part. Whether this is so or not, it is true that parental love or the parental instinct reaches out beyond the family circle. A man or woman usually has tender regard for strange children as well as for his or her own. The attachment may not be as strong for lack of specific sentiments that come from daily contact, but there is nevertheless an affection disposition. This is the experience even of those who have no children of their own. Parents often find the same attachment for adopted children as for their own offspring. Eppie’s coming wrought a transformation in the life of the old miser, Silas Marner. We call the soldiers, “boys,” though most of them are men grown. Even the Civil War veterans are referred to as boys: witness also the

⁶ Palmer, *Altruism*, p. 102.

⁷ Cf. Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, pp. 537-538.

"boys of '76." It is an endearing term, an expression of parental love, or the parental impulse. This fundamental drive is a factor in all forms and manifestations of love including even reverence, for we like to think of God as a "loving Father." The concept of love and the fatherhood of God is central in the Christian religion and doubtless a great motive of appeal because it touches human life so vitally.

We have not yet begun to realize the tremendous motive force in parental love in a systematic way. In propaganda the parental instinct is often appealed to, but not nearly as strongly as it is capable of exploitation: witness posters of thrift, safety, sanitation, pure food, education, charity, in which a child is the center of attraction. An audience will not respond as readily to an appeal that is decidedly personal—promise of luxury, comforts, etc., as to an appeal for better opportunities for "your children." Every parent covets the best for his child. It is a matter of common everyday occurrence for parents to make almost any sacrifice that their children may have a higher education or the best possible training for their life work, to climb to a higher social level, to achieve distinction, to make their mark in the world. It is often intimated that we are jealous of the success and good fortune of our close friends, unconsciously if not consciously. But no one dare say that parents are jealous of the success and good fortune of their children. It is their desire and the object of their striving to make it possible for their children to be more successful and happier than they themselves have been. Here is a motive that is as pure and unsullied and forceful as any in the whole category of motives and drives.

FILIAL LOVE

Filial love is, in a sense, the counterpart of parental love. It represents the affection of offspring to parent. This is also a strong motive, though not always as unalloyed and steadfast as parental love. There is no special instinct or impulse to prompt it. No instinct has developed perhaps because the child is not as necessary to the parent as the parent is to the child in the struggle for survival and the continuity of the race. The attachment between offspring and parent seems to be one of sentiment, chiefly the self-regarding sentiment, for the parent is the source of life and comfort and necessities. Sentiments are created and destroyed according to circumstances of social pressure, custom and the self-regarding impulses. Some of the Eskimo tribes and other savages dutifully dispatch their elderly parents as a matter of custom. In the United States there is an outward lack of respect on the part of children for their parents. But this is superficial and merely a phase of the general lack of servile respect and obedience to authority characteristic of the "good old days." Fundamentally there is a remarkably strong sentiment attachment: witness the institution of "Mother's Day" and "Father's Day," the enthusiastic response that the terms "home" and "mother" will draw in any audience. The vaudeville performers frequently fall back on a song or sketch of home and mother as a sure thing. It never fails. It is doubtful if any people at any time had a stronger sentiment.

Unfortunately, however, in individual cases, due to adverse conditions or lack of wisdom and understanding on the part of the parents, this filial sentiment of love

is destroyed and occasionally turned into positive hate. This may happen if parents are unnaturally "strict" or in some way or other cramp and crush the personality of the child. The self-regarding instincts and sentiments are stronger than the sentiments of filial affection; hence, in case of serious conflict, the latter is worsted.

FRIENDSHIP (PLATONIC LOVE)

Friendship, in concrete form, is a sentiment. The gregarious impulse doubtless predisposes towards friendship, but in selecting a friend, on the basis of certain elements of compatibility, this impulse finds specific outlet in the definite attachments to a particular person. Mutual esteem and mutual regard develop into the sentiment we call friendship. There are as many types of friendship as there are grounds and opportunity for cultivating this sentiment, and they are almost limitless: æsthetic (absence of repulsion and disgust), common interests, common experiences, mutual dependence, mutual respect, common appreciation of relative values, common misfortunes, and a host of others. Not only is there a difference in the types of friendship, but also in the strength of the mutual bond, and hence in motive force. The intensity of the affection depends upon the number and strength of the elements of compatibility (including also opposites, for these often attract each other more effectively than likenesses), the degree to which one has come to identify himself with his friend, the extent to which the space of interest and purpose and selfhood has been eliminated between them. It is significant that popular terminology uses the phrase "close friends."

Thus the motive force of friendship represents the greatest degree of diversity among the love motives. It may be so mild as to be almost negligible or it may rival any motive in intensity. Jesus paid friendship a high tribute as a motive when he said, "Greater love hath no man than this that a man lay down his life for his friends."⁸ The friendship between David and Jonathan is a classical example of the power of friendship. David was a rival to the throne that by right of succession belonged to Jonathan, the first Crown Prince of Israel. And yet because Jonathan loved David better than his own soul, he helped him to escape the murderous wrath of King Saul. David's moving lament over Jonathan indicates that the sentiment was reciprocated.⁹ Here is an instance in which friendship was stronger than conjugal love. But this is the exception rather than the rule. Ordinarily friendship is only moderately strong as a motive.

We all know how slight a friendly feeling may be, even when entirely genuine. This is because of the well-recognized limits of friendship—limits sometimes narrow, sometimes broad. I take John for my friend on account of his wit, James for his scholarship, Henry for discussion of art, Charles for theology. . . . Because of its narrow bounds and because it is sought for individual gain, friendship is of far wider currency than love. We make and drop our friendships with comparative ease, hardly from the first expecting them to be lasting.¹⁰

Platonic love is a term sometimes used to designate a sort of spiritual comradeship between a man and

⁸ John, 15: 13.

⁹ II Samuel, 1: 19-27.

¹⁰ Palmer, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

woman in which sexual impulses play no part. If Platonic love in its absolute sense were not a psychological monstrosity, its significance in motivation would be approximately the same as ordinary friendship between persons of the same sex which we have just discussed.

ALTRUISM AND PHILANTHROPY

Altruism and philanthropy are often used synonymously to indicate a generalized sentiment of love for others or for mankind. The altruist as such is not in love with any particular person or cause. He has a benevolent attitude towards all humanity and a broad enlightened sympathy for human suffering and need. The philanthropist, however, has more than a benevolent attitude. He is usually interested in some humanitarian project, gives to it of his time and thought, of his strength and material substance. We do not regard a man as a philanthropist unless he has demonstrated his altruism in some practical way. Altruism may, then, be regarded as the motive for genuine philanthropy and philanthropic enterprises such as the establishment of libraries or research laboratories for the discovery of scientific knowledge useful in prevention of disease or otherwise beneficial for the health, comfort, convenience and the happiness of the race; founding and endowment of educational and eleemosynary institutions, hospitals and asylums—aiding any enterprise calculated to benefit mankind. Of course a great deal that passes for philanthropy is prompted by other motives, usually the opposite to that of altruism. Social pressure, the desire to stand in well with the community or a certain group or a particular person, to make an “impression,” to display one’s wealth or gener-

osity, and a thousand other motives often enter in. Although the funds devoted to a worthy enterprise are practically as valuable to the cause regardless of the motives of the giver so long as these motives are not suspected, yet from the viewpoint of our discussion, it cannot be classed as philanthropy at all. But the fact that any one should want to feign the altruistic motive is significant. It shows that public morals and public opinion have reached a stage of development in which great value is placed on such conduct, that public approval and the weight of social pressure is placed on its side.

Now, what is the motive for rating altruistic motives so highly? A great deal of what was said in our discussion of sympathy ¹¹ is pertinent in this connection, especially the material on rational sympathy. In the course of social evolution, the individual learns to expand his ego, to take in larger units of his environment, to identify himself with his fellows, to find joy and satisfaction in sharing his possessions and personality with others, to include within the self-regarding sentiments wider and wider attachments. Finally he comes to experience a sentiment of love for his fellows not wholly because of what they are but more particularly of what human nature is capable of becoming through conscious evolution. This is enlightened sympathy. It is free from the sentimentalism of other sentiments of love because it is above personalities. Religion, especially Christianity, has doubtless helped to propagate humanitarian motives and create public sentiment in its favor.

¹¹ See pp. 336ff.

To a great many, the humanitarian, the altruistic appeal has great motivating force. The basis of the appeal is analogous to the appeal in the parental instinct which no doubt has played some part in the cultivation of the altruistic motive. If men are moved to do for their children what they would not do for themselves, those who have imagination enough are moved to do for other children also and for the great host of children yet unborn. Through conduct based on altruistic motives, one comes to realize the self in a higher and completer way than is possible on a narrow basis. Altruistic motives realize a higher value than is possible in strictly selfish pursuits.

This motive of altruism is already quite strong among the more highly socialized peoples of the world, but it has only just begun to exert its tremendous motive power as a social force. There was a time when altruism was confined to the members of one's own family and household. This grew to include larger units until now the nation seems to be the limit. The next step will go beyond national boundaries and embrace the whole human family. However, there is always this difficulty that social psychology must take into account. It is a great deal easier to attach the self-regarding sentiments to objects and persons that are concrete entities than mere abstractions, those that come within the range of one's daily contacts than those that are out of sight. The man who cannot stand to hear the cry of a hungry child without giving immediate relief will be moved very mildly if at all by the printed reports of thousands of starving children in foreign lands.

PATRIOTISM

Patriotism is a form of love in which the self-regarding sentiments have become attached to a particular country or nation, its history and traditions. Patriotism is demanded of all because it is believed that the integrity of the nation depends upon it. Hence social pressure is effectively enlisted in securing at least an outward manifestation of the sentiment.¹² But we are not now concerned with anything but the genuine love of country embodied in the term patriotism, the love which is greater than life. There is no denying the force of this motive. Men have endured superhuman hardships, have sacrificed health, limbs and life. One need not read very far in the history books of any country before coming to an illustration of some remarkable deed of heroism on the part of some patriot or whole swarms of them. What is it that induces a man to lay down his life gladly, exclaiming: "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country"? The demagogue as well as the statesman can stir the blood of his countrymen by appealing to the sentiment of patriotism. The psychic factor, the dynamic urge is to be found in the nature and extent of self-identification with the interests and traditions, the hopes and policies of one's country. Patriotism is more evident in times of national peril because the citizen is brought face to face with the actual extent of his devotion or self-identification to the nation.

From the viewpoint of social psychology, the nation

¹² Cf. *Howerth*, "The Teaching of Patriotism," *Educational Review*, Vol. LXVII, pp. 135-140.

is merely a larger group embracing groups within groups within the national unit, all of which demand loyalty. But the nation comes first and patriotism demands supreme loyalty. However, there is no necessary conflict here. Loyalty to the nation includes loyalty to the institutions and smaller groups comprising the nation and vice versa, that is, ideally speaking. So the appeal of patriotism really combines the motives of all the rest. The soldier is defending his own home and fireside, his nation's traditions and institutions, which means his own church and lodge and rights and privileges as a citizen under the federal constitution.¹³ Patriotism is a very complex sentiment. It takes in many other sentiments and unifies them by means of the self-regarding sentiments. Its motive force, therefore, is correspondingly great.

HUMANITARIANISM

Humanitarianism is here used to designate a sentiment of love in internationalism corresponding to patriotism in nationalism.¹⁴ Doubtless it is true that nationalism has been one of the most powerful factors in modern history.¹⁵ But it is questionable whether this will be true in the future. There is a growing minority to whom nationalism and patriotism make no appeal, but who are profoundly influenced by motives of

¹³ Cf. Hocking, *op. cit.*, pp. 207, 208.

¹⁴ Cf. Parmelee, "The Rise of Modern Humanitarianism," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXI, pp. 345-359.

¹⁵ McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 135. "He (Sir Ramsay Muir) rightly describes 'nationalism' as one of the most powerful factors in modern history. It is, I think, obviously true that we may go further and say that it is *the* most powerful factor in modern history."

386 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

a more inclusive humanitarian appeal embracing all nations. Some of them claim that since nationalism is not directly founded on any instinct and is merely a sentiment¹⁶ fostered by training and social pressure, it might easily be detached by the same process and attached to internationalism; that nationalism represents merely a stage in the progress of social evolution; that nationalism is not only not the final group in social evolution, but it is in reality dangerously detrimental to the attainment of that goal.¹⁷ They further claim that just as a man is only partially socialized who has developed a fine sense of loyalty to his family alone, or to his lodge alone, or to his church alone, or to his party alone, so is the individual only partially, or rather, not quite fully socialized at the stage of nationalism. We are not here concerned with the merits of the question nor with the controversy involved. We are concerned only and in so far as people are actually motivated or are likely to be motivated by such a comprehensive drive as humanitarianism. As stated a while ago, the appeal of abstract ideals and vague comprehensive ideas is not nearly so strong as the more concrete and vivid. Nationalism has a decided advantage over internationalism on that score. On the other hand, the strongest propaganda in creating morale for the Entente Allies during the World War was just such abstract and universal ideas of world freedom, defending the rights of small nations.

¹⁶ For a distinction in types of nationalism see Handman, "The Sentiment of Nationalism," *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1921, pp. 104-121.

¹⁷ Cf. Russell, "If We Are to Prevent the Next War," *Century Magazine*, May, 1924, p. 12.

The problem is open. It may or may not be as strong a motive as patriotism when attached to one particular country rather than to the whole human family, but that it has some motivating force with at least a minor-ity cannot be truthfully denied.

REVERENCE

Reverence is an attitude of respect and affection mingled with fear or awe for the deity. The self-regarding sentiments are attached to some power not ourselves. If this attachment is to a God having consciousness and personality we might speak of the sentiment as love, provided fear and awe do not entirely obliterate the element of affection. Reverence, or love of God as a motive depends upon the quality of the sentiment, the richness of the attachments, the extent to which the self has been identified with God. This varies from sheer atheism, to a mild sort of regard, to a more vital relationship and finally the climax is reached in the mystic with whom love of God is the master motive.

This master motive so completely dominates the mystic that he thinks of nothing else, he lives for nothing else. He devotes his life to the quest of completely identifying himself with God, of possessing the Deity and being possessed by Him, of becoming at-one with the Absolute. To this end he shuts out the rest of the world and every sensory experience so far as possible. He is jealous for his love to God. He wants it to be pure, complete, absolutely without rival among his desires. Consequently he indulges in certain rather unnatural practices to mortify the flesh and keep it under. Not only does he deny his physical wants, appetites and necessities, but also deliberately tortures him-

self, adopts ascetic practices, and gladly welcomes persecution and martyrdom to convince himself and his God of the supreme fidelity of his love. Poverty, chastity, obedience become the three great virtues because the mystic wants no property or possession save God, no earthly affection to compete for the love of God, no will of his own but complete self-abnegation and renunciation to the will of the beloved Deity. He will not even think of anything or any one save God. Therefore "contemplation" is his chief occupation. The whole of his intellectual and emotional life is introverted in meditation and contemplation of the Deity with intense passion and yearning to possess God. He does not want merely to be in the presence of God; he wants to feel that his soul and God are one corporate unity. But a creature of time and sense cannot possibly do this. In the phenomenal world there is an ultimate barrier between entities that is like a fixed gulf—impassable. Hence the mystic despises sense and sensory experience. He will none of it. He does not want to know God as he knows physical objects; he seeks to transcend the categories of phenomenal experience and clasp God intuitively and forever lose his personal identity in the bosom of the All.

This is positively the ultimate category of love as a motive. It cannot go any further. It is also indicative of the goal of all forms of love if carried to its logical conclusion. Every true lover wants to possess the object of his love so completely that nothing short of actual unity or oneness will satisfy him. One naïve form of securing oneness with the object of one's love—a pet animal, a member of the opposite sex, or a deity—is to want to eat him. Observe the love of the little

child for his kitten or puppy or playmate and you will see him at times of intense love motivation actually attempting to eat his pet. The love-sick swain says to his lady love in words that have more than a figurative significance: "You are so sweet" (by which he means "I love you so intensely and yearn to possess you so completely") "that I could eat you," as he playfully bites her hand or cheek. Almost every lover has wanted to eat his love—at least at one stage of his obsession. The intense love of the mother often reacts in the same way relative to her infant. The eating of the deity as symbolized in ceremonies and "love feasts" is probably motivated by the same urge and has a long history.

We have taken mysticism as our example of supreme motivation of the love of God. But we have also stated that there are many manifestations of lesser intensity described by the ordinary usage of the word reverence. Perhaps one exceptional form should receive special mention. And that is the "intellectual love of God" which is illustrated in Spinoza. It is not possible for the average person to exercise an "intellectual" love of God, which is almost a contradiction in terms. Yet to Spinoza and men of his stamp it is a real love motive.¹⁸

HATE

Hate is the opposite of love. Both are complex sentiments distinguished by the nature of the self-regarding sentiments attached. In love the person

¹⁸ What has been said in this section may incidentally serve to show how widely men differ in manifesting their reverence or love of God. Consequently it behooves one to endeavor to avoid the bigot's fallacy of believing that there is one method of religious experience and that is his way, that all others are wrong or valueless and should be condemned.

and the objects and situations associated with him in the love sentiment have a decidedly pleasing effect, i.e., foster the feeling of elation, self-esteem, sense of importance, enhance enjoyment, create personal morale, magnify the sense of power, afford outlets for self-expression or in some way minister to fundamental self-regarding sentiments. In hate, on the contrary, the person and the objects and situations associated with him in the hate sentiment have a decidedly unpleasant effect, i.e., threaten to lessen or destroy self-esteem (this is why reformers and volunteer advisors are often hated instead of being thanked), sense of importance, some real or fancied quality that is prized, material possessions, a loved object (here jealousy and fear also play a part), or in some other way hamper, inhibit, cramp, repress, make void, or actually destroy fundamental self-regarding sentiments or threaten personal violence (fear and anger also contributing) without adequate compensations.

It is necessary to include "without adequate compensations" because often in the love sentiment there is also some repression of the self and loss to the lover inflicted by the loved one. But in such instances there is adequate compensation in the thought that the injury or slight was well-deserved or that it was at least a mark of regard which might be placed higher than no notice at all, or the rebuff is offset by a spiritualized sort of ego maximation partially expressed in the idea "'tis better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all." Now, it also happens that this sometimes fails: there is no adequate compensation. In such a case actual love is turned into actual hate. Not only is hate added, but also love is subtracted and the vio-

lence of the hate is thus intensified. Love, then, may and often does turn into hate—where there are no adequate compensations for the losses to self-regarding sentiments caused by the loved one: witness the tragedies resulting from lovers' quarrels. This may also explain suicides due to disgrace, loss of self-respect, the complete breakdown of personal morale. The wounds inflicted to the self-regarding sentiments by the man himself are very much like the wounds inflicted by the loved object in case of no adequate compensation, except that it places even a greater strain on personal morale. When you have no one to blame but yourself and admit it, you are in the worst possible plight. There is no way of escape. You are trapped with no exit and panic and psychic stampede are imminent. Self-hate, then, is not only possible, but is also the worst type of hate.

Love and hate respond in opposite ways. The love sentiment is expansive. The lover wishes to continue and intensify the stimulus to the love sentiment on the basis of a fundamental biological law previously stated, that pleasant stimuli of any sort are actively sought and maintained while the unpleasant reactions are avoided because in the long run the former tend to be useful and beneficial to the organism while the latter are likely to be detrimental and injurious. One form of magnifying the stimulus is to keep it at the focus of consciousness through sensory impressions, hence the lover wants the object of his love to be close by. If physical contact or proximity is impossible, he likes to dote on his beloved in thought and memory and imagination, dreams and daydreams, to "brood over" the sentiment and keep it warm. The lover is gladdened when the be-

loved meets with good fortune and depressed at its opposite because he has identified his interests and destiny with those of the beloved. Moreover he will actually strive to increase the joy and happiness of the beloved and to destroy the agents working in the opposite direction for the same reason. But, on the other hand, the lover is jealous of any good to his beloved that threatens to rob him of his loved possession and to welcome, perhaps, some ill-hap that increases his hold on the loved object or in some way adds to the sum total of the love situation. Whatever comes between the lover and the loved is regarded as a rival and treated according to hate motives. Thus a woman may be jealous of her husband's reputation, of his golf or radio. Similarly, a husband may be jealous of his wife's pet canary or even possibly of her intense love for their own children, just as a child is often jealous of his father's love for his mother, who is wise to refrain from excessive show of affection for her husband in the presence of the child or vice versa.

As contrasted with the phase of love we have been discussing, hate seeks to put away or destroy the hated object, to banish it out of his life. From the viewpoint of motives and morality, the hater is a murderer because all hate is potential murder, in the sense of seeking the annihilation of the thing hated. Therefore, any good- or ill-hap that befalls the lot of the hated distresses or rejoices the hater, because he regards their interests as diametrically opposed. The increased power of the hated means a corresponding decrease in the safety of the hater and vice versa. This attitude predisposes to a blindness of bias on the part of the hater who magnifies the faults of the hated and mini-

mizes his virtues just as the lover reverses the situation relative to the loved. And when love turns into hate, the intensity of the hate sentiment is correspondingly great because of the combined force of this double illusion—disillusionment plus another illusion.

Sentiments of both love and hate may be transferred to objects and situations although, strictly speaking, they are reserved for persons. But such expressions as "I love strawberries" or "I hate that necktie" show how prone we are to make this transfer and on a correct psychological basis. For in the first instance of our illustration, the strawberries have pleasant associations, serve to increase the pleasure and well-being of the lover or "liker." He may even have strong sentiments attached to the strawberries. Perhaps his sweetheart makes delicious strawberry shortcake or she is fond of strawberry sundaes and they have such a glorious time at the soda fountain. Perhaps the necktie, on the contrary, has just the opposite effect upon the hater's or "disliker's" ego maximation. The "spread," therefore, of both sentiments is very great. The lover is inclined to be optimistic while the hater is pessimistic. While the lover transfers his love sentiment, the hater does the same with his predominating sentiment attitude and may go so far as to hate not only a particular person but also everything connected with him, his family, his friends, his type of person, his town even and possibly also the world itself of which he is an exaggerated part.

Hate seems to be more easily aroused than love because there are a great many more unpleasant emotions than pleasant ones in the psychic repertoire as was pointed out in the chapter on "Emotions as Motives."

394 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

Another reason might be that hate is older in the race because it served a more vital function in the struggle for survival. The individual and the group were in constant danger of personal violence and needed the drive of anger and hate to mobilize their physical resources for mortal combat. It was and is the common practice to hate the enemy as means of increasing morale and efficiency in war. Perhaps this accounts for the fact that it is much easier to secure a following if you denounce something or somebody or some institution vigorously, appealing to the motive of hate and vengeance, than by advocating positive and constructive policies minus the element of denunciation. Thus many a political party and religious sect dies when it ceases to denounce.

That hate of the opposing groups rather than affection for the principles and love for the persons of the group accepted is an important element in the development of the religious sect or community is evidenced by the ferocity with which heretics were dealt with in ancient times, persisting until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Why an innocent woman should be burned for doubting that the communion bread was part of the very body of Christ, or a scholar for believing that it was his privilege to think for himself in ways prescribed by the brain and mind with which he had been created, cannot be explained from affection either for the creed or for the organization.¹⁹

Social evolution has practically made a "vestigial organ" of hate just as organic evolution has done to the vermiform appendix, for example. Hate is no longer necessary in civilized society where settlement of grievances by personal hate and violence are theoretically

¹⁹ Pillsbury, *Psychology of Nationalism and Internationalism*, p. 76.

eliminated. But personal hate still survives to motivate conduct, though on a diminishing scale it is hoped. Much less progress has been made in eliminating hate as a motive in group antagonisms among nations, institutions, or religious sects. It requires considerable optimism to believe that this will be accomplished very soon. However, there are many indications of the spread of enlightened sympathy and the love sentiments of altruism and humanitarianism discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER XXI

VALUES AS MOTIVES¹

Conscious motives are greatly influenced by the standard of values. It may be that what a man desires intensely he regards as a value. Conversely, what a man regards as of value he wants. Not all values are equally desirable. There is a scale or gradation of values for each of us—some objects of desire have intrinsic value; others have instrumental value. Some are sought as ends, others as means. But always there is a supreme value by which all others are graduated. A man's life is motivated, therefore, not only by his standard of values, but more fundamentally, by his notion of the supreme value, the highest good.

The viewpoint of values is popular with modern writers on philosophy and psychology. It is especially useful for the problem of motivation. The materials in this chapter will be treated under five main heads: ethics, morality, religion, philosophy, science.

ETHICS

Ethics has been defined by Everett as the "science of values in their relation to the conduct of life as a

¹ The remaining materials of this book logically belong under the general head of values. Economic motives are means motives or instrumental value motives. The same is true of morale, while æsthetic motives are both means and ends, and have intrinsic as well as instrumental value. These topics are treated separately because of their importance and for the sake of convenience.

whole.”² Its fundamental problem is the quest of the *summum bonum*, the highest good, the chief value which is an end in itself and the highest goal of human effort. The kind of ethics that one may hold is determined by what he regards as the *summum bonum*. There are only three possible types of ethics. Every conceivable type may be classified under one of these: hedonism, formalism, energism. There are various shades of differences in each type, but no essential difference in relation to the highest good.

1. *Hedonism*. The *summum bonum* for a hedonist is pleasure. There are various interpretations of pleasure, such as qualitative and quantitative differences, egoistic and social hedonism, but all agree in making pleasure the highest value. Psychological hedonism is the doctrine that all men are actually motivated by the desire for pleasure, and the avoidance of pain; ethical hedonism asserts that men ought to be so motivated, presumably, because pleasure is the most worthy aim in life, the highest good to be realized. The significance of hedonism for motivation was discussed at some length in connection with “Feeling as Motive” where it was admitted that pleasure is a tremendous drive but could hardly be regarded as the only or even the chief motive in life. Pleasure for pleasure’s sake is frequently sought, but more often pleasure is not directly sought but rather some object or activity, and pleasure is merely an accompaniment. Hedonism as a principle of explaining motives is significant enough but cannot begin to account for all the facts. The chief defect of hedonism is that it claims far more than

² Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 7.

the facts warrant. Why this is so has already been pointed out.³

2. *Formalism.* Other names for formalism are rationalism, rigorism, absolutism, and duty ethics. It is also voluntaristic in that it regards the good will as the highest intrinsic value. This theory stresses rational self-consistency. One should live a life of reason. It is man's intellectual capacity that raises him above the brute, hence it is his duty to motivate his conduct by this superior faculty rather than feelings, instincts, sensation, emotions—characteristics which he shares with the lower forms of life. It is assumed that principles never change, that right is eternal, and that the moral law is the basis of the "ought" in duty. One should always do his duty regardless of consequences. "Nothing is fundamentally good," says Kant, "but the good will."

Formalistic theories of ethics overemphasize the intellectual and rational nature of man at the expense of the emotional and involuntary. Very few of our acts are motivated by rational considerations. Reason is often employed in the service of the impulsive desires as an afterthought to justify doing what one desires to do. In so far as it is a factor in motivation that factor is identical with ideas that have meaning and represent objects of desire or images capable of arousing real motives. There is no new motival factor here apart from ideas as motives, which were discussed fully in Chapter VIII, except possibly the belief in the doctrine that a life of reason is the highest value and in so far as this affects a person it modifies his conduct

³ See pp. 121ff.

accordingly. However, this seems rather too abstract to actually motivate conduct. And in each concrete instance other motives operate. Dewey is quite correct in the assertion that "The abstract idea of duty, like other abstract ideas, has naturally little motivating force."⁴

Duty for duty's sake is nonsense jargon. It has no content or meaning whatsoever so far as motives are concerned. The term duty has meaning only when conceived of in relation to the individual will and impulse. Moreover, it derives its moral quality from the same vital relationship. For, what is a duty for one man may not be so regarded by another. An act becomes my moral duty only when my own personality gives assent, when I am consciously bound up with the idea expressed in duty and appropriate it as my own personal ideal. One may argue on behalf of duty for duty's sake to an egocentric person till doomsday with no effect. To move him to modify his impulses he must be made to realize that the duty enjoined is related to his own personal "interests," in bringing rewards and punishments, the pleasure or satisfaction of realizing his best self (completer self), in expressing and developing the social side of his nature, and other similar appeals. The argument or urge which ultimately prevails will depend upon the capacity (original nature) and past experience of the person in question. "The feeling of duty," says Paulsen, "may have prevented much evil in the world, but the beautiful and the good

⁴ Dewey, *Interest and Effort in Education*, p. 88; cf. Link, "Dynamic Valuing Process," *American Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1922, p. 11.

have never sprung from the feeling of duty, but from the living impulses of the heart.”⁵

But is there nothing to be said for “a sense of duty” which compels a man to alter his course, to resist temptation, to undertake a dangerous or undesirable enterprise? Is it not possible for a man to be motivated by no other drive save the conviction that the thing is his duty? There is an obligation of oughtness in duty performed as an end, its own reward, “I have merely done my duty.” Again, this feeling of oughtness, this sense of duty is an abstraction. In so far as it has motivating force the urge will be found to be a definite principle of conduct, a habit, a character trait, a specific sentiment closely related to the self-regarding impulses, etc. The abstract notion of duty has no moving force; when expressed in a specific situation, the motive is more properly designated by some of the others we have mentioned, chiefly sentiment.

3. *Energism*. The chief end of human effort according to energism is self-realization and self-development, to develop one’s capacities to the utmost, to live the fullest, completest life possible. Personality is placed very high in the scale of values. Energism is claimed to be more inclusive than hedonism and formalism. Pleasure and a life of reason are not excluded, rather they are accepted as values but not supreme values. The chief objections to energism are two: (1) that it tends to be subjective and decidedly personal if not altogether egoistic and selfish; (2) as a standard of conduct it is rather vague and indefinite. What type of self is to be preferred? On what standard is

⁵ Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*, p. 355.

one to cultivate his personality and which traits shall he develop above others? If you must go outside of energism to find these standards, then you have introduced a higher value which negates the original contention of self-realization as the highest standard of conduct. The energist's reply is that if the *whole* self is cultivated the scale of values will take care of itself. This answer is not altogether satisfactory.

Our immediate problem, however, is not concerned with a theoretical appraisalment of energism, but whether or not it has dynamics for conduct, and if so, to what extent and how. Where, then, does the oughtness, urge, or drive of energism come in? Why should one want to cultivate his capacities to the utmost at the expenditure of great effort and "energy"? First of all, there is some satisfaction in the expenditure of energy which is its own drive. Second, the self-regarding impulses and sentiments may also be counted on for motivating conduct whose aim is self-realization. And, third, the "evolutionary urge" (if there be such a thing), the *élan vital*, the will to live, the will to power, and like expressions of a fundamentally social urge to move onward and upward may play a part in motivating the individual. But energism as such is too broad, too rational perhaps, to act as a specific motive. In writing these lines at this early hour in the morning when other members of the household are asleep, am I motivated by the urge of self-realization? If so, that drive was wholly unconscious, for I had not thought of it until this minute. It would seem that energism can only be a secondary motive in controlling and modifying motives already operative, in acting as a principle of selection between two conflicting motives. In so far

402 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

as it is a specific motive the real urge may be found in the self-regarding impulses and sentiments.

It might be well at this point to make a distinction between the urge of a primary motive and a value judgment or value appreciation.⁶ The impulsive drives are more or less spontaneous and are real springs of action. A value judgment is more rational. It is based on experience. It comes as an afterthought to regulate, modify or select among the drives. The sense of relative values, however, may operate as a selective agent so repeatedly as to make habitual certain types of conduct and inhibit others, in which case the real motive is that of a specific habit or of character in general. The *summum bonum* is significant as an attitude of mind which is bound to make a difference in choices and in the motivation of conduct in everyday life.

The urge of values, then, is the urge of attitude, of giving the organism a particular mental bent, a set, a readiness to react more favorably to some stimuli than to others. It functions only in the presence of real drives, objects or aims to be realized. But relegating values as motives to a secondary position by no means eliminates their significance for motivation. They yet play an important part in modifying conduct. Theories of ethics as factors in motivation we have just discussed. We turn now to a study of morals and morality.

MORALS: THE VIRTUES AS MOTIVES

Many people think of morals and morality in terms of virtue, or rather "the virtues"; temperance, pru-

⁶ Cf. Everett, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

dence, courage, cleanliness, orderliness, justice, veracity, benevolence, and the like. Aristotle's "golden mean" furnishes a good clue to the understanding of the virtues and their place in motivation. Courage, for instance, is a virtue because it avoids the extremes of cowardice and foolhardiness or rashness. Likewise, the other virtues are habits of life which in the long run bring the highest rewards of health, happiness, self-realization, and moral worth.⁷ In the cultivation of any virtue social pressure and the lure of desirable ends and values furnish the driving power. But once a virtue is established we properly speak of it as a habit. Each virtue, then, is a specific habit and has the motivating force of a habit. For the most part virtues are regulative, directive, inhibitory in their effect upon conduct; hence are secondary as motives. Virtues arise out of habitual ways of modifying natural impulses. Without these primary drives the virtues would never be needed. The total effect of all the virtues is self-control, self-mastery. "The power of self-control is the *sine qua non* of a secure morality." This is a further indication of the regulative nature of virtue.

The specific virtues, however, are determined by the mores, customs, and standards of a people. What is regarded as a virtue by one group may be disdained as folly by another. In other words, a sense of relative values determines the morals of a people not, however, in the abstract, formal sense, but in their practical everyday mode of life.⁸

⁷ Cf. Drake, *Problems of Conduct*, p. 141.

⁸ Lofthouse, *op. cit.*, p. 148. "A man may be a good *masai*, even if he slaughters an unsuspecting enemy in cold blood for the sake of a few head of cattle. A man may be a good Roman though he

Morality, then, means conformity to the values which the group has embodied in customs, standards, and laws. First and last the problem of morality is the problem of "getting on" in society, of living in peace and harmony, and mutual regard with one's fellows. At the outset the moral standards are imposed on the individual through a system of rewards and punishments, social pressure, training, discipline, education—in fine, all the machinery of socialization. But gradually the individual comes to accept these standards as his own, he identifies his best interests with the interests of the group. Social compulsion becomes moral impulsion. In so far as the individual has taken over the social standards of morality he has developed a conscience. But conscience includes more than conformity to moral standards; it includes religious elements which may conflict with the standards of the group; witness the "conscientious objector."⁹

MORALS AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

We despise and punish the man without moral standards because he does not play fair in the game of life. Consequently his conduct is detrimental to the other members of the group and to the game itself. For the sake of social integrity the moral standard must be upheld.¹⁰ Society employs numerous controls, but next to religious sentiments and ideals morality is the most effective because it carries a certain inward impulsion

condemns his own sons to execution. A man may be a good Red Indian, though he tortures his victims at the stake: just as a man might be a good Hebrew in the days of the Judges, though he sold his daughter into slavery (Exod. 21:7)."

⁹ Cf. Everett, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-277.

¹⁰ Cf. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 564 ff.

that is lacking in all external compulsion.¹¹ To move a person the strongest motive is the one that touches his life most intimately, a direct, rather than an indirect appeal, impulsion rather than compulsion. A society without morals is scarcely conceivable. Morality is one of the greatest regulating forces in any group. Without it social life is impossible. "Honor among thieves" is a good illustration of the absolute necessity of standards for maintaining the integrity of any group.

RELIGIOUS MOTIVES

Religion adds supernatural sanctions to morality. The two often overlap but are never identical, for morality is confined to human effort in meeting human needs both personal and social, while religion depends upon a "power not ourselves."¹² Religion is extremely difficult to define. Scarcely any two people will agree on a definition. A formal definition of religion, however, is unnecessary in this connection. It is sufficient to point out the essential elements upon which there is almost universal agreement, namely, that whenever the satisfaction of human need is sought by communion with a source other than human (some call it supernatural) there is present at least in germ, the religious attitude.¹³ In other words, some sort of deity

¹¹ Cf. Everett, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261; Drake, *op. cit.*, pp. 172, 174; Morrow, "The Approach to the Problem of Moral Motive," *International Journal of Ethics*, Jan., 1926, pp. 186-200.

¹² Cf. Drake, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

¹³ Cf. Professor Brightman's descriptive definition of religion; *An Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 318: "Religion is the total attitude of man toward what he considers to be superhuman and worthy of wor-

is essential to all religions. Almost every conceivable type of anthropomorphic, spiritual, animate, and even inanimate objects have been worshiped. Religion unifies a man's aims and purposes in life. It creates morale. It provides a sense of security, a belief in the "conservation of values."

The truth or falsity of any religion, the relative merits or demerits have no direct bearing on the problem before us. Our chief concern is to discover if possible the drives of religion in motivating conduct.¹⁴

Fear and awe in the presence of imminent dangers, forces and powers over which one has little or no control, mysteries which one cannot fathom are characteristic of primitive religions. Worship motivated by this type of fear consists in ceremonies calculated to placate the gods or powers that might do harm. Human emotions and human motives are ascribed to these spirits. Their aid is sought in securing the values of life. Magic, incantation, divination, enchantment, mystic and superstitious rites and ceremonies are methods employed by primitive man to induce the spiritual counterparts of natural phenomena to aid him in his struggle for existence. His wants are few—food, shelter, clothing—but not always easy to secure. Therefore he seeks to enlist the favor of the gods or friendly spirits, to appease or mollify the wrath or unfriendliness of the hostile spirits and to come into actual possession of the *mana*, or power of skill and strength

ship, or propitiation, or at least of reverence." Cf. also his *Religious Values* for a more comprehensive account of the whole subject of religion from the viewpoint of values.

¹⁴ Cf. Horton, "Origin and Psychological Function of Religion According to Pierre Janet," *American Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1924, p. 39.

in animals and natural phenomena through a vital relationship, such as eating the animal, worshipping the spirits in exact, precise ceremonials and sacrifices. The motive force of these ceremonials is a composite of numerous urges and is decidedly social in its manifestations. For primitive man they constitute practically the whole of his social, moral, and religious life, including also the rudiments of modern institutions.

The individual is absolutely bound to implicit obedience to the customs of his tribe as interpreted and directed by the shaman, the wizard, the exorcist, the medicine man or the holy man. He submits willingly and unreservedly. His ignorance of natural causes is supplemented by imaginative credulity and a sense of fear and awe in the presence of unexplained phenomena. He peoples the world with all sorts of spirits and goblins, and is frightened by the creatures of his own imagination. Gradually as the experience of the individual or tribe becomes more mature through discoveries of one sort or another as the result of trial and success, familiarity with things and natural causes, superstition begins to wane. The fundamental superstitions of primitive man have a strange power of reincarnation. The highest forms of civilized cults and religions are not wholly free from features that are not very far removed from the savage type. There are subtle forms of magic, very difficult to shake off.¹⁵

Thus the gods are not only to be feared, but also used ¹⁶ as means to securing the good things of this life and the next—to overcome the enemy, secure fertility

¹⁵ Cf. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 26.

¹⁶ Cf. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 206-207.

of fields and herds. Superstitious fear as an element of worship and the religious motive is gradually being eliminated as men come to understand the causes of natural phenomena and to think of the deity in spiritualistic rather than anthropomorphic terms. Fear in the form of awe and reverence is somewhat different. Its significance for motivation was treated in Chapter XX as one of the forms of love.

The more refined a religion is, the less stress it lays on securing gross physical wants from its deity, the less strongly motivated in its prayer and worship by such mundane considerations.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the urge of rewards and punishments is never wholly eliminated. The fear of hell used to be a powerful motive in religion. It is not nearly as potent now. The same is true of the lure of heaven. "Other-worldliness" and asceticism are intimately associated with historical Christianity. There was a time when this world was considered of no value at all, it was regarded merely as a preliminary stage, a preparation for the world to come. Such a belief was bound to make men more or less indifferent to the "sufferings of the present world," to the needed social and moral reforms. Personal salvation used to be a stronger motive than it is now. In asceticism, in a hermit life, in running away from society and social problems men sought to save their souls. That seems rather selfish to the modern man. He is not very strongly motivated by such a doctrine. The sense of guilt and sin is not as strongly felt as it used to be, hence not so potent a factor in motivation.

While the rewards and punishments, other-worldli-

¹⁷ Cf. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

ness, salvation, and many other of the old-fashioned religious motives and sanctions have lost something of their former potency, their loss is only relative and not altogether unmitigated from the larger and more spiritualistic viewpoint of religion. For, the motive of fear and rewards is not a very high type of motivation. Höffding rightly observes that "Where the thought of reward or punishment awarded by the deity in this or another life is of preponderating importance, we find ourselves confronted by a low motive, even when the tendency which it produces in certain cases is deserving in other respects."¹⁸ He goes on to tell of the woman who walked the streets of Damascus with a pan of fire in one hand and a jug of water in the other to "burn up Paradise and put out the fires of hell, so that men may do good for the love of God."

While some are inclined to lament the diminution of these motives in religion others hail it as a sign of progress. They see in it the sloughing off merely of the cruder and more primitively anthropomorphic phases of religion. They believe that the distinctly spiritual motive of religion is gaining, that more men are more intensely motivated by a firm conviction that the world-ground is moral, that good will ultimately triumph, that God is on the side of virtue and right and justice, that human enterprise, devotion, and consecrated ingenuity is needed to bring in more speedily the kingdom of God, and that such help is unstintingly offered by men of all walks of life. "Religion," according to Myers, "in its most permanent sense, is the adjustment of our emotions to the structure of the uni-

¹⁸ Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 328.

410 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

verse.”¹⁹ Religion helps the individual to adjust himself to his environment, it helps him to sublimate his thwarted desires, to keep a “straight upper lip,” to maintain his moral integrity, to unify his course of action, to live supremely and joyously in a world of strife and disappointment, to remain steady in the midst of a thousand disillusionments. “The reality answering to the idea of God, it may be said, must include, at its best, all that is involved in the deep instinctive historical and social consciousness of the race. It signifies the justice which government symbolizes, the truth which science unfolds, and the beauty which art strives to express. The attributes in the conception of God are as numerous as the ideal interests of those who use it, for it signifies the totality of our purposes and values.”²⁰ “Faith,” says Hocking, “is the loyal determination and resolve which sees the world as it is capable of becoming and commits its future to the effort to make real what it sees. The religious creed or world-view becomes a postulate rather than either an empirical discovery or a revelation to be obediently received.”²¹

There is another religious motive: many people “enjoy their religion.” To them it is an end as well as means. Many take their religion rather quietly, others are quite demonstrative. They sing, shout, jump, roll and go into ecstasies of rapture. Some of the religious sects believe in and practice a lot of “fireworks.” Not

¹⁹ Myers, *Human Personality*, p. 11; cf. Betts, *How to Teach Religion*, p. 63: “Matthew Arnold tells us that religion is ‘morality lit by emotion.’ We turn to God for our inspiration, for the quickening of our motives, for fellowship, communion and comfort.”

²⁰ Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 208.

²¹ Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 148.

a few become fanatical on religion. The emotional outbursts at camp meetings and so-called revivals are notorious for their religious fervor, to put it mildly. The mystic personalizes his religion. To him God is the supreme object of his desire. The contemplation and love of God becomes a master motive. Naught else matters. He gives up all in order to possess God. What is a master motive to the mystic is also a dominating motive to the devout worshiper—to know the will or mind of God in order to please him. The savage sought to appease the wrath of his divinity through fear; a devotee of the more refined religions seeks to commune with his God through love. To please God and to enjoy him forever is to many religionists the chief end of man, the highest of all values and motives.

Not only do men seek to know God and enjoy him but also to understand his will concerning their lives in order to coöperate in the conservation of values, in ushering in the “kingdom of God” more and more completely, in enhancing human values (personal and social), in enriching the moral content of our existence, in spreading the ideals of universal peace and good will and brotherhood, in brief, the desire to align one’s self on the side of the power not ourselves which makes for righteousness. This is the most worthy of all religious motives. It is seemingly gaining force and favor over the lower motives of fear and the drive of the loaves and fishes.

Religion is also a means of self-expression. All men are on the same footing. God is no respecter of persons. He is a loving Father, all are his children and brothers in Christ. The self-regarding impulses and sentiments are important in this connection. The in-

instinct of submission prompts the worshiper to humble himself before his God; the instinct of self-assertion is also operative. For, while he belittles himself, "a worm of the dust," in the presence of the Omnipotent One, yet he is highly pleased and complimented that the greatest personality, the highest power in all the universe is not indifferent to him, is in fact not only moved by his petitions but actually loves him infinitely more than is possible for an earthly parent. It is a tremendous motive to feel one's self loved and cared for by the creator and controller of all destinies. Thus a man comes to identify himself with the Absolute. And this is the supreme privilege and highest motive of any religion that is worthy of this enlightened age. This adds greatly to a man's self-respect, increases his power, creates in him a superb morale, lends dignity to the commonplace duties of everyday life, places value on all worthy effort, and promises much for the conservation of values.

As a means of social control religion is superb. It commandeers the whole personality, body, mind, and spirit. It takes hold of a man right where he lives, in the most intimate and vital way. "Religion alone offers a field for the play of all capacities and impulses."²²

Summary of religious motives: (1) fear and awe; (2) the lure of rewards and punishments; (3) sense of guilt and the desire for forgiveness; (4) love of God; (5) self-expression, self-abasement and self-expansion; (6) conservation of values (desire for personal immortality); (7) faith in the inherent goodness of the world-order; (8) sharing the life and power of God—"stimu-

²² Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

lation through alliance and friendship with the unseen"; (9) source of discipline and control (personal and social); (10) as an end in itself, enjoying one's religion.

PHILOSOPHY

"It is a man's idea, his philosophy, that fixes the *angle of impact* of all experience upon him, and so decides what 'effect' that experience will have."²³ This offers a good clue to the place of philosophy in motivation. Philosophy as such is abstract; it cannot motivate conduct. But some specific system of philosophy affects a man's point of view, colors his outlook upon life, determines his scale of values, and then profoundly influences his choices. This is a secondary drive, it is regulative, it fixes the attitude which, as we have pointed out, is a very significant factor in motivation. Every stimulus or urge or motive must reckon with a person's "set," readiness, attitude, at the given time. A man need not be an accomplished philosopher, trained in abstract thinking, or have a taste for metaphysical speculation, in order to have a philosophy of life or be influenced by a system of ideas which may be only partially consistent and held under some other name. Every normal person has some philosophy of life although he may not recognize it by that title. Some arrive at their conclusion by a careful systematic study of the problems of reality; some take it over on authority, ready-made; and some drift into it through the force of circumstances. Each man's philosophy is colored by his native disposition and his practical contact with the world in his everyday experiences. No

²³ Hocking, *Morale and Its Enemies*, p. 199.

man can go through life and never ask himself why he is here; whither he is going; whether things are as they seem; what are time and space; what and where is God; whether the universe is ruled by chance or purpose; whether there is an after-life; what are the realities; how may they be known; whether the governing principle in the world order is unitary, dual, or multiple; what is his own relationship to this "blumming buzzing" whirl of experience; whether it is all one grand dream; whether he may trust his senses. Variouslly stated these and other problems of metaphysics confront every intelligent person. And the nature of mind is such that very few are able to suspend judgment for long. One cannot keep a speculative question in the mind for any length of time without finding some sort of answer. It is a notorious fact that the least disciplined mind is the first to answer, and to answer with confidence the most perplexing problems of philosophy. He is likely to be dogmatic to boot.

In the great majority of instances a man's philosophy of life is a gradual unconscious development. It is tacitly assumed and practically applied. Very few could tell you offhand to what school of thought they belong, whether the idealistic, realistic, materialistic, etc., to say nothing of the fine distinctions within each group. Perhaps they have never heard of the distinction between objective idealism and subjective idealism, or of any idealism as a system of philosophy. Nevertheless, these same people are motivated in their conduct, their attitude and outlook upon life is such as to be easily classified under some system of philosophy. Although few if any—from the illiterate man to the trained philosopher—are wholly consistent; yet we all

approximate consistency, at least in a practical way. If a man is essentially a materialist he will react a little differently from the idealist to a similar situation. This is true of whole communities and nations as well as individuals. During the War we heard a great deal about a nation's philosophy and its influence in motivating the conduct of a people. In some instances this influence was greatly exaggerated but the very exaggeration bears eloquent testimony to the force of philosophy in practical affairs. The aim of true philosophy is the quest of ultimate, final truth or reality and also of universal, comprehensive truth. It is the quest for the right interpretation of all the facts and values of the universe in so far as we are able to comprehend them and their relationships. Hence philosophy is the most comprehensive of all approaches to the problems of life and also of motives. There might even be a philosophy of motivation which would seek to relate the various motives in a comprehensive way, to interpret their significance not only in the conduct of individuals and groups but also in its relation to all the other facts and values of the world order.

Philosophy, then, is essentially an attitude motive, it is regulative, it is usually unconscious, very much like a person's disposition or temperament—it is a mental disposition, an ideational set.

SCIENCE

The term science as such is another abstraction incapable of motivating conduct, but the scientific spirit, the objective point of view, the desire to understand and master natural forces, to create and conserve values, sheer joy and satisfaction in the mere quest of

scientific knowledge are decidedly factors in motivation. Man is inherently interested in understanding, directing, and controlling the forces of nature, of harnessing them to do his bidding, to satisfy his curiosity, minister to his material needs, feed his pride and allay his fears.²⁴

Like philosophy, science is an intrinsic and an instrumental motive. It is useful in satisfying other wants and motives; it is a drive for its own sake and in its own behalf as a game to be enjoyed. The scientific interest, or rather the interest in some scientific research, is both a mechanism and a drive.

²⁴ Cf. Edman, *Human Traits and Their Social Significance*, pp. 387, 411: "Curiosity, the instinctive basis of the desire to know, is the basis of scientific inquiry. Without this fundamental desire, there could be no sustaining motive to deep and thoroughgoing scientific research, for theoretical investigations do not always give promise of immediate practical benefits. The scientific interest is a development of that restless curiosity for a knowledge of the world in which they are living which children so markedly exhibit. Beginning as a kind of miscellaneous and omnivorous appetite for facts of whatever description, it grows into a desire to understand the unsuspected and hidden relations between facts, to penetrate to the unities discoverable beneath the mysteries and multiplicities of things.

"In Art and Science, man attempts to transform the world of nature into conditions more in conformity with his desires. In the enterprise of Morals, man attempts to discover how to control his own nature in the attainment of happiness."

CHAPTER XXII

ECONOMIC MOTIVES

“From wants for goods and services arises the so-called economic motives—the desire for wealth.”¹ Tap a man’s pocketbook and you strike a gusher in the field of human motivation. Under the present social order almost every social problem (and the overwhelming majority of personal problems) is directly or indirectly a problem of economics. Economic wealth has only instrumental value to be sure, but because it is so often the only means to intrinsic values, its influence is terrific in motivating human conduct in general. Moreover, the weight of social pressure happens to be on the side of wealth. It is the man of means who is envied, and what society envies she values and what she values she sets up as prizes to be striven for, and these prizes become master motives if not obsessions in the life of the individual. Many of our wants are for material things and what may be purchased by money. Economics as a science lays down the principles and policies by which these wants may be satisfied in the most efficient manner both for the individual and for society. Economic values are determined by human wants and wants are motives; hence, economic problems are also ultimately problems of motivation. Economics, how-

¹ Dickinson, *Economic Motives*, p. 212; cf. Parker, “Motives in Economic Life,” *American Economic Review*, 1918, Vol. VIII, pp. 212-231.

418 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

ever, deals with a rather restricted phase of the general problem of motivation since directly and primarily it is concerned with only a special type of wants, the material. Of course this has important, though indirect and incidental, bearings on practically all other motives. This, however, is only another way of saying that motives intersect or overlap which is true no matter where you dissect motives. The final chapter is devoted to the interaction of motives. In the present chapter the primary concern is economic motives or material wants and the motive force of the drives and mechanisms in actualizing these wants. The topics to be considered are: work, advertising and salesmanship, motives of rivalry, domination and exploitation, the profits motive, the something-for-nothing motive, and the motive of sympathy or social service.

WORK

With the meager original wants for food, shelter, and clothing, and very little of shelter and clothing in the primitive stage, man's economic motives were simple enough. There was very little demand for work and precious little was done, particularly in tropical climates where there was a readily accessible food supply and no "off" seasons to provide for in advance. There was probably plenty of activity but not a great deal that could be classified as work. Gradually wants began to multiply as men were forced, by the diminishing food supply or for other causes, to migrate into the colder regions where better shelter and more clothing were necessary and where the need of storing up food for the winter months was imperative.

As machinery is devised for meeting wants, new

wants are created. As new wants somehow spring up, machinery is invented to meet these wants. This cycle has been greatly accelerated in modern times through the enormous advance in the discovery and use of high-powered machinery. The average citizen has more luxuries to-day than the monarch of a few decades ago. And not only is this true of the artificial wants of luxury but also in regard to a great number of the so-called necessities. Luxuries are constantly transferred into necessities. A few years ago the telephone, the automobile, electric lights, modern plumbing and sanitary housing and housekeeping devices, and a host of other commodities were considered luxuries. To-day they are necessities.

But we need to inquire more specifically concerning these constantly increasing wants: Are they new motives? Are they motives at all? Are not the economic wants merely the means—becoming more and more diversified—but nevertheless means, of satisfying the fairly constant number of fundamental human motives already discussed? This is true in the sense that the other motives are nearly always involved either primarily or secondarily, directly or indirectly. But the statement is untrue in so far as new mechanisms also constitute new drives; that is, each new want is liable to create a new interest in the object which satisfies that want and is, for all intents and purposes, a new motive or drive.

Creating new economic wants and modifying old ones is merely another phase of the general problem of acquired and substitute motives discussed in an earlier chapter. The psychic factors relative to motives, chiefly the fate of motives, are identical. Because eco-

conomic wants are so intimately related to things, there is danger of shifting the point of view from the subjective to the objective factors. This is serious in motivation because once you shift to the objective things there is no limit to the number and nature of the stimuli that may arouse a motive. But we are compelled to take account of some of the objective considerations in order to understand the motives, our primary concern. Money, for example, is simply a means of exchange in goods, labor, and commodities. It is the standard of material values and the measure of economic wealth. Money has no intrinsic value except to the miser and even to him it is objective enough as such. And yet what a tremendous rôle money plays in conduct as means motive, as preparatory reaction motive! No wonder men strive so diligently to possess it. The might of the dollar is no myth. Money is the root of much evil as well as good simply because it is the means of satisfying most of our wants and motives. And when social pressure, the most powerful instrument of social control, forms an alliance with wealth and with money as the measure of wealth, we have the all too-familiar problems of modern society.² So many intrinsic values and end motives are realizable only through money and wealth that men come to draw the false inference that all values are derived therefrom. "What is he worth?" is a significant phrase—as though the dollar sign were the measure of a man's true worth, his character, his intellectual attainments, his value to society.

All this has a profound significance for work. Formerly the individual produced for himself. The family

² Cf. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 51.

used to be the economic unit. Through the coöperative efforts of the individual members, the family supplied its own wants. The problem of distribution was not very acute. Now the individual produces for society and the problem of distribution is one of the most perplexing of modern times. Not so much what a man puts into his work as what he gets out of it, motivates him in the enterprise. The strictly economic phase of the problem of distribution would be solved if each worker received a just share of the product of his labor. But for motivation the problem is a great deal more complex. Men select their occupation, in so far as they are free to choose, and remain in it not only for the financial returns, although that is always an important consideration, but also from numerous other motives, such as physical and mental adaptations, types of human associations and contacts, social pressure or the relative value placed upon it by the social code, amount of freedom from restraint or domination by others, opportunities for self-expression and self-realization. Thus a man may choose to work for less pay and longer hours provided he finds the task congenial to his tastes and capacities. The "white-collar jobs," such as clerking, bookkeeping and the like, are often preferred, at less pay, to the mechanical trades because the latter require overalls. Almost every one is influenced by the opportunities for self-expression. A certain amount of drudgery is incidental to all types of work, but it is made endurable by the elements which minister to fundamental impulses and self-regarding sentiments. A man is more than a machine. While machinery has released man from a great deal of labor that is menial and sheer drudgery it has also intro-

422 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

duced the factory system and standardized large-scale production which virtually make of the worker a mere cog in the wheels of industry, robbing him of every opportunity for initiative, self-direction, and self-expression. The loss here must somehow be made up to him if he is to remain healthy and contented. Then, too, there are those who prefer large financial returns to all other considerations because they think they can buy other values or because they hope to retire early and find leisure and means to do the things which shall feed the starved portions of their natures.

Money, except for the miser, and work, except for the unusual man to whom it is a game or hobby, are means motives and secondary drives, but because of social conditions and environmental forces they modify greatly the original drives, weakening, strengthening, inhibiting the primary motives and creating new mechanisms and drives.

ADVERTISING AND SALESMANSHIP

Advertising is wants propaganda. It is not only the means of marketing products but also of creating new wants for new commodities. A person may not know that a certain want exists until some new appliance is invented and its use demonstrated. He then finds it a necessity that he cannot do without. There are people who want almost everything they see. They want it all the more if some friend or neighbor has one. The characteristic restlessness of this age is probably due in part to the enormous increase in wants that can be satisfied only by wealth and material possessions. The failure to secure these in legitimate ways may account for the increase in crime.

Advertising and salesmanship depend largely on suggestion and association. They make appropriate suggestions and arouse pleasant associations relative to the article in question. And because of severe competition it is not sufficient merely to appeal to an old want or simply to create a new want. The particular "make" must be emphasized; hence the necessity of trade marks and "beware of substitutes," "get the genuine." The trade name is always conspicuous in all advertising. Sometimes nothing else is displayed. Advertising propaganda aims primarily at two objectives: (1) to secure attention, (2) to make an agreeable impression, forming a pleasant association with something that people want or may want and the particular brand the advertiser wishes to sell. Everything else centers around these two aims. The skills of the artist, the cartoonist, the designer of color schemes and of comic or striking cuts are employed as means to these ends. Advertising is mental photography. By the use of the artist's skill the advertisement secures your attention and poses for a mental photograph. The picture may be a snapshot (as posters seen from a moving train) or a time exposure (advertisements inside trains, trolley cars, newspapers, magazines, etc.). Advertising, then, depends upon the laws of attention and the laws of association for its success. Very little use is made of other elements except indirectly or incidentally and by way of suggestion. The main appeal, and the one on which chief reliance is placed, is emotional, a pleasant association.

But back of all advertising and salesmanship is the whole field of motivation. If motivation may be regarded as a science then advertising and salesmanship

constitute the art of that science for they make practical use of almost every principle of motivation. Sound advertising and good salesmanship are based on human appeals and human motives. The successful salesman knows human nature. He also knows how to apply his knowledge in a given case by "sizing up" his prospect and adapting his methods. He seeks to arouse and enlist as many motives as possible in behalf of what he has for sale. Advertising and salesmanship are given an important place on the curriculum of business colleges and, of course, by those who are actually engaged in business enterprises apart from the advertising specialist and the "man on the road." A great deal of literature is published on the subject. The common purpose is to determine the motives of appeal and how to arouse them most effectively relative to a given commodity or project. For example, Whitehead in his *Principles of Salesmanship* has a chapter on "Motives behind All Buying." In this he lists nine main motives to which a successful salesman appeals: (1) the desire for gain; (2) the desire to excel; (3) the appeal to caution; (4) the desire for knowledge; (5) the appeal of imitation; (6) the appeal to affection; (7) love of praise; (8) the pleasure of possession; (9) appeal to as many instincts as possible.³ "The art of salesmanship," according to Pierce, "is the art of making somebody want one thing more than another."⁴ And this is

³ Cf. Eastman, *Psychology of Salesmanship*, pp. 191-207; Snow, *Psychology of Advertising*, p. 11; Starch, *Principles of Advertising*, Part III, "The Appeals." (This contains an elaborate analysis and classification of human motives and their significance for business.); Franken, "Advertising Appeals Selected by Methods of Direct Impression," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, June, 1924, pp. 232-244.

⁴ Pierce, *Our Unconscious Mind*, p. 305; cf. *ibid.*, p. 308.

done most effectively through the science and art of motivation.

The relative strength of motives regarding a specific commodity or project is especially significant in advertising and salesmanship. In the interest of efficiency the strongest motive or the most favorable combinations of them must be appealed to. This is determined by extensive experiments in the laboratory and in the practical business world. Most of the knowledge is gained by the trial-and-error method. Statistics are compiled for general use and for specific commodities. As an illustration of the former, Hollingworth's "table of persuasiveness" may be cited. The list represents "the relative strength of various appeals to instincts and interests as determined by experiments on the pulling power of advertisements . . . when men and women are combined: Healthfulness, cleanliness, scientific construction, time saved, appetizing, efficiency, safety, durability, quality, modernity, family affection, reputation of firm, guarantee, sympathy, medicinal, imitation, elegance, courtesy, economy, affirmation, sport, hospitality, avoid substitutes, clan feeling, nobby, recommendation, social superiority, imported, beautifying."⁵ As an illustration of arriving at the relative pulling power regarding a specific commodity we might cite MacPherson's experiment. He submitted a set of twenty advertisements of breakfast foods to fifty students with instructions to arrange these advertisements in the order of their persuasive power. The results of the test are reported by his experimenter as follows:

⁵ Hollingworth, *Advertising and Selling*, p. 78.

426 THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION

"Cleanliness is clearly first; Doctor's recommendation clearly second; an aid to success in life, taste, health tie for third place; sold by reliable firm, recommended by Roosevelt, and cheap tie for fourth place; then follow process of manufacture, sold everywhere, patronize home industry, royalty, magnificent factory, and finally souvenir spoon, which is clearly last."⁶

Advertising, salesmanship, and indeed all propaganda have another practical problem to consider. It is not always sufficient to secure merely intellectual assent when the object is to secure action. The emotions and sentiments must also be enlisted.⁷ But, again, motives and their effective combinations is the problem.

A knowledge of motivation is essential to the advertising specialist, the salesman, and the propagandist in every field. It may also be useful to the general public as a means of self-defense.

THE PROFITS MOTIVE

One principle of the profits motive says, "Charge all that the traffic will bear." The chief urge is personal profits, the motive is decidedly selfish. If any benefits accrue to the public, well and good, but if public interests stand in the way of profits, "the public be damned." This is the profits motive in its pure and extreme form. In actual life, however, it does not always function in quite that way. For one thing, the profits motive is too abstract to motivate anything. Profits are realized in terms of money and wealth. These as motives have already been discussed in part. Attention is now called to the motives of rivalry, domination and exploitation

⁶ MacPherson, *The Psychology of Persuasion*, p. 159.

⁷ Cf. Scott, *Influencing Men in Business*, pp. 125, 127.

with their attendant social problems as the practical outcome of the profits motive in business.

RIVALRY AND DOMINATION

Men seek profits from various ulterior motives. One of these is rivalry for the sake of domination. The instincts of self-assertion and pugnacity are doubtless stronger in some than in others. The profits motive affords an opportunity for indulging these drives "within the law" and for securing social approval in the envy of the crowd to boot. The accumulation of vast fortunes is a kind of game. It shows how clever the player is. It appeals to his "sporting blood" if he must risk something, overcome obstacles, crush a competitor. Is not the ability to produce results, to succeed, to amass a fortune a sure and positive sign of a man's greatness? Wealth is power and power means opportunity for domination and domination in its various manifestations feeds the inflated ego-maximation. It is legalized warfare of the bloodiest sort transferred from the physical to the mental and industrial world. Its appeal is correspondingly greater. "We may not," says Ruskin, "strangle our neighbor by superior strength, out of hate for him; but we may by superior shrewdness starve him, out of love for ourselves."⁸

EXPLOITATION

Domination might be regarded as one form of exploitation. The profits motive affords opportunity for many types of exploitation: commercialization of amusements, of the press, of public lands and other

⁸ Ruskin, *A Joy Forever*.

resources, of the machinery of government. Even art and religion are not free from exploitation. Perhaps the worst form of all is the exploitation of child labor and the personalities of men and women as well. The profits motive may be sound economically, but it is vicious from the viewpoint of social psychology and public morals, and what is destructive of human values cannot be a wise business policy in the long run. The profits motive places the emphasis on things rather than on human persons, on the product rather than on the producer and the consumer. Ross proposes the following motives as a check to the profits motive: (1) pleasure in creative ability; (2) pride in the perfection of one's product; (3) accepted standards of technical excellence which forbid the putting forth of a ware or a service which falls below a certain degree of merit; (4) abhorrence of sham or humbug in one's work, desire to render loyal service, to market genuine goods; (5) solicitude for the welfare of the customer or patron, prompting one to refuse to supply him with that which will disappoint, defraud, or harm him; (6) doing one's work as a service to society.⁹ These motives are operative in a measure along side of the profits motives in business and more thoroughly in the professions. But everywhere in the economic world the profits motive is a strong factor.

SOMETHING-FOR-NOTHING MOTIVE

With some the profits motive amounts to an obsession. They want to get rich quick. They are looking for something for nothing. These are the "suckers"

⁹ Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

who bite on all sorts of wildcat schemes devised to "beat the game." However, they merely illustrate the extreme of a common enough trait. The enormous amount of money ¹⁰ annually invested in impossible enterprises by people from all walks of life shows how strong this motive is. It is said that the names of those who have made such ventures are sold to other "promoters" and that the sale price increases materially with each successive time that the person is taken in. It would seem that one's profit in wisdom by the experience should offset the financial losses. But rather the contrary is the case. The motive of appeal is the desire to make good in the new venture the losses of the past. The sharks are not slow to capitalize this motive. Some of the schemes are so transparently unsound in the light of common-sense business principles that one marvels how any person in his right mind could possibly be deceived. But that is just the point: rational considerations are subordinated to the emotional. The something-for-nothing motive becomes attached to a particular project resulting in an overvalued idea; or, more accurately, a sentiment complex is established amounting to an obsession or even to frenzy in the more extreme cases. As in all other obsessions, sound, impartial, objective reasoning is suspended. What reasoning is done simply reënforces the obsession by reading ideal and desirable reasons and motives into the situation. Once this stage is reached it is difficult to break the spell of the obsession. No one wants to be disillusioned in anything—concern-

¹⁰ Kirshman, *Principles of Investment*, p. 10: "The amount annually lost [by the people of the United States] in worthless securities has been variously estimated from \$250,000,000.00 upwards."

ing love, an automobile, a pet philosophy, or a religious belief. We hug our delusions and refuse to give them up. A little study, some first-hand investigation could easily dispel many a superstitious belief or expose a fake business scheme, but often we studiously refuse to investigate and resent it if the knowledge is forced to our attention. A student reports: "I was mad enough to lick the fellow who disillusioned me concerning the Santa Claus myth."

One explanation for this curious phenomenon may be that disillusionment reacts unfavorably on the self-regarding sentiments. It is not pleasant to have your castle tumble down on your head, an air castle as well as a real one. As applied to the problem at hand it may be that the something-for-nothing motive is so strongly enlisted that, like the drowning person, one desperately grasps at every straw. This seems a little far-fetched until we take into account the psychology of "beating the game." Unless a man has developed an inferiority complex he acts as though he believed in a special providence directing his destiny. He is the exception to the folly and misfortunes of the race. This is why he goes to the theater for a good laugh at the foibles of frail humanity instead of psychoanalyzing himself. He knows that laws are necessary and their enforcement absolutely essential to public morale—so far as the other fellow is concerned. If he breaks any part of the social code he will not be caught in the first place, and if he is caught he should receive special considerations. Of course he knows that "you can't beat the game" and heartily approves of Josh Billings' witticism that "when anyone offers you something for nothing it is time to holler for the police." And yet he

seems to act on the assumption that he is the exception to all rules, that he can actually beat the game. This illusion is responsible for the success of wildcat schemes.

All gambling and "sporting" devices are motivated largely by the something-for-nothing motive together with the tacit subtle assumption that while others may not be able to beat the game the individual in question may do it. Premiums offered with articles of purchase are also an appeal to the same something-for-nothing motive.

MOTIVE OF SYMPATHY AND SOCIAL SERVICE

The economic motives thus far considered are selfish, in that the individual is seeking to enhance his own power and prestige and general welfare primarily. To one so motivated society and social considerations are secondary. In case of conflict the latter is sacrificed. There is, however, another motive in industry as well as elsewhere. This is the opposite motive. It identifies the self with society to the extent of deriving greater pleasure and satisfaction from striving to enhance the welfare of the group than with the more strictly personal aspects of his experience. This we call the motive of sympathy¹¹ or social service. The ideal type is that which finds the *ego* and *alter* motives in a well-balanced combination.

The motive of sympathy and social service is assumed in most of the professions, chiefly, the ministry, teaching, medicine, and, to a lesser degree, in law, just as the profits motive is assumed in business. However,

¹¹ For a fuller discussion of sympathy as motive see pp. 336 ff. Here we are concerned with the special application of this motive in business.

a great many business men are also adopting professional standards and are motivated by sympathy and social service. The golden rule in industry is being seriously tried and tried successfully by some. Religious teachings and the spread of sympathy and the humanitarian ideal are responsible for no small part of this pressure to humanize business, to subject it to moral standards. The public moral conscience has reached the point now where it will not accept "tainted money," funds donated to a worthy cause but accumulated by questionable and anti-social practices. Ill-gotten gain may be a decided handicap to a man. Instead of being envied he is likely to be strongly censured and despised. Moreover, the traditional distinctions between what used to be called secular and the religious, and the "callings" as contrasted with ordinary work no longer hold. Every legitimate enterprise is regarded as a calling if motivated by sympathy and social service. Ethical codes and standards and traditions among professional men foster the ideal of service. A reputable physician does not advertise or exploit a scientific discovery for personal profit. A clergyman does not bring suit against a church for back pay or go out on strike for an increase in salary. Every profession and some of the trades have their special code. It would be a fine thing if all business concerns could also adopt some definite standard as indeed many of them have already done.¹² But the fraternal ties here are not so binding as in the professions nor is there the same opportunity for personal

¹² Heermance, *Codes of Ethics* contain a classified list of codes of ethics gathered from several hundred business organizations. Cf. Tausch, *Professional and Business Ethics*.

responsibility and personal pride in the products of one's labor. Nevertheless, the trend in business is away from the profits motive to that of social service.¹³

¹³ For other phases of this problem, see discussion on altruism, philanthropy and humanitarianism as love sentiments, pp. 381ff.

CHAPTER XXIII

MORALE AS MOTIVE

ESPRIT DE CORPS

Esprit de corps, loyalty, sportsmanship, teamwork, comradeship, the "we-feeling," morale are familiar expressions typifying a state of harmony, elation, efficiency, and coöperative effort on the part of a group with a common purpose or, in case of an individual, the sense of elated coördination of all of one's forces and abilities, sense of fitness, readiness for any emergency, optimism—very like euphoria.¹ The term morale, like a number of others, gained prominence and popularity as a result of the World War. During the War, it was evident that the side possessing the best morale would win out. This conviction became more pronounced after Russia collapsed. The Central Allies, realizing that the issue depended as much upon the peoples at home as upon the fighting men, made every effort to break down the morale of opposing nations and to build up their own through elaborate propaganda. The Entente Allies also made a systematic study and use of the motive force of morale. For many months it was a question of morale rather than of armies and navies, that was to determine, and that did finally determine, the issue. The morale of the Central Allies gave way first in Bulgaria, then in Turkey and Austria and finally in Germany.

¹ Cf. Hall, *Morale*, p. 17.

Any motive force that could play such a decisive part in a great world war is worthy of serious consideration here. G. Stanley Hall, at the invitation of the United States Government, prepared an article on "Morale in War and After,"² in connection with other articles for the Student Army Training Corps. He says of morale, "When and where it is strongest, it makes the individual feel 'fit' for any task. It also gives him a sense of solidarity with his comrades seeking the same end, and enables him to do or to suffer in a common cause."³ Morale, according to Hocking, "is the perpetual ability to come back."⁴ Morale is superb courage, healthy-mindedness, psychic regimen. "Napoleon is reported to have said that morale was to other factors that win a war as three is to one. Pershing and the other commanding generals have said they believed that he was right."⁵

Morale, though more conspicuous in war and games requiring teamwork (football, baseball, tug-of-war, and the like) is also essential to any organized group effort, from a business enterprise to an effective church organization. Every member of a business concern must have confidence in the enterprise and devote himself unreservedly to the task. Loyalty to the common cause is essential to the integrity of any group just as confidence in the inherent soundness of the world order, in one's own ability, and loyalty to one's ideals and principles are necessary for personal morale. Indeed, morale is one of the most significant factors in the

² Hall, *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. XV, No. 11, Nov., 1918.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Hocking, *Morale and Its Enemies*, p. 14.

⁵ Gulick, *Morals and Morale*, p. 11.

whole of human striving. Every constructive effort for individual or social betterment aims at creating and maintaining a better morale. Religion, morality, government, clubs, organizations, institutions, all strive to inspire, instruct, make more effective the individual and group efforts. In terms of values, morale is harmonized values.

The final test of all institutions of education and religion alike, as well as experience itself, is what they do for will, feeling, emotion, sentiment, or in a word for disposition. . . . Does man find his pleasure in things he ought to? Can he face the world with joy and confidence and get real happiness out of the fundamental things of life; or is he depressed, discouraged, and prone to lose hope? How the world loves the buoyant temperament, the cheerful optimist, the man who is always near the top of his condition, who can see the good side of others, of life, and things in general! Whether in the trenches or in home life his fellow-men turn to him and dub him "good fellow"; the degree *summa cum laude* which the folk confers upon its favorites. Some call it super-health or life abounding. It is simply high morale.⁶

Morale, like many other significant motives, is secondary, regulative, directive, modifying the primary motives. It is an attitude, a disposition, a readiness or set. It predisposes a person to a certain type of reaction. Morale could scarcely be an end in itself. It is the composite aim of all human striving. Of itself it cannot motivate conduct. We repeat, its place in motivation is chiefly regulative. In this sense, it is a secondary drive. However, morale has many elements worthy of consideration, for each is a factor in motivation as well as the composite which we call morale. Some

⁶Hall, *Morale*, pp. 361-362.

of these elements are tradition, sentiment and sentimentality, ideals, faith, hope, immortality, public opinion, propaganda.

TRADITION, THE "WE-FEELING"

Tradition is essential to maintaining a high morale. Loyalty means adherence to a body of common experiences and understanding, to tradition. From the sociological point of view tradition is "stored social values," the means of transmitting the social heritage. It is the memory of the race. It is embodied in institutions. It is usually conservative, analogous to heredity in biological continuity. It is the content of the social or group mind in so far as such a thing is possible.

Tradition is not only the bond of solidarity in a group or groups of contemporaries, but also reaches back to the very beginning of communal life among our semi-human ancestors, and is a potential bond with all succeeding generations of humankind. Each group, from the family to the tribe or nation and relatively permanent groups of clubs and organizations of all kinds has its peculiar traditions. Each school and college has its traditions. Every trade and profession has its traditional initiations for the novice, its code of ethics, its precedents, which carry over from generation to generation. These are constantly modified by the slow process of evolution. Some slight innovation repeated soon becomes an established precedent and finally part of the tradition. In the interpretation of law by lawyers and judges more than by juries precedent is all-important.

Any common experience—hardships endured, obstacles overcome, pleasures enjoyed, sorrows shared,

etc.—is likely to create a mutual feeling of regard, the “we-feeling,” traditions. The sharing of some common experience is likely to lead to the formation of some organization for the purpose of perpetuating the traditions resulting therefrom: witness the American Legion, the society of the survivors of the *Titanic*, the Daughters of the American Revolution, *ad infinitum*. Ross is of the opinion that “the we-feeling is not the outcome of mere juxtaposition, but depends on certain favoring circumstances” among which he names crisis, harmony of interests, conversation, pleasuring together, and rhythmic response.⁷

But no matter what the origin and fate of tradition, it is an important urge in personal and group conduct. Much of the force of tradition is due to sentiment and sentimentality. The emotional accompaniment it is that furnishes the real drive. By far the strongest factor is the linkage of one’s own egoistic interests with that of the group. Under the heat of a common experience, the emotions of the separate individuals are melted and fused in the mold of tradition. Ever afterward the tradition is sufficient to call forth intense loyalty and possibly self-sacrifice. For the most part, however, tradition soon becomes a matter of habit having the motive force of an emotional habit. Tradition is a strong socializing force because of the weight of social pressure and of civilization itself.

SENTIMENT AND SENTIMENTALITY

Good morale owes much to sentiment and sentimentality. Tradition, as we just saw, is cradled by

⁷ Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 106-107.

sentiments. The significance of sentiment as a motive was discussed in Chapter VI. Here we are more particularly concerned with the place of sentiment in creating morale. As already stated, a sentiment is an emotion that has become attached to some definite object or person or situation. It may be extremely complex, but always a strong motive. There is no limit to the specific sentiments a man may have. Nevertheless there are certain general situations that result in strong sentiments for most people and are, therefore, especially important for morale. Without sentiment life would be divested of real value. We live by our sentiments. A flag, for example, is nothing but a piece of cloth of very little intrinsic value ordinarily, but it represents a nation's honor, traditions, ideals, hopes,—everything. It is a sacred object because of its hallowed associations, the sentiments that it represents. The object is a vivid reminder of the sentiment, acts as a strong stimulus; but the sentiment itself is a motive.

A sentimental person is one who is unduly motivated by sentiment or who has an over-response to an emotional stimulus, who revels in the emotional experience as an end in itself.

IDEALS AS MOTIVES

An ideal is like a sentiment in that it has emotional content and is really a rationalized sentiment raised to a higher plane of motivation. Sentiment may be quite irrational, unworthy and inconsistent; an ideal is thought out, rationalized integration of a sentiment or sentiments. Ideals are the highest type of value judgments. They represent the highest attainments of

civilization. Surely morale could ask for no stauncher ally.⁸ An ideal is a "flying goal." It is that part of a man's reach which "exceeds his grasp." To have real motive force, however, it must not be too high or impossible of attainment. There is something tantalizing about an ideal in the sense that as you approach, it recedes from your grasp, luring you on and on. The moment you actually overtake it, it ceases to be an ideal. An ideal, then, is a rationalized emotional concept of a rather complex and comprehensive sort. Each ideal is a motive, but all of one's ideals center in the one supreme ideal that is attached to one's personality, the type of person he wishes to become. Every one has ideals of some sort.⁹ There is, however, a wide range of difference in the type of ideals from person to person according to the integration of his personality.

If you wish to know what type of person you are, examine your reveries and daydreams. These are the expression of your inner desires and ideals. "Day-dreaming," says O'Higgins, "is concerned with the realization in fancy of our dearest ideals and most instinctive wishes which reality has frustrated."¹⁰ He adds later, "I have never come in contact with an adult problem which did not resolve itself into a failure to

⁸ Cf. James, *On Some of Life's Ideals*, p. 82.

⁹ Cf. Chesterton, *Heretics*, pp. 250-251: "Every man is idealistic; only it so often happens that he has the wrong ideal. . . . When we talk, for instance, of some unscrupulous commercial figure, and say that he would do anything for money, . . . we slander him very much. He would not do anything for money. . . . He would sell his soul for money, for instance; and, as Mirabeau humorously said, he would be quite wise 'to take money for muck.' . . . He would not wear his coat tails in front, for money. He would not spread a report that he had softening of the brain, for money."

¹⁰ O'Higgins, *The Secret Springs*, p. 202.

realize an ideal." ¹¹ But whether wholly thwarted or partially realized the ideal is impelling. "The ideal is that, the attainment of which produces completeness and self-realization. It is at once that which stimulates the will to activity and that which determines the direction and character of activities." ¹² "The ideal attracts and inspires because it represents the complete fulfillment of man's powers as a voluntary agent—the attainment of the highest human good." ¹³ One of the strongest pleas for immortality is that the nature of the moral ideal is such as to require an eternity for its exercise.

A man's ideal for his permanent self is the most important motive because it is so comprehensive; it pervades every department of his psychic life and colors all other motives. Individual ideals pursued under the impellingly unifying urge of the ideal of a permanent selfhood gradually produce a type of integration that we call character or personality—the peculiar and distinctive thing in each person. This inner integration it is, this habitual motivation of conduct through the impulsive power of an ideal that makes up the moral fiber of a man. Morality is thus actualized and integrated ideals. And as ideals become integrated, actualized, they move on, expand, and beckon personality to follow. Civilization's debt to the ideal as an integrating social force, as a creator and maintainer of morale, is beyond measure. ¹⁴

As a motivating force in social control, the emotion

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 227-228.

¹² Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 83.

¹³ Wright, *Self-Realization*, p. 37.

¹⁴ Cf. Kidd, *The Science of Power*, p. 152.

of the ideal is unsurpassed. It is that which gives social significance to religion itself and, in turn, owes much to religion and supernatural sanctions in maintaining its own integrity.¹⁵ They reënforce each other and together create a social morale that is the heart-beat of civilization and the norm of social progress. Benjamin Kidd is extremely enthusiastic and perhaps a little too optimistic in his belief that the whole human race may be radically transformed in a single generation through the emotion of an ideal if education seriously undertakes the task of social integration.¹⁶

One does not need to agree fully with Benjamin Kidd to realize the tremendous motivating power of an ideal in personal and social integration, in the economy of a high type of morale. Ross is quite right in saying that "the disseminator of wrong ideals is altogether more dangerous to society than the disseminator of wrong opinions."¹⁷ The corrupting of ideals is poisoning the stream at its source, for out of ideals come the purities or impurities of social conduct. Society rightly places value on ideals and conduct motivated by an ideal.¹⁸ There is no greater social motive than an ideal.

¹⁵ Cf. Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, pp. 108-110.

¹⁶ Kidd, *op. cit.*, p. 308; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 154, 160; also cf. Satow, *Hypnotism and Suggestion*, p. 217.

¹⁷ Ross, *Social Psychology*, p. 133.

¹⁸ James, *op. cit.*, p. 80: "The barrenness and ignobleness of the more usual laborer's life consist in the fact that it is moved by no such ideal inner springs. The backache, the long hours, the danger, are patiently endured—for what? To gain a quid of tobacco, a glass of beer, a cup of coffee, a meal, and a bed, and to begin again the next day and shirk as much as one can. This really is why we raise no monument to the laborers in the Subway, even though they be our conscripts, and even though after a fashion our city is indeed based upon their patient hearts and enduring backs and shoulders. And this is why we do raise monuments to our soldiers, whose outward

FAITH AND HOPE

Sympathy, loyalty, traditions, sentiment, ideals are all essential to a good morale as we have tried to show. Faith and hope are also important. Faith has a religious connotation because it is central there, but it also has significance for everyday affairs in activities that used to be designated as secular. Life is a great venture. It is a venture of faith; faith in the numerous postulates "uttered or unexpressed." To reason at all means to have faith in the mechanism of thought, in the laws of thought, in the validity of conclusions, in the reality of experience. There is no absolute proof that life is not an illusion or that solipsism is not true. We accept the fundamental postulates of experience on faith and the venture is justified on the basis of values—the richness and satisfaction of experience. Faith means confidence in the integrity of the world order, in law and in uniformity among the facts of cause and effect: that food nourishes, fire burns, water drowns, bodies attract each other in a definite way, etc. Faith on the animal plane of life is a venture that is prompted by organic forces mainly, tacit, unconscious for the most part. Beings endowed with reason and the power of abstract thought take another stride in the venture of faith. The effort to interpret the meaning and value of life, "to see life steady and see it whole," is to philosophize, to look beyond and beneath the facts of immediate experience, to synthesize segments of experi-

conditions were even brutaller still. The soldiers are supposed to have followed an ideal, and the laborers are supposed to have followed none."

ence into a coherent system or principle of explanation. Faith is not only necessary to philosophical thought, but also to scientific investigations because science as well as philosophy has to rely on realities not present in consciousness. In any synthesis of knowledge we have many unknown qualities that must be accepted on faith to complete the design, very like constructing a picture puzzle with only a few of the pieces at hand. Every postulate, every hypothesis of science is an example of faith.

Faith, abstractedly regarded, is practically synonymous with morale. It means confidence, trust, resignation, courage, a willingness to venture, high morale. Concretely, faith means the willingness to venture on a specific idea, or judgment, or ideal. It is readiness. "Of all the forces at the disposal of humanity," says Le Bon, "faith has always been one of the most tremendous, and the gospel rightly attributes to it the power of moving mountains. To endow a man with faith is to multiply his strength tenfold. The great events of history have been brought about by obscure believers who have had little beyond their faith in their favor."¹⁹ To be successful in a worthy enterprise one must have faith in its worth and value. Faith tides a man over the rough places in life, during the darker moments of uncertainties, disillusionments and failures, in the absence of tangible evidence. It is virtually a psychic staff.

Hope and faith go together. The former is an emotional state of confident expectancy. It signifies good morale. The hopeful temperament is optimistic. Opti-

¹⁹ LeBon, *The Crowd*, p. 136.

mism is the habitually cheerful outlook upon life, expecting good, believing the best. Pessimism is exactly the opposite attitude. Both make a difference in motivation. On the whole optimism is more truly normal. It represents the "will to live." It is one of the means of self-defense in the struggle to survive. No matter how dubious the prospects (of recovering from a chronic ailment, getting out of financial difficulties, etc.) we keep "hoping against hope" that something will happen to bring relief and triumph. Unconsciously we keep up a good courage as though we believed in Browning's line "for the worst often turns best to the brave." So long as hope is present morale is also present. Discouragement is the worst foe of morale. It is used in propaganda for breaking down morale. Cheered by faith and hope one may endure almost incredible suffering, ridicule, and moral anguish. A convict sentenced to a life term in prison does not permit himself to believe that he will actually stay in prison all his life. He creates a degree of morale to make life tolerable by hoping that somehow or other he will ultimately secure his freedom. Dante with rare poetic insight and psychological intuition intensified the horrors of hell in his classic *Inferno* by inscribing over the entrance of the portal: "All hope abandon, ye who enter here." There is no worse torture conceivable than to suffer without the least ray of hope. There is no worse enemy to morale than that which would destroy faith and hope.

IMMORTALITY

In terms of faith and hope immortality is the supreme hope and the greatest venture of faith. It en-

hances the worth of personality²⁰ and explains the meaning of struggle for moral perfection. Without it many facts of human experience have no explanation,²¹ for our life here is but a beginning, so much is left unfinished. The problem of justice and the permanency of values demand the hypothesis of immortality. It is necessary for faith in the inherent goodness of the world order, for the conviction that right will ultimately prevail, for a discrimination of values—for high morale. Without this hope, life would lose its greatest stabilizing force to the vast majority of people. It has great disciplinary merit and is invaluable as social control. "If this life is all," so many would argue, "why should I struggle against my personal desires and forego and strive? What great difference can it make? The epicure has the right idea, 'eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow we die.' " Of course, there are a great many, especially the choicer spirits and cultured personalities to whom the hope of immortality is not so strong a motive, that is, in so far as their daily conduct is concerned. They have other drives for living a worthy type of life, though they are not wholly indifferent to the motive of hope in immortality.²² Nevertheless, many many people would lose their grip

²⁰ Cf. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 230, 234.

²¹ Cf. John Haynes Holmes, *The Proof of Immortality*, p. 16.

²² Cf. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 237: "One of the most 'objective' of scientists—Thomas Huxley—toward the close of his life wrote to his friend Morley: 'It is a curious thing that I find my dislike to the thought of extinction increasing as I get older and nearer the goal. It flashes across me at all sorts of times and with a sort of horror that in 1900 I shall probably know no more of what is going on than I did in 1800. I had sooner be in hell a good deal—at any rate in one of the upper circles where the climate and company are not too trying.' "

on life and the integrity of their ideal self if they were to lose their hope of immortal life, or come to believe that there is no life after death.²³

There are at least four types of belief in immortality each of which has force and value in motivation, not of equal importance to be sure, nor equally forceful in every person. Nevertheless a brief survey of each type should be useful in understanding the problem of immortality as related to the problem of motivation.

1. *Potential immortality.* This has to do with heredity, the transmission of life, generation after generation, in an unbroken series from the very beginning of life. For, if the continuity is broken anywhere, the succession ends, so far as we know, forever: hence all living matter is immortal in that it has come down through centuries of continued life: it has potential immortality in that it may transmit its kind for untold generations to come. The almost universally accepted theory that, whatever may have given rise to life in the beginning, under present conditions, life can come only from life and from no inorganic source, adds significance to this form or expression of immortality—the potential. As a motive force it is none other than the racial impulse and the parental instinct. To live again in the lives of one's own children and descendants is a powerful motive.

2. *The immortality of influence.* There is indeed something immortal in the personal influence, conscious and unconscious, of almost every human being. Of course the extent of the influence will vary with the

²³ Cf. Wright, *Self-Realization*, p. 302.

native endowment of each person and with the circumstances that enable some persons to impress their fellows more forcibly than others. Some men have changed the whole course of history and left the indelible impress of their personality for all time: witness Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon, Confucius, Buddha, Jesus, and a host of others. The immortality of influence is not limited to the so-called great men and women. Practically every human being who lives among other human beings is bound to touch other lives and influence them to some extent. No one can estimate the far-reaching influence of even the humblest of earth's mortals. Like the pebble thrown into the quiet surface of a small pond causing a ripple of ever widening circumference to expand until it shall have traversed the whole surface of the water, so is the impingement of one human life against another, with the exception that the human ripple is interrupted at many points, somewhere inhibited, somewhere deflected, somewhere accelerated. The immortality of influence is likely to be potent as a motive in proportion to social-mindedness, the desire for popular favor, for the ability to visualize generations yet unborn. This motive, however, scarcely ever functions by itself apart from the motive of personal immortality, for there would be little joy in the contemplation of future acclaim and recognition if one is not somehow to witness the spectacle.

3. *Physical immortality.* On the strength of the widespread acceptance of the law of the conservation and immutability of matter and energy, it might be argued that human beings are also immortal in this sense. The orientation, or configuration, or constitution of our bodies may change but can never die. They

are merely transformed into a multiplicity of forms. One can fancy, however, that a firm believer in immortality in the theological sense would find little comfort in the idea that he will not entirely pass out but that there is a possibility of becoming somebody's door mat some day, or—if you please, in perhaps a more poetic prospect so aptly put in soldier language—"pushing up the daisies."

4. *Personal immortality.* This is what most people have in mind when they think or talk on the subject, especially in religious circles. The view in short is that somehow, somewhere, human beings will continue to have a conscious existence after the event called death.

The type of immortality most potent in motivating conduct is the hope that all values will be preserved and chief among them conscious personality, which is to realize other values, for outside of personality there is no value at all. And if God be the supreme personality then faith in this belief means faith in God as the creator and preserver of values, including the value of personal immortality. Immortality is a religious theme because it is bound up with faith in God. We agree with Brightman that "If God be good, then somehow human persons must be immortal—To promise so much, only to destroy us; to raise such hopes, and then to frustrate them; to endow us with such capacities that are never to be used; to instill in us a love for others, all of whom are to be annihilated, is unworthy of God. Faith in immortality thus rests on faith in God. If there be a God, man's immortality is certain; if not, immortality would not be worth having." ²⁴

²⁴ Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 349; cf. also his *Immortality in Post-Kantian Idealism*.

PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion is the chief instrument of effecting changes in the customs, mores, and institutions of a people. It is itself a dynamic process, constantly evolving. Public opinion gives force not only to social pressure, but to written codes and laws as well. It is not necessarily representative of the will of the people as a whole or even of a considerable majority, but it does represent a certain uniformity of the opinions and judgments of an influential group at least and for the time being, accepted by the leaders, those who set the pace. In short, public opinion is very like fashions in dress not so much in its fickleness but rather in its power to cow the individual into submission. Rare are the souls who dare oppose public opinion. Ellwood seems to have a great deal of respect for public opinion as a motivating force. He says, "In democratic societies, public opinion is, then, a force lying back of the power of all regulative institutions. It is to be regarded, perhaps as *the chief instrument of social control in highly dynamic societies, inasmuch as the other institutions of control, especially government, very largely rest upon it.*"²⁵

It is not always easy to account for or directly control public opinion. It is subject to a great many vicissitudes. Many elements enter into it. A single incident, often purely accidental, may create public opinion (better, public sentiment) within a few hours: witness the sinking of the *Maine* and public sentiment regarding the Spanish-American War of 1898, and

²⁵ Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 158.

similar incidents. "That great compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy, and newspaper paragraphs which is called public opinion" is Sir Robert Peel's way of stating the case.²⁶ The newspapers and magazines are doubtless chiefly responsible for public opinion. And yet, these often merely reflect public opinion for they have their "ears close to the ground." They dare not lose contact. The truth probably is that they both create and reflect public opinion very much as the moving picture producers cater to the people's tastes and at the same time help create that taste. Regardless of the agency employed, in so far as public opinion is consciously created and directed it is due to propaganda.

PROPAGANDA

Propaganda is a deliberate effort to affect the minds and emotions, chiefly the latter, of a group in a given way for a given purpose.²⁷ Propaganda is good or bad according to the purpose and the point of view. All religion and missionary enterprises are propaganda in so far as they strive to create a specific type of morale, to gain adherents, spread the influence and power of their particular beliefs, secure favorable recognition from the general public, and otherwise affect men's lives for a definite purpose. This we regard as legitimate

²⁶ Quoted by Lippman, "The Making of a Common Will," *Century Magazine*, Jan., 1922, p. 442.

²⁷ Cf. Dodge, "The Psychology of Propaganda," *Religious Education*, Oct., 1920, p. 242: ". . . speaking generally, propaganda is the art of making up the other man's mind for him. It is the art of gaining adherents to principles, of gaining support for an opinion or a course of action. So are some forms of education, so at times is advertising."

propaganda because the aim is to serve humanity. The motive of the propagandist is presumably altruistic. Propaganda in behalf of law enforcement, spread of knowledge relative to contagious diseases and means of prevention, conservation of the natural resources, may be placed in the same class. On the other hand, the scandalmonger, the vilifier, the insinuator are vicious propagandists. When this sort of thing is undertaken on a large scale, such as during election campaigns and in times of war to destroy an opponent or an adversary, all sorts of base and vile methods are often employed by "capitalizing" some prejudice. Propaganda was one of the most effective weapons in the late War for bolstering up morale at home and breaking down the morale of the enemy. During such times much of the "news" is "inspired." There is a natural limit,²⁸ though, for once the people realize that they are being propagandized it will have the opposite effect on morale. They lose confidence in the leaders and exaggerate the reports of losses. To be successful, then, propaganda must be camouflaged. This is especially true of the sinister sort, just the kind we need to guard against. The camouflaging of propaganda is developed into a fine art. One is often propagandized without realizing the fact. "News" in the press may be garbled for a purpose or the heading so worded as to create a false impression highly desirable to the editor or owner of the paper. The moving picture films are not wholly

²⁸ Dodge, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-251: "There are three limitations to the process of propaganda. The first is emotional recoil, the second is the exhaustion of available motive force, the third is the development of internal resistance or negativism." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 255: "To become blasé is the inevitable penalty of emotional exploitation."

free from propaganda (much of it good no doubt), nor are the billboards, and certain forms of advertising. Propaganda is now recognized as the most effective instrument in modern times. War and the implements of destruction are not nearly so formidable as propaganda, because they depend on the latter for success. The side putting out the most effective propaganda wins. This is true in most types of competition—passing legislative measures, advancing policies of international relationships—in every instance which requires public opinion to support the measure or a large number of adherents to insure success.

From the viewpoint of motivation, propaganda is indirectly significant, in creating or destroying morale.

CHAPTER XXIV

ÆSTHETIC MOTIVES

UNIVERSALITY OF THE ÆSTHETIC APPEAL

Æsthetic appreciation reaches back in human history as far as we are able to go. The cave man lacking much that we possess by way of culture was not without his art. He inscribed outlines of animals on the walls of his dwelling or carved them on bits of wood and bones. "Man from first to last is an æsthetic animal."¹

The remarkable influence of æsthetic motives is apparent to any one who reflects on the subject. Such motives actuate us constantly: witness cleanliness, neatness, personal adornments, dress, fashion, beauty in speech, in gesture, in manners, in eating, in playing, in worship, in ritual—in fine, in every activity, apart from the obviously æsthetic motives in industrial arts and in the fine arts themselves. Indeed, there is no experience that is not tinged with æsthetics.

The æsthetic motive is often stronger than the moral in so far as the two may be distinguished. Immodesty in dress may be condoned if it is regarded as beautiful. To change a style that is morally offensive it is more effective to attack it on the grounds of beauty than on

¹ Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, p. 33; cf. Jastrow, "A Survey of Æsthetics," *School and Society*, Dec., 1922, p. 683; Buerymeyer, *The Æsthetic Experience*, p. 172; Croce, *Æsthetics: as Science of Expression*.

religious and moral grounds. Even in the hour of death one is not wholly indifferent to æsthetic values. It is said that "Murat feared disfigurement more than death, and when facing the firing party that was to end his days he besought them not to spoil his beauty by firing at his face. A similar instance of posthumous coquetry is afforded by the behavior of Sir Thomas More on the scaffold. That great and good man had already placed his head on the block preparatory to receiving the final blow when it occurred to him that in the position he had assumed his beard also would be severed, and remarking that that at any rate had plotted no treason, he carefully removed it from the ax's path."²

Thus whether in joy or sorrow, in pleasure or pain, in life or death the sense of beauty acts as a motive directly or indirectly. So widespread, fundamental, and persistent are æsthetic motives that it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to find instances in human experience where it is wholly lacking.

ELEMENTS OF ÆSTHETIC MOTIVATION

We have just seen how every one of our acts is directly or indirectly influenced by æsthetic motives. What are the elements of this drive? They are sensation, feeling, emotion, empathy, self-assertion, and self-realization. These elements are not independent. In æsthetic motivation they function in unison: inhibiting, summing, reënforcing, and modifying each other. They are different ways of regarding the same thing. "Objectively," says Miss Puffer, "we have formal

² *The Kansas City Star Magazine*, Feb. 22, 1925, p. 5.

beauty; subjectively, on the physiological side, a harmonious action of the organism, and on the mental side the undefined exaltation which is known as æsthetic pleasure.”³

However, do æsthetics furnish a new or distinct factor in motivation? The answer must be “no” in so far as the æsthetic motive is completely identified with each or any of the elements already discussed in previous chapters and their place in motivation designated. The elements of æsthetics referred to above are therefore drives and motives in themselves. But this does not exhaust the possibility. The thesis in this book is that every distinct combination or compound of urges and drives is a motive and must be recognized as such. On the basis of this hypothesis the previous question may be answered in the affirmative. While the elements in the æsthetic experience are not to be distinguished in their functioning in other phases of mental life, yet in so far as they form new and distinct combinations which we designate as æsthetic, they are distinct motives. One phase is the æsthetic attitude which according to Münsterberg

is one in which we do not change the world, and in which no external effects are to be reached. The stormy sea arouses our fear if we are in the practical setting, but we enjoy the beauty of its waves if we take the æsthetic attitude. In our fear of the sea we escape; in our joy we do not want anything changed. Our practical life demands a general setting of the brain centers by which impressions or associations become impulses to actual movements. The characteristic preparation for the æsthetic emotion is a general setting of the brain centers by which every external response is inhibited.

³ Puffer, *Psychology of Beauty*, p. 276.

We do not grasp for the painted fruit; we do not rush to assist the hero on the stage.⁴

Let us turn now to discuss the elements of æsthetic motivation.

1. *Significance of the senses and sensation in æsthetics.* Every one of the nine senses has æsthetic as well as survival value. Each of the senses is a source of pleasurable as well as painful awareness. While sensation may be distinguished from feeling as a psychic phenomenon it is, nevertheless, closely connected with it. Practically every sensation has feeling tone. Sensations, usually, are not merely sensations; they are either pleasant or unpleasant. On the whole the unpleasant sensations are detrimental if not positively injurious to the individual; hence the tendency to avoid them. On the other hand, pleasant sensations are, as a rule, beneficial; hence the tendency is to seek these and to prolong them once they are operative.

But there is a possibility of over- or under-development of pleasure and pain attachments in sensory experiences that have marked influence in æsthetic appreciation. When the gastronomic propensities are overdeveloped we have an epicure, a gourmand. When the excess is in matters of dress and the characteristics that go with it, the fop, the dude, the dandy appear. Every one of the senses is capable of being overworked. The result is a disproportionate emphasis upon this or that sensory experience at the expense of some other and at the cost of harmony and proportion among the sensory experiences which give pleasure and satisfaction to the properly integrated personality. This is the

⁴ Münsterberg, *Psychology General and Applied*, p. 208.

mark of a cultured person, that his tastes are cultivated in harmony with each other. He derives pleasure from many sources—from the simplest to the most complicated. And all are refined, that is, quality counts for more than quantity; kind rather than degree. This sense of harmony among the sensations it is that gives rise to a sense of beauty, to an appreciation of the beautiful, the absence of discordant elements and of all feelings of disgust.

2. *Feeling as a factor in æsthetics.* Feeling in æsthetic motivation is largely expressed in likes and dislikes, in native and acquired tastes. One might even include the term pleasure.

From a philosophical point of view we must insist on a sharp demarcation line between beauty and pleasure, between the ideal aim of a drama or a symphony and the mere selfish aims of a pleasant meal. From a strictly psychological point of view, however, art and literature and music are not separated by any sharp boundary from any other endeavors to bring joy to the human heart and pleasure to the human senses. The psychotechnical work must be adjusted to the psychological aspect. If we wish to use psychological knowledge for purposes of art and beauty, the outlook must be widened so as to include the whole field of human enjoyments, the pleasures of life as well as the pleasures of art, the psychotechnics of the agreeable as well as the psychotechnics of the perfect.⁵

Looked at from this point of view feeling takes a commanding place in æsthetic motivation, to the æsthetic hedonist at least. On the other hand, the type of pleasures that one seeks as ends is determined largely by his tastes, by his æsthetic appreciations. Certain

⁵ Münsterberg, *op. cit.*, p. 454.

kinds of conduct are impossible to some because of the feeling of disgust and repulsion they arouse or because they shock the æsthetic sense. Æsthetics check the individual and the race in impulsive tendencies to gross excesses in instinctive cravings. Æsthetics often save us from ourselves, from wrong and immoral acts which are inconsistent with the integrated personality, out of harmony with habitual modes of characteristic reactions and hence unæsthetic. We can be just about so bad and no worse. In the normal person there is usually a recoil from the mean and base and crude. Blushing, experiencing shame, remorse, repentance may be due partly to an avenging outraged æsthetic sense. It is almost impossible to overestimate the force of taste.

If taste be merely the caprice of personal choice between trivial things—a nice judgment in bric-a-brac—then, indeed, it is no matter to make a gospel of. But if, on the contrary, taste be a wise choice among the pleasures of life, the ability to perceive and enjoy what was divinely intended for our enjoyment, then the difference between good taste goes to the very roots of our nature. . . . What we *like* determines what we *are*, and is the sign of what we are; and to teach taste is inevitably to form character.⁶

3. *Emotion as a factor in æsthetics.* Emotion as a motive has already been discussed.⁷ Here we take up its place in æsthetics. "What a glorious sunset!" "Isn't that gorgeous!" "I am overcome by the majesty of the hills," "That poem stirs me to the depths," "This picture thrills me through and through," "The charm and grace of that statue is unsurpassed," "I stand in

⁶ Winchester, *An Old Castle and Other Essays*, pp. 279-280.

⁷ See Chapter VI.

awe before a Gothic Cathedral," "What enchanting music!" These and similar exclamations of delight in appreciation of beauty values bear eloquent testimony to the force of emotional motives in the æsthetic experience. In fact we usually judge beauty, whether in nature or in art, by the type of emotion it arouses in us. "Human language," says Beatty, "would seem to be the logical means of conveying thought from one mind to another while art is the only means of producing æsthetic emotions—its exalted mission."⁸ Artists as well as mystics know the meaning and force of "rapture" and "ecstasy." Æsthetic ecstasy, Miss Puffer defines as "The tension of those mutually antagonistic impulses which make balance, and so unity, and so the conditions for loss of sense of self, clears the way for tasting the full savor of pleasure in bright color, flowing line, exquisite tone-sequence, moving thought."⁹

4. *Æsthetic empathy.* There is dispute concerning the objective and subjective elements in beauty. There is no denying, however, that beauty is determined largely by subjective factors. The observer's imagination and æsthetic attitude have a great deal to do with his appreciation of the beautiful. Without a perceiving consciousness, beauty and all æsthetic values would cease to have any meaning or significance whatsoever. The self that we bring to an object or situation is responsible for the æsthetic response. This reading of one's own likes and dislikes, associations, memories,

⁸ Beatty, *The Modern Art Movement*, p. 12.

⁹ Puffer, *op. cit.*, p. 84. For a criticism of Miss Puffer's position see Bawden, "Studies in Æsthetic Value," *Psychological Review*, Vol. XV, pp. 217-236, 265-291.

emotions, aims, purposes, ideals—in fine, the self, into the situation is what is meant here by æsthetic empathy.

The reading of one's self into the æsthetic situation is more or less thorough according to the intensity and occasion of the experience. Sometimes it is complete self-identification with the object, as the mystic's contemplation of the Absolute until he becomes "at-one with the Infinite," completely losing, for the time being, personality and self-identity. Miss Puffer says in this connection: "The mystic, then, need only shut his senses to the world; and contemplate the object. Subject fuses with object, and he feels himself melt into the infinite. But such experience is not the exclusive property of the religious enthusiast. The worshipper of beauty has given evidence of the same feelings."¹⁰ The almost complete identification of the self with the æsthetic experience is brought out in the following passage: "When I feel the rhythm of poetry, or of perfect prose, which is, of course, in its own way, no less rhythmical, every sensation of sound sends through me a diffusive wave of nervous energy. I *am* the rhythm because I imitate it in myself. I march to noble music in all my veins, even though I may be sitting decorously by my own hearthstone; and when I sweep with my eyes the outlines of a great picture, the curve of a Greek vase, the arches of a cathedral, every line is lived over again in my own frame."¹¹

Empathy is not peculiar to the æsthetic experience except that here, as in mysticism, we may find its fuller manifestations. We are constantly reading ourselves

¹⁰ Puffer, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

into objects and situations in order to understand and appreciate them more fully. We personify natural objects. We read our emotions into the forces and phenomena of nature. Nothing escapes: not even the deity. Anthropomorphism in religion is due to this very tendency. A good illustration of empathy which at the same time "turns the tables" on nature, is found in Emerson's rhetorical question, "What is man but nature's finer success in self-explication?"¹²

5. *Self-expression*. 6. *Self-realization*. The close connection between the self and the æsthetic experience—any experience for that matter—was apparent in the discussion on empathy. We need, however, to emphasize the fact that no matter what the source of stimulation and what the subjective factors of the æsthetic experience may be, the effect is greatest when it engages the whole self. Within limitations we may reverse this and say that the whole man is involved in every æsthetic experience. In æsthetic motivation it is possible for one to choose inconsistently with the integrated personality. But such choices are usually the more transitory and least significant. The very genius of æsthetics is harmony. That implies unity, coördination, symmetry, which translated in terms of behavior, involves the whole personality in self-expression and self-realization. Moreover, it is not an isolated æsthetic craving which needs to be satisfied but the whole æsthetic self. Hence the particular choices in æsthetic motivation are directly and indirectly influenced by the unitary self.

¹² Emerson, *Essay on Art*.

MOTIVES OF APPEAL IN DRAMA ¹³

The appeal in drama is the opportunity it affords for the creation and release of emotions and sentiments that have little or no exercise in everyday life. In discussing thrill as a motive it was pointed out that our psychophysical mechanism craves excitement. There is need for rhythmic expression of natural impulses. Intense moments with tingling nerves must come occasionally to balance the humdrum monotony of the day's work. Drama does this very thing: tense moments are followed by those more tense if the performance is a tragedy. In comedy the tense moments are followed by anti-climax, a sudden letting down of the strain. This arouses the ludicrous and appeals to the "sense" of humor. Whether we laugh or cry we enjoy the thrill of exercising emotions whose expression is enjoyable and whose suppression makes life drab and uninteresting. Whatever there may be in the theory of katharsis is best illustrated in drama. What a privilege to shed copious tears over imaginary misfortunes! After all, they are not so imaginary as they seem. We are really enjoying the luxury of crying over our own pains and misfortunes.

Æsthetic sympathy and self-expression, as well as katharsis, are important motives in drama. The actors are just that: they represent us in all the thrilling, trying, embarrassing, challenging situations the plot brings them. We identify ourselves with the hero or heroine. For the time being at least the disappointed

¹³ Drama will serve to illustrate the æsthetic drives in the fine arts. It would take us too far afield to discuss the motives of appeal in each and every one of the fine arts.

lover in real life is accepted by the fair lady in the play; the careworn business man is successful in amassing his fortune or fights a game battle in losing it; the maid is temporarily the fairy princess; the ancient housewife, once more lovely in face and form, is ardently courted by the handsome hero; the boy sails the seven seas with daring pirates or shoots up a town with some dare-devil cowboy. If the situation is comic the enjoyment consists in consciously or unconsciously placing the rival or "boss" or any person feared or hated in the awkward position that renders him ridiculous. This constitutes a real sport—to be able to laugh at one who ordinarily does the laughing. And to laugh *at* another is to assume the position of superiority. It is not ordinarily considered good taste nor good strategy to tease or poke fun at a superior. But the desire to do so is all the stronger because one dare not do it in actual life. One may do it to his heart's content in the playhouse as well as in his dreams and daydreams. Perhaps Stekel forces the notion a little in the statement that "... the woman who laughs so heartily at the awkward clumsiness of a clown, that the tears run down her cheeks, is perhaps laughing at her husband, who, though she will not acknowledge it, appears to her just as stupid and clumsy; she is thereby excusing to herself her own sins which she has possibly committed only in fantasy."¹⁴ Stekel's further statement is manifestly an accurate summary of the motives involved. He says, "The theater serves as a kind of confessional; it liberates inhibitions; awakens many memories, consoles, and perhaps renews in us hopes

¹⁴ Stekel, *The Depths of the Soul*, p. 26.

of secret possibilities as to whose fulfillment we have long since despaired.”¹⁵

AMUSEMENTS: HOBBIES, PLAY AND GAMES

The lure of the theater is approximated in practically all forms of entertainments and amusements. What our natures crave is recreation. The form is not so essential. The diversion and recreation may be furnished by a game of chess, football, collecting old coins, a bull fight—anything that is undertaken as an end in itself, needing no ulterior motive. Play is distinguished from work by the fact that it is an end, while work is means to an end. A hobby is a specialized type of play. Every one who has a hobby, no matter how trivial, is able to derive satisfaction from it at quick notice and without fail. And he who believes in the value of relaxation will also believe in the value of having a hobby provided the hobby does not ride the man. In specific hobbies and games the motive soon comes to be the game itself, that is, the interest in the game as an activity is also the drive, although the other elements of pleasant sensory reactions, emotion, empathy, and self-expression are present in varying degrees. The interest in the game is the compound motive made up of these elements. It is the genuine motive according to our interpretation. In the “fan’s” interest the chief element is empathy. The fan prefers his play vicariously. For him it is more of an amusement than a game.

There are numerous theories of the play impulse, chiefly: (a) the surplus energy theory, (b) the recrea-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

tion theory, (c) the practice theory, (d) the recapitulation theory.¹⁶ The play impulse has a psychophysical basis. "Playful activity," says Miss Reaney, "is that type of activity in which the end is in harmony with the means, and the individual with both. It is not difficult to realize that these forms of behavior tend to follow the primitive lines of evolution, especially as they are influenced by nervous and somatic development and it is also possible that by natural selection this form of activity has been made use of as a means of practice and education for future life."¹⁷ Very early the urge of random activity becomes attached to definite reaction patterns and an interest in the activity becomes its end and motive. This is obviously true in specific plays and games. In the advanced form many new elements are added to form the compound drive which makes up the "interest" motive. The play impulse is practically identical with all pleasurable, "unbalked" psychophysical activity. And this is not very far removed from the æsthetic motives.

The stimulation of the senses is a source of play. Basking in the sun is a temperature play. Sweetmeats are frequently eaten not for their food value but for the agreeable stimulation of the sense of taste; even bitter and sour substances are played with. Color in nature, in pictures, in dress, and in ornaments is a large part of the source of enjoyment in life; so also is form, both in real objects and as expressed in drawing, painting, sculpture, and architecture.¹⁸

¹⁶ Reaney, "The Psychology of the Organized Group Game," *British Journal of Psychology* (Monograph Supplement), p. 15.

¹⁷ Reaney, *ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁸ Seashore, *Psychology in Daily Life*, p. 10.

COMEDY: HUMOR AND LAUGHTER

He was a wise man who said that "The only people who have the cheek to write on laughter are those who have no sense of humor."¹⁹ While laughter and the comic are quite commonplace no one seems to have a satisfactory explanation, despite the numerous theories offered. No attempt will here be made to solve this riddle. Our present interest is from the viewpoint of æsthetic motives with which it seems to be closely related, for a situation ceases to be comic the moment disgust or repulsion appear or when pain and shame are present. Moreover, very few people appreciate a joke on themselves, especially if it puts them in an inferior position or is seriously embarrassing in any way. "Tears of joy" and "laughing till one cries" show how intimately laughter and tears are connected with each other and with the emotional life. As weeping is associated with sorrow or pain; laughing is associated with joy and being "tickled" (both figuratively and literally). Each releases certain emotional energies by its respective appropriate stimuli. The motives in humor and laughter are obviously the pleasurable and "tickled" feeling-sensation-emotion reactions. The stimuli for humor or laughter do not differ at the outset with those for sorrow and weeping. There is a tense moment of suspense which is followed by pain or pleasure, sorrow or joy. The painful result; the blow (physical, psychic, spiritual) is likely to cause sorrow; the incongruity, the trivial result, the inadequate response, or the over-response to a trivial stimulus result in mirth and laughter. Perhaps this accounts for the

¹⁹ Greig, *Psychology of Laughter and Comedy*, p. 7.

feeling of superiority accompanying laughter, while the opposite is true in most forms of sorrow, especially shame and "humiliation." One can afford to relax in mirth immediately upon the realization of the trivial nature of the stimulus which first aroused his preparatory mechanism. The sense of superiority is further illustrated by the fact that we are amused by complimentary remarks. The element of surprise heightens the effect by virtue of arousing keen expectation. In this way the tense moment is made more tense so that the abrupt trivial ending produces a greater thrill. Said a traveling salesman to a prospective customer who was the proprietor of a large furniture store and who happened to be a woman, "I perceive that you have been drinking." In flushed astonishment, resentment, and anger the woman demanded, "What do you mean by such a remark!" The salesman with a twinkle in his eye replied, "I mean that you look as though you had been drinking—at the fountain of youth."

The great variety of mirth-provoking situations baffle the psychologist. The baby and the adult, the native and the foreigner, the cultured and the vulgar are not equally influenced by the same type of humor. In fact what seems excruciatingly funny to one person may be nauseating to another and incomprehensible to still another. Training and association certainly play an important part in determining the kind of situation which shall arouse laughter or appeal to the "sense of humor." However this is not essentially different from any other emotional and intellectual reaction among people of different mentality and background.²⁰

²⁰ Nevertheless, there are certain situations that do seem humorous to most people. These situations have been variously summarized by

The appeal of humor and the comic as a motive in life is summed up in the truism, "Laugh and the world laughs with you." Every salesman carries a good line of jokes, the public speaker makes effective use of wit and humor. The Sunday papers have their comic sheets. There are magazines that have wide circulation which contain nothing but jokes and comic pictures and cartoons. If comedy, humor, and laughter were to be entirely eliminated from the theater a very large portion of the patronage would obviously fall off. The negative phase of this motive may be judged by the force of satire, ridicule, scorn. Who wants to be laughed at? It takes a strong character to withstand the gibes of his fellows and the jeers of the crowd. The motive of humor cuts like a two-edged sword. We seek situations that are mirth-provoking, but we carefully avoid being the victims of it. We like to laugh *with* others; we prefer to laugh *at* others. We dread being laughed at *by* others.

CULTURE

In the last analysis the æsthetic motives include all the arts and sciences. Æsthetics represent culture, the highest and most complete expression of the self, a supreme valuation of personality. The æsthetic life is the idealistic life and essentially spiritual. "Æsthetic perceptions, emotions, and principles are so primary and so elemental in the evolution and the activity of the

writers in the field. See Bergson, *Laughter*, pp. 58, 96, 112, 146; Sidis, *The Psychology of Laughter*, pp. 3, 5, 19, 25, 77, 88, 103, 151, 152, 209, 231, 242, 271, 282; Wallis, "Why Do We Laugh?" *Scientific Monthly*, Oct., 1922, pp. 343-347; Patrick, *The Psychology of Relaxation*, pp. 97ff; Gregory, *The Nature of Laughter* (bibliography).

human mind that ultimately Truth, Utility, and Goodness must be referred back to them.”²¹ Beauty by itself is but an empty shell. Goodness and truth apart from beauty are without form and void. But the great triumvirate of goodness, truth and beauty, which in reality are inseparable, constitute the highest synthesis, the most complete harmony. They are for man the epitome of his universe. In them he finds his ultimate self-development and self-realization, a spiritual achievement never wholly completed, always *in potentia*. And yet in this very effort to lay hold of the flying goal we reach the best possible integration of symmetrical personality, inner peace and unity, sympathetic communion with other selves, with the material environment, with the Absolute. There is no higher end to be striven for than this at-oneness with the Infinite, not necessarily in the sense of the mystic but in a more comprehensive and vital sense. He who has true culture is in harmony with the universe, with the laws of his own being, and with the deepest and widest and most completely exquisite harmony of all things. He shares divinity with the divine, eternity with the eternal—he is already immortal.

The æsthetic motive in this inclusive sense is the most compelling, most universal, most spiritual, most sublime, most enduring.

²¹ Review of *Harmonism and Conscious Evolution* by Sir Charles Walston. Review by John Murray, *British Journal of Psychology*, Jan., 1923, p. 535.

CHAPTER XXV

INTERACTION OF MOTIVES

There are as many motives as elementary drives plus all possible combinations of these elements into compounds, plus all possible complex compounds of these compounds, plus higher and higher syntheses. In other words, motives are limitless—theoretically. But in actual life there is a relatively fixed number of motives, approximately those treated in these pages. Motives vary in degree or intensity from person to person and from time to time in the same person according to what might be called the principle of interaction of motives. There is a remarkable interpenetration of motives. They modify each other from total inhibition to complete summation and every stage in between. Fear, for example, may completely quell the motive of curiosity or vice versa, or the two may be so well balanced as to furnish the thrill of such games as hide-and-seek.¹

Certain motives may break through and demand immediate attention just as an interview is temporarily interrupted as one or the other is called to the tele-

¹ Cf. Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, p. 28: "Suppose that I am in love and that I also have a passion for rhyming. I turn my love to inspiring my metromania. My love quickens and my rhyming mania is intensified. How many poetical works have originated in this kind of interference! Suppose, again, that I am a philanthropist and that I like notoriety. In this case I will strive to distinguish myself in order to do more good to my fellows, and I will strive to be useful to them, in order to make a name for myself, etc."

phone. The insistent motives are the safety drives, and the urges that are essentially vegetative or chemical, i.e., the appetites. One may be absorbed in an interesting bit of work, but the pangs of hunger have a way of rising to the focus of consciousness and persisting. The work is temporarily interrupted, the appetite is appeased, and the work resumed with no permanent loss either of interest in the work or of the ability to become hungry.

There are, however, conflicts among motives that cannot be so easily reconciled. In the above illustration both motives were realized although one had to give way temporarily for the more insistent drive. But in case of a real conflict when one or the other has to be suppressed we have a different problem.² And yet the inhibition may be only partial. There may be a compromise. In fact there are distinct motives that might be called compromise motives. "Self-respect," for example, as Jastrow points out, "is the mean between domineering conceit and abject humility; courage is the mean between cowardice and bravado; a sense of propriety between shamelessness and prudery; caution between timidity and recklessness; thrift between parsimoniousness and extravagance."³ Moreover, there is a possibility of teamwork among the motives. Certain groups act together or tend to succeed each other very like the association of ideas.

Life is a tangled skein. Psychic phenomena everywhere intersect. Motivation is extremely complex. Every phase of mental life is directly or indirectly

² See the discussion on the fate of motives, pp. 250ff.

³ Jastrow, *Character and Temperament*, p. 342.

significant for motivation. The strength of one motive is relative to all the rest individually, collectively, and in their various possible combinations. Although conduct is not always consistent and antagonistic motives often have their innings successively, yet the individual reacts as a unit. Personality unifies conduct to a greater or lesser degree according to the type of integration. In recognition of the tangled and comprehensive nature of the springs of human action we have tried to study the sources, mechanism, and principles of motivation synthetically as well as analytically from the viewpoint of the total personality.



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INDEX

- Abashment, 100
 Abhorring, 103
 Abulia, 101, 180 *ff.*; see VACILLATION
 Acquisition, 73, 74, 77, 78, 98, 101;
 see INSTINCT
 Acrimoniousness, 100
 Adhesion, 23
 Adler, A., 333
 Admiration, 103
 Adoration, 103
 Adventureousness, 75, 98, 112
 Adverseness, 103
 Advertising, 14, 422 *ff.*
 Æsthetics, XXIV, 353, 370, 379
 Affection, 102, 387, 422
 After-image, 130
 Aggressiveness, 88, 89
 Agony, 98
 Agoraphobia, 286
 Alertness, 99
 Alexander the Great, 448
 Allport, F. H., 12, 73
 Allport, G. W., 182
 Altruism, 98, 104, 199, 227, 264,
 373, 381 *ff.*
 Amazement, 103
 Ambition, 40, 41, 77, 98
 Amity, 101
 Amorousness, 102
 Amusement, 94, 260, 465, 466
 Anger, 39, 84, 88, 89 *ff.*, 98, 101-
 104, 106
 Anguish, 98
 Animosity, 98
 Antagonism, 103, 316, 340
 Antipathy, 98
 Anti-sociality, 101, 269
 Anxiety, 91, 98, 100
 Apathy, 278
 Appetite, 44, 48 *ff.*, 56, 74, 124,
 268, 472; conditioned, 44,
 48 *ff.*
 Ardor, 98
 Aristippus, 119, 120
 Aristotle, 403, 448
 Arnold, Matthew, 410
 Arrogance, 103, 106, 224
 Asceticism, 99, 408
 Aspiration, 98
 Assurance, 101
 Astonishment, 93, 103
 Astounding, 103
 Attention, 33, 153 *ff.*, 171, 172;
 objective, 154 *ff.*; subjective,
 157 *ff.*
 Attitude, 166, 167, 229, 234, 315,
 415
 Authority, 357, 358
 Automatisms, III, 53, 172; in-
 nate, 36 *ff.*
 Autonomic reflexes, III, 36 *ff.*,
 41; see REFLEX
 Avarice, 77
 Avariciousness, 101
 Aversion, 96, 98
 Awe, 96, 99, 406
 Bacon, Francis, 230
 Bagley, W. C., 131, 147
 Baldwin, J. M., 133, 138, 160
 Balked desires, 29, 30, 100, 111,
 114; see COMPLEX, NEGATIVE
 MOTIVES, FATE OF MOTIVES
 Barrett, E. B., 6, 18, 58, 180, 274
 Baseness, 102
 Bashfulness, 102

- Baudouin, C., 62, 63, 137, 302, 304, 305, 309, 310, 323
 Bawden, H. H., 460
 Beaty, J. W., 460
 Beauty; see *ÆSTHETIC MOTIVES*
 Beers, C. W., 285
 Behaviorism, 8, 9
 Belief, 99, 100, 231, 239 ff.
 Benevolence, 98, 403
 Bentham, J., 120, 121
 Bergson, H. L., 21, 323, 469
 Berman, L., 38-40, 67, 110, 300
 Bernard, L. L., 82, 84, 87, 169, 293, 347
 Betts, G. H., 410
 Bewilderment, 100
 Bewitching, 101
 Bias, 102; see *PREJUDICE*
 Bismarck, O. E., 345
 Bitterness, 100
 Blaming, 103
 Blasé, 94, 99, 280
 Bligh, S. M., 271
 Blissfulness, 99
 "Blues," 100
 Bogardus, E. S., 318
 Boiling, 104
 Bolk, L., 38
 Boredom, 99, 279 ff.
 Boulanger, G., 345
 Bravado, 472
 Bravery, 90
 Bridges, J. W., 110, 285
 Brightman, E. S., 189, 323, 405, 449, 450
 "Brokenhearted," 98
 Brooding, 102, 106
 Brown, C. R., 303
 Browning, Robert, 113, 445
 Bryce, Lord, 281
 Buckham, J. W., 70, 225, 226, 334
 Buddha, 327, 448
 Buerymeyer, L., 454
 Burnham, W. H., 44
 Bushee, F. A., 169
 Cabot, R. C., 17
 Cæsar, Julius, 345, 448
 Calkins, Mary W., 10, 84
 Cannon, W. B., 38, 39, 86
 Capriciousness, 99
 Captiousness, 103
 Captivating, 101
 Carefulness, 99, 424
 Carelessness, 99
 Carrington, H., 293, 340
 Carver, A., 83, 159
 Case, C. M., 235
 Cason, H., 44
 Ceremony, 352, 361
 Chagrin, 101
 Character, 40, 62 ff., 172, 181, 216, 226
 Charitableness, 98
 Charming, 101
 Cheerfulness, 99
 Chemical affinity, 23
 Chesterton, G. K., 440
 Choice, X, 144, 180 ff., 301; see *WILL*
 Choleric, 108
 Churlishness, 100
 Clairvoyance, 343
 Claustrophobia, 286
 Cleanliness, 403, 454
 Closeness, 101
 Cloymont, 99, 280
 Cohesion, 23
 Colvin, S. S., 147
 Comedy, 467 ff.
 Comfort, 99
 Comic, 102
 Commiseration, 102
 Compassion, 102, 245
 Complex, 98, 179, 285, 292; inferiority, 100, 212, 221, 223; *Œdipus*, 293; self-regarding, 99-103; superiority, 100, 212
 Compound motives; see *MOTIVES*
 Comradeship, 101, 434
 Conceit, 103, 213, 224, 472
 Conditioned reactions; see *REFLEX*

Confidence, 99, 101, 344, 435
 Confounding, 103
 Confucius, 448
 Confusion, 100
 Conjugal love, 80, 102, 105, 367 ff.
 Conscience, 231, 244 ff.
 Conscience-stricken, 100, 245
 Consecration, 273
 Conservatism, 206, 359
 Constellation motives; see MOTIVES
 Construction, 73, 74, 78
 Contemplating, 106
 Contentiousness, 103
 Contentment, 99
 Contrariness, 103
 Contrition, 100
 Contumaciousness, 102
 Convention, 231, 290, 350, 355 ff.
 Conversion, 272, 273
 Conviction, 99, 239 ff., 271, 272
 Conway, W. M., 334
 Cooley, C., 264, 347
 Cordiality, 99
 Coriat, I. H., 294
 Cosmic forces, 23
 Coué, E., 304
 Couéism, 303 ff.
 Courage, 101, 102, 403, 472
 Covetousness, 101
 Cowardliness, 75, 90, 102, 472
 Coyness, 102
 Crabbedness, 100
 Craig, W., 26
 Craving, 48 ff., 57; see HABIT;
 VEGETATIVE INSTINCTS
 Craze, 335
 Credulity, 100
 Crile, G. W., 26, 38, 220, 252,
 256
 Crime and Criminality, 101, 245,
 285
 Croce, B., 454
 Cruelty, 102, 223
 "Crushed-feeling," 98
 Crustiness, 100
 Culpableness, 100
 Culture, 469, 470

Curiosity, 57, 73-76, 88, 92 ff., 98,
 99, 102, 103, 156, 193; see IN-
 STINCT
 Custom, 56, 324, 235, 290, 350,
 355 ff., 366, 378
 Cuvier, G. B., 239

 Dante, A., 445
 Daring, 31
 Darwin, C. R., 239
 Dastardliness, 102
 Daydreams, 93, 114, 127, 128, 173,
 183, 291, 293
 Dearborn, G., 324
 Dedication, 273
 Dejection, 100
 Delight, 115
 Delusion, 286, 333
 Dementia, 333; see NEGATIVE
 MOTIVES
 Demoralization, 101
 Demureness, 102
 Dependence, 100, 202, 206 ff.
 Desire, 167 ff., 171; desire to ex-
 cel, 209, 214-216, 424
 Despair, 89, 100, 106, 279
 Despondency, 100
 Detestation, 98
 Dewey, John, 6, 12, 59, 81, 115,
 141, 157, 164, 165, 168, 176, 181,
 243, 249, 399, 407
 Dickinson, Z. C., 2, 5, 16, 25, 44,
 67, 417
 Diffidence, 102
 Dipsomaniac, 287
 Disappointment, 100, 327
 Discomposure, 100
 Discontentedness, 100, 278, 279
 Discouragement, 279
 Disdainfulness, 103
 Disease, 91, 282 ff.; see NEGATIVE
 MOTIVES
 Disgrace, 288
 Disgust, 4, 88, 94 ff., 98-100, 103
 Disillusionment, 100, 278, 327
 Disinterestedness, 99

- Dislike, 96, 98, 234
 Display, 213
 Displeasure, 88, 98
 Disposition, 436, 437; see TEMPERAMENT
 Dissatisfaction, 60, 100
 Dissuasive motives; see NEGATIVE MOTIVES
 Distaste, 98
 Distrustfulness, 103
 Divination, 406
 "Do-or-die" attitude, 102
 Docility, 100, 106, 357, 358
 Dodge, Raymond, 283, 451, 452
 Dominancy, 100
 Domination, 209 ff., 224, 427
 Doubtfulness, 101, 276
 Drake, D., 403, 405
 Drama, 463 ff.
 Dread, 98, 100
 Dreams, 93, 114, 173, 183, 290, 291, 293
 Dresser, H. W., 272
 Drever, J., 12, 49, 50, 69, 70, 72, 159, 256, 349
 Drummond, Henry, 339, 356
 Dunlap, K., 66, 185
 Duty, 399
 Dysphoria, 30, 31

 Eagerness, 98
 Ease, 99
 Eastman, G. R., 424
 Economic Motives, XXII, 2, 263; see MOTIVES
 Ecstasy, 99, 460
 Edman, I., 16, 69, 126, 141, 336, 416
 Edson, D. O., 16, 137
 Effort, 178; see WILL
 Egoism, 199, 264, 373
 Egotism, 103
Élan Vital, 21, 71, 401
 Elation, 99, 101-103
 Elliot, H., 61, 192
 Ellwood, C. A., 6, 61, 70, 82, 86, 144, 152, 159, 262, 269, 302, 333, 336, 339, 354, 362, 442, 450
 Embarrassment, 100, 219, 220, 288
 Emerson, R. W., 241, 354, 462
 Emotion, VI, 38, 56, 69, 72, 455, 459, 460; compound, 98 ff.; secondary, 96 ff.; primary, 88 ff.; tender, 98, 101, 103, 368, 376
 Empathy, 199, 208, 319, 455, 460 ff., 465; æsthetic, 460 ff.
 Emulation, 220
 Enchanting, 101
 Enchantment, 406
 Energism, 400 ff.
 Energy, 99, 101
 English, H. B., 2, 159, 283
 Enmity, 98
 Ennui, 99, 280
 Enrapture, 101
 Enthusiasm, 101
 Enticing, 101
 Envy, 98, 101, 103, 213 ff.
 Epicurus, 120
 Escape; see MOTIVES
 Esprit de corps, 102, 434 ff.
 Esteem, 103
 Ethics, 121, 396 ff.
 Euphoria, 30, 31, 99, 115, 434
 Everett, W. G., 129, 132, 190, 240, 396, 402, 404, 405
 Excitability, 101
 Exhibitionism, 293
 Expectancy, 166, 463
 Exploitation, 45, 211, 212, 224, 428
 Extravagance, 99, 472
 Extrovert, 108, 109
 Exuberance, 101
 Exultation, 101

 Fads, 350, 354, 366
 Faith, 101, 443 ff.
 Familiarity (at-homeness), 229, 338, 353
 Fanaticism, 149 ff., 239

Fascination, 101, 345
 Fashions, 350, 354, 366, 454
 Fate of motives; see MOTIVES
 Fatigue, 178, 282 ff., 314; see
 NEGATIVE MOTIVES
 Fear, 31, 39, 44, 84, 87, 88, 89 ff.,
 98-103, 106, 173, 212, 334, 406;
 see EMOTION
 Fearless, 31; see EMOTION
 Feeling, VII, 34, 98, 229, 455,
 458, 459; fellow-feeling, 101
 Felicity, 99
 Ferociousness, 104
 Festival, 352, 353
 Fetishism, 293
 Fichte, J. G., 21
 Fickleness, 99
 Fielding, W. J., 216, 292, 293,
 307
 Filial love, 80, 378, 379
 Flaming, 104
 Flattery, 214, 215
 Flight, 73-75, 89, 102; see IN-
 STINCT
 Folkways, 235, 350, 361, 366
 Forgetfulness, 291, 296
 Forgiving, 102
 Formalism, 398 ff.
 Fosdick, H. E., 82, 226
 Franken, R. B., 424
 Franklin, Benjamin, 218, 374
 Freedom, 201, 205, 365
 Fretfulness, 98
 Freud, S., 3, 11, 257, 289, 292-
 294, 334
 Friendliness, 101
 Friendship, 105, 379 ff.
 Fuming, 104
 Furiousness, 88, 104

 Galloway, T. W., 183
 Games, 465, 466
 Gates, A. I., 256, 257
 Gault, R. H., 28, 66, 232, 355
 Gehlke, C. E., 362
 Geley, G., 186, 309, 325

Giddings, F. H., 338
 Gladness, 106
 Gladstone, W. E., 58, 345
 Glandular, reactions, 36 ff., 110
 Gloominess, 100
 God, 387 ff., 449, 450
 Gratefulness, 101
 Gratitude, 96
 Gravitation, 23
 Greediness, 77, 101
 Gregariousness, 73, 74, 78 ff., 80,
 100-102, 373; see INSTINCT
 Gregory, J. C., 469
 Greig, J. Y. T., 467
 Grief, 96, 98, 100, 282, 288
 Grouchiness, 100, 106
 Group-suggestion, XVIII; see
 SUGGESTION
 Groves, E. R., 307
 Gruffness, 100
 Guiltiness, 100
 Gulick, L. H., 435
 Gullibleness, 100

 Habit, IV, 12, 51, 52, 81, 229, 315,
 403
 Hadfield, J. A., 245, 441
 Hall, G. S., 16, 76, 91, 92, 237,
 434-436
 Hallucination, 232, 286, 335
 Handman, M. S., 386
 Happiness, 99, 114, 121-123, 226,
 369
 "Happy-go-lucky," 99
 Hardness, 102
 Harrow, B., 41
 Harshness, 102
 Hart, B., 156, 240, 286
 Hate, 44, 96, 98, 101, 102, 104,
 106, 389 ff.
 Haughtiness, 103
 "Heart-ache," 98
 Hedonism, 199 ff., 397; see FEEL-
 ING
 Heedfulness, 99
 Heedlessness, 99

- Heermance, E. L., 432
 Helplessness, 100
 Henry, Patrick, 365
 Heraclitus, 21
 Herd impulse; see GREGARIOUS-NESS
 Hesitancy, 101, 180, 276
 Hilariousness, 102
 Hobbes, Thomas, 120
 Hobby, 260, 465, 466
 Hobhouse, L. T., 70, 198, 337, 341
 Hocking, W. E., 4, 5, 62, 69, 71, 130, 152, 184, 226, 278, 362, 372, 385, 410, 413, 435
 Höfding, H., 409, 412
 Hollingworth, H. L., 3, 14-16, 67, 70, 108, 156, 425
 Holmes, J. H., 446
 Homesickness, 102
 Hope, 99, 101, 106, 443 ff.
 Horne, H. H., 152
 Horror, 100
 Horton, W. M., 8, 82, 406
 Hostility, 98
 Howerth, I. W., 384
 Humanitarianism, 385 ff.
 Humiliation, 101
 Humility, 101, 472
 Humor, 102, 467 ff.
 Humphrey, G., 321
 Hunger, 48, 57; see VEGETATIVE INSTINCT
 Hutcheson, F., 120
 Huxley, Thomas, 446
 Hyper-sensitiveness, 100
 Hypnosis, 296-298, 305 ff., 310
 Hypocrisy, 276-278; see MALINGERING
 Hysteria, 285
- Ideals, 172, 182, 184, 226, 489 ff., 443
 Ideas, VIII, II, 295, 296; fixed, 134, 149 ff.; ideo-motives, VIII, 446 ff.; ideo-motor, II, 133 ff.; overvalued, 149 ff.
- Identification, 318, 319
 Illness, 282 ff.; see NEGATIVE MOTIVES
 Illusion, 232, 286
 Imagery, 148, 149
 Imagination, 93, 172, 240, 303, 304
 Imitation, 46, 312, 318 ff., 356, 357, 424
 Immodesty, 454
 Immorality, 284, 285
 Immortality, 445 ff.; of influence, 447, 448; personal, 449, 450; physical, 448-449; potential, 447
 Impatience, 100
 Impetuosity, 98
 Impulse, 60, 61; see INSTINCT
 Incantation, 406
 Incredulousness, 103
 Incubus, 98
 Independence, 202
 Indifference, 99
 Indignation, 222
 Indolence, 99
 Inertia, 276, 356; see NEGATIVE MOTIVES
 Ingratitude, 197, 219
 Initiative, 98, 202, 203
 Injustice, 364
 Insanity, 285
 Insight, 324, 325
 Insolence, 103
 Inspiration, 101, 295, 298, 325, 326
 Instinct, V, 11, 12, 45, 47, 48, 53, 57, 59, 86, 96, 110, 173, 424; vegetative, 48 ff., 56, 58, 74
 Institutions, 233, 235, 313, 358 ff., 361, 366, 407; social, 358, 359
 Insubordination, 101
 Intelligence, 344
 Intention, 167 ff.
 Interest, IX, 171, 172, 284, 399
 Internationalism, 238, 385 ff.
 Intractableness, 102
 Introvert, 108, 109
 Intuition, 293, 295, 297, 298, 322 ff.

- Irascibility, 104
 Irresolution, 101
 Irresponsibility, 99
 Irritability, 23
 Irritableness, 100
 "Itching-for-a-fight," 103
- James, W., 6, 26, 60, 67, 70, 124,
 126, 127, 139, 140, 165, 178, 187,
 191, 227, 287, 288, 349, 440, 442
 Janet, Pierre, 8, 82, 406
 Jastrow, J., 6, 16, 31, 82, 85, 105,
 129, 132, 183, 211, 223, 238, 262,
 264, 282, 332, 339, 342, 376, 454,
 472
 Jealousy, 96, 101, 103, 220 ff., 392
 Jenks, E., 355
 Jesus, 380, 448
 Jones, E., 448
 Joy, 88, 92, 99, 101, 102, 115
 Joyousness, 99, 106
 Judd, C. H., 361
 Judgment, 140, 141, 144, 240, 243,
 298, 402, 439
 Jung, C. G., 16, 69, 70, 81, 109,
 165, 178, 233, 238, 298, 300, 302,
 319, 324
 Justice, 363 ff.
- Kant, Immanuel, 225, 398
 Kantor, J. R., 42, 45, 46, 68, 82,
 168, 180
 Katharsis, 463
 Kelly, F. C., 16, 29, 64, 219
 Kempf, E., 36, 38, 44, 46, 67, 68,
 161, 166
 Kidd, B., 263, 441, 442
 Kindliness, 101
 Kinetic drives, 36 ff., 53
 Kirshman, J. E., 429
 Knowledge, 144, 315, 424
 Kuo, Z. Y., 68
- Ladd, G. T., 47
 Laing, B. M., 66
- Lasciviousness, 102
 Laughter, 467 ff.
 Lavishness, 99
 Law, 77, 362, 363, 366
 Lawlessness, 101
 Laziness, 99, 276
 Leadership, 77, 343 ff.
 LeBon, G., 334, 345, 357, 444
 Leibnitz, G. W., 21
 Liberty, 365, 366
 Libido, 13, 251, 293
 Likes, 234, 337, 459
 Lincoln, Abraham, 267
 Link, H. C., 25, 66, 68, 150, 399
 Lippmann, W., 451
 Livingstone, David, 58
 Loathing, 95, 96, 100
 Locke, John, 120
 Loeb, J., 26, 67, 238
 Lofthouse W. F., 348, 403
 Lonesomeness, 79, 102
 Lotze, R. H., 191
 Love, XX, 80, 104, 227
 Love-sickness, 102
 Lowliness, 101
 Loyalty, 385, 434, 435, 443
 Lumley, F. E., 347
 Lund, F. H., 240
 Lust, 369
 Lustfulness, 101
- MacCurdy, J. T., 72, 81, 290, 300,
 338
 MacDonald, A., 91
 MacPherson, W., 272, 425, 426
 Magic, 93, 406
 Malice, 98
 Malingering, 276 ff.; see NEGA-
 TIVE MOTIVES
 Mania, 285
 Manipulation, 74, 78, 263
 Manners, 450
 Martin, E. D., 333, 334
 Martyrdom, 99
 Masochism, 99, 293
 Master motives; see MOTIVES

- Mating, 74, 80
 Mawkishness, 103
 May, M. A., 552
 McDougall, W., 2, 3, 6, 11, 12, 16, 55-59, 65-67, 69-71, 73, 87, 135, 146, 147, 151, 157, 159, 193, 194, 223, 227, 248, 263, 318, 334, 385
 Meanness, 102
 Meekness, 101
 Megalomania, 212
 Melancholia, 100, 108
 Memory, 140, 172, 240, 296
 Mental complex; see COMPLEX
 Mercifulness, 102
 Meyer, Max, 118
 Mill, J. S., 120, 121
 Mirabeau, C., 440
 Mirthfulness, 102
 Misanthropy, 99, 279
 Miserliness, 77, 101
 Misogamy, 99, 279
 Misogyny, 279
 Mixed motives; see MOTIVES
 Mob psychology, 320 ff., 364
 Modesty, 102
 Monotony, 111
 Mood, 91, 106, 107, 123
 Moodiness, 100, 278
 Moore, J. S., 10, 162, 185, 186, 296
 Morale, XXIII, 102, 223, 226; see MOTIVES
 Morals, 355, 402 ff.
 More, Sir Thomas, 455
 Mores, 235, 354, 355, 366
 Morgan, J. J. B., 18
 Morley, H., 446
 Moroseness, 100
 Morrow, F. R., 405
 Mortification, 99, 100
 Moss, F. A., 18
 Motives, acquired, XIV; æsthetic, XXIV; artificial, 271; autonomic, III; autosuggestion, XVII, 138; choice, X; complex, 5; compound, 266; constellation, 266; defined, 20; dissuasive, 278 ff.; economic, XII; elusive, 4; emotion, VI; escape, 76, 89, 114; fate of, 250 ff. (coördinated, 257 ff.; disguised, 255, 256; disjuncted, 254, 255; dissipated, 253, 254; inhibited, 253, 254; realized, 252; reënforced, 256, 257; sublimated, 257 ff.; substituted, 257 ff.); feeling, VII; group-suggestion, XVII; habit, IV; idea, VIII; instinct, V; interaction of, 27, XXV; interest, IX; love, XX; master, 267 ff., 387, 411; mixed, 266; morale, XXIII; negative, XV, 62; new, 262 ff.; personality, X; physical activity, II; prejudice, XII; preparatory and consummatory, XIII; profits, 426 ff.; reflexive, III; self-regarding, XI; social, XIX, 17; something-for-nothing, 428 ff.; sophisticated, 271; subconscious, XVI, 11, 17, 62, 81, 294 ff.; substitute, XIV; ulterior, 269 ff.; values, XXI, 115, 188, 397; will, X
 Mournfulness, 98
 Muir, R., 385
 Münsterberg, H., 70, 119, 137, 373, 456, 457, 458
 Murat, J., 455
 Murray, J., 470
 "Mushy," 103
 Mutinousness, 102
 Myers, F. W. H., 138, 409, 410
 Myerson, A., 344
 Mysophobia, 286
 Mysticism, 93, 389, 406
 Napoleon Bonaparte, 345, 435, 448
 Narcism, 103, 293
 Nationalism, 385, 386

Native tastes, 158; see **TASTE**
 Nausea, 96, 100
 Negative motive; see **MOTIVES**
 Nettlesomeness, 103
 Neurosis, 7, 91, 151, 285, 292, 293;
 see **COMPLEX**
 Newfang, O., 116
 Nirvana, 328
 Northridge, W. L., 289
 Nutting, L. Ruth, 344

Obedience, 388
 Obsession, 7, 149 ff., 166, 239, 286,
 306
 Obstinateness, 103, 275
 Oedipus complex; see **COMPLEX**
 O'Higgins, H., 311, 374, 440, 441
 Opinion, 239 ff.
 Optimism, 99, 106, 107, 444
 Organic drives, 23, 91
 Ostentatiousness, 102
 Other-worldliness, 408
 Overvalued ideas; see **IDEAS**
 Owen, R., 239

Pain, 91, 112, 120, 122, 126,
 282 ff., 288; see **NEGATIVE MO-**
 TIVES
 Palmer, G. H., 359, 376, 380
 Pang, 98
 Panic, 87, 334
 Paramnesia, 293, 295, 297
 Parental instinct, 73, 74, 98, 102,
 447
 Parental love, 105, 376, 377
 Parker, C. H., 417
 Parmelee, M., 68, 385
 Passion, 102
 Passionateness, 104
 Patrick, G. T. W., 17, 335, 469
 Patriotism, 97, 102, 384, 385
 Paulsen, F., 224, 399, 400
 Pavloff, I. P., 44
 Peel, Sir Robert, 451
 Penitence, 100

Penuriousness, 101
 Perseverance, 77, 98
 Persistence, 98
 Personality, X, 40, 61, 93, 123,
 144, 184 ff., 200, 224, 246, 265,
 349, 379, 400, 412, 446, 472;
 dual, 285, 306; multiple, 285,
 306; see **WILL**
 Persuasion, 99, 271, 272, 293
 Perverseness, 103
 Perversions, 284 ff.; see **NEGATIVE**
 MOTIVES
 Pessimism, 100, 279, 445
 Peter the Great, 345
 Petulance, 103
 Philanthropy, 98, 105, 198, 381 ff.
 Philosophy, 413 ff.
 Phlegmatic, 108
 Phobias, 44, 90, 285, 286; see
 FEAR
 Physical activity, II, 32, 74, 75 ff.,
 465, 466
 Pierce, F., 6, 36, 309, 317, 424
 Pillsbury, W. B., 72, 141, 315, 394
 Pining, 102
 Piquedness, 103
 Pity, 102
 Plato, 448
 Platonic love, 379 ff.
 Play, 31 ff., 73, 75, 465, 466
 Pleasantness, 102, 457
 Pleasure, 9, 93, 94, 115, 121 ff.,
 369, 397; pleasant act, 122,
 126 ff.; primary, 122, 127, 128;
 secondary, 128, 129; pursued,
 122, 126 ff.
 Poffenberger, A. T., 16, 70
 Possession, 101, 102, 424
 Pratt, J. B., 273, 325, 407, 410
 Prejudice, XII, 47, 102, 132
 Prestige, 145, 313, 317, 344, 357,
 358
 Pride, 100, 103, 213 ff., 224
 Prideaux, E., 275, 317
 Prince, M., 84, 186, 302, 307
 Principles, 172, 231, 243, 244
 Procrastination, 180, 276

- Prodigality, 99
 Profits motive; see **MOTIVES**
 Propaganda, 229, 270, 422, 451 ff.
 Prudence, 99, 403
 Prudishness, 472
 Psychasthenia, 285
 Psychoanalysis, 83, 289, 290 ff.
 Psychophysical activity, 27 ff., 33, 56, 60, 136, 466
 Psychosis, 44, 83, 151, 285, 292, 293; see **COMPLEX**
 Public opinion, 363, 450, 451
 Puffer, Ethel D., 33, 456, 460, 461
 Pugnacity, 73-76, 88, 100-104, 275, 427
 Punishment, 129 ff., 264, 271, 347, 408, 409
 Purpose, 167 ff.
 Pursued pleasure; see **PLEASURE**
 Pusillanimousness, 102
 Pyrophobia, 286
- Quarrelsomeness, 103
 Querulousness, 103
- Rage, 84, 88
 Raging, 104
 Random activity, 28, 56, 74; see **PHYSICAL ACTIVITY**
 Rapaciousness, 101
 Rapture, 99, 460
 Rashness, 99, 403
 Rationalism, 398
 Ravishment, 101
 Reaney, Mabel J., 31, 70, 466
 Reason, 59, 141, 144, 398
 Recklessness, 472
 Reflex, III, 55, 58, 68, 74, 83, 95, 128, 179, see **AUTONOMIC REFLEX**; reflex arc, 42; conditioned reflex, 44 ff.
 Refractoriness, 102
 Regard, 103
 Regretfulness, 100
 Reid, L. A., 183
- Religion, 405 ff., 412
 Remorse, 244, 332, 458
 Remorsefulness, 100
 Repentance, 458
 Repining, 100
 Repose, 276
 Repression, 290
 Reproach, 244
 Reproachfulness, 103
 Repugnance, 88, 94 ff., 98, 100, 103
 Repulsion, 4, 73
 Reputation, 91, 188
 Resentfulness, 103, 106
 Resentment, 59, 223
 Respectfulness, 103
 Rest, 276
 Restiveness, 100
 Restlessness, 28 ff., 98, 146
 Revenge, 86, 96, 220, 224, 364
 Reverence, 99, 105, 106, 387 ff.
 Reverie, 136, 142
 Revival, 272
 Reward, 129 ff., 264, 271, 347, 408
 Rhythm, 33, 34, 353, 463
 Ribot, T. A., 134, 336
 Ritualism, 352, 361, 406
 Rivalry, 101, 103, 220 ff., 312, 427
 Rivers, W. H., 66
 Roback, A. A., 9
 Robinson, D. S., 5
 Ross, E. A., 12, 16, 166, 212, 221, 275, 316, 347, 349, 353, 355-357, 404, 408, 420, 428, 438, 442
 Rousseau, J. J., 250
 Ruskin, John, 427
 Russell, Bertrand, 386
- Sacrifice, 77
 Sadism, 102, 293
 Sadness, 106
 Salesmanship, 14, 422 ff.
 Sanguine, 108
 Satiety, 99, 280
 Satisfaction, 99
 Satow, L., 305, 308, 310, 325, 345, 442

- Sauciness, 103
- Science, 415, 416
- Scoffing, 103
- Scolding, 103
- Scorn, 95, 96, 98, 100, 103
- Scornfulness, 103, 106
- Scott, W. D., 1, 137, 426
- Seashore, C. E., 34, 138, 139, 466
- Seathing, 104
- Secretiveness, 101
- Sedateness, 102
- Seditiousness, 102
- Self (soul), 10
- Self-regarding, XI, 33, 74, 76, 256, 314, 365, 379, 387, 391, 401; self-abasement, 71, 73, 74, 76, 89, 193 ff., 370; self-abnegation, 99; self-assertion, 71, 73, 74, 76, 98-104, 193 ff., 275, 370, 427, 455; self-control, 77; self-denial, 99; self-effacement, 99; self-esteem, 100, 191 ff., 328, 390; self-expression, 55, 201 ff., 224, 411, 421, 462; self-preservation, 8, 71, 237; self-realization, 55, 224, 245, 462; self-respect, 77, 187, 223 ff., 472; selfishness, 101, 227, 371
- Sensation, 34, 35, 98, 117, 455, 457, 458
- Sensori-motor reactions, 34, 35
- Sentiment, 13, 86, 98-102, 104-106, 172, 234, 363, 365, 374, 438, 439; ideational, 102; love, 99, 102, 390, 391; religious, 99; public, 363, 451; self-regarding, 99-103, 172, 192, 197, 370, 401
- Sentimentality, 103, 438, 439
- Sex, 44, 48, 80, 102, 251, 257, 259
- Shaftesbury, Earl of, 94
- Shame, 77, 96, 98, 101, 224, 282, 288, 458
- Shamelessness, 472
- Shand, A. E., 13, 69, 86, 88, 92-94, 104
- Sharp, F. C., 227
- Sheepishness, 101
- Sherrington, C. S., 42
- Shiftlessness, 99
- Shocking, 103
- "Showing off," 102
- Shrewdness, 99
- Shyness, 102
- Sidis, B., 310, 313, 358, 469
- Sin, 111, 278, 408
- Skepticism, 103
- Slavishness, 100
- Sleep, 276, 295, 306; see HYPNOSIS
- Slothfulness, 99
- "Slushy," 103
- Smith, T. L., 76
- Sneering, 103
- Snow, A. J., 169, 424
- Sociability, 106
- Social control, 359, 404, 405
- Social pressure, 100, 200, 241, 346 ff., 356, 362, 366, 378, 382, 403, 417
- Social service, 12, 81, 431 ff.
- Socrates, 120, 295
- "Soft," 103
- Soldiering, 276; see MALINGERING
- Solicitude, 98
- Something-for-nothing motive; see MOTIVES
- Sophisticated motives; see MOTIVES
- Sophistication, 99
- Sordidness, 101
- Sorriness, 100
- Sorrow, 88, 92, 98, 100, 102; see EMOTION
- "Sour grapes," 326 ff.
- Spencer, H., 21
- Spinoza, B. B., 389
- Spiritualism, 343
- Spitefulness, 103
- Sportsmanship, 434
- Spurning, 103
- Stampede, 334
- Stanley, H. M., 58
- Starch, D., 424

- Stekel, W., 67, 128, 150, 151, 211,
 226, 227, 242, 245, 291, 292, 369,
 464, 465
 Stinginess, 101
 Streeter, B. H., 283
 Strong, E. K., 2
 Stubbornness, 103, 209
 Subconscious; see MOTIVES
 Submission, 74, 99, 100-104; see
 SELF-ABASEMENT
 Suggestibility, 73, 311 ff., 330
 Suggestion, 62, 73, 298, 311 ff.,
 356, 357; autosuggestion, 137,
 324, 325; see MOTIVES
 Suicide, 287, 328, 391
 Sulkiness, 100
 Sullenness, 100
Summum bonum, 121, 196, 397,
 402
 Sumner, W. G.
 Superstition, 100, 315, 406, 407,
 430
 Suppression, 32, 111, 290
 Surfeit, 99, 280
 Surliness, 100
 Surplus energy, 30, 31
 Surprisingness, 93, 100, 103
 Suspiciousness, 101, 103, 220, 242
 Sutherland, A., 88, 339
 Swift, E. J., 239
 Symbolism, 148, 149, 333
 Sympathy, 73, 98, 102, 336 ff., 382,
 431 ff., 463

 Taboo, 44, 182, 251, 290, 361
 Taesch, C. F., 432
 Tarde, G., 320, 322, 338, 471
 Taste, 234, 458, 459
 Taylor, A. E., 190
 Taylor, W. S., 285
 Teamwork, 102, 434
 Telepathy, 295, 342, 343
 Temperament, 19, 40, 73, 91, 93,
 108 ff., 181, 234
 Tender emotion; see EMOTION
 Tenderness, 102

 Tennyson, Alfred, 372
 Terror, 89, 100
 Thankfulness, 101
 Thilly, F., 231
 Thrill, 76, 93, 101, 102, 111 ff.,
 280, 281
 Thorndike, E. L., 108, 135, 262
 Thurstone, L. L., 17
 Timidity, 223, 472
 Tradition, 56, 290, 313, 437, 438,
 443
 Tridon, A., 112, 217, 286
 Tropism, 25 ff., 67
 Trotter, W., 334, 348
 Trust, 99, 101
 Tsai, C., 18
 Tyranny, 100

 Umbrageousness, 103
 Unconscious; see SUBCONSCIOUS
 Uneasiness, 28 ff., 60, 69, 75
 Unhappiness, 100
 Unpleasantness, 93, 457
 Unselfishness, 98
 Untidiness, 99
 Unwillingness, 99
 Upbraiding, 103

 Vacillation, 31, 101, 180 ff., 212,
 276; see ABULIA; CHOICE;
 WILL
 Valentine, C. W., 289
 Values, XXI; see MOTIVES
 Vanity, 103, 215, 224
 Veneration, 99
 Venturesomeness, 31, 98
 Veracity, 363 ff., 403
 Verworn, Max, 23
 Vexation, 98
 Viciousness, 102
 Virtue, 402 ff.
 Voltaire, F. M. A., 279

 Wallas, G., 62, 112, 337
 Wallis, W. D., 17, 469

- Walston, Sir Charles, 470
 Walsh, W. S., 250
 Wanderlust, 75, 104
 Ward, S. B., 334
 Wariness, 99
 Warren, H. C., 42, 70, 72, 74, 88, 153, 167
 Wastefulness, 99
 Watchfulness, 99
 Watson, J. B., 2, 26, 44, 55, 67-69, 81, 88, 90, 203
 Weariness, 99.
 Wechsler, D., 84
 "We-feeling," 434, 437, 438
 Weeks, A. D., 12
 Well-being, 99
 Wernicke, C., 150
 Wheeler, R. H., 18, 141, 180
 Whitehead, H., 424
 Whiting, H. F., 283
 Wiliness, 99
 Will, X, 9, 59, 71, 303, 304; freedom of, 188; limitations of, 41, 172 ff.; province and scope of, 174 ff.; see PERSONALITY
 Winchester, C. T., 113, 459
 Wish, 167 ff.
 Wohlgemuth, A., 118
 Wolfe, A. B., 2, 366
 Wonder, 92, 94, 99, 102, 103; see CURIOSITY; EMOTION
 Woodworth, R. S., 2, 6, 12, 17, 31, 44, 60, 62, 66, 69, 70, 72, 158, 159, 165, 167, 176, 179, 248, 258, 259, 263, 264, 275, 277, 285, 286, 310, 321, 337, 341, 347, 349, 370
 Work, 77, 418 ff.
 Worry, 98
 Worship, 106, 352
 Wrathfulness, 104
 Wretchedness, 100
 Wright, H. W., 70, 115, 245, 441, 447
 Wundt, W. M., 108
 Young, P. T., 119
 Zealousness, 98
 Znaniacki, F., 8, 17



